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Virtue ethics was originally presented by its proponents as a rather special 
normative conception that was radically different from that of what was known as 
the ethics of duty.1 There were at least two important thematic lines behind this 
claim. The first concerned the way of delimiting the area of thought, behaviour 
and passions belonging to ethics2, while the second concerned questions connected 
with the nature of practical deliberation.3 
As regards the first aspect, those upholding virtue accused deontological ethics 
and utilitarianism of delimiting ethics to questions such as respect for other persons 
and their individual moral rights or the promotion of their happiness. In this 
description ethics is the combination of those institutions, rules and psychological 
dispositions that focus on how we should relate with others (with their freedoms, 
their goods, their desires) and does not directly concern the self, its needs and its 
development in its various dimensions. The proponents of virtue ethics have 
notably modified this way of delimiting the content of their area of enquiry. Ethics 
is that area of thought, behaviour and passions that concerns characters: that is to 
say, practical dispositions that involve passional and cognitive elements that 
arouse our approval and disapproval. A virtue is such, not only when it is the 
expression of our benevolent traits or those that inspire impartial behaviour, 
which are necessary for social cooperation, but also when it is the basis of those 
activities that mainly concern care of one’s self. The moral subject described by 
virtue ethics not only has benevolent traits or dispositions necessary for respecting 
the rules of group life, but also possesses other admirable qualities such as courage, 
                                           
1 For a discussion of this issue, see M. Slote, Virtue Ethics, in M. W. Baron, P. Pettit, M. Slote 
(eds.), Three Methods of Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, pp. 175-238. See also M. Slote, Morals 
from Motives, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, ch. 1. 
2 See S. Van Hooft, Understanding Virtue Ethics, Chesham, Acumen, 2006, ch. 1.  
3 See S. Van Hooft, ch.1. See also D. Statman, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, in Statman (ed.), 
Virtue Ethics. A Critical Reader, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1997, pp. 2-41 and R. 
Crisp, M. Slote, Introduction a Virtue Ethics, in R. Crisp, M. Slote (eds.), Oxford-New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 1-25. 
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prudence, steadfastness in achieving one’s goals, and the vocation to seek and 
follow one’s deepest impulses.4 
As regards the second aspect, those upholding the virtues claimed that these 
structural features modified the nature of the thinking that was in play in 
deliberative processes. It was a transition that was generally described as a change 
in the way of understanding the kind of practical questions that are at the centre 
of ethics, which is marked by the shift from the question “what should I do?” to 
“what kind of person do I want to be?” In this reconstruction virtue ethics put on 
one side what had been regarded as the perspective of modern philosophy that 
limited itself to actions and invited us to consider more complex practical problems 
as to the kind of life we should live. 
More recently, after the initial opposition between virtue ethics and 
deontological ethics and consequentialism, a new phase has begun, marked by a 
flowering of many different virtue ethics.5 Alongside new theories that offer to 
develop Aristotle’s moral philosophy we have seen various new currents that are 
working on theories of virtue elaborated in modern moral philosophy. In recent 
years, not only Aristotle, but also Hume, Kant, John Stuart Mill and Nietzsche 
have been the most frequent sources for conceptions of ethics that revolve around 
ideas of virtue and character. The interest in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue, the 
development of a Kantian ethic of character and new positions on the role of the 
emotions in Aristotelian ethics have been the basis of recent attempts by Barbara 
Herman, Marcia Baron and Rosalind Hursthouse to show important areas of 
convergence between Kantian and Aristotelian ethics. 6  Other perspectives, 
however, have shunned Aristotle’s rationalist and eudaimonistic ethics. Julia 
Driver has expressed the need to reconcile recognition of the centrality of virtue 
with a perspective that reduces the importance of moral knowledge and that 
reconstructs moral value starting from the consequences of actions.7 More recently, 
Julia Annas has formulated a virtue ethics that starts from the Aristotelian thesis 
                                           
4 B. Williams, Morality. An Introduction to Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972, 
p. 79. 
5 For a systematic discussion of this new phase, J. Oakley, Varieties of Virtue Ethics, «Ratio», 9 
(1996), pp. 128-152; S. M. Gardiner, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, Old and New, in S. M. Gardiner 
(ed.), Ithaca-London, Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 1-7. See also T. Chappell, Virtue Ethics 
in the Twentieth Century, in D. C. Russell, The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, Oxford-
New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 149-171. 
6 See B. Herman, Making Room for Character, in S. Engstrom, J. Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant, 
and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
reprinted in B. Herman, Moral Literacy, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2007, pp. 
1-28; M. Baron, Kantian Ethics, in M. Baron, P. Pettit, M. Slote (eds.), Three Methods of Ethics 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, pp. 3-91; R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford-New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
7 J. Driver, Uneasy Virtue, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
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of virtue as a practical skill.8A virtue ethics that draws on David Hume informs 
the work of Michael Slote 9  and Lorraine Besser-Jones 10 . It is a particularly 
promising conception as it combines a pluralist and sentimentalist perspective on 
the virtues with a conception of human nature centred on sympathy and on the 
self-conscious emotion of pride.11 
The essays in this collection are an expression of this second happy phase of 
contemporary thinking on the virtues. Each of them has a clear philosophical 
perspective behind it. Yet they are not presenting an abstract defence of their 
orientation, but are seeking, rather, to defend it by showing how it is best fitted to 
respond to important aspects of our moral experience or able to provide a better 
explanation of some constituent principles of human psychology. 
Lorraine Besser-Jones examines how well eudaimonistic virtue ethics is 
holding up in the light of two recent objections: the self-effacing objection, which 
claims that virtue ethics is problematic because it sets out to justify the virtues in 
a way that is not part of the motives of those acting in favour of virtue, and the 
self-centeredness objection, which claims that virtue ethics, at least in its 
eudaimonistic version, expresses a selfish conception of ethics that does not take 
account of the other regarding passions that make up a central aspect of moral 
theory and of our shared ethical experience. Through an extensive discussion of 
the interdependent nature of the self, Besser-Joness shows how these objections are 
effective only in the false hypothesis that the self is egoistic. On the contrary, a 
virtue ethics that takes on board a relational conception of the self, supported, 
moreover, by influential research carried out by empirical psychology, can defend 
a version of eudemonics that is immune from these criticisms. 
The essays by Gopal Sreenivasan and Julia Driver both discuss the theme of 
moral deference. More precisely, they examine the situations in which a moral 
agent defers to a so-called moral expert in ways that leads us to consider him as an 
agent that falls short of our ideal of moral agency. Using various arguments, these 
essays show that though moral deference is a less than perfect outcome from the 
point of view of agency, this does not constitute a proof that the agent is not 
virtuous or, more precisely, that she does not possess that specific virtue on which 
she is asking advice of the expert. As Driver observes, what matters in these cases 
                                           
8 See J. Annas, Intelligent Virtue, Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
9 M. Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, London, Routledge, 2007and Moral Sentimentalism, 
Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2009. 
10 L. Besser-Jones, Eudaimonic Ethics: The Philosophy and Psychology of Living Well, New York, 
Routledge, 2014. 
11See J. Taylor, Moral Sentiment and the Sources of Moral Identity, in C. Bagnoli (ed.), Morality 
and the Emotions, Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 257-274. See also D. 
Hart, M K. Matsuba, The Development of Pride and Moral Life, in J. L. Tracy, R. W. Robins, & 
J. P. Tangney (eds.), The Self-Conscious Emotions. Theory and Research, New York – London, 
The Guilford Press, 2007, pp. 114-133. 
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is that the agent is properly oriented in performing the action: that is, that the 
agent is responding to moral reasons although she may not be able to perceive 
them as such. The two essays, and particularly Sreenivasan’s, also show how 
virtue ethics, especially his version, which rejects the Aristotelian thesis of the 
unity of virtuous traits, has a greater chance of grasping this fundamental aspect 
of our everyday moral experience. 
The theme of the limits of moral understanding, considered in the framework 
of feminist ethics, is again present in Caterina Botti’s essay. Using a complex and 
eclectic method of enquiry, which draws on psychology as well as philosophy, 
Botti underlines that, though the relations between human beings are fact of 
human life that cannot be by-passed, they are marked by a constituent opacity. In 
her contribution, Botti explores the effects of this epistemological thesis on how to 
describe the virtues at the centre of the ethics of care. On the one hand, care 
cannot be based merely on the spontaneous exercise of compassionate inclinations, 
but will presuppose the cultivation of our imaginative resources, our receptiveness 
and out attention, which bring better understanding of the characteristic, 
distinctive aspects of specific care situations. On the other, Botti’s perspective 
brings out how the effort to understand others meets a limit, a threshold beyond 
which the other is not knowable. According to Botti, our willingness to care must 
therefore be associated with the virtue of humility, a trait that expresses our 
awareness that our cognitive resources are limited and imperfect. 
In continuity with his most recent works on care and moral sentimentalism, 
Michael Slote investigates the psychological causes of our altruistic inclinations. 
After distinguishing empathy – the psychological mechanism by which human 
beings and animals communicate their passions and opinions to each other – from 
sympathy, which is a term that identifies the active psychological principle that 
leads us to take care of others, Slote claims that there is a fundamental connection 
between these two psychological principles: empathy motivates sympathy. Slote’s 
enquiry offers to give a new and original explanation of this tie. Unlike 
psychologists such as Gregory Batson, Nancy Eisemberg and Martin Hoffman, 
Slote claims that the relation between empathy and sympathy/altruism is not an 
empirical, but a conceptual question. In this essay, Slote develops in particular 
Elizabeth Anscombe’s well-known thesis on the conditions of intelligibility of some 
desires. Following the structure of Anscombe’s argument, Slote claims that 
empathy constitutes a condition of intelligibility of our benevolent desires. Slote’s 
intention, with this explanation, is to provide an important argument in favour of 
a sentimentalist conception of the virtues. Slote shows that a perspective that 
appeals to David Hume’s teaching and that regards the mechanism of empathy as 
a constituent element of human nature can give a full account of that part of the 
virtues that coincides with the benevolent traits of character. 
Julia Annas and Sophie-Grace Chappell examine the continuing relevance of 
Aristolelian ethics. Annas discusses the inexplicably neglected topic of the nature 
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of vice, while Chappell deals with the question of the method, or methods, for 
determining the list of the virtues. 
In Annas’ contribution, an examination of our everyday moral experience 
reveals, in her view, the soundness of Aristotle’s analysis of this concept. Like 
virtue, vice too can be regarded as an internally unconflicted state of character. 
More precisely, just as the virtuous person, unlike the enkratic person, succeeds in 
doing the right thing without having to combat contrary motivation in order to do 
so, in the same way the vicious person is one who does not posses virtuous motives 
without feeling any regret for this lack. Secondly, Annas convincingly shows that 
vice, like virtue, is a psychological state that cannot be explained except as the 
result of a particular kind of upbringing. As a stable state of character, vice should 
be learnable in a way that virtue is learnable. According to Annas, the difference 
between these two states of character can be explained if we use the metaphor of a 
skill. Annas claims that every skill has its own intrinsic standard that concerns the 
acquisition of goods that are in some way intrinsic to that skill and that need to be 
pursued for themselves. Annas’ thesis is that though the vicious agent, unlike the 
virtuous one, can learn the skill, she will no longer be able to satisfy their 
standards. As she does not consider the goods internal to the skill to be pursued for 
their own sake, the vicious person merely acquires the skill because she considers it 
a means for pursuing other purposes. 
In her fascinating contribution, Chappell reflects on the methods for 
identifying the virtues within a certain community. Chappell is impatient with 
Foot’s ethical naturalism and, more generally, with every form of foundationalism 
that claims to derive admirable character traits starting from a morally neutral 
description of the excellent exercise of human faculties. Following this approach, 
Chappell proposes a cautious and piecemeal methodology that brings together 
three different suggestions: a non-finalistic conception of Aristoelian eudaimonistic 
ethics, McIntyre’s argument about the virtuous traits necessary for the successful 
pursuit of human practices, and the aesthetic and emulative value of the living 
exemplars of a given virtue. 
My aim was to assemble a cornucopia of varied current issues in virtue ethics. 
Yet, as is probably already evident from this preface, it is easy to identify some 
recurrent themes. For example, in their different ways the essays by Gopal 
Sreenivasan, Julia Driver and Caterina Botti all give attention to the issue of 
moral epistemology. Julia Annas and Sophie-Grace Chappell have a common 
interest in Aristotle’s legacy to contemporary virtue ethics. The notion of the 
social and empathic agent runs through the papers by Lorraine Besser-Jones and 
Michael Slote. And, taken as a whole, they show the endless fascination of virtue 
ethics. 
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ABSTRACT 
Empathy and helping motives are more closely connected than philosophers and 
psychologists have realized. Empathy doesn’t just cause sympathetic concern for others, but 
is conceptually tied to it. When we empathize with someone’s distress at their pain, we 
ourselves are distressed by that pain and that in itself necessarily constitutes a motive to rid 
them of that pain. But helping motives like compassion or concern for others can be shown to 
be conceptually impossible in the absence of empathy. Compassion as a feeling and 
compassion as a motive are thus inseparable from one another, and this then lets the Chinese 
complementarity of yin and yang enter the picture. Yin can be viewed as a kind of 
receptivity, and compassion as a feeling instantiates such receptivity; but compassion as a 
motive instantiates yang conceived along somewhat traditional lines as a form of strong 
purposiveness. If moral sentimentalism is on the right track, then the motives and feelings it 
views as foundational to normative morality turn out to instantiate yin and yang conceived in 
traditional terms as an indissoluble complementarity. Moral sentimentalism properly pursued 
allows East to meet West in the field of ethics and possibly in other areas of philosophy as 
well.  
 
KEYWORDS 
Empathy, compassion, Yin and Yang, receptivity, strength, complementarity, sympathy, 
moral sentimentalism. 
 
1 
I have written a great deal in defense of a sentimentalist form of virtue ethics in 
recent years, and like David Hume, my work has placed a great emphasis on 
empathy (Hume didn’t have the word “empathy” but often spoke of what we 
mean by empathy using the term “sympathy”). I have argued that empathy not 
only motivates us to help others (and even to conform to deontological side-
constraints and the moral demands of respect and justice), but actually gives us 
a criterion for distinguishing right from wrong across the complete spectrum of 
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possible cases.1 But this is not the place to repeat those arguments. I have also 
defended the role of empathy in the making of moral judgments (though 
somewhat differently from the way Hume advocated such a role), but, again, 
this is not the place for me to try to recapitulate all that I have said in that 
direction.  
So what am I going to do here? Well, as I said just above, my view 
subscribes to and depends on the motivating force of empathy, but until very 
recently I think I had a somewhat distorted view of how empathy motivates 
altruistic behavior or just plain sympathy with the plight of others; a distorted 
view, however, that I shared with some of the most significant psychologists 
who have written about empathy. Martin Hoffman, Nancy Eisenberg, C. D. 
Batson, and I myself (following their lead) have long believed that the relation 
between empathy and sympathy/altruism is an empirical issue, that human 
sympathy and altruism develop as a result of developing empathy and that this 
is an entirely contingent matter that we have to learn about from the science of 
psychology (or personal observation).2 But I now think we have all been 
mistaken about this. I therefore propose, initially, to tell you why I think we 
have been confused on this subject, and this conclusion will prepare us for the 
main topic of the present essay, the question whether there can be such a thing 
as altruism/sympathy independently of empathy. If there can’t be such a thing, 
if such a thing turns out to be unintelligible, then the case for a sentimentalist 
account of morality will have been considerably strengthened. 
2 
Let’s first talk about terminology. Most of us don’t find it very difficult 
nowadays to distinguish between empathy and sympathy. When Bill Clinton 
said “I feel your pain,” he was talking about what we now call empathy, and 
sympathy, by contrast, simply means a desire to see someone’s lot in life or 
present condition improved. And (though this is a point that hasn’t, I believe, 
been made in the philosophical or psychological literature) sympathy can be said 
to be a kind of minimum level of benevolence and of altruism/altruistic 
motivation more generally. A benevolent and altruistic person wants to help 
                                           
1 See my Moral Sentimentalism, Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
2 See M. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000; N. Eisenberg, The Caring Child, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992; C. D. 
Batson, Altruism in Humans, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011; and my own Moral 
Sentimentalism. 
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another person, and sympathy may just be expressed in the desire to see the 
other person helped (by someone, not necessarily oneself). But I don’t think one 
can actually count as sympathetic in this latter sense or way unless there is 
something one would oneself do to help the other person. If one wouldn’t help the 
other person even if it was incredibly easy to do so, then any expression of 
sympathy would have to be considered hypocritical, “crocodile” sympathy. (I 
am reminded of Doctor Johnson’s complaint about people who just “pay you 
with feeling.”) But having made these points we still have a seeming conceptual 
divide: between empathy, on the one hand, and sympathy/compassion/ 
/benevolence/altruism, on the other. And I think that in the most important 
sense or way, this divide is actually illusory. Empathy’s connection with 
sympathy, benevolence, compassion, caring, etc., is conceptual, not empirical. 
However, to make this point I first have to distinguish, as many 
philosophers and psychologists nowadays do, between two kinds of empathy. 
There is projective empathy, which involves putting oneself into the shoes or the 
head of another person (or animal), and then there is what is variously called 
associative, receptive, or emotional empathy, which occurs when we are 
invaded, so to speak, by the feelings or attitudes of another person. This is the 
kind of empathy Hume mainly spoke of using the term “sympathy,” and it is 
the kind that plays the most central role in my own approach to virtue ethics 
and that, as I now think, is conceptually tied to sympathy, etc. Empathy in 
some of its embodiments depends on a certain degree or amount of conceptual 
and cognitive sophistication. A child of four cannot empathize with the 
sufferings of the people in another country the way an adolescent or adult can, 
because they simply lack the requisite concepts. And when a father is infected 
by his daughter’s enthusiasm for stamp collecting, this too requires the father to 
know something about stamps, about collecting, and about his daughter. But 
the empathic infection occurs without the father consciously willing for that to 
happen, so we are talking here, not of the projective kind of empathy, but of the 
associative emotional kind. 
And notice one thing. The father who is infected or, to switch metaphors, 
who takes in his daughter’s enthusiasm by a kind of empathic osmosis, doesn’t 
merely become enthusiastic in an unspecific or vague way. The enthusiasm has 
the same intentional object as his daughter’s, namely, stamp collecting. (There is 
some ambiguity or leeway here as to whether he starts wanting to help her 
collect stamps or starts wanting to collect for himself or both.) In other words, 
receptive or associative empathy takes in an attitude, motive, or feeling with its 
intentional object, and this is something that Hume seems to have recognized 
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when he pointed out in the Treatise of Human Nature that we humans have a 
strong tendency to take in the attitudes of those around us. Thus if my parents 
love Winston Churchill (mine did), one can and will, without knowing it, take in 
that attitude, but the attitude taken in isn’t just some generalized or vague form 
of positive feeling: it is positive feeling directed toward Churchill as its intention 
object.  
 These observations give us all we need to show that there is a conceptual, 
not a mere empirical, connection between the emotional or associative kind of 
empathy, on the one hand, and sympathetic, benevolent, altruistic, and/or 
compassionate motivation, on the other. If someone feels pain and is distressed 
about it, then they automatically, ex vi termini, count as motivated to alleviate 
that pain. That’s just what distress means. But then consider someone who 
empathizes with, who empathically takes in, the other person’s distress at their 
pain. This means feeling distressed oneself about their pain, and, again ex vi 
termini, this constitutes motivation to alleviate that person’s pain. Which is 
what we mean by altruistic or benevolent motivation. So on strictly conceptual 
grounds empathy involves sympathy with and motivation to help another 
person. (Of course, the motivation may not issue in action if stronger contrary 
motives are also in play in the given situation.) 
However, those who accept the above argument often have an interesting 
way of (in effect) resisting its force and implications. They say (at talks I have 
given) that even if empathy entails sympathy on the grounds I mention, there 
still might be such a thing as sympathy without empathy. And till very recently 
I haven’t known how to answer them. I have tended to grant that there might 
in principle be such a thing as sympathy and benevolence without empathy in 
(extraterrestrial) species other than our own and have usually just insisted that 
in the human case, there is no such thing as sympathy or benevolence without a 
developed capacity for empathy. But now I think the case can be made stronger, 
that sympathy is conceptually impossible in the absence of empathy, and the 
very title of the present essay gestures allusively in the direction of the kind of 
argument I am now prepared to offer for that conclusion.  
 
3 
In her famous book Intention, published in 1957, Elizabeth Anscombe made a 
conceptual point that very much bears remembering.3 She argued (roughly) that 
                                           
3 G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957, p. 70 and passim. 
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certain desires don’t in fact make any sense, that if someone claimed to desire a 
saucer of mud, we couldn’t attach any sense to what they were saying unless 
they went on to suggest some intelligible reason why they wanted this: e. g., 
someone had told them they would give them a lot of money if they gave them a 
saucer of mud, or they needed the mud for a beautifying facial, or some such. 
The point is well taken; it makes no sense to suppose that someone just wants a 
saucer of mud and has no further reason for this desire beyond the simple desire 
itself. But how exactly does this bear on the topic of the present essay? 
Well, I think it bears immediately and, I hope, decisively. Those who 
questioned whether sympathy needs to be underlain by empathy were saying 
that one might just be sympathetic or benevolent without there being any 
further basis for that motivation, that such motivation might, for example, be 
simply instinctual. But I now think this is a mistake, a conceptual mistake, and 
my reason for thinking so partly comes from Anscombe’s earlier example. 
Though the matter is far from as obvious as what we (with benefit of hindsight) 
can say about the desire for a saucer of mud, I think, I now think, we in fact 
can’t make sense of there being benevolence or sympathy lacking any further 
basis or reason for the benevolence or sympathy. 
However, in order to show you this, I think I need to begin by making use of 
a maneuver that Bishop Butler used to very good effect in his Sermons from the 
Rolls Chapel. Butler wanted to show that people are capable of altruism, but he 
recognized a certain difficulty standing between himself and that goal: the fact 
that people know that helping others can be a very rewarding and even 
pleasurable experience and are inclined to conclude that we sympathetically 
help others for egoistic, rather than altruistic, reasons. (There is some evidence 
that even Kant was taken in by this kind of thinking.) So Butler, rather 
ingeniously, changed the subject from benevolence and altruism to malice and 
revenge. He pointed out that the person who feels malice toward another may 
get pleasure from hurting them, but also typically risks his or her own happiness 
and comfort in their effort to do dirt to the person they hate. Hurting the person 
is their goal, and the only pleasure they get in this connection is from the fact, 
when it is a fact, that that goal is (thought to be) achieved. And this is 
something it is fairly easy for us to recognize. But once we see the case for 
regarding malice and revenge as non-egoistic motives, it is easy or easier to see 
that an analogous case can be made for regarding benevolent action and 
motivation as non-egoistic. And I propose to use a similar maneuver to deal with 
the issue of whether sympathy and benevolence can ever be sheer and basic. To 
help us with that issue, it will be useful to focus on the opposite of these feelings, 
Saucers of Mud: Why Sympathy and Altruism Require Empathy 
17 
on malice and the desire for revenge, the very feelings or motives that proved so 
useful to Butler’s purposes. 
Now no one could think that (the desire for) revenge could exist all on its 
own: revenge is always based on some offense or injury, imagined or otherwise. 
But this then contrasts, or seems to contrast, with malice (or malevolence). The 
Shakespearean critic A. C. Bradley once described Iago as having felt 
“motiveless malignity” toward Othello, and though this may not be entirely 
accurate to the play (Othello had passed over Iago for promotion at the time the 
play Othello begins), the idea of motiveless malignity doesn’t seem a 
contradiction in terms the way the idea of motiveless revenge does. However, I 
still think we should be suspicious about the notion of motiveless malignity. 
When we think of the malice that actually exists among or in humans, there 
always seems to be an element of revenge or some other deeper motivation for 
the malice. Iago bore malice toward Othello, but also had a motive of revenge 
against Othello, and just think about it. When you and I feel hatred toward 
someone, don’t we always think we have a basis or justification for feeling the 
way we do? Even the paranoid schizophrenic who deliberately injures others 
imagines that the others are out to get him or have done him dirt in the past, 
and so their malice and hatred toward others doesn’t, in psychological terms, 
stand on its own.  
But perhaps the psychopath raises a problem here. Some (but I don’t think 
all) psychopaths have hereditary or congenital brain lesions or abnormalities. 
And many such psychopaths seem to want to hurt or harm others even if this in 
no way advances or promotes their own well-being. May such psychopaths not 
demonstrate the sheer malice that I am saying is conceptually impossible? Well, 
I am not sure. But I don’t think we should rush too quickly toward classifying 
such people as having motiveless malignity. Perhaps, for example, their 
brain/neurological deficiencies make them paranoid like some schizophrenics, 
which would undercut the claim that there is nothing motivating or behind their 
malice toward so many others. Alternatively, their brain abnormalities or earlier 
psychological/sexual abuse may make it harder for them to control or moderate 
their anger when unpleasant things occur or are done to them, and this may 
make them angry at the world in a way most of us aren’t. But once again, such 
anger and the malice that embodies it are not unmotivated or lacking in 
intelligible psychological grounding. So at the very least I am inclined to say the 
following. 
Aside from bizarre cases like psychopathy that we don’t yet perhaps know 
enough about to characterize properly in moral-psychological terms, the idea of 
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motiveless malice doesn’t make a lot of sense. To say of someone “he just hates 
people, and there is absolutely no reason why he does” seems to me to be saying 
something quite difficult to make sense of. And in that respect I think the case is 
similar to Anscombe’s example. The simple desire for a saucer of mud is not 
something we can readily understand, and I say the same about the simple 
desire to hurt people, sheer malice. And if one can always wonder whether the 
neurologically damaged psychopath might not have a basic and unaccountable-
for hatred of others, one can wonder too whether such a psychopath or someone 
else with a brain abnormality might not just have an unaccountable-for desire 
for mud. If we can’t rule the former out, how can we rule out the latter? But, 
turning the tables, might we not rather conclude that it is as difficult to make 
sense of the idea that brain malfunctioning might make us hate people for no 
psychologically operative reason as it is to make sense of the idea that such 
malfunctioning might make someone desire saucers of mud for no other reason 
than that desire itself. Every case of malice we are actually aware of seems to 
have some psychological basis other than the malice itself, and I can see no 
reason to think that any possible or conceivable malice could really be 
otherwise.  
But then this argument transposes to benevolence, sympathy, and altruism. 
If the idea of sheer raw malice makes no genuine sense, why should the idea of 
sheer raw benevolence make any more sense? Of course, we are aware of our 
sympathy for others more vividly and/or self-consciously than we are of the 
(potential) empathy or empathic transmission of feeling that I say underlies 
sympathy. But this is an epistemic matter, not a causal or ontological one. Even 
if we typically know sympathy before we know empathy, it doesn’t follow that 
the former can exist without the latter. We may also know our own desire for 
revenge more vividly and immediately than we know the cause of that desire, 
but the former still depends for its existence on the latter. And similarly for lots 
and lots of other cases where the ordo essendi and the ordo cognoscendi proceed in 
opposite directions. We run into difficulties when we prescind from issues of 
knowability and just try to imagine malice with no psychological cause, and the 
case of benevolence/sympathy seems analogous. Imagine someone who is in 
trouble and someone who has sympathy for their plight. Doesn’t there have to 
be something that gets them to be or makes them sympathetic with the other 
person’s trouble? After all, a psychopath can recognize that someone is in 
trouble and feel no sympathy whatever for them, so the sheer recognition of 
another’s trouble doesn’t automatically arouse the sympathy of a bystander or 
onlooker. And in parallel doesn’t there have to be something in, something 
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about, the onlooker that leads them to feel sympathetic? The idea that someone 
might just automatically want another person’s suffering isn’t a very clear one, 
and the idea that someone might just automatically want another person to 
escape a difficult situation isn’t a very clear one either. 
Now in the case of the psychopath, there is something missing, something 
which, if present, would allow and account for their sympathetic motivation 
toward someone who is suffering or in trouble. And the missing element or 
ingredient is, of course, empathy. As we have seen, empathy is a mechanism 
that converts distress on one person’s part to similarly-directed distress on the 
part of another person, and this yields or constitutes altruistic motivation and 
sympathy on the part of the person to whom the distress is conveyed. (This can 
happen with some non-human animals as well.) In such a case, we can 
understand, and understand very well, how altruism and sympathy can arise. 
But if we don’t posit empathy, then the motivation behind or for altruism seems 
difficult or impossible to fathom. And that is just what I am saying.  
Now the reader may want to reply at this point that I am forgetting how 
easy it sometimes is to feel sympathetic concern in the absence of empathy. If 
(to take a famous example from Confucian thought) a child is about to fall into a 
well, can’t one feel concern and act on that concern even if the child doesn’t see 
their own danger and there is therefore no distressed state of the child to 
empathically latch onto? Yes, all of this is possible, but it only constitutes an 
objection to what I am saying about sympathy and altruism, if empathy 
exclusively takes in actual psychological states, and that assumption is far too 
limiting. It is possible to empathize with the distress, and suffering one knows 
someone will have if one does or doesn’t do something, and in the case of the 
child about to fall into a well, the observer can have a quite vivid sense of what 
the child will feel and suffer once they have fallen into the well. Sympathetic, 
caring, altruistic adults are capable of feeling empathy with what can or will 
happen to or in another person (the psychology literature on empathy discusses 
this possibility), and so in the kind of normal case of helping motivation the 
reader may have worried about, both empathy and sympathy are present.  
 In the end, therefore, I think sympathy and altruism without empathy are 
very much like a basic desire for a saucer of mud: something we really can’t 
understand. And at this point this comparison shouldn’t perhaps be so 
surprising. If desire has intelligibility conditions and cannot attach to some 
intentional object independently of those conditions, then sympathy and 
altruism, which involve specific (and positive) forms of intentionally directed 
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desire, may have their own intelligibility conditions; and can one think of a 
better candidate for such a condition than empathy? 
 
4 
 
In the light of the above, we might want now to consider the more general 
question whether empathy is necessary to any and every sort of moral 
helpfulness toward others. Sympathy and benevolence as I have been describing 
them don’t rest on any specifically moral or ethical thinking (this is another 
aspect of their naturalness in Hume’s sense of the term). When I benevolently 
help another person, I needn’t be thinking that this is my moral duty or that it 
would be a virtuous thing for me to do—I may simply be impelled by my sense 
of what the other is suffering and my empathy for their state of mind. But in 
describing things in these terms, I have remained pretty much entirely within 
the sentimentalist moral tradition that derives from Hutcheson and Hume. 
Rationalists have other ways of justifying and explaining the motivation behind 
actions that seek to promote the well-being of others, and it would be interesting 
to consider whether any of them allows coherently for beneficent actions based 
on something other than benevolence, compassion, empathy, or (psychological) 
altruism. 
Kant seems, for example, to have thought that our rationality (or rational 
freedom) as such can lead us to help others. According to Kant, reason grounds 
the Categorical Imperative, and one of the duties that follow out of the 
Categorical Imperative is the (imperfect) duty to promote the welfare of others. 
But, in addition, Kant thinks pure reason not only grounds this obligation but 
makes it have a certain motivational force with us. However, rather than try to 
tease out Kant’s reasons for saying all this, I would rather talk about some 
recent ethical rationalists who I believe make the case for Kant’s conclusions 
easier to understand than Kant himself does. Let’s see if some more recent 
rationalist approach allows for helping motivation independently of an appeal to 
empathy. 
I think John McDowell has made the overall best case, in rationalist or 
cognitivist terms, for the idea that empathy isn’t necessary to helping 
motivation. In his “Virtue and Reason” he argues (roughly) that if someone 
isn’t motivated to help someone in dire need or distress, that can only be because 
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they don’t fully appreciate what the other person is going through.4 A 
thoroughgoing apprehension of relevant facts can be automatically motivating, 
and in such cases, McDowell argues, the cognitive and the motivational are 
inextricably bound together—they can’t even be conceptually prized apart. 
Now McDowell’s view and others like it have been criticized as “queer” for tying 
the cognitive and the motivational so tightly together. But I am not going to 
object to this aspect of what McDowell is committed to. I can think of many 
cases where it seems plausible to suppose that cognition and motivation are 
inseparable and have discussed the matter at great length in my book A 
Sentimentalist Theory of the Mind.5 My objection to McDowell’s 
cognitivism/rationalism will come at his views from a somewhat different 
direction. We need to go back to the case of psychopaths. 
What prevents a psychopath from fully appreciating how bad or painful it is 
or would be for one of his (potential) victims and being motivated to help them 
(or not hurt them in the first place)? Psychopaths are famous for being able to 
“get into the heads” of their potential victims (this presumably is projective 
empathy), so how can the rationalist like (the early) McDowell say that their 
lack of appropriate motivation is due to their lack of appreciation of relevant 
facts, to their not seeing certain facts as salient in the way a moral person 
would? Well, let me suggest that empathy may make the difference here and 
may be (part of) the only possible explanation of the difference of motivation 
between a psychopath and a moral person. Psychopaths may be able to get into 
the heads of other people, but they characteristically lack the ability or 
tendency to empathically feel what others feel. So if the psychopath fails to 
appreciate certain facts about another’s need or suffering, fails to see those facts 
as salient in a way that would motivate them to help, that may be precisely 
                                           
4 McDowell, “Virtue and Reason” in R. Crisp and M. Slote eds., Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997. Incidentally, if someone argues against the analogy between 
malevolence/malice and benevolence that I have been making use of on the grounds that 
benevolence seeks to bring about something impartially good, the flourishing of other human 
beings, and malice seeks to bring about something bad, their suffering or faring poorly, they 
have actually given the game away. If benevolence is based in the thought of the goodness of 
what it seeks to bring about, then it isn’t the sheer desire for the welfare of another, but 
rather anchors itself in a conception of what is good in itself. So this sort of objection does 
nothing to show that sheer benevolence, the sheer desire for the welfare or happiness/non-
suffering of another, makes sense.  
5 M. Slote, A Sentimentalist Theory of the Mind, Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014. 
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because they lack (associative or emotional) empathy. It would then turn out 
that the lack of empathy makes it impossible for the psychopath to fully 
apprehend the suffering of others and to be motivated on that basis to help 
rather than hurt them. So McDowell’s purely rationalist/cognitivist route 
toward motivating helping behavior seems blocked, and once again we need 
empathy in order for such helping morally good behavior to occur.  
Is there any other possible way for the rationalist to argue that empathy 
isn’t necessary to the kind of helping motives that morality (at least in part) 
depends on? Well, let me mention one other possibility. In What We Owe to Each 
Other, T. M. Scanlon argues that people have reasons for action and belief, that 
they can recognize such reasons, and that the reasons are capable all on their 
own of motivating actions or beliefs.6 For Scanlon, the notion of a reason is not 
reducible to any naturalistic notion, but can in any event be seen as equivalent 
to the idea that a given consideration favors a certain belief or action. Scanlon 
holds that many of us think we have reason to help others, and on his view the 
fact that it appears to one that one has a reason to help someone can on its own 
motivate one to help that person. But such a rationalistic view of moral or 
altruistic motivation (Scanlon is not talking about a “natural virtue” of 
benevolence here) makes no mention of empathy or of any need for empathy in 
order for the appropriate helping motivation to occur and eventuate in actual 
helping, and it is worth considering whether in fact Scanlon’s view can 
coherently avoid any appeal to empathy in the way it seems committed to 
doing. 
I think that, as with McDowell’s views, the psychopath represents a 
stumbling block for Scanlon’s rationalistic views. One thing seems clear: even if 
there appear to some of us to be reasons to help others, such appearances don’t 
occur to the psychopath. It doesn’t seem to him or her that he or she has reason 
to help rather than hurt the person they want to victimize. (I am leaving aside 
cases where the psychopath has an egoistic and ulterior motive for wanting to 
help some other person.) And the best and most obvious explanation of why the 
psychopath doesn’t seem to see any reason to help is that they lack the kind of 
empathy with others that involves feeling what others feel. In that case, 
empathy and the capacity for empathy seem to make the difference between the 
psychopath and those of us to whom there appear to be reasons to help others, 
and so again, as with McDowell, the rationalist account that Scanlon gives of 
helping motivation seems essentially incomplete. The sentimental factor of 
                                           
6 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
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empathy has to be brought into any full picture of the phenomena here, and so I 
am inclined to conclude that any non-egoistic motivation to help others depends 
on empathy. Not only do the so-called natural virtues of sympathy, 
benevolence, and compassion require empathy, but empathy has to be brought 
into any possible account of non-egoistic morally mandated or desirable helping 
motivation. 
But let me now mention one final way in which someone might want to 
claim that the latter sort of motivation might be explained without bringing in 
empathy. It could be said (this is the sort of thing Kant says) that the 
conscientious desire to do one’s duty can motivate someone who thinks it is their 
duty to promote the welfare of others to actually help other people, and it is 
surely far from obvious that the desire to do one’s duty and the recognition or 
belief that one has a duty to help others require empathy. There are in fact two 
ways one might go about answering this possible objection, one more critical, 
one more positive. The critical route will tell us to focus once again on the 
psychopath and ask why such people lack the desire to do their duty (and are 
incapable of guilt for moral failures). Surely, the absence of empathy will be part 
of the most plausible answer, and in that case one cannot invoke the 
conscientious desire to do one’s duty as motivating helping behavior without 
implicitly assuming that the person with such a desire is capable of empathy.7 
But there is also a more positive way of answering the present objection to what 
I have been saying here. The objection effectively assumes that we can have 
moral concepts without having empathy, but many of us hold that psychopaths 
are like the congenitally blind. The latter lack full color concepts even if they 
eventually can tell you that grass is green and blood red. And by the same token 
one might say that psychopaths don’t really understand what terms like “right” 
and “wrong” mean even if they learn (for adaptive social reasons) to be able to 
tell people that stealing and killing are wrong.  
But even if there is some initial tendency nowadays to think that 
psychopaths lack full moral concepts, can this view of them be supported in 
some more definite or positive way? Well, I think it can be, but that is a very 
long story. In my book Moral Sentimentalism, I argue—to some extent following 
Hume—that our second-order empathic experience of being warmed by the first 
order empathic warmth some agent displays toward some third party (e. g., 
                                           
7 Terminologically, the desire to fulfill one’s duty to promote the welfare of others can be 
regarded as a form of altruism even if it isn’t thought to be based on empathy, but I am using 
the term “altruism” more narrowly as a catch-all for all and only natural (in Hume’s sense) 
helping motives. 
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their friend or sibling) serves to fix the reference of the term “morally good” for 
us; and I argue that the way cold-heartedness empathically chills us helps fix 
the reference of “morally wrong” in a similar fashion. This is not the place to 
repeat the earlier arguments. But if the ideas just mentioned are on the right 
track, they serve to explain why psychopaths are like blind people with respect 
to the relevant concepts. Their lack of associative/emotional empathy undercuts 
their ability to fix the reference of moral terms in the way I believe is essential to 
the meaning, to a proper semantics, of moral language. 
All in all, then, I don’t think we can have beneficent or helping moral 
motivation in the absence of empathy. This goes well beyond anything I or 
anyone else has previously said about the moral role of empathy, and it moves 
us toward the conclusion that empathy is probably the most significant factor in 
the moral life. 
 
5 
 
Conceptual/philosophical speculation is a very risky business, and I have been 
doing quite a lot of that here. But in this concluding section, I would like to 
speculate further and in a new direction. Let’s say that the above discussion 
supports the idea of an inextricable connection between empathy, on the one 
hand, and sympathy, benevolence, etc., on the other. One can’t have either one 
of them without the other. But consider how this relates to the fact that we 
think of sympathy, benevolence, compassion, and the like both as feelings and 
as motives. The above argument shows or seeks to show that the feeling side of, 
say, compassion is irrecusably tied up with the motivational side, and this in 
and of itself seems to me to be an interesting result. It can seem strange (it 
always has to me) that compassion is considered to be both a feeling and a 
motive, and the argument I have given helps explain how that can make sense. 
If the empathy/feeling side of compassion and the motivational side of 
compassion cannot be separated, then one can see how it makes sense to hold, as 
common sense does, that compassion is a feeling and also a motive. And exactly 
the same points can be made about benevolence, caring, and sympathy. 
But now I want to make what will seem to most of you like an incredible 
leap of topic. I think what I have just been saying offers a philosophical 
foothold for the ancient Chinese complementarity of yin and yang, and if that is 
the case, moral sentimentalism illustrates some themes that go beyond Western 
culture. Now yin and yang are nowadays not thought to be serious topics for 
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philosophical thinking—even by the Chinese. Like us Westerners they are 
accustomed to various popularizations of yin and yang—as with macrobiotic 
diets; and they are aware, as most of us Westerners are not, of how ancient 
yin/yang explanations of physical phenomena (e. g., of how sunlight 
differentially affects the two sides of a hill) have had to yield to more 
quantitative and mathematical explanations of such phenomena of the sort that 
are the mainstay of (elementary) modern physics. But despite these problems or 
limitations, I think suitably updated notions of yin and yang can be useful for 
present-day philosophical purposes, and I am going to try to persuade you of 
that here and now.  
What do I mean by updated versions or notions of yin and yang? In a recent 
article, I have argued that we can make the most ethical sense of yin and yang 
via the Western notions of receptivity and active/rational control.8 Yin is often 
equated with passivity and often with pliancy or pliability, but it is also often 
equated with receptivity (there is no term in Chinese for “receptivity” and “yin” 
may be the closest that language comes to our notion of receptivity). And I 
think that, unlike passivity and pliability, receptivity is a positive and broadly 
valued quality that, equated with yin, can be counterbalanced with or against 
the quality I am proposing to equate with yang, the quality (and notion) of 
active/rational control. 
I have argued elsewhere that Western philosophy has tended to emphasize 
active/rational control at the expense of the value and virtue of receptivity, but 
the point then is that we need and need to value both active/rational control and 
receptivity in our lives and thought. And I think these two qualities can be 
viewed as necessary complements in the moral or ethical life. Again, I have 
made the arguments for this conclusion elsewhere.9 But for present purposes and 
given what was argued earlier, something very interesting (I think) follows if we 
conceive yin and yang in this updated philosophical way. When we empathize 
with the distress of someone who is in pain, we are receptive to them in a way 
the psychopath never is with anyone. And when we ipso facto are then 
motivated to help (remember, though, that this doesn’t mean we actually will 
help—other motivational factors may override our compassion), we are 
motivated to actively do something effective as a means to alleviating the pain 
of the other person; and this motivation to help shows us as active and 
                                           
8 See my “Updating Yin and Yang”, in Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 12 (3): 271-
282 (2013). 
9 See my From Enlightenment to Receptivity: Rethinking Our Values, Oxford – New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013.  
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interested in exerting control over what will happen to the other person. 
(Rationality comes in because if one doesn’t, cognitively, seek to find or learn 
about the best means to help the other, the fact of compassion is criterially 
challenged or undercut; one doesn’t count as compassionate if one is slapdash 
about finding proper means to helping the other person.) 
So I am saying that compassion, benevolence, and the like have the yin 
quality of receptive feeling and the yang quality of desiring actively to help in a 
specific way—they have both of these at the same time and, as I have been 
arguing, each aspect is inseparable from the other. And this gives yin and yang a 
deeper, further foothold in our discussion because that complementarity is 
traditionally viewed involving just such an inextricable or irrecusable 
relationship. The traditional symbol of yin and yang depicts yin with a small 
circle of yang in it and yang with a small circle of yin in it, and this is one way to 
symbolize the ancient view that yin and yang is a necessary complementarity, 
that yin and yang are really yin/yang.  
But the present discussion gives these ancient and philosophically somewhat 
vague (and suspect) notions a particular and definite embodiment. If you can’t 
have compassion as feeling without compassion as motivation and vice versa, 
then you can’t have a certain sort of receptivity without also having a certain 
sort of control-seeking activeness and vice versa; and if one buys my updating of 
the notions of yin and yang, then in the sphere of moral sentiments you can’t 
have yin without yang or yang without yin and they are invariably instantiated 
together. The (valued or positive) moral sentiments thus all have a yin/yang 
character, and that is a philosophically significant fact both about the 
sentiments and about the ancient Chinese complementarity of yin/yang.  
But if moral sentimentalism lends itself to an interpretation via the Chinese 
categories of yin and yang, we really shouldn’t be too surprised. What we call 
moral sentimentalism had its origins, in the modern West, in eighteenth-century 
Britain, but there is a strong element or aspect of sentimentalism in traditional 
Confucianism: in Mencius and in neo-Confucians like Cheng Hao and Wang 
Yangming who were strongly influenced by him. However, the specific idea that 
yin/yang applies to compassion and other particular moral sentiments doesn’t 
seem to have occurred to any Confucian or neo-Confucian (or later Chinese) 
philosopher, so what I have just been saying is intended as a contribution to the 
overall Confucian tradition at the same time that it represents, as I believe, a 
philosophical application of yin/yang to or within moral sentimentalism. I also 
think yin/yang has applications outside of ethics, but that is a long story to be 
told on another occasion. 
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A consensus has been reached that moral knowledge can be transmitted via testimony 
(Jones 1999; Driver 2006; Hills 2009). That is, one’s belief, say, that “x is wrong” can 
be true, and can be justified solely on the basis of the testimony of a reliable and 
trustworthy authority. Yet, even granting this, one might still hold that a person 
ought not to rely solely on the testimony of someone else in deciding what one ought 
to do, that such reliance exhibits moral failure. Alison Hills, for example, argues that 
deference to moral testimony exhibits a lack of moral understanding, and it is moral 
understanding and not moral knowledge that is the “centrally important concept in 
moral epistemology” (Hills 2009, 97). Moral understanding is quite distinct from 
moral knowledge. Attributing knowledge to an agent with respect to a particular 
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proposition is too thin to capture what we care about in assessing actions and in 
assessing an agent as a moral agent. This is because there is both something morally 
defective in the action an agent performs on the basis of pure deference to testimony, 
and something morally defective in the agent herself who needs to rely on testimony.  
What is missing is moral understanding, which is unpacked in terms of the agent 
possessing a full appreciation of the reasons that justify the action.  When an agent 
possesses moral understanding, and acts in light of that understanding, her action 
possesses moral worth, and the possession of that understanding underlies moral 
virtue in the agent.  Without such understanding, the action lacks moral worth and 
the agent fails to exhibit virtue. In this paper I assume for the sake of argument that 
understanding is very different from knowledge (though this has been very effectively 
challenged by other writers, see Riaz 2015). However, I disagree that all actions 
performed purely on the basis of testimony lack moral worth, and that all agents who 
rely on testimony lack moral virtue. 
 
Deference 
 
What is justified deference? 
D defers to A that m, iff:  D’s judgment that m is adopted solely on the basis of 
A’s judgment that m; D’s deference is justified given that A is deemed by D to be 
the appropriate relative authority on the basis of [an appropriate level of] 
evidence that A is a reliably good judger in moral matters [within the appropriate 
domain of expertise], and must also responsibly judge A to be trustworthy 
regarding the testimony provided. 
For the deference to be justified the deferrer must be justified in regarding the 
person providing the testimony as trustworthy and the relevant sort of relative 
authority. By ‘relative authority’ it is understood that A is an authority on m relative 
to D.  In many cases, A will be an expert relative to D, though this need not be the 
case.  For example, A might simply be more competent relative to D in some way 
that is time or situation specific.  D might be drunk, for example, and A sober. 
The word ‘solely’ is important.  All are in agreement that moral knowledge can be 
responsibly and appropriately acquired via testimony without deference when the 
authority makes clear to the agent what the reasons are and how they are to be 
weighed, and the agent takes that on board; that is, she sees and appreciates what the 
reasons are and how they are appropriately weighed.  The problem cases are those in 
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which the agent must defer because she either doesn’t see the reasons at all, or has no 
understanding of their appropriate relative weight. 
 
Moral Understanding 
 
Hills develops an account of moral understanding that is very demanding.   
If you understand why X is morally right or wrong, you must have some 
appreciation of the reasons why it is wrong.  Appreciating the reasons why it is 
wrong is not the same as simply believing that they are the reasons why it is 
wrong, or even knowing that they are the reasons why it is wrong. Moral 
understanding involves a grasp of the relation between a moral proposition and 
the reasons why it is true. (Hills 2009, 101) 
For Alice to understand why stealing is wrong, she must grasp the reasons why it 
is wrong via an appreciation of those reasons, and that goes beyond simply knowing 
that it is wrong.  Further, moral understanding does not hold for isolated facts.  Moral 
understanding requires a “systematic grasp of morality.”  It would be odd for Mary to 
realize that she should be nice to Sandra, to avoid causing Sandra pain, and yet not 
be able to grasp that this counts as a reason to be nice to others as well, and have 
some understanding that this is because pain is bad.  Understanding requires the 
following abilities: 
 If you understand why p (and q is why p), then in the right sort of 
circumstances, you can successfully: 
  (i) follow an explanation of why p given by someone else; 
  (ii) explain why p in your own words; 
  (iii) draw the conclusion that p (or that probably p) from the 
information that q; 
  (iv) draw the conclusion that p’ (or that probably p’) from the 
information that q’ (where p’ and q’ are similar to but not identical to p and q); 
  (v) given the information that p, give the right explanation, q; 
  (vi) given the information that p’, give the right explanation, q’. 
(Hills 2009, 103) 
JULIA DRIVER 
 30 
Because understanding is itself so demanding, one can know that p without any 
understanding of p.  Acting on knowledge without understanding both undermines 
the moral worth of the action and exhibits the lack of virtue in the agent.1 
Friends of moral deference hold that moral deference is not only appropriate, but 
also sometimes required, especially in cases where the harm in failing to defer is quite 
large.2  Suppose that Mary believes, with very good reason, that she herself tends to 
become flustered when required to make decisions about her elderly mother’s nursing 
home care, and that her sister, Donna, is much better able to make decisions that 
protect their mother’s interests.  It would seem that, for the sake of her mother, she 
ought to defer to Donna’s judgment on how their mother’s care should proceed, and 
follow Donna’s advice about what instructions to provide the nursing facility.  Here, 
Mary has enough self-awareness to realize that there is a feature of her temperament 
that interferes with her practical deliberations on a specific topic. 
Do Mary’s actions lack moral worth?  Given how Hills characterizes moral worth, 
they must lack it. The notion of ‘moral worth’ has a long history, and accounts of 
moral worth attempt to capture Kant’s idea that some actions are deserving of a 
special moral esteem in virtue of being properly motivated, or performed for the right 
reasons.  Hills unpacks it the following way: “Your actions is morally worthy only if 
it is a right action performed for the right reasons…” (Hills 2009, 113)  Kant’s honest 
shopkeeper case is supposed to distinguish right action from morally worthy action 
(Kant [1785] 2002, 397). The action of an honest shopkeeper, who correctly charges 
his customer, and who is motivated by self-interest, is right, but lacks moral worth.  
This is because the honest action is done from a motive of duty. The honest action 
that is motivated duty, on the other hand, possesses moral worth. For an action to be 
morally worthy the person performing the actions needs to act for the reasons that 
make the action right. What makes charging one’s customers the correct amount for 
their purchases is that duty requires it.  Self-interest is not what properly justifies 
honesty. Of course, Hills is not at all committed to the way Kant happens to spell out 
the proper justification for moral actions.  She is simply making use of the idea that 
there is, intuitively, a distinction between an action’s rightness, and something else, 
call it “moral worth”, which picks out a special sort of esteem for actions performed 
with the proper motivations, however we spell out those motivations.  
There is an ambiguity here.  Nomy Arpaly points notes that there is a difference 
between acting for reasons known or believed by the agent to be moral reasons, and 
                                           
1 Hills discusses other ways in which moral understanding is important, but the focus on this paper 
will just be the issue of how understanding is allegedly undermined by deference, and how this 
relates to moral virtue. 
2 David Enoch focuses on cases in which the risk of significant harm is quite large.  In these cases it 
seems clear one ought to defer.  See his “A Defense of Moral Deference” (2014). 
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acting in response to moral reasons, even if the agent does not perceive them as such.3  
On her view an action has moral worth if it is done for the right reasons, and “done 
for the right reasons” is understood in terms of the agent simply being responsive to 
the right reasons – she need not herself think of the reasons as the right ones.  The 
case of Huckleberry Finn is an illustration:  Huckleberry has, out of genuine feelings 
of sympathy, helped a friend of his, Jim, escape from slavery.  However, Huckleberry 
views what he has done as wrong since he doesn’t question slavery itself.  Does 
Huckleberry’s act of helping Jim have moral worth?  Arpaly correctly notes that it 
depends on how we reconstruct the case.  If we understand Huckleberry as someone 
who is not accidentally, or whimsically, doing the right thing, as someone who is 
rather “…racist in conscious opinion but viscerally more egalitarian…” (Arpaly 2002, 
229)  then we might see Huckleberry as someone who, though lacking in moral insight 
still sees Jim as a person, and thus someone whose action has moral worth. I make a 
similar point about Huckleberry Finn in Uneasy Virtue.  I note there that 
Huckleberry, “…though lacking a correct conception of the good, was still acting in 
accordance with the correct conception of the good….In order to be virtuous…one 
need not know that what one is doing is good or right.” (Driver 2001, 52) 
Huckleberry’s actions were virtuous, deserving of praise, and thus morally worthy, 
though he lacked systematic moral insight. 
What seems crucial for moral worth is that the agent be “properly oriented” in 
performing the action.  One way to spell this out is to hold that one’s actions are only 
properly oriented if they are done for the reasons that justify them.  But this is not 
the only way to spell this out, and there are alternatives that would make deference 
to another’s testimony display a proper orientation. 
One of Hills’ examples of an action that lacks moral worth is the following, which 
is a modified version of a case discussed by Arpaly: 
The Knowledgeable Extremist – Ron is an extremist, believing that killing a person 
is not generally immoral but that killing a fellow Jew is a grave sin. Ron would 
like to kill Tamara, but he refrains from doing so because he wants to do the right 
thing, and he knows (on the basis of his rabbi’s testimony) that the right thing to 
do is to refrain from killing her. (Arpaly 2002, 115) 
When Ron refrains from killing Tamara, he does the right thing, Hills believes, 
though his action clearly lacks moral worth.  Though he is motivated by a de dicto 
desire to do what is right, he does not see that the fact that Tamara is a person gives 
him sufficient reason not to kill her.  This is certainly a failure to be properly oriented. 
That much seems clearly right to me.  Ron’s action lacks moral worth.  However, I 
                                           
3 N. Arpaly, “Moral Worth”, Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002): 223-245, 226. 
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don’t believe that the lack of proper orientation that Ron displays is best unpacked as 
a mismatch between his reasons for acting and the justifying reasons for the action.  
Though, I also believe that Arpaly may be mistaken in her analysis of Huckleberry 
Finn. This might be a good example, though, of a case in which virtue and moral 
worth part ways.  Huckleberry is described as someone who does the right thing, even 
though he thinks it is the wrong thing to do, so it is odd to view him as having a 
desire to do the right thing – he only has the desire to do the thing that, in fact, is 
right, but not under the description of it being right.  So Huckleberry does not act out 
of a de dicto desire to do the right thing.  If this is necessary for the moral worth of an 
action, but not sufficient, his action lacks moral worth. 
Consider the case of Matilda: 
Matilda wants very much to do the right thing, and has been brought up to 
believe that lying is wrong.  However, she has a friend, Marilyn, who she 
justifiably takes to be an expert on morally appropriate social interactions, and 
Marilyn assures her that sometimes lying is not wrong, it just depends on the 
circumstances.  Indeed, sometimes lying can be morally required.  This puzzles 
Matilda.  One day both she and Marilyn are attending the same baby shower.  
Marilyn, understanding Matilda’s predilection for scrupulous honesty, tells her  
“You ought not to say the baby is ugly, or that the baby doesn’t look like his 
parents at all – that would be wrong because it would hurt the parents’ feelings to 
no good end.”  Again, this puzzles Matilda.  It’s not that she fails utterly to see 
the moral significance of hurting people’s feelings, but she simply has no feel for 
the trade-offs Marilyn’s judgment requires.  However, she defers to Marilyn and 
though she does in fact think that the baby is ugly, and though she is asked her 
opinion, she lies and says the baby is quite lovely. 
In certain structural respects, this case is similar to Ron’s.  Matilda wants to do 
the right thing – she has a de dicto desire to do the right thing.  There is a mismatch 
between her reasons for acting and the reasons that justify the action.  She is acting 
because she wants to do the right thing, and she knows, from Marilyn’s testimony, 
that lying is the right thing to do in this circumstance.  She lacks moral 
understanding because she clearly lacks the sort of systematic understanding of 
morality that is required on Hills’s view.  However, unlike Ron, she seems properly 
oriented. Her motivations, more broadly considered, are basically good ones.  She 
wants to do the right thing, she has some idea of what sorts of considerations go into 
moral justification, but lacks more precise and systematic grasp of the relations 
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between reasons and competing considerations.4  She is not utterly unresponsive to the 
right sorts of reasons, unlike Ron, but she lacks the sensitivity to those reasons that 
would allow her to make the finer judgments and discriminations that Marilyn is 
capable of. 5 
It might be useful here to make a distinction between the act of deferring itself 
and the action that is the result of the deferring.   Hills might hold that in the case of 
Matilda, her decision to defer to Marilyn is done for the right reasons, and thus has 
moral worth, though when she tells the lie she does not act for the right reasons, and 
so that action lacks moral worth.  I don’t think that this is open to Hills, really, if we 
take her at her word on what is required of moral understanding.   None of Matilda’s 
actions possess moral worth, if what is required is a systematic understanding of 
morality.  But maybe this can be weakened a bit.  When Matilda decides to defer to 
Marilyn she is doing so out of a desire to do the right thing, and surely that, along 
with the belief that Marilyn knows best in this case, is what justifies the deference.  
But this does not seem sufficient for proper orientation.  Otherwise, Ron’s decision to 
defer would have moral worth.  Thus, there seems to be something more that is 
required for an action to have moral worth.  Even in deciding to defer Ron displays a 
failure to appreciate, at any level, the sorts of reasons that count against something – 
the sorts of reasons that factor into an action’s rightness or wrongness. 
Does deference undermine moral virtue?  Consider the case Hills’ uses to motivate 
the intuition that it does: 
The Incompetent Judge – Claire has just been appointed as a judge and is very 
anxious to sentence people justly.  But she finds it exceptionally difficult to work 
out the just punishment for various offenses, though she listens to the evidence 
presented carefully and tries her best to get the right answer.  Luckily she has a 
mentor, a more experienced judge, Judith, who has excellent judgment.  Claire 
always consults with Judith and gives her decision in accordance with Judith’s 
                                           
4 One might hold both Ron and Matilda to be morally fetishistic, since they act from a de dicto desire 
to do what is right.  However, that someone is morally fetishistic is not really problematic. See 
Jonas Olson, “Are Desires De Dicto Fetishistic?” (2002). Further, Matilda does not seem to be pure 
case, since she has awareness of the moral reasons, and is just unclear on how to weigh them (though 
it is true that it would be hard to characterize her de re desire to do the right thing). 
5 Eric Wiland (2014) notes that the focus in the literature has been on what is wrong with those who 
need to defer on matters such as “Suffering is wrong” and deference to something like that is odd 
indeed.  The more realistic cases are those that involve weighting different factors.  Wiland discusses 
this issue in light of Ross’ distinction between prima facie duties and duties proper.  We are clear on 
our duties, but weighing them is more complicated since an act in one way may be prima facie 
wrong, but in another way prima facie right. 
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guidelines, offering Judith’s explanation of why the sentence is just to the 
defendants. 
Claire lacks moral understanding, and thus lacks virtue. This is another instance 
in which I agree with Hills’s verdict on the case itself, but disagree on the lessons to 
be drawn from it. 
In rendering the just verdict Claire is not responding to considerations of justice 
(i.e. the right reasons). Rather, she is responding to Judith’s judgment – and on 
Hills’s view this is the wrong sort of reason, at least if we want to characterize the 
agent as virtuous.  This is because she holds that the virtuous person must be a moral 
authority, an authority on what is right (Hills 2009, 111-112). Further, the virtuous 
person is someone whose “…thoughts, decisions, feelings, and emotions as well as her 
actions…” are “…structured by her sensitivity to morality” (Hills 2009, 112).  Claire, 
like Matilda, is someone who is motivated to do what is right.  What she lacks is good 
judicial judgment, and this is what undermines her virtue, on Hills’s view.  But we 
can agree with Hills that Claire lacks virtue. The critic only needs to find cases where 
deference is responsible, and even virtuous, the critic need not hold that all cases of 
deference that lead to the right decision are indeed virtuous. 
Human beings are subject to limitations, both epistemic or cognitive, and 
temperamental.  We often need to seek out advice to make responsible decisions.  Of 
course, it would better if we had no limitations, and we did not need to seek out 
advice.  But this shouldn’t detract from our capacity for virtue.  A responsible moral 
agent will want to do the right thing more than she will want to exhibit the sort of 
moral understanding Hills regards as necessary for virtue.   She should care about 
that more than her own possession of virtue. In cases where she is unsure of which 
reasons obtain, or have greater weight, as in the case of Matilda, the desire to do the 
right thing should lead her to get moral advice.  But it may be that in spite the 
advisor’s best efforts she still doesn’t grasp how it is that one reason has greater 
weight than another.  She knows what the right thing to do is.  She must defer.  Hills 
has defined virtue so that moral understanding is a part of it.  It looks as though 
being concerned with the moral worth of one’s actions, and with virtue, are obstacles 
to doing what is right since doing what is right in situations where deference is 
required for doing what is right requires that one act in such a way that one’s action 
lacks moral worth, and one is failing to exhibit virtue.   On my view, responsible 
moral agency requires deference in such cases, and given the very plausible 
assumption that those who are responsible moral agents possess some virtue, we have 
an argument that responsible moral deference is required of the virtuous person in 
some circumstances.  Responsible moral deference is not incompatible with virtue. 
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When we rely on advice we can do so responsibly or irresponsibly.   In order to 
responsibly rely on advice we need to consider factors such as the reliability of the 
putative advisor, along at least two parameters: does the advisor reliable come to 
correct judgments on the matter at hand, and is the advisor trustworthy – someone 
who can be relied on to honestly communicate those judgments?  
A person who seeks to make important decisions in isolation, without seeking out 
advice, does not represent the relevant sort of ideal for us.  Again, certainly, it would 
be better if we all knew everything we needed to know to engage in effective practical 
deliberation on all issues of moral significance, and if we possessed a fully systematic 
understanding of morality. It would be better if we had capacities that allowed us to 
use that knowledge more efficiently – if we could think more quickly, for example.  
But again, given our limitations, seeking out advice from reliable sources is not just in 
keeping with virtue, it is required of it.  And a similar argument can be made – by 
extension – to deference.  The conditions for responsible deference are the same as 
those for responsibly trusting advice.  The difference is that when one is relying on 
advice as opposed to deferring, one comes to appreciate for oneself the moral reasons at 
play in the decision or judgment and their relative weight and significance.  Full 
deference involves lack of moral understanding.   A person who seeks out and relies on 
advice either possesses moral understanding already or comes to possess that 
understanding through the advice.  But if we are operating with the very demanding 
notion of moral understanding articulated by Hills, it will be hard to motivate the 
distinction between pure deference and relying on advice.  If the person possesses 
moral understanding to begin with, the only advice that person will need will be on 
purely empirical matters.  For example, I may need advice on which charity is the 
most efficient in making a decision about where to send a contribution.  No moral 
advice is required.  However, if a person does need moral advice, it seems incredible to 
me to suppose that any single provision of that advice will result in moral 
understanding – given that this requires a systematic understanding of morality.  
Thus in practice, as a practical matter, on Hills’s view the distinction between moral 
deference and advice will be difficult to make. 
Further, the view that a person who relies on deference is acting incompatibly 
with virtue relies on a very narrow understanding of what a virtue – or excellence of 
character – is.  One way to approach virtue is to ask what sorts of character traits a 
morally conscientious person would want to have – including, what a morally 
conscientious person who is not perfect – would want to have in light of those 
imperfections.  A similar issue arises in the debate between possibilists and actualists:  
should I do the best that I think I can do, or should my decisions about what to do be 
guided by my views about what I will do, given various features of my character?  
The classic example used to illustrate the distinction involves a procrastinator who 
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needs to decide whether or not to agree to write a book review (Jackson and Pargetter 
1986).  The best option would be to agree to write the review and then write it in a 
timely matter.  If the review is not written in a timely manner, however, it would be 
better not to agree to write it in the first place.  The procrastinator is aptly named – 
she knows that she has a tendency to procrastinate and that it is unlikely that she 
will finish the review in a timely manner.  What should she do?  The actualist holds 
that she should not agree to write the review – and, after all, isn’t that the advice a 
friend would give her?  The possibilist, however, believes that she should agree to 
write the review, and then write it in a timely manner.6  Taking into consideration 
what she will likely do, given her character flaw, is letting herself off the hook.  The 
connection to the question we are considering here has to do with how we should 
approach the question of what we should be like, given that we have flaws and 
limitations?  This is taking an actualist perspective to the question of virtue.  
However, the question we are considering isn’t wholly analogous to the question of 
what we should do given our limitations – in the actualist/possibilist debate the 
actualist concedes that it is possible for the agent to do what is best, it is just very 
unlikely.  Here, though, we also consider cases where it isn’t possible for the agent to 
make the right decision on her own, without deferring. In this case, even someone 
who leans in favor of the possibilist would hold that the deference is warranted, and 
given that the agent has certain limitations, the deference is good, not bad.  Thus, the 
opponent of deference when the agent cannot make the right decision on her own, the 
opponent who thinks that such an agent is lacking in virtue, is in the odd position of 
holding that in deferring she is doing everything she ought to do, for good reasons, 
too, and nevertheless is exhibiting vice in so deferring. 
Can we make a stronger case for deference counting as virtuous? Some virtues 
seem to be ‘coping’ virtues.7  They are virtues that we need or that benefit us 
precisely due to certain character deficits.  Philippa Foot had the view that all virtues 
were correctives:  “…each one standing at a point at which there is some temptation to 
be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good” (Foot 1978, 8). Her claim is 
both broader and narrower than the one I would like to make.  It is broader in that 
she views all virtues, not just a subset, as corrective.  It is narrower in that she 
restricts what needs to be corrected for, or what needs to be managed in some way, to 
those deficits regarding our abilities to withstand temptation and be properly 
                                           
6 I discuss the actualism/possibilism debate in “The Actual in ‘Actualism’. ” (2008). 
7 I briefly discuss coping virtues in the context of a discussion of epistemic virtue in “The Conflation 
of Moral and Epistemic Virtue.” (2003). 
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motivated.8   I agree that these are two prominent ways in which a sort of deficit 
impedes practical deliberation, but there are other ways – some relating to features of 
the person herself, and some relating to that person’s circumstances.  One person may 
benefit from a strong will precisely because she is tempted.  We can call these ‘coping’ 
virtues.  Deferring to greater authority on important moral matters may be such a 
virtue.  It is only because Matilda lacks a systematic grasp of the reasons that she is 
required to defer.  And there will be other cases where the agent has difficulty trying 
to figure out which reasons among a range of possible reasons are the right ones.  So, 
for example, someone might know lots of reasons that are not the right ones, but be 
unsure about which ones are the right ones.  Consider Melissa, who has taken a class 
on contemporary moral problems and comes to believe that abortion is morally 
permissible.  She knows that there are good arguments for not viewing the human 
fetus as a person; she also knows that there are good arguments to the effect that even 
if the fetus is a person, abortion is still permissible.  She doesn’t know what to think 
about fetal personhood at all, but she does know that either way, whichever is the 
right way to go, abortion is permissible.  Here she isn’t able to identify which line of 
justification is the correct line of justification; just that permissibility ‘dominates’.  
Does this qualify as appreciating the reasons that justify the permissibility of 
abortion?  Or does the agent need to get things precisely right?  It seems that given 
Hill’s criteria such an agent lacks moral understanding.  This seems highly 
counterintuitive to me, but perhaps this shows that we simply need to acknowledge 
different ways in which someone can possess moral understanding.  One way is 
through a generalizable appreciation of the reasons that morally justify actions in 
such a way as to be able to apply them to particular cases; another way is by 
appreciating reasons more generally, without, in some cases, being able to tell which 
ones apply and/or how they apply, as in Mary’s case.  In the latter sense, then, 
someone who completely doesn’t see that causing pain is a bad thing, and a wrong 
making feature of an action, is lacking moral understanding.  Melissa, however, is not 
like this, though she lacks the sort of appreciation that allows her to properly identify 
the operative reasons. 
There are coping virtues that help people counteract deficits they have, that may 
or may not be typical for the average human being.  Some virtues, such as 
graciousness, involve responding appropriately to one’s own failure.  This may 
include things like sincerely apologizing, not allowing one’s disappointment to 
interfere with showing the correct respectful behavior towards others.   This raises the 
issue of diachronic versus synchronic coping.  The latter example of graciousness 
                                           
8 Foot seems mainly worried about deficits that afflict persons in general – e.g. so that a virtue is 
still a corrective even in cases where a person is not tempted to do the wrong thing.  However, my 
reading of “Virtues and Vices” holds her as allowing that virtues also correct for individual deficits. 
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could be handled by the Aristotelian by noting that the gracious person has become 
virtuous – they had lacked it when they behaved badly – but the recognition of their 
own bad behavior and what the appropriate response is to said behavior shows that 
they have grown into virtue – thus, the coping is diachronic – not at the same time as 
the lapse – and this is not at all incompatible with the Aristotelian view.  Synchronic 
coping, on the other hand, would be – because it involves coping with a lapse as one is 
experiencing or displaying the lapse.  This doesn’t affect my overall point, since 
synchronic coping can still be virtuous – and responsible deference is an example of 
synchronic coping. 
There are a variety of deficits someone might need to cope with, and how one 
copes says a lot about one’s level of virtue.  There are epistemic deficits – some may 
involve features of the person, such as an inability to focus on solving a problem, 
confusion over what sorts of reasons apply in a given case, or lack of the relevant sort 
of experience; some may involve features of a situation a person might find herself in, 
such as lack of time to carefully think through the options, or the presence of other 
environmental factors that impede practical deliberation.   Other deficits might be 
temperamental, such as a tendency to get angry too quickly.  Yet other deficits may 
have to do with attention, or salience (perhaps these also qualify as epistemic).  
Perhaps Sally has a tendency to get lost in her own world as she walks home from 
work, and thus fails to notice the suffering of others around her, or perhaps she is too 
easily distracted by kitten pictures on social media, and fails to attend to more serious 
issues. 
These deficits, in one way or another, undermine one’s ability to make the right 
judgment, not necessarily one’s virtue.   In any of these sorts of situations, it may 
make perfect sense to defer to a trustworthy expert.  It is actually required of the 
virtuous agent.   
The coping virtues fall into the category of what Robert Adams calls ‘structural’ 
virtues (Adams 2009, 33ff.). He contrasts these virtues with what he calls 
‘motivational’ virtues.  Motivational virtues are defined by their good motives:  so, 
benevolence must involve “desiring or willing” what is good for others.  Structural 
virtues are not defined by their aims.  Examples are courage, self-control, and 
patience.  These may or may not have good ends in any particular case.  All by 
themselves, then, they don’t make a person good.  This is certainly true of deference.  
Responsible deference, on the other hand, deference for a good end, just like courage, 
strength of will, and patience, are good.  As Adams notes, without such virtues one 
cannot be “excellently for the good”.  A disposition to defer in standard ‘coping’ 
situations seems to be a structural virtue.  One’s ends may or may not be good; but 
the deference is necessary to really do good in these situations, where the agent is 
motivated to act well. 
Virtue and Moral Deference 
 39 
To test this lets look at some of the other structural virtues.  Consider self-control.  
If one has a view of virtue in which it consists of having one’s desires in conformity 
with what is right, as many neo-Aristotelians do, then self-control is not a virtue 
either since one only needs it when one is working towards virtue.  It is a kind of 
crutch for those who lack virtue – but even if we accept this picture of virtue, which is 
highly contentious – this view of how self-control functions as a crutch is too one-
dimensional.  I can learn virtue through the exercise of self-control – this could be 
part of the natural developmental picture for virtue.  Rather than undermining 
virtue, it makes it easier for people to become virtuous.  After all, what really is the 
alternative?  And the same can be said for responsible deference.  Even if one 
accepted the neo-Aristotelian view of virtue, responsible deference is a developmental 
aid as plausibly as it is an undermining crutch.9 
But responsible deference doesn’t simply help someone develop out of limitations.  
We will not be able to avoid all limitations, and, we will need deference as part of our 
decision-making tool kit, a quality that if responsibly deployed is part of an excellent 
human character. Thus, ‘the virtue of deference’ is not an oxymoron.   
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ABSTRACT 
It seems to be a commonplace of the philosophical literature that there is no such thing as moral 
expertise. Or perhaps, more narrowly, that there is no such thing as justified deference to moral 
expertise, when there is moral expertise. On the other hand, a warrant for moral deference seems to 
have a secure place in everyday moral experience. It is illustrated, for example, by the ubiquitous 
phenomenon of taking moral advice (this includes a role for exemplars of individual moral virtues, 
but is not limited to exemplars of virtue). In this paper, I shall defend moral deference against 
overblown philosophical skepticism. I hope to contribute to rehabilitating the notion for some role 
in moral theory.  
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Imagine that you face a practical situation in which you do not know what the 
morally right thing to do is. Suppose, moreover, that you also happen to know 
someone who does know what the right thing for you to do is (and she is in a position 
to advise you). Should you accept her moral advice? In due course we shall encounter 
and discuss some examples that fit this bill. It will also be useful to refine the 
parameters of our question in a little more detail along the way. But we can make a 
reasonable start in fairly general terms. 
In the recent philosophical literature around this question, two facts stand out as 
fixed points of the discussion, with one of them having greater salience than the 
other.  The first fact is that the question has some importance for moral theory, 
especially perhaps for theories of virtue in particular. The more salient fact is that, 
sociologically, there is a wide consensus among participating philosophers that, in 
some important sense, the correct answer to the question is ‘no, you should not accept 
the other person’s moral advice.’  Naturally, my two qualifications call for some 
elaboration. 
A narrower way of construing the relevant consensus would be to express the 
point of agreement as the proposition that accepting the moral advice is somehow 
GOPAL SREENIVASAN 
42 
notably objectionable:  it carries some kind of toxic stain.1  While some parties to 
this agreement hold that it is nevertheless sometimes permissible to accept the 
advice—that, under some conditions, the objection may be overcome—all parties 
agree that there is something to be overcome. Indeed, a common project in this 
literature, undertaken even by ‘defenders’ of moral deference or testimony,2 is to 
explain the stain that attaches to accepting moral advice, i.e. to identify or diagnose 
it properly. The presence of the stain accounts for the ‘important sense’ in which you 
should not accept the advice, even if, all things considered, accepting it remains 
permissible. 
My own view is that no stain attaches to your accepting the advice of someone 
who knows (when you do not) what the right thing for you to do is. You may accept 
such advice, and often you should accept it. More significantly, in the basic and most 
instructive version of the case, there is no good objection to your accepting it. In 
arguing for this conclusion, I not only decline to join the recent philosophical 
consensus, but I reject it. (Of course, I do not deny that the consensus itself 
exists—hence, ‘sociologically’). Unlike many of its other defenders, then, the plea I 
shall be making for moral deference will be a plea without excuses. 
Now different contributors to this debate enter it along different terminological 
pathways. The relevant terrain is defined by a nexus of inter-relations among the 
terms, ‘moral expertise,’ ‘moral testimony,’ and ‘moral deference,’ where (roughly) 
non-experts defer to experts in relation to their testimony. It is possible to distinguish 
sharply between any pair of these terms, thereby severing one term from the nexus.  
The motivation for so doing is usually to establish its innocence by disassociation.  
But, whatever their motivation, contributors often leave at least one of these terms 
outside the scope of their enquiry altogether. I shall do the same. 
In what follows, I pay no particular attention to moral ‘testimony.’ Insofar as 
there is any reason for this, it is because I shall also be ignoring a subsidiary debate 
that commonly arises here concerning an alleged asymmetry between the moral and 
non-moral cases.3  Everyone (or almost everyone) admits that there is nothing 
objectionable about deferring to non-moral testimony. Given the background 
consensus that something is wrong with deferring to moral testimony, a further 
question therefore arises of how to explain the resultant asymmetry. Among other 
things, framing this asymmetry in terms of ‘testimony’ facilitates comparisons with 
an established epistemological literature on (non-moral) testimony. Clearly, I reject 
                                           
1  For example, it is ‘unacceptable’ (Hopkins 2007; Hills 2009), ‘off-putting’ (McGrath 2011), or 
‘fishy’ (Enoch 2014). 
2  See, e.g., Sliwa (2012) and Enoch (2014). 
3  See, e.g., Driver (2006), McGrath (2011), and Howell (2014). 
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the presupposition of the comparison. To some extent, however, I am also simply 
opting for a narrower scope. 
While I ultimately wish to focus on evaluations of moral deference, I shall begin 
with moral expertise. For the most basic objection to moral deference is that there is 
simply no such thing as moral expertise, and hence nobody to whom one might defer 
morally. Even though I believe that this objection is both mistaken and confused, it 
remains well worth discussing. I shall then introduce an example and develop my 
defence of moral deference in relation to it. Throughout I shall argue in terms of 
morality quite generally. Yet I am also interested in the ramifications for deference to 
exemplars of the moral virtues, specifically. Accordingly, I shall close with a coda on 
virtue. In the coda, I shall argue that, in several respects, the case for deference 
within the province of virtue is easier to make than the generic case for moral 
deference. 
1.  Moral expertise 
Let us begin by considering an ‘in principle’ version of the objection that there are no 
moral experts. So construed, the objection lends itself to either a negative or a 
positive formulation. In its negative formulation, the objection derives from a denial 
that there can be any in principle moral epistemic elite—a denial, in other words, that 
there is any sub-class of individuals who know (or are even able to know) moral truths 
that the rest of us cannot know. In its positive formulation, it derives from an 
affirmation that, in principle, moral truths are all fully accessible to everyone, i.e. to 
every ordinary person. Although the historical origins of this view are commonly—in 
the philosophical literature, anyhow—attributed to Kant, they really belong to a 
cultural legacy to which Kant himself is much more heir than testator, namely, the 
legacy of the Protestant Reformation. Fundamentally, this version of the objection 
originated in an anti-clerical critique:  specifically, in the idea that there are no 
human gate-keepers to salvation.4 
In any case, as a matter of substance rather than history, the basic idea inspiring 
the objection is plainly very appealing, since it amounts to the democratization of 
morality itself. Equivalently, it applies something like a principle of equality of 
opportunity to the achievement of moral knowledge, and thereby to the achievement 
of a morally good life. Unfortunately, however, just because an idea is very 
nice—noble, even—that does not make it true. On inspection, moreover, this 
particular idea turns out to be philosophically suspect. Let us examine the matter 
under its positive formulation. What might account for the fact, if it is one, that the 
truths of morality are all fully accessible to every actual human being? 
                                           
4  See, e.g., the helpful account in Taylor (1989, ch. 13). 
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At least when human epistemic capacities are taken as a given, the explanation 
for the universal accessibility of moral truths arguably has to rest either on a giant 
coincidence or on the operation of some prior constraint on the moral truths 
themselves. That is to say, in the latter case, that this accessibility results from 
morality’s having been ‘bent to fit’ our epistemic capacities. Which particular 
epistemic capacities served as the target for this bending depends on whether every 
actual human being is equally capable (in principle) of working out the requirements 
of morality. In the more difficult—but presumably, much more plausible—case in 
which actual human beings (even ‘normal’ ones) are not equally capable in this 
respect, the prior constraint would have the effect of bending morality to fit the 
lowest common denominator among (normal) human epistemic capacities. 
For simplicity, let me reject the giant coincidence out of hand.5 What remains is 
the possibility of explaining the universal accessibility of moral truths on the ‘bent to 
fit’ model. But this explanation seems to commit us to some kind of constructivism 
about morality. As far as secular accounts of morality are concerned, then, the 
explanatory basis of the present objection to moral expertise appears to be 
inconsistent with the objectivity of morality.6Whether or not that counts as a 
                                           
5  How demanding a coincidence is required depends, inter alia, on whether the content of morality 
is fixed in advance of the comparison or not. On one model—probably more appropriate to the 
historical view, but much less philosophically robust—we assume a particular content for morality 
(conventional Protestantism, say) and then compare the epistemic capacities required to grasp that 
content to our actual (lowest common denominator) capacities. The claim on offer here is that the 
terms of this comparison happen to coincide. On another model, moral truths are held to be 
universally accessible, whatever the content morality turns out (correctly) to have. While this is 
philosophically more robust, the coincidence it requires is also correspondingly more demanding:  
for here the claim is that, of all the manifold contents morality might have, those contents that 
exceed the reach of our actual (lowest common denominator) epistemic capacities just happen, all of 
them, to be false. Of course, the staggering extent of this coincidence can always be avoided by 
falling back on the first, less demanding model. But the consequent reduction in coincidence will be 
encumbered by the presupposition that the particular content nominated for morality is both 
correct and complete. Either way, the position seems unsatisfactory. 
6  On theological premisses, by contrast, it is still possible to reconcile a version of constructivism 
about morality with its objectivity. Moreover, if the bending is to be God’s work, it seems that the 
desired congruence between our actual epistemic capacities and the capacities required to grasp 
morality could in principle be achieved by bending in either direction. In other words, a further 
option of bending our capacities (to bring morality within their reach) then comes into view. While a 
secular account can, of course, also allow human epistemic capacities to change, I am assuming that 
it has no way to make sense of the idea of bending them to fit morality. 
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decisive strike against the objection, it is certainly philosophically problematic.7  In 
any case, that is my ground for classifying the objection as a mistake. 
I need not insist on this point, however, because the objection is also confused; 
and its confusion alone is adequate for my purposes. To see this, let us stipulate that 
every normal adult human being is equally capable (in principle) of working out the 
requirements of morality. Moral truths are therefore all fully accessible in principle to 
every ordinary person. We can regiment this landscape by saying that there are no 
moral ‘experts’ (in it). All the same, it simply does not follow that there is nobody to 
whom one might defer about what morality requires one to do. 
To generate that further conclusion, even for a given point in time, we would 
need to be shown that every ordinary person had developed his or her in principle 
equal epistemic capacities equally, i.e. to the same extent as everyone else (at that 
time).  Alternatively, differential moral learning among some group of individuals is 
both consistent with their underlying epistemic capacities all being equal in principle 
and yet inconsistent with there being nobody in the group to whom any one of them 
might defer on moral questions.  
Those who have learned more are natural candidates for the role of someone to 
whom others who have learned less might defer. It remains a separate question, of 
course, whether there is anything objectionable about moral deference (and we shall 
join that question below). However, the present issue is not whether moral deference 
is objectionable, but rather whether it is even possible, in the minimal sense of there 
being anyone available to whom others might defer on moral questions. On the face 
of it, one person’s having some moral knowledge that another person lacks – or, 
perhaps better,8 her reliably having such knowledge – is sufficient to put the first 
person in the role of someone to whom the second person might defer morally. To 
occupy this role, the first person need not be a moral ‘expert’ in any stronger sense 
than that,9 and certainly need not be an expert in the sense of knowing some moral 
truths to which the second person lacks epistemic access in principle. 
                                           
7  Here as elsewhere, we may be reminded of the familiar symmetry between modus ponens and 
modus tollens. McGrath (2011), e.g., drives something like this argument in the other direction, 
taking the (asymmetrically) ‘off-putting’ character of moral deference as a ‘datum,’ and deriving a 
challenge for moral realism from it. 
8  We can refine the relevant conditions more fully in the next section. 
9  I have no stake in the label:  it makes no substantive difference whether ‘expert’ is in any sense 
an appropriate label for the ‘object of deference’ role. If it is, then the confusion in the objection we 
are discussing can be diagnosed as equivocation between weaker and stronger senses of ‘moral 
expert.’  If ‘expert’ is a wholly inappropriate label, then the objection’s confusion is to have 
(wrongly) assumed that the existence of moral experts is a condition of the possibility of moral 
deference. 
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Logically, then, the universal accessibility of moral truths (even when granted for 
free) is hopeless as a basis for pre-empting the possibility of moral deference. 
Nevertheless, it should also be acknowledged that ‘differential moral learning’ is not 
merely a logically coherent spanner that happens to lend itself to insertion in the 
anti-deference crusader’s works. On the contrary, I take it that differential moral 
learning is a plain fact of ordinary moral experience, and indeed a massively common 
one. All of us, presumably, are acquainted with people who are better than we are, or 
more reliably knowledgeable anyhow, in some or other department of morality (if not 
many such departments). There is no shame in admitting this. Nor (I’m guessing) 
does it require a lot of reflection, but only a little honesty or humility, to recognize 
oneself in that portrait. 
One could always try to factor differential moral learning into its causal 
constituents. Besides the omnipresent possibility of differential underlying epistemic 
capacity (itself a complex of factors, clearly), there is certainly differential experience 
as well, and no doubt more. I shall not pursue this sort of analysis, since the raw fact 
of differential moral learning is adequate for our purposes. Still, in case some resist 
acknowledging the raw fact in the first place, it may be worth briefly going one more 
round. 
Differential experience can be factored into differential net quality and 
differential quantity. Opening an explicit place for quantity reminds us that the ‘wise 
people’ who populate legend and folklore are invariably wise old people. That is to 
say, brute relative age—certainly, a generation gap—makes a prime contribution to 
differential moral learning,10 which is relevant here because real people are always 
distributed across a generational spectrum, unlike the weightless contemporaries of 
abstract analysis. On reflection, this is itself enough to yield our conclusion. 
Consider, e.g., the platitude that it is appropriate (compulsory, really) for 
children to defer morally to their parents or elders. What makes a child’s moral 
deference to his elders possible is their differential moral learning. However, as long as 
this differential persists into the child’s adulthood, the upshot will precisely be 
differential learning between adults (the grown child and his elders still), i.e. our raw 
fact. To resist this conclusion, one would have to deny that this differential typically 
does persist for a significant interval, which requires one to embrace one of the 
following nettles:  Either there is some early point in adult life at which moral 
learning effectively ceases or else the bare attainment of majority obliterates any 
                                           
10  Its contribution is consistent, of course, with some cases of precocious moral wisdom, as well as 
with the age difference between two people’s declining in epistemic significance over time. I insert 
the qualification ‘typically’ into my claim about the persistence of differential moral learning, in the 
next paragraph, to cover just these points. 
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remaining gaps in the former child’s moral knowledge (relative to his elders). While 
the latter proposition is scarcely credible, the former is not at all plausible either. 
 
2.  Moral deference 
So let us take it that moral deference is possible and return to the question of whether 
it is objectionable. To focus our discussion, consider the following everyday sort of 
example: 
Country cousin. Suppose that my poor cousin from the country is coming to town 
for a few days to interview for a job. He has asked me to put him up during his 
visit, since a hotel bill would be a real hardship for him. But my apartment is 
very small, with hardly enough room for my immediate family, which includes a 
baby. Since there is no spare couch, I would have to let him sleep on the floor. 
That would work, albeit with some discomfort for all concerned, especially him. 
The alternatives seem to be footing his bill at a modest hotel nearby or finding 
some friend with a larger place to help me help my cousin. Each of the available 
options—floor, footing, or friend—has its disadvantages.11  I have no hesitation, 
let us say, in agreeing to my cousin’s request. But I also have no idea which of 
these ways of putting him up is best. 
There are various ways in which I might consider how to respond to my cousin’s 
request. I might simply wonder which of the options is best. Or I might wonder, of 
some particular option, whether it is required (or somehow, best). Or I might wonder 
something yet more specific. With this case, it seems natural to wonder whether 
generosity, e.g., requires me to take the footing option. To wonder, that is, whether 
offering my cousin the floor or my friend’s couch would constitute a criticisable lack 
of generosity on my part.12  Let me begin by following this particular thread.13 
By hypothesis, I myself have no idea whether or not generosity requires me to 
take the footing option in Country cousin. (While I may have a nagging suspicion to 
that effect, I have no idea how to evaluate that suspicion). How then might I 
proceed, given my ignorance?  One possibility, evidently, is to ask somebody who 
                                           
11 The hotel bill would be a strain for me, though I can certainly manage it better than my cousin. 
On the other hand, he might feel rather awkward or offended being sloughed off on someone he does 
not know. 
12 We need not concern ourselves with the issue of what the force of this criticism would be, exactly. 
We may simply suppose that I innocently aspire not to merit the criticism. 
13 In the coda on virtue, I shall return to comment on the relation between this narrow thread and 
the widest question, what is the right thing for me to do (in Country cousin)?  I shall claim, though, 
that it makes no real difference to the status of moral deference. 
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does know what generosity requires (or, more generally, someone in a better epistemic 
position).  However, in order for this quite general possibility to be practically 
available to me, two further conditions have to hold.   
To begin with, trivially, the situation must leave me enough latitude to seek 
counsel (sometimes immediate action is required). Furthermore, someone who knows 
what generosity requires has not merely to exist, but to be known (and available) to 
me.  There is some question about how this second condition gets to be satisfied, but 
for the moment I shall simply stipulate that it holds.14 Let us say that I have a friend 
available, Gina, who is known to me as a model of generosity (i.e., I know that she is 
reliably knowledgeable about what generosity requires). For convenience, I shall refer 
to this version of the case, which builds in the two further conditions, as Country 
cousin (plus).  
Now suppose that I ask my friend Gina for advice and that she says there is no 
particular reason to foot my cousin’s bill.15 “You could,” she says, “but it would be 
going over the top. Offering him the friend’s couch is perfectly good. You can offer 
him your own floor as well, to make it clear that you are not trying to slough him off. 
He can choose.” From here, we could proceed straight into an examination of whether 
there is anything objectionable about my accepting Gina’s moral advice. But this 
may trample over a distinction on which some critics of moral deference have wished 
to insist, namely, a distinction between accepting moral advice and moral deference 
proper.16 
As applied to Country cousin (plus), this distinction turns, roughly, on whether I 
accept Gina’s judgement simply on the basis of her known reliability as a model of 
generosity (deference) or whether Gina’s role extends instead to bringing me somehow 
to grasp myself why generosity does not require me to foot my cousin’s bill (advice). 
Thus, to clarify that our case offers an example precisely of ‘deference,’ so 
understood, let us specify that I accept Gina’s judgement here simply on the basis of 
                                           
14 This stipulation is dialectically legitimate because (following on the argument in the previous 
section) the controversy has now shifted, in effect, to the question of whether moral deference is 
objectionable, given that it is possible. My stipulation merely serves to tighten the scope of the 
italicized concession. Nevertheless, a profitable question does remain to be discussed here, and I 
shall return to it (too) in the coda on virtue. 
15  To forestall irrelevant difficulties that arise when the objective and subjective dimensions of 
moral evaluation come apart, let me also stipulate that Gina is right about this. 
16  See, e.g., Hills (2009) and McGrath (2011). For criticism of this distinction, see Sliwa (2012). I 
am very sympathetic to Sliwa’s criticism, as I am to her argument generally. But it is not necessary 
to fight that battle here. 
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her reliability.17 While her judgement is indeed correct, it remains obscure to me why. 
I shall refer to this final version of the case as Country cousin (*). 
So I defer to Gina in the matter of what generosity requires. What is wrong with 
that?  In general terms, a very common idea is that something morally important is 
lost when we defer to others. It somehow belongs to the ideal of an adult moral agent, 
we might say, that she works the answers to moral questions out for herself. Living 
up to this ideal therefore requires more of me than mere acquisition of a valid warrant 
to affirm some answer to my moral question [even, the correct answer], which I 
presumably do acquire in Country cousin (*). Taking a page from Hills (2009), a 
central example of what I lose (or rather, fail to gain) is moral understanding of why 
generosity permits me to take the friend or floor options. 
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, I fully agree that, in some sense, it is better not 
to defer morally to others. Alternatively, I agree that some valuable things are lost or 
forgone when we defer, and even that these plausibly include moral understanding.  
However, I deny that this entails any good objection to moral deference. The basic 
point is a structural one. But we should warm up to it by noticing that the relevant 
structure can be framed without appealing to any especially moral values, let alone 
fancy theoretical ones.   
Situations in which one moral agent defers to another are situations in which the 
first agent falls short of our ideal of moral agency. The valuable things that stand to 
be lost here can be analyzed as dimensions of this ideal, i.e. as respects in which 
someone’s moral agency may prove sub-optimal. Moral understanding is one such 
dimension; and other contributors to the ‘explain the stain’ game, if I may call it 
that, propose various additional candidates. Yet the mundane advantages of 
self-reliance also fit the minimal bill perfectly well. That is to say, moral agents who 
can answer moral questions for themselves will have access to these answers even in 
situations where no other reliable advisor is available, whereas the same cannot be 
said of agents who have to rely on others to answer moral questions for them. This 
suffices to yield a fairly straightforward sense in which deference is sub-optimal or in 
which it is better not to have to defer. 
However, from the mere fact that moral deference is sub-optimal, it simply does 
not follow that deference by some agent is at all objectionable or somehow stained or 
to be avoided. This basic point is demonstrable without regard to the particular 
                                           
17  We nestle up against a separate issue here, concerning how articulate (intellectually or 
philosophically) a reliable moral judge has to be. I deny that Gina’s reliability in judgment entails 
that her ability to articulate the reasons for her judgments about generosity is equally reliable. But 
we need not engage that dispute here. Those who disagree may imagine either that (while she was 
capable of explaining her reasons to me) Gina was otherwise prevented from doing so or else that 
she did explain her reasons, but I still failed to grasp them. 
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dimension in which the relevant agent’s moral agency proves to be sub-optimal. It 
will nevertheless be dialectically useful to frame the argument specifically in relation 
to moral understanding (rather than self-reliance, e.g.). To sharpen the point, let us 
also assume that moral understanding is much more important than self-reliance (as 
Hills 2009 seems to hold) or than any of the other candidate dimensions. 
So consider moral understanding. Its ability to license objections to moral 
deference entirely depends on whether understanding is actually on offer in the 
agent’s practical situation. Suppose, e.g., that I cannot understand why generosity 
does not require me to take the footing option in Country cousin (*). In that case, the 
valuable thing that ‘stands to be lost’ by my deferring to Gina is already lost. There is 
nothing I can do to change that.18But then no objection to my deferring can arise (not 
from moral understanding, anyhow).19 
Notice, crucially, that this conclusion does not result from any trade-off. More 
specifically, it is not the case that while moral understanding gives me some reason 
not to defer to Gina (cf. Crisp 2014, pp. 132 and 134), this reason is defeated by my 
reason to learn what generosity requires [which, in Country cousin (*), favours 
deferring to Gina]. For in the present version of the case, my practical options are 
only to defer to Gina or to guess at the right answer or to do nothing.20None of these 
options will gain me any moral understanding. While it may be obvious that moral 
understanding therefore gives me no reason to guess or to defer, it is important to see 
that it does not give me any reason to do nothing either. In comparison to the first 
two options, doing nothing amounts to a ‘dog in the manger’ option, as it will 
certainly cost me something else of some value (and for no purpose). But moral 
understanding gives me no reason to play dog in the manger. Under the 
circumstances, then, it gives me no reasons at all.21Rather, moral understanding is 
practically inert. 
This further observation explains why it is literally correct that no objection to 
my deferring to Gina is licensed (by moral understanding). Moreover, this conclusion 
is preserved under substitutions of other candidate dimensions of our ideal of moral 
                                           
18  Enoch (2014, p. 247) makes a similar observation, but does not draw the conclusion to follow in 
the text. 
19  As I read her, Hills actually concedes this point (2009, pp. 122-4). But it seems to me that this 
gives the game away. It no longer follows, e.g., that ‘we have strong reasons neither to trust moral 
testimony nor to defer to moral experts’ (p. 98). Hills also argues that actions performed without 
moral understanding (of why they are right) fail to be morally worthy. However, this is a separate 
point. While I reject it (too), I do not have the space to engage this further claim properly here. For 
some criticism of this aspect of Hills’ position, see Jones and Schroeter (2012) and Driver (2015). 
20  Some may think that I always have a fourth option, of trying to understand and failing. Those 
who do should suppose that I have done that already. 
21  Except perhaps to regret that my situation has the features it does. 
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agency, as long as any such candidate (self-reliance, e.g.) is not on offer in the agent’s 
practical situation either. Hence, my conclusion—that no objection to my deferring 
to Gina is licensed—holds independently of taking ‘moral understanding’ as the 
particular valuable thing that stands to be lost. 
Of course, in other situations, the valuable thing might actually be on offer. In 
other variants of Country cousin (*), e.g., I might well be able to understand the basis 
of Gina’s moral advice. We shall come to these variants presently. But we should first 
recognise that the variant in which I cannot understand—or, more generally, in 
which the valuable thing in question is not on offer in the agent’s practical 
situation—is the basic and most instructive version of the case. For that is the 
version in which our evaluation of moral deference is focused starkly and exclusively 
on comparing deference to guessing or doing nothing, i.e. to the available alternative 
specifications of ‘not understanding’ (or, more generally, of ‘not the valuable thing in 
question’). What emerges from this comparison is the realisation that moral 
understanding is indifferent as between these alternatives. Its indifference is what 
makes it practically inert under the circumstances. 
Once we see this point in the basic version of the case, however, we become better 
able to appreciate that it extends to other versions, too, albeit more subtly. Suppose 
now that I might actually manage, in Country cousin (*), to understand why 
generosity does not require me to take the footing option. To simplify, let us say that 
my deliberative options are (i) to defer to Gina, (ii) to guess at the right answer, and 
(iii) to work that answer out for myself. While moral understanding plainly favours 
option (iii), it does not follow that option (iii) is in fact my best option. Whether that 
conclusion is warranted depends on how various considerations besides moral 
understanding balance out, including the likelihood of actually reaching the right 
answer for each deliberative alternative and the importance of reaching the right 
answer in the case at hand.22  No doubt philosophers disagree about these questions. 
But to sharpen the point once more, let us simply accept that, in this variant of the 
case, option (iii) is my best option. (In the usual course of affairs, this conclusion 
would have to be earned by argument. I do not mean to be conceding that it will 
typically be an easy conclusion to earn.) 
Against that background, consider my choice between (i) deferring to Gina and 
(iii) working the answer out for myself. Imagine that I decide to defer to Gina. In the 
specified context, my decision is gratuitous and unjustified. However, even treating 
options (i) and (iii) as inconsistent alternatives, my decision still has two halves, the 
half in which I decide against (iii) and the half in which I decide in favour of (i). Their 
                                           
22  For an argument that option (iii) can never be my best option, provided that I am more likely 
to reach the right answer by deferring, see Enoch (2014, pp. 248-50). 
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independence is secured by the existence of my option (ii) to guess at the right 
answer. Strictly speaking, then, the objection to my decision licensed by our case 
stipulations only applies to its first half, where I decide against(iii). That is what is 
gratuitous and unjustified.  
Of course, one might respond that, under the circumstances, ‘having decided 
against (iii)’ is a presupposition of deciding in favour of (i). In that sense, the objection 
remains attached to the second half of my decision, insofar as that half inevitably 
carries an objectionable presupposition. While this cannot be denied, it actually helps 
to explain why, all the same, no objection attaches specifically to my moral deference. 
For the objectionable presupposition attaches equally to anything I decide here, once 
I have decided against (iii) working the answer out for myself. In particular, and by 
way of illustration, it would attach equally to my decision (ii) to guess at the right 
answer.23  But any objection that applies equally to moral deference and to guessing 
thereby fails to discriminate between them. Hence it has nothing to do with moral 
deference per se. 
 
3. Coda on virtue 
When I defer to Gina in Country Cousin(*), the conclusion I accept on her authority 
is that ‘generosity does not require me to take the footing option.’  It does not follow 
from this, of course, that morality does not require me to take the footing option. As 
described, then, Gina’s moral advice is partial or incomplete. 
In my own view, this feature of the example is not any kind of problem. On the 
one hand, to put it both starkly and mildly, that is how things actually are. In life as 
we know it, that is, very few people are reliably knowledgeable about morality across 
the board. One sense, therefore, in which the example is not problematic is that it is 
realistic. On the other hand, despite the incompleteness of Gina’s advice, it remains 
the case that, in accepting it in the manner described, I fully exhibit the phenomenon 
of interest, namely, moral deference. Another sense, therefore, in which the example is 
not problematic is that it is still relevant to our enquiry. 
Now there are various ways to bridge the gap between Gina’s incomplete moral 
advice and a conclusion about what, all things considered, the right thing for me to do 
is in Country Cousin(*). In the simplest case, morality’s all things considered verdict 
coincides with the verdict of generosity because no other moral considerations apply 
in the situation at hand. In that case, all that I require to complete Gina’s advice is 
                                           
23  It is worth bearing in mind here that guessing is something an agent can do all by herself. 
Whatever the objection to the presupposition may be, then, it has nothing to do with the agent’s 
relations to others. 
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access to the proposition ‘no other moral considerations apply here’; as it were, access 
to that plank enables me to bridge the gap in question. 
While the necessary plank might be procured from various sources, by far the 
simplest source is my own judgment (i.e., the agent’s own). For present purposes, it 
does not matter how reliable the agent’s own moral judgment happens to be. If mine 
is not very reliable, then my final conclusion about what to do in Country Cousin(*) 
may suffer correspondingly. However, that is clearly a problem I have anyway. Our 
present concern is to evaluate the contribution(s) made by moral deference 
specifically. The fact that agents can always fall back on their own judgment to 
bridge any gap between the advice on offer and the conclusion they seek about the 
right thing to do, all things considered, means that incompleteness in the moral 
advice offered by an exemplar of virtue does not prevent such advice from being 
practically useful.  
In the cases of interest to us, moreover, the exemplar’s judgment will, by 
hypothesis, be more reliable than the agent’s own, at least with respect to moral 
considerations specific to the virtue in question (e.g., to generosity). Hence deference 
to an exemplar’s moral advice, however incomplete, can only serve to improve the 
reliability of the agent’s final conclusion about what to do, even if that conclusion 
remains unreliable in certain other respects. Since improved reliability was always the 
primary reason in favour of deferring, we thus return to our original question about 
deference, namely, whether it also introduces countervailing moral difficulties. That 
is the question we have already asked and answered. But we are now in a position to 
confirm that, as I said, structuring our discussion around cases in which the advice 
and deference at issue are incomplete, as they are in Country Cousin(*), makes no 
difference to the status of moral deference. 
Let us turn, finally, to consider my suggestion that pleading for moral deference 
is easier when it is confined to the province of virtue in particular, as compared to 
morality at large. For those who happen to be interested in virtue anyhow, this 
conclusion will be no more than a happy bonus. But since most of the debate about 
moral deference is prosecuted in more general terms, vindicating my suggestion may 
still add something in behalf of the defense. I shall concentrate on two main points, 
both of which concern respects in which it is easier for exemplars of virtue to earn the 
credential of ‘expert,’ i.e. someone to whom others are licensed to defer.  
For present purposes, credentialing someone as an ‘expert’ is simply a matter of 
his or her reliability with respect to a certain class of moral judgments. As we have 
seen, the central basis on which one person is licensed to defer to another (with 
respect to a certain class of moral judgments) is that the second person is a more 
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reliable judge than the first (with respect to that class of judgments);24and that the 
first person knows this. By an ‘expert,’ then, I mean no more than someone who 
satisfies these two conditions (cf. note 9).  
My first point is that being a reliable judge is easier with respect to the moral 
considerations specific to a given virtue (generosity, say, or compassion) than it is 
with respect to the right thing to do, all things considered.25 Up to a point, this is just 
a boring consequence of the fact that reliability is easier to achieve with respect to a 
narrower class of judgments than it is with respect to a wider class (especially when 
the wider class encompasses the narrower one). Beyond this, however, the extra width 
in the scope of judgments about all things considered rightness also covers at least 
two sorts of judgment differing in kind, and not merely in number, from judgments 
about the moral considerations specific to generosity, say.26 
On the one hand, this extra width extends to judgments about the various moral 
considerations specific to each of the other virtues. (This is plainly an umbrella 
category). On the other hand, it extends to the judgments required to resolve conflicts 
among any number of more specific moral considerations. Even if someone is a 
reliable judge of generosity, then, there is no particular reason to expect that the basis 
of her reliability—the particular abilities that constitute it—will already equip her to 
be reliable about either of the other sorts of judgment, let alone both of them. This is 
not at all to say that an exemplar of generosity could not develop all of the other 
relevant abilities. But it is undeniably easier for her not to (have to) develop them. 
Of course, the distinctions invoked here between various kinds of moral 
judgments presuppose that someone can be an exemplar of generosity or compassion 
without having all of the other virtues. My distinctions presuppose, in other words, 
that there is no unity or reciprocity of the virtues. Since I have argued for that 
conclusion elsewhere (Sreenivasan 2009), that is fine with me. But it may be helpful 
to recast my first point in these familiar terms. Under the unity of the virtues, 
someone can have the virtue of generosity only if she also has all of the other 
virtues—either because the various relevant abilities are not actually distinct 
existences (unity) or because, while they are, having the abilities relevant to 
                                           
24  Distinctly more reliable, if you prefer. 
25  The position I shall describe is broadly similar to the one advocated by Jones and Schroeter 
(2012), although the basis on which it is secured is somewhat different. 
26  Naturally, there may be additional moral considerations that are neither specific to any virtue 
nor common among all virtues. If there are, then all things considered rightness will include a third 
sort of judgment likewise differing in kind (or more than two sorts, anyhow). For what it is worth, it 
seems clear to me that there are such considerations, i.e. that morality includes more than virtue(s). 
Indeed, my argument against the unity of the virtues begins from this very fact (Sreenivasan 2009). 
But the present point does not depend upon it. 
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generosity, say, does not count as having a ‘virtue’ unless one also has all of the other 
abilities, too (reciprocity). By contrast, under disunity, someone can have the virtue of 
generosity all by itself. So construed, my first point is simply that it is (much) easier 
to have the ‘disunified virtue’ of generosity than it is to have its ‘unified’ counterpart; 
and likewise for any other individual virtue. 
Eric Wiland (2015: 171-77) has recently argued that moral expertise is more 
plausibly or appropriately located at the level of ‘all things considered rightness’ than 
at the level of specific judgments of compassion or gratitude, say.27 On the face of it, 
his claim runs precisely counter to mine. Nevertheless, this appearance is misleading 
in one notable sense. In another sense, it is not misleading, but does correspond to an 
important point that Wiland has overlooked. It will be useful to clarify these matters 
briefly before proceeding to my second main point. 
To begin with, Wiland actually agrees that judgements about all things 
considered rightness are much more difficult than specific judgements of compassion 
or gratitude.28  Indeed, that is his point of departure. For specific judgements of 
gratitude (say) are not only easier, he claims, but in fact ‘self-evident,’ so that only a 
‘moral idiot’ would require help to make them properly. That is what is supposed to 
make deference to experts at this level inappropriate; and Wiland’s fundamental 
observation is that this ‘problem’ does not arise at the level of all things considered 
rightness. Nor do I think that the greater difficulty attending judgements of all things 
considered rightness makes claims of expertise or deference to experts at this level in 
any way ‘inappropriate.’  Rather, my contention—to foreshadow the lesson to 
follow below—is only that it makes experts about all things considered rightness very 
scarce (and hence, less available to help the rest of us). I also agree that some specific 
judgements of gratitude (or generosity or whatever) are reasonably regarded as 
self-evident; and consequently, that few normal adults will be in position to require 
advice about them (at least, in ‘our’ culture). 
What Wiland overlooks, however, is that not all specific judgments of this or that 
virtue are self-evident.29  Hence, it is not necessary to ascend to the level of all things 
considered rightness to find moral terrain on which normal adults may, with perfect 
propriety, find themselves in need of moral advice. More specifically, within the class 
of judgments specific to a given virtue, we can distinguish ‘paradigmatic’ judgments 
                                           
27 Wiland himself formulates the (lower) level of specific judgments in the language of Rossian 
‘prima facie duties,’ rather than in the language of virtue. Yet, as he recognizes explicitly (2015: 
171), nothing turns here on the details of the formulations. 
28  Following Ross, he focuses on the dimension of conflicts among prima facie duties. 
29  The same goes for prima facie duties. Wiland’s twin contrasts—‘prima facie duties’ versus ‘all 
things considered rightness’ and ‘self-evident’ versus ‘not self-evident’—therefore fail to align neatly 
in the way that his argument requires. 
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of that virtue from ‘non-paradigmatic’ judgments. Paradigmatic (or ‘stereotypical’) 
judgments of some virtue are judgments that anyone who is acquainted with that 
particular virtue concept can make; and they are typically also the judgments by 
reference to which the concept is taught. ‘Helping an old lady to cross the street,’ for 
example, is a paradigmatic act of kindness. Anyone who is familiar with the concept 
of kindness knows that it is ‘kind’ to help [suitably situated] old ladies to cross the 
street. Wiland is certainly right that no such person requires moral advice to make 
that judgement.30 
By contrast, non-paradigmatic judgments of kindness are simply moral judgments 
that are plausibly specific to kindness and yet not paradigmatic of it. It may be 
controversial exactly where (and how) to draw the line between ‘non-paradigmatic 
judgments of kindness’ and moral judgments that not judgments ‘of kindness’ at all. 
But I take it, in any case, that paradigmatic judgments of kindness clearly do not 
exhaust the class of judgments specific to kindness. So it is not controversial that 
there are some non-paradigmatic judgments of kindness. Along with their 
counterparts for other individual virtues, these judgments satisfy both Wiland’s 
criterion that someone may stand in need of moral advice about them without 
qualifying himself as a ‘moral idiot’; and mine that reliability about them is easier to 
achieve than reliability about judgments of all things considered rightness. 
Recall that an ‘expert’ about kindness, in the present sense, is someone who is 
both reliable about making judgments of kindness and known to be reliable on this 
score.31  My second main point is that this second condition is also easier to satisfy 
within the province of virtue. That is to say, not only is reliability in judgment itself 
easier to achieve, but so too is a reputation for reliability—or, more precisely, the 
accessibility of the evidence for someone’s reliability—easier to secure with respect to 
individual virtues. As I said earlier (see note 14), there is some question about how 
those of us in need of moral advice are supposed to go about identifying moral experts 
in the first place. Indeed, various skeptics about moral deference seem to feel that this 
represents some kind of insuperable stumbling block. 
In general terms, the challenge is to find an evidence basis for someone’s 
judgmental reliability that satisfies all of the following desiderata:  First, it really is 
                                           
30  It does not follow that, when co-located with an old lady and a street, everyone familiar with 
the concept of kindness always knows whether to help her across or not (not even when no other 
moral considerations apply). For there is still a significant difference between making a moral 
judgment in a stylized ‘textbook’ context and making the ‘same’ judgment out in the world. See, 
e.g., the persuasive account in Blum (1994). Accordingly, even within the core of paradigmatic 
judgments for a given virtue, there remains room for differential reliability in practice between 
normal adults, and thus room for moral deference. 
31  For simplicity, I elide the comparative dimension of expertise here. 
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evidence of reliability (so that trust on its basis is neither blind nor arbitrary); second, 
one does not have to be an ‘expert’ oneself to employ it; and third, it is not itself 
controversial. The argument (or rather, claim) in the literature concerning possible 
asymmetries between the moral and non-moral domains in relation to expertise has 
been that, in the moral domain, these desiderata either cannot be satisfied or are very 
difficult to satisfy jointly. 
At least within the province of virtue, I claim that a straightforward basis for 
identifying moral experts is made available by the distinction between paradigmatic 
and non-paradigmatic judgements.32  Consider kindness again. My suggestion is that 
experts in kindness can be identified on the basis of their (greater) reliability in 
performing paradigmatically kind acts. These acts can be identified as acts of 
kindness by anyone who is familiar with the concept. Hence, access to this (potential) 
evidence does not depend upon one’s being an expert oneself. Moreover, the open 
accessibility of paradigmatically kind acts still leaves room for differentially reliable 
performance between normal adults (cf. note 30). The rest of us are therefore in 
position, more specifically, to recognize others—if or when we encounter some—who 
are more reliable about acting kindly than we are (i.e., others who have comparative 
expertise or expertise, proper). Finally, the status of paradigmatically kind acts as 
‘kind’ is not controversial in any relevant sense.33Accordingly, paradigmatically kind 
acts or judgments satisfy all three desiderata for an evidence basis on which to 
identify reliable judges of kindness. 
The scope of the licence to defer to experts in kindness one acquires on this basis 
plainly includes paradigmatically kind judgments in all their manifold variety in 
practice. It would also be reasonable, however, to treat the scope of this licence as 
extending further, to non-paradigmatic judgments of kindness as well. Unlike 
judgments of other virtues (such as generosity or gratitude), non-paradigmatic 
judgments of kindness respond to the same kind of moral considerations as 
paradigmatic judgments of kindness. The particular abilities that constitute a reliable 
agent’s reliability with respect to the latter judgments are therefore, I submit, 
reasonably seen as enabling her to be reliable with respect to the former 
                                           
32  Whether there are (also) good bases for identifying experts in the wider moral domain I simply 
leave open. Thus, by ‘easier to identify experts in particular virtues,’ I mean that we already have a 
straightforward basis for doing so, as argued in the text, whereas it remains obscure what basis 
there might be for identifying experts within morality more generally. 
33  Their status as kind is not controversial within the community of those who endorse the 
operative concept of kindness, which community includes both experts and those in need of moral 
advice. Of course,  as with any moral notion, ‘kindness’ may be controversial in other, deeper 
senses (e.g., to moral skeptics and nihilists or between different moral cultures). 
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judgementstoo.34  In addition, we should notice that when I defer to an expert’s 
non-paradigmatic judgments of kindness, what I am deferring to her about is, in 
effect, the question of how best to generalize the application of certain moral 
considerations we both recognize from central cases on which we agree to 
neighbouring cases where I am unclear. Thus, while it is still clearly moral deference, 
my deference here has a less radical flavour insofar as it is confined within the bounds 
of a shared evaluative perspective. 
Let us take stock. My plea for moral deference has two parts. Its main part, 
recapitulated below, consists in explaining why there is nothing objectionable about 
deference, notwithstanding the consensus in the literature. This explanation holds 
equally in all provinces of morality. But its usefulness presupposes that those of us in 
need of moral advice stand a chance of actually finding someone to whom we are 
licensed to defer (about the matter at hand). The second part of my plea concerns the 
satisfaction of this presupposition; and that is the part it is easier to deliver within the 
province of virtue. A licence to defer to someone depends both on that person (who 
must be a reliable judge) and on the agent himself (who must have a secure basis on 
which to identify another’s reliability). In this coda, I have argued that each of these 
conditions is more easily established with respect to individual (disunified) virtues. 
Experts in these virtues are consequently more available to the rest of us than experts 
in all things considered rightness.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
I have sought to defend moral deference against a prevalent skepticism. My main 
argument has been that the mere fact that the circumstances in which deference 
occurs are typically sub-optimal does not ground any good objection to the agent’s 
deference itself. Someone who defers to another person may not fully achieve our 
ideal of an adult moral agent. Fair enough.35 Still, this fact does not result from the 
agent’s deference nor does it prevent her deference from being a blemish-free response 
                                           
34 The inference from ‘reliable about paradigmatic judgments’ to ‘reliable about non-paradigmatic 
judgments,’ all within the same virtue, is clearly more reasonable than the parallel inference from 
‘reliable about one [disunified] virtue’ to ‘reliable about another [disunified] virtue.’  However, my 
claim is that the first inference is also reasonable tout court. I argue for this claim elsewhere 
(Sreenivasan, forthcoming). 
35  While I suspect that skeptics also greatly over-value the full achievement of their ideal of 
agency, that is another matter. 
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to the agent’s circumstances as they actually are. Often, deference will also be her 
best response.* 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores two objections to virtue ethics: the self-effacing objection, which holds that 
virtue ethics is problematic insofar as it presents a justification for the exercise of the virtues that 
cannot be appealed to as an agent’s motive for exercising them, and the self-centeredness objection, 
which holds that virtue ethics is egoistic and so fails to accommodate properly the sort of other-
regarding concern that many take to be the distinctive aspect of a moral theory. I examine the 
relationship between these two objections as they apply to eudaimonistic virtue ethics. While 
defenders of eudaimonistic virtue ethics often appeal to self-effacement in order to deflect the self-
centeredness objection, I argue that there is nothing in the structure of eudaimonistic virtue ethics 
that makes it problematically self-centered. Analysis of the self-centeredness objection shows that 
self-centeredness is problematic only on the assumption that the self is egoistic. Because 
eudaimonistic virtue ethics is predicated upon a non-egoistic understanding of human agency, it is 
not problematically self-centered. As a result, there is no reason for it to be self-effacing.  
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Introduction 
In discussions of the basic structure of virtue ethics, two objections often lurk. These 
are the self-effacing objection and the self-centeredness objection. While those critical 
of virtue ethics believe these objections pose serious problems for the enterprise of 
virtue ethics itself, defenders of virtue ethics tend to brush them off. They recognize 
their existence, as well as virtue ethics’ vulnerability to them, but seem to think the 
objections really are not bothersome. Something is amiss here: what critics of virtue 
ethics deem to be serious problems with virtue ethics, defenders of virtue ethics just 
aren’t that worried about.  
The self-effacing objection holds that virtue ethics is problematic insofar as it 
presents a justification for the exercise of the virtues that cannot be appealed to as an 
agent’s motive for exercising them. The self-centeredness objection holds that virtue 
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ethics is egoistic insofar as its justification of the virtues fails to accommodate 
properly the sort of other-regarding concern that many take to be the distinctive 
aspect of a moral theory. While I think we can all appreciate the potential these 
objections have to create problems for a moral theory that is vulnerable to them, 
most defenders of virtue ethics have not tried to extinguish them. Where they address 
these objections, it often seems as if their goal is to show that while virtue ethics is 
vulnerable to them, this vulnerability does not really present the problem that the 
objectors think it does.1  
In this paper, I seek to develop a new, more satisfying, line of response to these 
objections, and one which sheds light on the basic enterprise of virtue ethics. As there 
are many varieties of virtue ethics, and the application of the two objections varies 
depending upon the kind of virtue ethics we are focusing on, my discussion will be 
limited to consideration of eudaimonistic virtue ethics (EVE), which many think is 
especially vulnerable to these objections. I take EVE to include any virtue ethical 
theory that motivates the virtues by appeal to their connection to the agent’s 
flourishing. While Aristotle’s virtue ethics and the contemporary theories that it has 
inspired are the most well known examples of EVE, my discussion will focus on EVE 
considered more generally. Because both objections target the framework of EVE, my 
question will be whether or not the framework of EVE necessarily is committed to 
features that make it self-centered and require self-effacement. 
I’ll begin with consideration of the self-effacement objection. After considering 
why self-effacement is problematic, I’ll argue that whether or not EVE must be self-
effacing turns on whether it is self-centered. I then move to consideration of the self-
centeredness objection, I’ll argue that this objection misconceives the nature of the 
self that lies at the heart of, and indeed, drives EVE. I’ll conclude by showing that, 
because EVE is not vulnerable to the self-centeredness objection, it need not be self-
effacing.  
 
Self-Effacement  
 
A moral theory is self-effacing if considerations that justify a particular act cannot be 
appealed to as motive to perform said act. In a well-known paper, Stocker (1976) 
charges both deontology and consequentialism with being self-effacing. According to 
Stocker, an agent who attempts to do the right thing for the reasons offered by either 
the deontologist (“because it is right/my duty/specified by the rules”) or the 
                                           
1 Toner (2006) calls this move, as it is made with respect to the self-centeredness objection, the 
“complacency defense”.  
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consequentialist (“because it promotes the best state of affairs”) frequently fails to do 
the right thing, because she has incorporated the justification for her acts into her 
motives. The woman who visits a sick friend in the hospital because it is her duty fails 
to act well: she ought to be visiting her sick friend not because it is her duty, but 
because she cares about her friend. While Stocker’s original critique was of 
consequentialism and deontology, others have since pressed this charge against virtue 
ethics, arguing that virtue ethics is self-effacing in the same sense in which deontology 
and consequentialism are self-effacing.2 Hurka even suggests that the sense in which 
virtue ethics is self-effacing is “more disturbing” than the sense in which other moral 
theories are self-effacing, for virtue ethics is non-contingently self-effacing (Hurka, 
2001, p. 247). Whereas other theories (e.g., consequentialism, might be require self-
efficacy based on contingent features of our psychologies, self-effacement, on Hurka’s 
understanding of EVE, is built into the very structure of EVE given EVE’s 
justification of the virtues: “to avoid encouraging self-indulgence, [EVE] must say 
that being motivated by its claims about the source of one’s reasons is in itself and 
necessarily objectionable” (Hurka, 2001, p. 247). 
Self-effacement is seen to be objectionable for good reasons. Stocker (1976) 
originally argued that self-effacing moral theories were problematic insofar as they 
generated a schizophrenia between one’s reasons and one’s motives, thereby making 
impossible a state of psychological harmony. He writes:  
One mark of a good life is a harmony between one's motives and one's reasons, 
values, justifications. Not to be moved by what one values-what one believes good, 
nice, right, beautiful, and so on- bespeaks a malady of the spirit. Not to value what 
moves one also bespeaks a malady of the spirit. Such a malady, or such maladies, can 
properly be called moral schizophrenia between one's motives and one's reasons 
(Stocker, 1976, pp. 453–454). 
There is something very plausible about this line of thought: when we think 
about a well-functioning agent, and especially about a flourishing agent, we think 
about a person who knows why she acts and identifies with those reasons, and 
incorporates them into her motivational outlook. A theory that presents as a 
flourishing agent one who (necessarily) sets up a clear divide between her reasons and 
motives seems flawed.  
More recently, Stocker (1996) and others (e.g., Pettigrove (2011) have worried 
about a self-effacing theory’s potential to offer normative guidance. The concern is 
that reflection upon her reasons for action—upon why it is important to exercise the 
virtues—plays an important practical component within an agent’s deliberative 
process. Oftentimes, part of figuring out what to do involves thinking about why we 
                                           
2 See Keller (2007) for an overview. 
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ought to do it. But, if reflection on the reasons why we ought to do something 
interferes with our success in exercising virtue, virtue ethics must be self-effacing and 
so burdened with the problems associated with self-effacement.   
Let us now turn to the question of whether EVE must be self-effacing.  Keller 
(2007) argues that any virtue ethics is subject to the self-effacing objection to the 
extent that its theory of right action refers to a conception of what the fully virtuous 
person would do, a consideration that in some instances cannot serve as an effective 
motive to act virtuously (where an “effective motive” is one that enables the agent to 
successfully exhibit the virtues). Keller argues, for example, that the woman who 
helps her friend because it is what a virtuous person would do fails to be fully 
generous. According to Keller, we must conclude that virtue ethics—in general—is 
self-effacing, and that the virtue ethicist must “say that what makes an act right is its 
being what the fully virtuous person would do, but add that having the governing 
motive of acting like the fully virtuous person precludes the possibility of being like 
the fully virtuous person—so it is often undesirable for people to take as their motives 
the considerations that provide reasons for action” (Keller, 2007, p. 227). 
Is it fair to say that EVE is self-effacing insofar as it is committed to 
understanding right action in terms of what the virtuous person would do? While I 
think Keller is right to posit that any virtue ethics, including EVE, is committed to 
this understanding of right action, I worry that Keller’s formulation of the self-
centeredness objection may be based in a mis-understanding of the role this theory of 
right action plays within EVE. In determining whether or not a moral theory is self-
effacing, what counts are the reasons a theory appeals to in order to justify any 
particular act as right. For some moral theories, these reasons, and subsequent 
justification, are quite transparent. According to a simple consequentialism, the 
reason why any act is right is because it promotes the best state of affairs. The fact 
that an act promotes the best state of affairs also makes that act right and so serves 
as its justification. The same reason, then, both explains the rightness of the act and 
justifies it as right. When it comes to virtue ethics, however, things are less 
straightforward. The reasons that explain an act as right are not necessarily the same 
ones that justify an act as right. 
Consider again what Keller takes to be the virtue ethicist’s justification for right 
actions: “the virtue ethicist says that the primary explanation of why right acts are 
right is that they are in accordance with the virtues, or would be performed by a fully 
virtuous person” (Keller, 2007, p. 224). Notice that in this quote Keller writes that 
the appeal to what a fully virtuous person would do, or to what is in accordance with 
the virtues, explains why right acts are right. Keller’s discussion presumes this 
explanation of rightness also serves as the justification of rightness and it is here that 
I think he errs. 
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Sometimes explanations can serve as justifications. As we’ve seen, for the simple 
consequentialist, that an act produces the best state of affairs both explains what the 
right act is and makes that act the right act. However, it is a mistake to read the 
virtue ethicist’s explanation of what acts are right as her justification of the rightness 
of the act, i.e., as an explanation of why right acts are right, and I worry that Keller 
may be making this mistake. For the proponent of EVE in particular (although the 
same probably holds for proponents of virtue ethics more generally), appeals to what 
a fully virtuous person would do have always been intended as an explanation of what 
agents ought to be doing. More specifically, the appeal to what a fully virtuous agent 
would do is meant to provide normative guidance to the person who is not fully 
virtuous, guidance which doesn’t explain why she should do the right thing, but 
rather, practical guidance, which explains what she should do. These are importantly 
different tasks. An explanation specifies what it is the person ought to be doing. 
Aristotle, for instance, would say that the person ought to act for the right reason, in 
the right manner, and at the right time. This is what the fully virtuous person should 
do. But it is not what justifies her actions and likewise should not be understood as 
providing her with justifications for acting.3 For Aristotle, and EVE more generally, 
the justification for developing and possessing the virtues lies in the virtue’s 
connection to flourishing. Their connection to flourishing makes them virtues and is 
what justifies their status as traits we ought to cultivate. While EVE holds that 
people ought to strive to act as the fully virtuous person, this is only because doing so 
enables them to develop a state of flourishing.  
Because the justification of the virtues lies in their connection to flourishing, if 
EVE is self-effacing, it is so in a different manner than we find in Keller’s analysis. 
Whereas Keller gauges whether or not virtue ethics is self-effacing by whether or not 
a desire to do what a fully virtuous person would do can serve as an effective motive, 
the real challenge for EVE is whether EVE’s justification, which appeals to one’s own 
flourishing, can serve as an effective motive.  
Hurka (2001) argues that EVE is self-effacing in precisely this sense. He argues 
that EVE must be self-effacing because it justifies the virtues by appeal to egoistic 
considerations of flourishing that are incompatible with the demonstration of genuine 
virtue: 
                                           
3 Pettigrove (2011) notes that different kinds of persons need different kinds of reasons and so that 
justifications vary depending on the person towards which it is directed. I agree that reasons may 
vary depending on the person involved, but want to resist the idea that justifications vary. An 
appeal to what the virtuous person would do might serve as a reason for the child to do something, 
given the child’s lack of developed rationality to demand, expect, or appreciate more, but I do not 
think it would serve as a justification for the child’s actions. The justification ought to refer to why 
the virtuous person would do it.  
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A flourishing-based theory . . . says a person has reason to act rightly only or 
ultimately because doings so will contribute to her own flourishing. If she believes 
this theory and is motivated by its claims about the source of her reasons, her 
primary impetus for acting rightly will be a desire for her own flourishing. But 
this egoistic motivation is inconsistent with genuine virtue, which is not focused 
primarily on the self. (Hurka, 2001, p. 246) 
 
Hurka is surely right in stipulating the inconsistency of egoistic motivation with 
genuine virtue. The person trying to act compassionately while driven by egoistic 
motives presents a classic illustration of someone whose specific motive is an 
ineffective one, which prevents her from succeeding in her actions and from 
developing genuine virtue.  
In order to evaluate Hurka’s version of the self-effacing objection, however, we 
must first consider whether or not it is accurate to say, as Hurka does, that EVE is 
committed to an egoistic justification that gives rise to the egoistic motivation that 
proves incompatible with the exercise of genuine virtue. The self-effacing objection 
thus hinges on whether or not EVE is also subject to this, the self-centeredness 
objection. Let us now turn to consideration of this objection and then re-visit the 
question of whether it is self-effacing.  
 
Self-Centeredness 
 
A moral theory is self-centered if it takes, as its primary aim, promoting self-regarding 
concerns. This is problematic for those who think the function of a moral theory is to 
promote a concern for others, i.e., to inculcate genuine concern and care for those 
around us. Many think that EVE is self-centered and straightforwardly so: EVE 
justifies the virtues by appeal to the agent’s flourishing, thus offering, as Hurka 
highlights, what appears to be an egoistic justification for the virtues. While EVE 
maintains that part of developing the virtues is developing non-instrumental, 
irreducible other-regarding concerns, the worry is that the structure of EVE 
nonetheless is such that it inescapably places priority on self-regarding concerns (of 
personal flourishing). This is why Hurka thinks it must also be self-effacing.  
One response defenders of EVE make against the charge of self-centeredness is to 
distinguish between “formal” self-centeredness and “content” self-centeredness. 
Annas (1993, p. 225) makes this move in her analysis of the self-centered nature of 
EVE. According to Annas, ancient conceptions of virtue ethics, including Aristotle’s 
eudaimonistic virtue ethics, are formally self-centered or egoistic insofar as they 
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maintain that an agent’s own good serves as her final end. But this doesn’t mean that 
their content is self-centered; rather, they direct an agent to develop other-regarding 
concerns. Where people worry about “egoism”, Annas argues, is with respect to 
content self-centeredness, not formal self-centeredness. Thus, she concludes, even 
though EVE is formally self-centered, it is not problematically so, for its formal self-
centeredness does not affect the content of its normative prescriptions.  
Notice, however, what has happened here: Annas’ defense against the self-
centeredness objection is to say that the degree to which EVE is self-centered is not a 
problematic one, insofar as self-regarding concerns enter into the justification of EVE 
yet not the content. This is just to say that EVE is not self-centered in a problematic 
way because it is self-effacing—its egoistic justification does not factor into an agent’s 
deliberations about what she should do. 
This reply to the self-centeredness objection is unsatisfying on two levels. First, as 
we’ve seen, it commits EVE to being self-effacing, and so subjects EVE to the 
problems that come with being self-effacing. Second, allowing that EVE is egoistic in 
its justification of the virtues overlooks the central insight of EVE, which is that 
human beings are not egoists. This is a point Annas hints at in a later article, where 
she seems to depart from her earlier position and argues “that aiming at flourishing is 
not egoistic” (Annas, 2008, p. 215). I agree with this basic sentiment and think it 
needs and ought to be fleshed out more concretely than it stands in Annas’s 
discussion. As I’ll now argue, the reason that aiming at flourishing is not egoistic, is 
that human nature is not egoistic. This, I believe, is the central insight of EVE; EVE 
is based upon the view that we are not egoists. Recognizing this provides a response to 
the self-centeredness objection that does not require self-effacement and so defends 
EVE, decisively, against the two objections in question. More importantly, however, 
it uncovers what I think is the real issue at stake in these debates. This has to do with 
the picture of the self to which EVE is committed, a picture that, we will see, is not, 
in any sense, egoistic. By bringing to light this understanding of human nature and 
the vision of the self that lies at its core, we can reach a better understanding of the 
basic framework of EVE and what distinguishes it from other normative moral 
theories. 
To make my case, I begin with evaluation of the self-centeredness objection. I 
argue that self-centeredness is problematic only if the self that lies as the object of 
concern is construed egoistically. Because EVE construes the self in non-egoistic 
terms, it is not problematically self-centered, nor is it at all mysterious as to how the 
development of other-regarding concerns can be justified by appeal to flourishing. 
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A Non-Egoistic Self 
 
While a theory will be self-centered if it grants priority to an agent’s self, I’d like now 
to suggest that self-centeredness is only problematic if the self prioritized by the 
theory is an egoistic one. Call an egoistic self one whose true interests can be described 
without making essential reference to the interests of others such that one person’s 
interest usually (although not necessarily) stand in a zero-sum relation to the other, 
whereby one person’s gain is the other’s loss. Call a non-egoistic self a self whose true 
interests can be described only through reference to the interests of others, such that 
one person’s interests usually (although not necessarily) stand in a positive-sum 
relation to the other, whereby one person’s gain adds to the gain of the other and no 
one wins at the expense of another. 
The justification of the virtues upon which EVE rests presupposes the existence 
of a non-egoistic self. It presupposes that one cannot flourish unless one takes into 
account the needs and interests of others and understands that doing so is not 
sacrificial of one’s interests, for our interests are interconnected and their satisfaction 
dependent upon the other. This non-egoistic understanding of the self underwrites the 
very justification of the virtues, according to which developing and exercising virtue 
enables individuals to flourish; without the assumption of a non-egoistic self, this 
justification breaks down: virtue is not necessary for the egoist to flourish, and very 
well may stand in conflict with the flourishing of the egoist. 
While my goal here is to illuminate the structure of EVE and not necessarily to 
defend the plausibility of this way of thinking about the self, it is worth taking a 
minute to explore some research suggesting it is both a viable and accurate way of 
conceiving of the self, lest we think this vision of a non-egoistic self is an ancient 
relic—an assumption that cannot be supported given our growing knowledge of 
human nature. 
I’ll first consider some research on motivation that supports the thesis that we 
function best when we operate as non-egoistic self, thus affirming in part the 
connection EVE makes between the virtues and flourishing.4  While there is a host of 
psychological literature attesting to this basic idea, I’m going to focus on a line of 
research by Jennifer Crocker that explores the effects motivation by self-image goals 
(representative of the egoist self) or compassionate goals (representative of the non-
egoist self) has for the agent. Her research explores interpersonal relationships and 
everyday goal pursuit in general, and not exclusively instances of helping behavior, 
but the extension is clear.  
                                           
4 I develop a full defense of this connection in Besser-Jones (2014). 
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In two longitudinal studies, Crocker and Canevello (2008) explored the 
motivational orientation of first-year college students and their success in learning, 
self-regulation, well-being, and relationships. Student’s motivational orientations 
were assessed according to whether they were driven by compassionate goals (which 
reflect a non-egoist perspective) or self-image goals (which reflect the egoist 
perspective). The defining feature of compassionate goals is that they do not make 
reference to a benefit to oneself. They include: 
• Be supportive of others 
• Have compassions for other’s mistakes and weakness 
• Avoiding doing anything that would be harmful to others 
• Avoid being selfish or self-centered. (Crocker & Canevello, 2008, p. 560) 
 
Self-image goals are specified in terms of making reference to a benefit for oneself. 
They include: 
• Get others to recognize or acknowledge your positive qualities 
• Avoid showing your weaknesses 
• Avoid taking risks or making mistakes 
• Convince others that you are right. (Crocker & Canevello, 2008, p. 560) 
 
Students completed surveys on their goals and experiences both before and after 
their first semester, and every week in between. 
What Crocker and Canevello (2008) found was a significant correlation between 
having compassionate goals and experiences positive affective states (feeling “clear 
and connected”) and between having self-image goals and experiencing negative 
affective states (feeling “afraid and confused”). Unsurprisingly, these negative 
affective states tracked higher levels of anxiety and depression (Crocker, Olivier, & 
Nuer, 2009). Student’s motivational orientations also tracked the progress they made 
in their academic and social goals. Their research showed that students driven by 
higher than average level of compassionate goals made higher than average progress 
towards their other goals; it moreover showed a correlation between a weekly increase 
in pursuit of compassionate goals and an increase in the weekly (non-compassionate) 
goal progress (Crocker et al., 2009, p. 261).5 
This research gives us good reason to expect that agents driven by compassionate 
goals will be more successful in whatever they pursue than will those driven by self-
                                           
5 In this particular study, goal progress was self-reported and not tracked by objective measures. 
The findings, though, are consistent with Moeller et al (2008), which identified the same correlation 
using objective standards of goal progress (e.g., vocabulary test scores). 
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image goals.6 And, this, in turn, supports the thesis that we operate at our best when 
we function as non-egoists. This is the spirit of Crocker’s own explanation of this 
phenomenon and I think it captures in a very basic way the picture of human nature 
lying at the foundation of EVE.  
Crocker believes that the positive effects emerging from agents who are high in 
compassionate goals arise largely because in embracing compassionate goals, one 
transcends the self. “When people transcend the self,” she writes, “caring less about 
how others view them and more about the well-being of others, others are mostly 
likely to regard them highly and provide support, and relationship quality improves. 
Consequently, well-being improves” (Crocker, 2011, p. 142). Her thesis is that we 
improve our own well-being by improving the well-being of others, and that this 
happens most effectively when we are driven by compassionate goals, taking on a 
position she describes as an “ecosystem motivational perspective” (Crocker et al., 
2009; Crocker, 2011).  Individuals working from this motivational perspective take 
on, in Crocker’s words, 
a perspective in which the self is part of a larger whole, a system of separate 
individuals whose actions nonetheless have consequences for others, with 
repercussions for the entire system, that ultimately affect the ability of everyone 
to satisfy their fundamental needs. Like a camera lens aimed at the self but 
zoomed out, people with an ecosystem motivational perspective see themselves 
and their own needs and desires as part of a larger system of interconnected 
people (and other living things), who also have needs and desires. (Crocker et al., 
2009, p. 254) 
What Crocker calls the “ecosystem perspective” is analogous to what I’ve been 
calling the non-egoist self; the individual working from this perspective does not 
sharply distinguish between her interests and others and she does not calculate the 
personal costs of helping others; she just does it, and benefits as a result.  
In contrast, individuals driven by self-image goals work from an egosystem 
motivational perspective, which is analogous to what I’ve described as the egoist self: 
Like a camera lens zooming in on the self, they focus on themselves and their own 
needs and desires. They view the relationship between the self and others as 
competitive or zero-sum—one person’s gain is another’s loss. They evaluate and 
judge people, including themselves, and they expect evaluation and judgment 
from others. They are concerned with the impressions others hold of them, 
leading to self-consciousness and social anxiety. They focus on proving 
                                           
6 This, incidently, affirms the fundamental message of the paradox of egoism: living life as an egoist 
is self-defeating. 
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themselves, demonstrating their desired qualities, validating their worth, and 
establishing their deservingness. (Crocker et al., 2009, p. 252) 
Key features of this egosytem motivational perspective are that the self is always 
in perspective and is invoked as the standard from which the agent evaluates her 
options as well as how she negotiates with others.  
Crocker’s analysis puts into concrete form the two different ways of 
understanding basic human agency that lie at the root of much of the debate between 
defenders of EVE and those who think that EVE is self-centered. Defenders of EVE 
believe that in order to flourish, agents must transcend the self and operate from an 
ecosystem perspective, as non-egoists. Those who think EVE is problematically self-
centered may contest that the only reason agents have to adopt this ecosystem 
perspective is that it makes sense to do so from an egosystem perspective, i.e., they 
will say that the reason why we have to transcend the self is because it benefits the 
self, conceived as egoistic. But this misses the point. We don’t adopt an ecosystem 
perspective because it makes sense to do so from an egosystem perspective. Rather, 
the ecosystem perspective enables us to flourish precisely because, at our core, we are 
not egoists.  The best explanation of why we operate at our best when we operate as 
non-egoists is because we are, at our core, non-egoists.  
A second range of research affirming this position draws on the deeply rooted 
needs we have for engaging with others in meaningful ways, research which we can 
see as both affirming and explaining why we operate best as non-egoistic selves. It 
has long been acknowledged that there is within human nature a need for 
relatedness.7 The need for relatedness shows itself earliest in the form of attachments 
between parents and infants. Infants need to develop attachments to an adult that 
make them feel safe and secure; this allows them to begin exploring new territory, all 
the while confidant that they have a secure base to return to and to support them. 
The need for attachment transforms as we mature, but never disappears. We need to 
feel connected to others, to feel a sense of belongingness. Importantly, what we need 
as adults seems to be to develop interactions that exhibit mutual care and respect for 
both parties: it is not enough for others to be cared for; we need also to care for 
others—one-sided relationships do not typically fulfill our need for relatedness 
regardless of which side one is in.8 That individuals are driven by this need to engage 
well with others (and that their well-being is diminished when this need goes 
unsatisfied) affirms EVE’s assumption that we are non-egoists, and that we flourish 
                                           
7 Many different research perspectives affirm this need, ranging from attachment theory (Bowlby, 
1979), to evolutionary theory (Fowers, in draft), to research on motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and 
self-esteem (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). 
8 I discuss the above research at length in Besser-Jones (2014). 
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when we recognize that we are essentially connected to others and that the interests 
of others do not stand in a zero-sum relation to one’s own interests. 
 
Revisiting the objections 
Recognizing that EVE is predicated upon a non-egoistic conception of the self allows 
us to put into perspective the concerns regarding both self-centeredness and self-
effacingness. We can now see that self-centeredness per se is not a problematic feature 
of a moral theory; rather, it is only problematic insofar as it works in conjunction 
with an egoistic conception of the self. A moral theory committed to an egoistic 
conception of the self ought not to be self-centered. But EVE is not at all committed 
to an egoistic conception of the self. Its central insight, as we’ve seen, has always been 
that developing and exercising virtue is part of flourishing, that an agent must act 
well towards others in order to flourish herself, and that this is so because we are not 
egoists. The self-centeredness of EVE is thus not problematic. 
I have argued that the self-centeredness intrinsic to the structure of EVE is not 
problematic because it works in conjunction with a non-egoistic conception of the self. 
Recognizing this allows us to respond to the self-centeredness objection in a way that 
helps us to better understand the enterprise of EVE itself. That EVE assumes a non-
egoistic self is one of the things that set it apart from many other moral theories. 
EVE recognizes that the answer to the question “how ought I to live?” is to develop 
the virtues. It recognizes that this will involve caring about others as well as oneself 
and it recognizes that this will enable an agent to flourish. It does all of this because it 
recognizes that the self is fundamentally non-egoistic. 
We are beings who are intertwined with others and for whom treating others 
well—exercising virtue—allows us to cultivate a state of flourishing. This is the 
fundamental insight of EVE and one that makes perfect sense when considered in 
conjunction with the picture of human agency revealed above. It is also one, I think, 
that ought to be recognized and reflected upon by the virtuous agent; this, I’ll now 
argue, both precludes and makes unnecessary self-effacement.  
Self-effacement occurs when one cannot appeal to the justification of an act as 
also a motive to act. We’ve seen that Hurka believes EVE requires self-effacement 
because it offers an egoistic justification of the virtues that cannot be embraced as a 
motive, for egoistic motivation is incompatible with the development and exercise of 
genuine virtue. However, once we recognize that EVE offers a justification grounded 
in and dependent upon the thesis that we are not egoists, this picture changes 
significantly. EVE does indeed justify the virtues by appeal to flourishing, but the 
reason that this succeeds as a justification is because we are not egoists, and cannot 
flourish without caring about others and developing an irreducible concern for their 
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own well-being. Given this justification of the virtues, there is no need for self-
effacement. Recognizing our interdependency, and the need we have for relatedness, 
can indeed serve as an important part of developing and embracing virtue; certainly, 
there is nothing inconsistent in reflecting on this justification and exercising virtue. 
Indeed, I’ve argued elsewhere that this kind of reflection helps individuals to identify 
and internalize the importance of acting well to others and so in itself plays an 
important motivational role (Besser-Jones, 2014). 9 
 
Conclusion 
Recognizing that EVE assumes the existence of a non-egoistic self allows us to see 
that EVE is not problematically self-centered, and that EVE does not have to be self-
effacing in order to avoid the self-centeredness objection. I’ve argued that thinking 
about how the virtues are justified—about the connection between oneself and others 
and of our mutual dependency—and being motivated by those thoughts, is perfectly 
compatible with exercising virtue. EVE need not be self-effacing, because it is not 
problematically self-centered. 
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I 
Virtue ethics tells us to act “in accordance with virtue, by which I mean contrary 
to no virtue.”1But which are the virtues? Broadly, we might agree with Aristotle 
Nicomachean Ethics 1106b36that nothing can be a moral virtue unless it is “a 
disposition of choice”, a character-trait that works to transmit our values into our 
actions; but consensus looks harder to come by when we try to get beyond this 
rather simple and obvious necessary condition. Or perhaps we will not even get 
this far: Hume notoriously defines a virtue as any trait the disinterested 
contemplation of which produces in us “the pleasing sentiment of 
approbation”.2As is well-known, this seems to capture a much wider class of traits 
than Aristotle’s necessary condition does. 
Beyond these points, one obvious problem for virtue ethics is the relativist 
worry wherethe virtue ethicist gets her list of virtues from: “what historical 
enquiry discloses is the situatedness of all enquiry, the extent to which what are 
taken to be the standards of truth and of rational justification in the contexts of 
                                           
1 P. Foot, Virtues and Vices, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 14. 
2 “[M]orality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or 
quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.” 
(Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix 1, p. 10) Query: is it morality that does 
this defining? Or sentiment? Probably the latter, but Hume’s “it” is ambiguous.  
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practice vary from one time to another”.3 There is research that gives 
quantitative-analysis evidence of changing language about which are the virtues, 
and which ones matter most, even within one society, the US, during the twentieth 
century: 
A study by Pelin Kesebir and Selin Kesebir found that general moral terms 
like “virtue,” “decency” and “conscience” were used less frequently over the 
course of the 20th century. Words associated with moral excellence, like 
“honesty,” “patience” and “compassion” were used much less frequently. The 
Kesebirs identified 50 words associated with moral virtue and found that 74 
percent were used less frequently as the century progressed. Certain types of 
virtues were especially hard hit. Usage of courage words like “bravery” and 
“fortitude” fell by 66 percent. Usage of gratitude words like “thankfulness” 
and “appreciation” dropped by 49 percent. Usage of humility words like 
“modesty” and “humbleness” dropped by 52 percent. Usage of compassion 
words like “kindness” and “helpfulness” dropped by 56 percent. Meanwhile, 
usage of words associated with the ability to deliver, like “discipline” and 
“dependability” rose over the century, as did the usage of words associated 
with fairness. The Kesebirs point out that these sorts of virtues are most 
relevant to economic production and exchange.4 
Of course there is a sense in which this kind of finding is not news. Different 
societies have always had different lists of virtues. Classical Greece had the four 
cardinal virtues justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom - and in earlier lists, 
holiness/ piety as well. Christian Rome, and its successor civilization, has the three 
theological virtues faith, hope, and charity. (Alasdair MacIntyre famously wrote 
that “Aristotle would certainly not have admired Jesus Christ and he would have 
been horrified by St Paul”: AV p.184.)Some say that the Jewish tradition today 
recognizes six virtues: justice, truth, peace, loving-kindness, compassion, self-
respect.5 Elsewhere in world history, Confucianism recognizes humanity, 
propriety, beneficence, reverence, practical wisdom, selflessness, and 
exemplariness.6 Buddhism sometimes gives us a list of three virtues (detachment, 
mindfulness, pity7), sometimes a list of ten (good habituation, study, keeping good 
company, teach ability, helpfulness, truthfulness, industry, contentment, 
                                           
3 A. MacIntyre, appealing to Robin Collingwood in the Prologue to After Virtue, 3rd edition, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. 
4David Brooks, “Opinion: What our words tell us”, New York Times May 20 2013. Online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/opinion/brooks-what-our-words-tell-us.html?hpw&_r=2 . Thanks to Natalia 
Skradol for the reference. 
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_ethics 
6 http://philosophy.lander.edu/oriental/main.html 
7From personal conversations with Buddhist friends. 
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mindfulness, and insight).8 Islam, apparently, admits no fewer than thirty-six 
virtues.9 Back in the Western tradition, besides the three “theological virtues” of 1 
Corinthians 13, St Paul’s epistles are awash with other lists of desirable 
characteristics for Christians to display: “the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, 
patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, humility, and self-control” (Galatians 
5.22-23). (More on these lists later.) Much of the Secunda Pars of Aquinas’ Summa 
Theologiae is dedicated to making out and defending one long and intricate list of 
virtues and sub-virtues, graces and gifts and fruits, centered on, but not confined 
to, Aquinas’ fusion of the Classical Greek and Roman Christian lists into one list of 
seven virtues.10Hymns, too, often contain catalogues of desired virtues, even if in 
some cases what the catalogue is apt to prompt today is the retort “Not desired by 
me”: 
 
Let holy charity  
Mine outward vesture be, 
And lowliness become mine inner clothing;  
True lowliness of heart, 
Which takes the humbler part, 
And o’er its own shortcomings weeps with loathing.  
(Bianco da Siena, “Come down, O love divine”) 
 
A list of virtues that looks very different from either Bianco da Siena’s or 
Aquinas’ is derivable from what is anyway an interesting exercise in street-level 
experimental philosophy - a survey of the Lonely Hearts columns. In this 
important contemporary list, alongside the perennial favourite GSOH, the most 
important virtues probably turn out to be kindness, romanticness, liking pets, and 
being a non-smoker.   
There is this diversity even within the Western tradition which all of us here 
and now inhabit and from which most of us are culturally descended; never mind 
the further diversity outside that tradition to which we are nowadays equally 
exposed. So it looks hopeless for any virtue ethicist to simply accept a list of 
virtues wholesale from her society or tradition, and just construct a virtue ethics 
uncritically upon that unquestioned basis. This makes it all the more striking that 
the Nicomachean Ethics might seem to do exactly that. In NE 2.7, from 1106a34 
onwards Aristotle just introduces one virtue after another for discussion, “taking 
them” (as he disarmingly says there) “from the diagram”. (We are presumably to 
imagine that he has a blackboard or the like next to him as he speaks these words.)  
 
                                           
8 http://www.buddhapadipa.org/meditation/10-virtues/ 
9 http://islam.ru/en/content/story/36-islamic-everyday-virtues 
10 For a fine study of Aquinas on the virtues (and related characteristics) see A. Pinsent, The 
Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas's Ethics: Virtues and Gifts, London, Routledge, 2011. 
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Aristotle’s Book 2 list of virtues includes only three of Plato’s four cardinal 
virtues, and adds in seven other virtues as well. It runs: andreia, sophrosynê, 
eleutheria, megaloprepeia, megalopsychia, praotês/ philia, alêtheia, eutrapêlia, nemesis, 
dikaiosynê. (Wisdom, both theoretical and practical, he leaves to Book 6.) Aristotle 
makes no attempt to say (explicitly) why these and just these are the virtues that 
ought to be in his diagram. The list of virtues that he goes through in NE 2.7, 
where his main concern is clearly to establish the doctrine of the mean, he goes 
through again, in greater depth and generality, in NE 3.6-5.11. (But with two 
small modifications: (a) second time around he either forgets or deliberately leaves 
out nemesis; (b) at 1126a20 he oddly says that the virtue that comes after 
megalopsychia in his list is nameless, though it seems to be the same as what the 
first list called praotês (1108a7)or philia (1108a28).) Second time around just as first 
time, Aristotle says nothing to justify his list of virtues: neither when he begins it 
at 1115a4, nor at any later point. 
At the very least there is a sharp contrast here with Plato, whose entire career 
as an ethicist is devoted to the question which the virtues are, and why. If 
Aristotle seems to incline towards an uncritical traditionalism, Plato inclines, on 
the contrary, towards a hypercritical rationalism. For him, above all in the 
Republic, it is of the utmost importance to be able to give a complete theoretical 
justification of his list of the virtues: especially justice, of course, but the other 
cardinal virtues too, since justice cannot be defined with full clarity except relative 
to them. Famously, he sees the virtues as emerging one by one from his city-soul 
analogy, though perhaps not in the way that we might antecedently have 
expected. Courage, andreia, is the distinctive virtue of the warrior class in 
Callipolis, as it is of that part of the individual psyche that Plato calls the thumos; 
and wisdom, sophia, presumably is the distinctive virtue of the ruling guardians, as 
it is of the nous or intellect in the individual. But sophrosynê, temperance, is not the 
distinctive virtue of the lowest order of Callipolis, the wealth creators or business 
class, even though they are paralleled with the individual’s epithumiai, base 
desires. Of course that class, as much as any other, needs to have the virtues; but it 
has no distinctive virtue. Temperance is not its distinctive virtue; rather, 
temperance is an agreement in all parts of the city, or soul, about which part 
should rule, and thus comes to sound uncomfortably close to justice as Plato 
defines it (Republic 443b), which is the condition of the city, or soul, when each 
part within it knowingly and willingly performs its own proper function and no 
other part’s.   
But perhaps, on second thoughts, something like Plato’s schema for generating 
the virtues is still present, albeit not explicitly spelled out, in the Nicomachean 
Ethics? There, it could be said, the cardinal virtues can be imagined to emerge in 
orderly sequence, in parallel with Aristotle’s review of human nature “upwards” 
from its lowest to its highest parts, in NE 1.13. As this picture has it, temperance 
regulates our desire for pleasure, and courage regulates our fear of pain; then 
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justice is there to give right order to our relations to our fellow-citizens. As for 
wisdom, which had been the fourth and highest of Plato’s virtues, this maintains 
its preeminence in Aristotle’s thought, but with a curious duplication in its nature 
(which is also presaged in numerous places in Plato, beginning with Meno97a-c’s 
famous admission that true belief can be as good a guide as knowledge to human 
affairs): Aristotle recognizes both practical wisdom, phronêsis, as a master-virtue 
for human affairs, and also theoretical wisdom, sophia, as a virtue that takes us 
beyond the human to the divine.  
If this is, at least implicitly, the schema whereby Aristotle generates his list of 
the virtues - or at any rate four of them - we might have almost as many doubts 
about it as about Plato’s. The schema of the Republic is manifestly a creaky, 
clunky, and contrived way to generate a list of virtues. The psychological schema 
that I have just suggested might be attributed to Aristotle is a vast improvement 
on Plato’s schema, but it is still extremely rough and ready. Of course, that might 
actually be an advantage: given the extremely crude psychological science that 
was available to him, Aristotle could hardly have done better by basing his schema 
of the virtues on a preciser psychology.  
Nonetheless, modern-day Aristotelian virtue ethicists do not typically go in 
this psychological direction if they want to give a foundation for a list of the 
virtues. They look instead to the notion of eudaimonia. Aristotle, as we have just 
seen, simply presents us with a list of virtues; he never says explicitly that he is 
going to generate a list of virtues from the contours of human psychology. No 
more does he ever say explicitly that he is going to generate a list of virtues by 
asking “What are the character-traits that humans need in order to live flourishing 
lives?” That has not deterred a host of attentive and intelligent readers, with 
Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse at the forefront of the host, from 
concluding that this is what he is really up to in his ethics.  
One attraction of this conclusion - we are told - is that it makes Aristotle into 
what, in modern terms, is called a “naturalistic ethicist”; another, connected, 
attraction is that it seems to make his ethics dovetail very neatly with biological 
science. Now I am pretty sure that Aristotle would not only have found the 
concept of “naturalistic ethics” unintelligible himself - he would have insisted too 
that we don’t really understand what we mean by it either.11 This possibility has 
not deterred Philippa Foot and her followers. One crucial advantage they claim is 
that, on their reading, ethics can be given a descriptive or factual grounding. What 
makes humans flourish or fail to flourish is, Foot liked to point out, a matter of 
biological or zoological fact, just as it is a matter of biological fact what makes a 
plant or a tree flourish. What the traits are that lead to this flourishing are also, 
therefore, at least in principle factually establishable. Hence there is such a thing 
                                           
11 For more on this see my “Aristotle’s naturalism”, in A Companion to Greek and Roman Political 
Thought, Ryan Balot ed., Oxford, Blackwell’s, 2009. 
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as the unique objectively correct list of the virtues, and the contents of that list 
can, at least partly, be read off the nature of human beings as a zoological species 
in nature.  
As some species of animals need a lookout, or as herds of elephants need an old 
she-elephant to lead them to a watering-hole, so human societies need leaders, 
explorers, and artists. Failure to perform a special role can here be a defect in a 
man or a woman who is not ready to contribute what he or she alone - or best - 
can give. There is also something wrong with the rest of us if we do not support 
those of genius, or even of very special talent, in their work. 
In spite of the diversity of human goods - the elements that can make up 
good human lives - it is therefore possible that the concept of a good human 
life plays the same part in determining goodness of human characteristics and 
operations that the concept of flourishing plays in the determination of 
goodness in plants and animals. So far the conceptual structure seems to be 
intact. Nor is there any reason to think that it could not be in place even in the 
evaluations that are nowadays spoken of as the special domain of morality… 
Men and women need to be industrious and tenacious of purpose not only so as 
to be able to house, clothe, and feed themselves, but also to pursue human 
ends having to do with love and friendship. They need the ability to form 
family ties, friendships, and special relations with neighbours. They also need 
codes of conduct. And how could they have all these things without virtues 
such as loyalty, fairness, kindness, and in certain circumstances obedience? 
Why then should there be surprise at the suggestion that the status of 
certain dispositions as virtues should be determined by quite general facts 
about human beings?12 
One obvious objection to this philosophical programme – zoological 
naturalism, as we might call it - is that it is one thing for an ethics to dovetail with 
Aristotle’s biological science, and quite another for it to dovetail with our biological 
science.13 There is no such thing in modern evolutionary zoology as the notion of 
flourishing. For evolution, the only thing that counts is surviving long enough to 
pass on your genes, and for that it is simply immaterial whether you are 
flourishing or not. In many species, the may-fly for example, breeding is something 
that happens very late in the life-cycle, when the organism is already literally 
falling apart.14Or consider the praying mantis: when the female praying mantis 
eats the male after they have mated, is the male flourishing? 
                                           
12 P. Foot, Natural Goodness: 44-5. 
13For more on this objection see James Lenman, “The saucer of mud, the kudzu vine, and the 
uxorious cheetah: against neo-Aristotelain naturalism in metaethics”, European Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 1.2 (2005): 27-50. 
14http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/189544/mayfly/39534/Mating-and-egg-deposition: 
“Mating takes place soon after the final moult. In most species death ensues shortly after mating 
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But it did not, if you ask me, need the emergence of modern evolutionary 
zoology to tell us that there is something wrong with flourishing, understood in the 
biologically-based way that Foot and her followers understand it, as a basis for a 
virtue ethics, or any ethics. The notion fails to fit Foot’s own requirements, in at 
least two ways.  
First, Foot and her school are resolutely anti-consequentialist (and hurrah for 
that). But zoological-naturalist virtue ethics itself is, or is very naturally 
understood as, a consequentialist view. Specifically, it is a consequentialism of the 
dispositions: it tells us to have the dispositions that will most promote flourishing. 
So zoological-naturalist virtue ethics fits the charge that Derek Parfit and Brad 
Hooker think applicable to virtue ethics in general, the charge of collapsing into at 
least indirect consequentialism.15 
Secondly, if we are going to resist what Hursthouse likes to mock as “high-
mindedness” (she takes John McDowell to be a key exemplar of this vice), and 
insist that flourishing for humans really is significantly like flourishing for wolves, 
then it seems impossible to avoid the objection that no such “low-minded” 
conception of flourishing can possibly be relied on to generate e.g. justice, charity, 
and temperance as virtues rather than, say, ferocity, cunning, and stealth. In 
conjunction with other materials, a zoological-naturalist conception of flourishing 
might produce an intuitively plausible list of virtues. But (first) there again, it 
might not. And secondly, when things do turn out right, it seems to be the other 
materials in the argument that have this happy effect - in particular, the account 
of human reasoning and rationality that the zoological naturalist offers - and not 
the zoological-naturalist’s distinctive account of flourishing.  
Foot and her followers are of course not unaware of these difficulties, and have 
spent much energy on attempting to address them. Hursthouse, for one, is 
particularly insistent that her account of human flourishing is not offered from a 
neutral scientific view: “Everyone who is taking the Aristotelian naturalist line 
takes it as obvious that they are not pretending to derive ethical evaluations of 
human beings from an ethically neutral human biology, but are already thinking 
______________________________ 
and… egg deposition. Winged existence may last only a few hours, although Hexagenia males may 
live long enough to engage in mating flights on two successive days, and female imagos that 
retain their eggs may live long enough to mate on either of two successive days... Mating is 
completed on the wing. After her release by the male, the female deposits her eggs and dies. A 
few species are ovoviviparous—i.e., eggs hatch within the body of the female generally as she 
floats, dying, on the surface of a stream or pond.” 
15Derek Parfit has frequently expressed this view in correspondence with me, as a reason why he 
does not need to engage with virtue ethics in, for instance, the project of conciliating the 
different moral theories that he undertakes in his On What Matters, Oxford – New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2011. Brad Hooker argues the case that Judith Jarvis Thomson’ sand Rosalind 
Hursthouse’s virtue ethics are both really forms of indirect consequentialism in his “The Collapse 
of Virtue Ethics”, Utilitas14.1 (2002): 22-40; Hursthouse responds to Hooker (though not mainly 
to this charge) in the same issue, pp.41-53. 
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of human beings in an ethically structured way”.16 But first, one suspects a little 
hyperbole here: it is less than clear that either Philippa Foot or Michael 
Thompson, for instance, doin fact take this to be obvious. And secondly, if 
Aristotelian naturalists are indeed not “pretending to derive ethical evaluations of 
human beings from an ethically neutral human biology”, then there is a serious 
question what their often fairly detailed claims about (human and other) nature 
are actually for - what work those claims do to shape their moral theory if not, as I 
have been suggesting, to ground it in the factual and descriptive matter of 
“Aristotelian categoricals” 17. Thus for Hursthouse in Chapters 9-10 of her On 
Virtue Ethics - the most plausible response to these problems that I have seen - the 
naturalistic foundation of her virtue ethics is reduced to the four points that 
humans are social, that they seek enjoyment, that the continuance of the species is 
a priority for them, and they have close and particular ties with particular others, 
especially their families.18All of which seems obviously right, and to furnish us, as 
Hursthouse says, with some important constraints on what ethics can be for 
creatures like us. Yet none of these claims seem necessarily dependent on anything 
like the kind of zoological naturalism that Foot lays out in Natural Goodness, or 
that Michael Thompson lays out in “The representation of life”.19 
What goes wrong in zoological naturalism, I think, is at least partly the 
philosopher’s characteristic mistake of over-ambition. Like Plato, the zoological 
naturalists seek a single uniquely complete and correct account of how to generate 
the virtues, from the ground up;20 like Plato, the picture they end up with is 
unconvincing.  
 
 
II 
 
It is also, I suggest, deeply un-Aristotelian. It isn’t Aristotle’s project in the 
Nicomachean Ethics to derive a list of virtues solely and exclusively from an 
account of flourishing. And this is not because his project is, rather, to derive a list 
of virtues exclusively from an account of human psychology. As already pointed 
out, it isn’t his project to derive a list of virtues at all. A fortiori, he isn’t trying to 
derive a list of virtues from anyone source exclusively.   
                                           
16R. Hursthouse, “Human nature and Aristotelian virtue ethics”, Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement 70 (2012): 169-188, p.174. 
17P. Foot, Natural Goodness, chapter 2. 
18 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
19In R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and P. Quinn eds., Virtues and Reasons, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1995. 
20Hursthouse often remarks that she rejects foundationalism; but the relation of this rejection to 
her endorsement of the idea that the nature of morality, for us, depends on the natural facts 
about us, is not clear. 
SOPHIE-GRACE CHAPPELL 
So what is he doing? Well, he’s doing what he says he’s doing in the Ethics 
itself (7.1, 1145b3-8): 
We must, as in all other cases, set the observed facts before us and, after first 
discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the 
common opinions … or, failing this, of the greater number and the most 
authoritative; for if we both refute the objections and leave the common 
opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently. 
Aristotle’s thoughts about the virtues, and his presuppositions about which is 
the right list of the virtues, begin in and with his own tradition. As he explains 
here, that does not mean that his ethics is necessarily wide open to the relativist 
accusation that he simply takes a list of virtues for granted. Tithenai ta 
phainomena is sometimes translated as “accept the appearances”; but “posit them 
as a starting point” would be better. What Aristotle undertakes to do in these lines 
– which happen to be prefaced to his discussion of akrasia, but could stand as his 
statement of method at almost any point in his writings – is to start from the 
endoxa (common opinions) of tradition; but not to end there. The common 
opinions, the traditional views that we’ve inherited, are to be exposed to each 
other, to check their internal consistency. But they are also to be exposed to 
whatever “difficulties” (aporiai) they may seem intuitively to face. And this - I 
suggest, though I admit the point can’t be proved - is not just a test of their 
internal coherence, but also of their correspondence to the way things are in the 
world beyond them.  
The method that I think we can draw out of Aristotle’s words here is not just a 
method for arriving at a list of the virtues; it is a method of quite general 
usefulness in philosophy. As John McDowell puts it: 
It is a deep truth that all thinking, just as such, is anchored in traditions. 
Reflection has nothing to go on, anywhere, but a putative grasp of the that, 
which (at least to begin with) is merely inherited.21 
The method is not the Cartesian one of getting rid of everything we already 
think, and trying to start somewhere else, somewhere suspended in the vacuous 
abyss of “pure inquiry”. The method, rather, is to start from everything we already 
think, and subject it, not to one single all-purpose philosophical test (such as, for 
instance, Cartesian doubt), but to a variety of different tests and questions that we 
can use, not usually just to abandon our initial view, but to refine it.  
This way we can have the great advantage of traditionalism or conservatism, 
that it starts off with our pre-philosophical opinions. (As Aristotle says in NE 
1173a1-3, there isn’t really anywhere else to start.) Yet we avoid its great 
disadvantage, that of being insufficiently critical about those starting-points for 
                                           
21 J. McDowell, The Engaged Intellect, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2013, p.57. 
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thought. The critical element is supplied by the questions and tests that we apply 
to our initial presumptions. And our balance, our common sense, and our 
resistance to fanciful skepticisms are all preserved by the fact that it is questions, 
plural, and tests, plural. Pace writers like Peter Singer,22 there isn’t one super-
methodology that does away with pre-philosophical common sense. Rather, there 
is a variety of methods for adjusting it, with none of those methods being 
preeminent and exclusively correct, and the correct application of them being, as 
always, a matter of judgment.  
This way we can also have the advantages of systematic and constructive 
philosophy, that it will actually be possible for us to present an interesting positive 
and structured view as our philosophical position, rather than courting the 
familiar accusation that we are “quietists” or “conservatives” or “just being 
negative” (or opposed to what we might call edifactiousness23). Yet we avoid the 
great disadvantage of system-building philosophy, that we make it look as if our 
theoretical structure were the only possible one, or as if our philosophical approach 
were all-or-nothing. We are freed of the supposed duty to derive our list of the 
virtues “from the ground up”, so that our derivation is either the only possible one 
and completely inexpugnable, or else completely impossible and a complete failure. 
This cautious and piecemeal methodology, balancing a default presumption in 
favour of received opinion with a willingness to revise it for sufficiently good 
philosophical reasons, and balancing an openness to the sheer variety of what 
“good philosophical reasons” might be with a healthy skepticism about the 
philosophical fanaticism or monocularism that again and again becomes fixated 
with just one sort of philosophical reason - this, I want to suggest, is the truly 
Aristotelian method in philosophy, and the method that Aristotle himself tries to 
apply: with resounding success at times, and resounding failure at other times. In 
philosophy in general, there are explanations for most things, but there is no one 
explanation which is the explanation for even most, let alone all, things. In ethics 
in particular, there are reasons that ground most cases of rightness and wrongness, 
goodness and badness, but there is no one foundational reason, or kind of reasons, 
that grounds everything, or anywhere near everything. If we liked we might call 
this an intuitionist method, in the methodological sense of “intuitionism” that 
Bernard Williams endorses in “What does intuitionism imply?”.24 Or we might 
prefer to keep things simple, and just call the method common sense. 
                                           
22See Peter Singer, “Ethics and intuition”, Journal of Ethics 9 (2005): 331-352. For a forceful 
reply see James Lenman, “Scepticism about intuition”, in Sophie Grace Chappell ed., Intuition, 
Theory, Anti-Theory in Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp.24-39. 
23 John Maynard Keynes’ word for Henry Sidgwick, in Keynes’ well-known letter to Lytton 
Strachey, quoted by Williams in Making Sense of Humanity, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1995, p.155. 
24In B. Williams, Making Sense of Humanity, pp. 182-191. 
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I have abjured the search for one test or criterion that, all on its own, will give us a 
complete and definitive list of the virtues; I prefer talk of tests and criteria - plural. 
So what is in this plurality of tests, and how do the various individual tests 
interact to give us the right results? And how can we be sure they won’t interact to 
give us the wrong results? (An obvious piece of arithmetic shows that the number 
of possible interactions of the tests is a much larger number than the number of the 
tests: so this multiplicity might seem really worrying.) 
The answer to the how-can-we-be-sure question is, of course, that we can’t be 
sure (in advance): that is what I meant by talking, a moment ago, about 
judgement. What we can be sure of is that intelligible argument about what the 
virtues are will always be conducted by appeal to these tests. But there is no 
guarantee that all intelligible argument about the list of the virtues will be 
plausible argument about the list of the virtues. Working out what is wrong with 
an implausible argument, or an implausible list, will often be a subtle and delicate 
matter, and will usually be a case-by-case one too.  
We should enter another reservation too at this point, and before we go any 
further. This is about the supposed definitiveness or objectivity of the list of the 
virtues that we might hope to end up with by deploying the multi-criterial and 
intuitionist method that I have sketched. Here too there is a contrast with the 
over-ambition, as I see it, of zoological naturalism, which as we saw above, at least 
aims to give us a completely objective and definitive list of virtues, in principle 
applicable to all societies, but as far as I can see, specific to none.25 These claim 
strikes me as implausibly over-ambitious; and as unnecessary, even for those who, 
like me and the zoological naturalists, agree in endorsing moral realism. 
Notice here the philosophical advantages of moral realism over moral irrealism 
of whatever stripe. If moral irrealism is the thesis that no moral propositions are 
objectively true or false, moral realism is simply the negation of that thesis. Moral 
irrealism, therefore, is refuted by a single example of a moral proposition that is 
objectively true, or false; moral irrealism is intolerant of objectivity.26 Moral 
realism, by contrast, need not be at all intolerant of subjectivity: since it is the 
thesis that some moral propositions are objectively true or false - and of course, 
preferably the central and important ones - there is room for subjectivity within 
moral realism, in a way that there cannot be room for objectivity within moral 
irrealism.  
So in the present case, while the moral irrealist cannot say that there is - really, 
ultimately - any such thing as the correct list of virtues, and must say that there is 
                                           
25 “Morality which is no particular society's morality is to be found nowhere”: MacIntyre, After 
Virtue , Second (corrected) edition (with Postscript), Norfolk, Duckworth, pp.265-266. 
26 Cp. Timothy Chappell, Ethics and Experience, Durham, Acumen, 2011, p.42. 
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no such thing, the moral realist is free to say either that there is or isn’t such a 
correct list. Provided the moral realist takes something(and, of course, something 
important) to be objective, there isn’t even an apparent threat to his moral realism 
if he denies that lists of virtues are objective, or are fully objective.  
Well, I am a moral realist; and although I don’t actually want to go as far as 
outright denial that there is such a thing as the correct list of the virtues, I do want 
to say that there is often something rather beside the point about anxious queries 
whether this or that list of the virtues is or is not “objectively correct”. To take it 
that lists of the virtues are actually meant, by those who propound them, to be - 
and to be nothing but - flatly descriptive of an antecedently given reality seems to 
me a rather naïve kind of literalism. Very often the intentions of those who offer us 
such lists are, and are patently, prescriptive rather than descriptive. They are not 
so much attempts to describe a reality that is already there, as to summon a reality 
into being by sketching an ideal and exhorting one’s hearers to live up to it.  
This hortatory function of lists of virtues has a number of explanatory 
applications. For one thing, it makes it perfectly explicable, for the moral realist, 
why there should be so many differences between different societies’ lists of 
virtues. Some of those differences no doubt do reflect substantive philosophical 
disagreements: consider, for instance, the differences noted by MacIntyre between 
Jesus’ and Aristotle’s conceptions of the virtues, or again the differences between 
the virtues of a Socrates and those of a Thrasymachus.27 But many other 
differences are merely a matter of emphasis or of the division of topics. Between 
somebody who (say) takes gentleness to be a primary virtue and humility to be an 
offshoot or subcategory of gentleness, and someone who sees things the other way 
round, there need be no more than a difference in the order of exposition. 
The hortatory function of lists of virtues is particularly obvious, I want to 
suggest, in the writings of a figure who - along with Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas - 
is one of the three or four most influential propounders of lists of the virtues that 
Western ethics has ever seen, namely Paul of Tarsus. One list of his we have cited 
already: 
 
The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, 
faithfulness, humility, and self-control.  
ὁ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματός ἐστιν ἀγάπη, χαρά, εἰρήνη, μακροθυμία, χρηστότης, ἀγαθωσύνη, 
πίστις, πραΰτης, ἐγκράτεια: κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστιν νόμος. (Galatians 5.22-23) 
There are plenty of others: 
So, as those who have been chosen of God, holy and beloved, put on a heart of 
compassion, kindness, humility, gentleness and patience; bearing with one 
                                           
27See Timothy Chappell, “The virtues of Thrasymachus”, Phronesis 38(1993): 1-17. 
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another, and forgiving each other, whoever has a complaint against anyone; 
just as the Lord forgave you, so also should you forgive each other. Beyond all 
these things put on love, which is the perfect bond of unity. Let the peace of 
Christ rule in your hearts, to which indeed you were called in one body; and be 
thankful. Let the word of Christ richly dwell within you, with all wisdom 
teaching and admonishing one another with psalms and hymns and spiritual 
songs, singing with thankfulness in your hearts to God. Whatever you do in 
word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks through Him 
to God the Father. (Colossians 3.12-17) 
Finally, brethren, whatever is true, whatever is honourable, whatever is right, 
whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is of good repute, if there is any 
excellence and if anything worthy of praise, think on these things. (Philippians 
4.8)28 
Let all bitterness and wrath and anger and clamour and slander be put away 
from you, along with malice. Be kind to one another, tender-hearted, forgiving 
each other, just as God in Christ also has forgiven you. (Ephesians 4.31-32)29 
It isn’t that there are no standards of correctness for such lists; if St Paul had 
recommended that the Ephesian Christians seek not only to be kind, forgiving, and 
tender-hearted, but also louche and cynical, there would have been something 
wrong with that. Or if he had recommended that the church at Philippi think not 
only on the true and the lovely, but also on the crafty, that too would have 
justified a readerly double-take. There are standards of correctness for these lists, 
but the standards are standards for exhortatory, not for descriptive, catalogues. 
Contrast the zoological naturalists and their would-be straight-descriptive lists of 
dispositions that, as a matter of fact, promote flourishing. 
Though come to think of it, perhaps the zoological naturalists are also wrong 
about the sort of list that their account of the virtues implies: perhaps a list of the 
characteristics that, say, a wolf needs in order to live a life that is long, healthy, 
and largely undisturbed except by predation-opportunities is also rather more 
open-ended than they like to admit. (One obvious thought that points in this 
direction: what those characteristics are is determined in large part by the wolf’s 
environment; and environments change.) Still, as I say, their list is (at least 
                                           
28 Is this a list of virtues at all? Isn’t it rather a list of things to meditate on?” It is certainly the 
latter; its being the latter does not preclude its also being the former, since these subjects of 
meditation are apparently classes of actions or of the dispositions that produce them. Though 
even if it isn’t a list of virtues, the relevance to a virtue ethics of such a list of reflective practices, 
or topics for reflective practice, is obvious; it is a key part of virtue—Paul is telling us—to reflect 
on things like these. 
29 And of course behind all St Paul’s lists of virtues stands Jesus’ list, the Beatitudes: Matthew 
5.1-12. 
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intended as) a straight-descriptive list: it is meant to capture the facts about what 
characteristics actually achieve or tend to achieve a supposedly given end, namely 
biological or quasi-biological flourishing. If such a descriptive catalogue of the 
virtues is, in fact, open-ended, it will be so for quite different reasons from the 
reasons that make for open-endedness with St Paul’s lists of virtues and ideals.  
We are close here to the large and interesting question, what a list of the 
virtues is supposed to be for anyway; exhortation has been suggested as one 
possible function, but maybe there are others. At any rate it would be bizarre to 
suppose that the list of the virtues is meant to be deployed directly in agents’ 
deliberation, as their main means of thinking about what to do. The zoological 
naturalists do not suppose this: that is why Hursthouse often invokes the notion of 
the “v-thoughts”, the thoughts that motivate the virtuous person, which can be 
but are not necessarily coincidental with the thoughts about the virtues that, 
according to her, give the criterion of rightness for all action.  
It has often been argued that this manoeuvre rescues Hursthouse’s virtue 
ethics from an implausible picture of how agents deliberate, at the price of making 
the very distinction between deliberative procedure (DP) and criterion of rightness 
(CR) that makes so much trouble for utilitarianism.30 Without getting too deeply 
into this debate here, I will say simply that the DP/ CR distinction in itself seems 
to me entirely unproblematic. The problem comes only when a theory is forced to 
suppose that an agent is bound to entertain thoughts on the one side of the 
distinction that subvert or contradict thoughts that she is bound to entertain on 
the other side. Utilitarianism of every variety known to me is clearly refuted by its 
failure to avoid this problem about internal consistency; it is less clear that every 
version of virtue ethics is. 
Anyway, St Paul’s practice gives us further evidence that is that there are 
other things that lists of virtues can be for, besides straightforward description of 
moral reality, and the equipping of the agent with materials for (more or less 
direct) deliberation, and for devising and applying a criterion of rightness. A list of 
virtues can also be for meditative attention: it can be an ideal, or constellation of 
ideals, that we reflect on in order to internalize. It is clear that St Paul thinks that 
such meditative attention is a powerful form of moral discipline, and a powerful 
source of moral transformation. And on that, of course, modern thinkers such as 
Iris Murdoch will agree with him. 
 
 
                                           
30For a fine discussion of the issues, and of the two main sources of the charge in work by Tom 
Hurka and Simon Keller, see Glen Pettigrove, “Is virtue ethics self-effacing?”, Journal of Ethics15.3 
(2011): 191-207. 
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IV 
So though there are certainly (according to realists like me) antecedent realities 
that a list of the virtues needs to fit, presenting a list of virtues is not merely a 
matter of describing antecedent realities. As the case of St Paul makes clear, it is 
also, at least as much, a matter of prescribing: of exhorting one’s hearers to see 
things in a certain light, to dispose themselves in particular ways, to attempt to 
approximate some ideal or ideals, and to “think on” those ideals: to reflectively 
internalise them.  
We can keep this thought in mind as we turn to the question that section III 
left outstanding, the question of what the tests are that should determine our list 
of the virtues. After the remarks I have just made about the exhortatory value of 
such lists, it would be odd to attempt to offer a complete and definitive answer to 
this. But I will offer three suggestions. The first is about eudaimonia; the second is 
about the notion of a technê or practice; and the third brings us back to the idea of 
reflecting on and imitating ideals or exemplars. 
The first suggestion, then, is just the idea that the notion of human flourishing 
or eudaimonia can give us some help in formulating a list of virtues. Perhaps it 
looks as if I have already excluded all reference to eudaimonia; but actually what I 
have rejected is eudaimonism, by which in this context I mean the view that the 
point of the virtues is to promote eudaimonia, and so that our list of the virtues 
can be derived solely from thinking about what promotes human flourishing. I 
have denied this in particular where the notion of flourishing that we are working 
with has the misleadingly scientific look of zoological-naturalistic flourishing. But 
to deny these claims is not to deny that there is anything to the notion of human 
flourishing. Of course there is, but the notion is a “folk” notion, not a scientific 
one: what we count as flourishing is not part of our science but of our form of life.31 
My second suggestion arises from MacIntyre’s discussion of the nature of the 
virtues in After Virtue. MacIntyre’s approach rephrases the question “Which 
character-traits are the virtues?” as the question “What character-traits do we 
need for successful pursuit of the practices?” His account of what a practice is - the 
notion has obvious affinities to Aristotle’s and Plato’s notion of a technê - is this: 
 
Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in 
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and the goods involved, are systematically extended.32 
                                           
31A point which, as we have seen, the zoological naturalists of course attempt, at least 
sometimes, to accommodate. In my view, not successfully; but that is an argument for another 
time. 
32MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 187. 
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Examples of practices that MacIntyre gives include farming, chess, music, 
science, history, novel-writing, and (a very Aristotelian example, this) politics. As 
MacIntyre brings out, the mark of all these practices is that in order to practise 
them, one needs honesty, humility, preparedness to learn from others, and 
responsiveness to the legitimate demands of others: so one needs something very 
like justice. One also needs persistence and self-discipline – so something very like 
temperance – and the optimism to keep going when the practice seems impossibly 
difficult or overwhelmingly complicated: so something very like courage. And 
what one learns through the practices is how human understanding and expertise 
is articulated in particular cases and contexts, and how to move from those 
particular contexts and apply their lessons to the overall context of living our 
lives: so something like wisdom too. 
The flourishing of the virtues requires and in turn sustains a certain kind of 
community, necessarily a small-scale community, within which the goods of 
various practices are ordered, so that, as far as possible, regard for each finds 
its due place within the lives of each individual, or each household, and in the 
life of the community at large. Because, implicitly or explicitly, it is always by 
reference to some conception of the overall and final human good that other 
goods are ordered, the life of every individual, household or community by its 
orderings gives expression, wittingly or unwittingly, to some conception of the 
human good. And it is when goods are ordered in terms of an adequate 
conception of human good that the virtues genuinely flourish. “Politics” is the 
Aristotelian name for the set of activities through which goods are ordered in 
the life of the community.33 
We do not learn the virtues only through the practices; but that is one very 
obvious place where we do learn them. When we look at the dispositions of 
character that are required for expertise in some particular practice, what we 
arrive at very quickly comes to look pretty much like a list of the virtues that we 
need in any practice, and in the living of our lives overall.  
Here then is a second way of arriving at some ideas about what the virtues are. 
It is a way that Iris Murdoch at least gestures towards as well: 
If I am learning Russian, I am confronted by an authoritative structure which 
commands my respect. The task is difficult and the goal is distant and perhaps 
never entirely attainable. My work is a progressive revelation of something 
which exists independently of me. Attention is rewarded by a knowledge of 
reality. Love of Russian leads me away from myself towards something alien 
to me, something which my consciousness cannot take over, swallow up, deny 
                                           
33MacIntyre, Preface to the Polish edition of After Virtue. 
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or make unreal. The honesty and humility required of the student - not to 
pretend to know what one does not know - is the preparation for the honesty 
and humility of the scholar who does not even feel tempted to suppress the 
fact which damns his theory... Studying is normally an exercise of virtue as 
well as of talent, and shows us a fundamental way in which virtue is related to 
the real world.34 
My third and final suggestion about the tests that we might use to derive a 
credible list of the virtues is that at least some of the content of any plausible list 
of virtues is generated by thinking about examples of good people, and especially of 
remarkably good people - saints, or ideals, or exemplars of the virtues.  
Exemplarism, the thesis that we can derive our conception of the virtues from 
thinking about exemplars of the virtues, is a venerable and important part of the 
virtue tradition. One way to develop it I deployed myself, in a paper that I toured 
for a couple of years in the early nineties without ever managing to get it 
published. The idea was to work from thin descriptions to thick: the key question 
was “If you know of Jane only that she is a good person, what further descriptions 
may you reasonably expect to be true of Jane?” I thought then, and twenty-five 
years later I still think, that there can be an interesting answer to this that gives us 
a good deal of information about the nature of the virtues. To be sure, we get that 
information in the form of a long, loose and defeasible disjunction; and to be sure, 
the information we thus get is filtered via my or our reasonable expectations, 
which no doubt are both cognitively imperfect and culture-relative. But these 
points are philosophical commonplaces. They constitute serious obstacles only to 
an attempt to use this “key question” as the unique method that definitively gets us 
to everything we need to know about the correct list of the virtues. As should be 
obvious by now, I am not in that game at all; I doubt I was, really, even in 1991.  
In recent philosophy the exemplarist approach to virtue ethics has been 
argued for by other strategies than the one I tried out in that old draft of mine: by 
Linda Zagzebski in one way 35, and by me in another36. For both Zagzebski and 
myself, Aristotle is the source and authority for this thesis whom we quote the 
most, though we could also have quoted St Paul, who repeatedly tells the readers 
of his letters to imitate Jesus (e.g. Galatians 3.27, Philippians 2.5, Ephesians 4.14). 
(Paul also tells them to imitate himself at least twice: 1 Corinthians 11.1, 
Philippians 3.17.).The Christian tradition has made rich use of exemplarism: that, 
for instance, is one reason why the church has the lives of saints to meditate on.  
                                           
34I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of God, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970: 89. 
35 L. Zagzebski, “The admirable life and the desirable life”, in T. Chappell ed., Values and 
Virtues, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
36 T. Chappell, “The good man is the measure of all things”, in Christopher Gill ed., Virtue, 
Norms, and Objectivity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. 
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Part of the point of exemplarism is, as Zagzebskistresses, that a living 
exemplar of a given virtue gives us far more detailed information about what the 
virtue actually involves than any abstract description or definition of that virtue 
could. We might say, as she does, that what we learn from the exemplar is 
basically knowledge by direct ostension – “The virtue is like that”– rather than 
knowledge by definition. Or we might make what seems to be a closely-related 
point, that what the exemplar gives us is not, or not only, explicit and 
propositional knowledge of the virtue, but also tacit and non-propositional 
knowledge of what it is like for someone to have that virtue; or perhaps practical 
knowledge – knowledge how to exercise the virtue. Or again, we could observe with 
Iris Murdoch that attention to exemplars of virtue – those found in novels and 
plays, to give two obvious examples – feeds our imagination and our moral vision 
in a richer and psychologically deeper way than if-and-only-if equations do. Or we 
might make all of these points, as in fact I think we should; they seem perfectly 
consistent with each other. And what they add up to, in combination, is a striking 
picture of how much more there can be to moral knowledge than straightforwardly 
propositional knowledge.  
How, though, do exemplars get established as exemplars? Very often, I 
suggest, it is because some person or some deed comes across to us as immediately 
admirable. In print or in person, we come across some Gandhi or St Francis or 
Martin Luther King or Sophie Scholl, and that person strikes us - directly and 
primitively - as awesome, as having done something noble or wonderful, perhaps 
even beautiful. Two well-known cases of this sort of experience are given by Rai 
Gaita early on in Good and Evil: the cases of the nun in the hospital working 
selflessly and unendingly to relieve the sufferings of her patients, and Primo Levi’s 
description of the sufferings of Ladmaker in Auschwitz: “Charles’s behaviour 
showed a goodness to marvel at”.37 
What thinking about exemplarism gets us to see here, in fact, is something 
that we might find profoundly missing from approaches to virtue ethics such as 
zoological naturalism. It is that any plausible and attractive list of the virtues is 
going to depend at least as much on the notion of the morally fine or beautiful – in 
Greek, on to kalon – as on the notion of flourishing or the advantageous – in Greek, 
on to ophelimon. The virtues are not just the dispositions that tend to lead us to the 
desirable life. They are also, and perhaps even more fundamentally, the dispositions 
the exercise of which is admirable, and makes us admirable people.38 (But the point, 
of course, is to be admirable, not to be admired; it is to have in us what necessarily 
makes admiration apt, not what actually prompts admiration. Here talk of the 
beautiful is preferable to talk of the admirable, precisely because it lacks this 
misleading connotation.) 
                                           
37R. Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception, London , Macmillan, 1991, xvii. 
38 For the admirable/ desirable contrast cp. Linda Zagzebski, op.cit. 
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We can put this as a point about the familiar old question “Why be moral?”.39 
So put, the point is that the answer to “Why be moral?” is quite often “Because 
that is the beautiful thing to do”. It’s not that the moral act is itself prudentially 
disastrous, but just happens to be, unfortunately enough, one of a class to the 
whole of which we are somehow committed, if we are committed to any part of it - 
as theories like rule-consequentialism and Gauthier’s contractualism too often tend 
to suggest. Nor is that the moral act is prudentially advantageous in some way - 
just a very obscure way, one which is consistent with the fact that the moral act is 
attended with terrible penalties like those that Hans and Sophie Scholl faced, or 
those described by Calliclesin Plato’sGorgias(486b). We need not think that there is 
any prudential advantage, in any sense, in the gravely-sacrificial moral act. (Notice 
here how close to the surface we find a false assumption that I have criticised 
elsewhere:40 that reasons for action have to be future-directed.) At least in some 
cases, advantage simply isn’t the point. It is rather that the moral act demands to 
be done even if it does involve a grave sacrifice - just because it is beautiful. 
Perhaps this appeal to to kalon, The Beautiful, is the answer to the puzzlement 
expressed by the person who said of Sophie Scholl and those who suffered with her 
that “the fact that five little kids, in the mouth of the wolf where it really counted, 
had the tremendous courage to do what they did, is spectacular to me. I know that 
the world is better for them having been there, but I do not know why.”41 Perhaps 
it is also the best answer to the difficulty that Philippa Foot is struggling with in 
her rather convoluted discussion of the “Letter-Writers”, a group of victims of the 
Nazis who thought it was worthwhile to die rather than to give in to Hitler42. 
Foot’s difficulty is, precisely, to square the Letter-Writers’ willingness to die, and 
their obvious virtue, with Foot’s own eudaimonism: the virtues are supposed to 
lead, or at least tend to lead, to flourishing, and here the virtues are, in all their 
glory, leading their possessors directly to death. (And not only leading but tending 
to lead, given the nature of Hitler’s Germany.) Despite repeated study of what 
Foot says about their case, I am not entirely sure how she thinks their case can be 
squared with the eudaimonist idea, which goes back at least to Socrates, that “the 
virtues benefit their possessor”. But I know how I want to respond to their case. 
On the grounds precisely of cases like the Letter-Writers’, I simply deny that the 
virtues do necessarily benefit, or even tend to benefit, their possessor. As the 
                                           
39 The next two paragraphs draw on Chapter Eight of Knowing What To Do. Imagination, 
Virtue, and Platonism in Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
40In Chapter Three of Knowing What To Do. 
41 Lillian Garrett-Groag, quoted in the Wikipedia article on Sophie Scholl. The remark is 
quoted—from the same source—and discussed by Eleonore Stump in Wandering in Darkness, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010:149 and 549. In the present context we are close, of 
course, to Gaita 1991’s remarks about “a goodness to marvel at”, cited in the last chapter; there 
is bound to be some overlap between the notions of glory and of nobility. 
42P. Foot, Natural Goodness: 95-6. 
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Letter-Writers show, there are cases where the exercise of the virtues can be 
utterly disastrous for their possessor - and yet, the virtues continue steadfastly to 
point us towards “the thing to do”. For the Letter Writers, what their virtues do is 
make their possessors, and their terrible submission to the suffering that 
confronted them, admirable/ fine/ beautiful/ kalos. But that, in the circumstances, 
was the very opposite of benefiting them. 
Eudaimonia, the dispositions that we need for the practices, the power of 
examples: all of these are resources that we can appeal to when attempting to 
refine our list of the virtues, or assess whether we really think that this or that 
disposition of character is a virtue or not, and why. No doubt there are other 
resources too. My suggestion is not that any one of these resources would give us 
all we needed to derive a list of the virtues - even if deriving a list of the virtues 
from scratch, rather than refining the list(s) of the virtues that we have already 
inherited from our traditions, were really what we are engaged in doing. Rather, 
the three resources that I have looked at here suggest tests and diagnostic 
questions and criticisms that may be applied to already existing lists of the virtues. 
Such evaluation of lists of the virtues is therefore more like a matter of good 
judgment than of the application of a simple algorithm. But that, of course, is 
precisely what we would expect, and entirely as it should be. 
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In recent years, as is familiar, there has been a flow of work on virtue in many 
fields, and notably in philosophy, mostly in the area of virtue ethics. Here I want 
to take up a point which is quite surprising, namely that this intense focus on 
virtue has not similarly focussed on vice. Once you notice this, you scan complex 
works on virtue in vain for anything comparably developed on vice.1 It seems to be 
assumed that an account of virtue does not need also to provide an account of vice 
for it to be adequate as an account of virtue. I have been as guilty of this as 
anyone, and it may be that this assumption is not arbitrary. Aristotle, for 
example, tells us that we are studying virtue not for the sake of it, but to become 
better people2, and we can see why study of virtue alone would suffice for that, 
bringing in vice only insofar as we need to understand it to understand virtue.  
However, vice is of interest, certainly to me, insofar as an account of virtue 
raises puzzles about the nature and structure of vice. This is especially so for those 
of us who defend an Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) account of virtue, in which it 
is prominent that virtue is acquired in a way analogous to the way in which a 
practical skill is acquired. For such an Aristotelian account, it is central to the 
account of virtue that its structure, and so the way it is taught and learned, 
resembles that of a practical skill. Yet this does not carry over unproblematically 
                                           
1 Theologians do not share this neglect to the same extent, but it is often difficult to make use of 
their work if you do not share the relevant tradition of understanding the idea of sin. Aquinas, 
for example, understands vice partly in terms of sin, which makes his work on vice less accessible 
to non-religious philosophers than his work on virtue.  
2 Nicomachean Ethics II 2, 1103b26-30. 
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to vice. This would not be a worry, of course, if we did not expect vice to be 
anything like virtue in its structure. But we do think of vice as being, in some 
respects, more like virtue than either is like other ethical states, and so we are 
faced by a problem: why do we think this if vice does not have the structure of a 
skill? What is the structure of vice? Some vices at least seem to display intelligence 
and application; how is this related to practical skill? 
 I hope to broach a topic which deserves more attention than it has had. I am 
not aiming to give anything like a complete account of vice, and there are many 
issues about vice and the vices which I must leave untouched. In order to get a 
handle on understanding vice I am focussing on the skill analogy for virtue, the 
question of its fit for vice and how we are to understand the intelligence often 
shown by the vicious. 
I will begin with a brief account of an Aristotelian account of virtue, familiar 
though it is, in order to have a clear view of what it is that vices are being 
contrasted with. This account lays out the main features, and is obviously not a 
definition of any kind. A virtue is a disposition of a specific kind, to think, reason, 
feel and act in certain ways, namely the virtuous ways. This disposition has a 
specific history, namely of being built up through experience by selective and 
intelligent habituation, where this is guided by learning from those who, in the 
culture, already have the relevant virtues. (This can take the form of role models, 
books, movies, and so on.) What makes these dispositions virtues is that they aim 
at the good. When we are old enough to reflect on the virtues we have learned from 
our culture, we are able to revise our positions as to whether these virtues do, in 
fact, aim at the good, or are merely conventional, or even deeply misguided. There 
are various ways of interpreting the good that is aimed at, and in this paper I shall 
be assuming that we are dealing with a secular interpretation, where the good 
aimed at is that of a flourishing human life.3 The ‘skill analogy’ comes in because 
the habituation in virtue takes the form of the kind of education in acting that you 
get in making and acting when you learn a practical skill. 
It’s important for this conception of virtue that virtue be a stable disposition, 
different from a mood or temporary commitment. It’s also important that 
habituation forms and educates our emotive and feeling, as well as our cognitive, 
aspects. Aristotle puts this in a striking way when he says that it is a mark of the 
virtuous person that she performs virtuous actions with pleasure rather than pain. 
What he envisages is the difference between, on the one hand, doing a generous 
act, but with a conscious effort, awareness of being pulled to do something else and 
with felt regret afterwards; and, on the other hand, just doing it readily and 
effortlessly. The virtuous person will just do it; her intelligent and educated 
disposition encounters no block from unwillingness, and so she experiences the 
                                           
3 This is particularly important when focusing on vice, since non-secular views of flourishing 
often understand vice in terms of a non-secular concept like sin.  
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kind of pleasure in activity that Aristotle is concerned with. This is of course not 
the kind of pleasure that we think of as a perceptible feeling, but the kind of 
pleasure taken in effortless activity, whose hallmark is that it encounters no 
obstacle from contrary motivations on the agent’s part.4 Virtue is motivationally 
unconflicted in a way that contrasts with the person who does the right thing but 
unwillingly and so effort fully. Using Aristotle’s convenient term, we can call this 
latter person the enkratic. The enkratic person succeeds in doing the right thing, 
but has to combat contrary motivation in order to do so, and is not acting from an 
unconflicted state. 
We also take it, along with Aristotle, that there is a similar contrast between 
the person who just does something cruel or mean without felt conflict or regret, 
and the person who does it, but whose action registers with him as a lapse from the 
conviction that this is the wrong thing to do, and who subsequently does feel 
regret. Again using Aristotle’s convenient term, we can call the latter person the 
akratic, and the former vicious.  
Here we meet a point which needs to be considered in contemporary 
discussions of vice. The above contrasts take over Aristotle’s contrasts between 
virtue and vice on the one hand, and enkrateia and akrasia on the other – but do 
we actually understand Aristotle’s conception of vice? In contemporary society we 
are discouraged from being ‘judgmental’, and the idea of vice is often trivialized, so 
that people will say that their vices are indulgences like food or buying shoes. This 
might not matter much, as it does not much matter that we do not in ordinary 
conversation use the term ‘virtue’ much: we still recognize virtues like bravery and 
generosity, and we still recognize vices like cowardice and cruelty. So we might 
retain the concept of vice, but in the form of recognizing vices rather than that of 
trying to take over the common usage of the term ‘vice’.  
An objection remains, however. We use the term ‘vicious’, but no longer use it 
to cover all or even most of the vices. We talk of people as vicious when they are 
cruel or aggressive; it sounds odd to us to say that cowardly or selfish people are 
vicious. This might suggest that there is a deeper problem than our use of ‘vice’ in 
finding unity among the vices. We could, it seems, recognize the vices without 
finding any common structure in them. If so, then virtues would have a shared 
structure, but vices would not, so that aiming to give a common account of the 
vices would be misguided. 
This is a serious objection, but there are two powerful points against it. One is 
that much the same kind of objection could have been (and sometimes was) 
brought against study of virtue as a unified entity before the rise of interest in 
virtue and virtue ethics. In contemporary life ordinary discourse about virtue and 
the virtues had been philosophically ignored for over a century, so it is no surprise 
                                           
4 Obstacles from outside the agent are another matter; here I am concerned with the lack of 
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that clear distinctions, and clear outlines of virtue ethics, were not to be found on 
the surface. After forty years of philosophical and psychological exploration, we 
now do have a clear view of the many different options there are for virtue and for 
the role of virtue in ethical theory. (They are still, of course, very disputed.) Vice 
has not been the object of this kind of intensive and extended discussion, so the 
fact that our present discourse does not deliver clear results about vice may well 
not be philosophically significant; it may indicate no more than that ordinary 
discourse reflects an uncritical cultural tendency to associate using vice terms with 
being ‘judgmental’, which is acceptable only in cases of clear harm to others. This 
may be no more philosophically significant than the fact that before the rise of 
discussion of virtue, many people associated that term with prudery about sex, 
something now seen as obviously culture-bound and no longer relevant.  
Rehearsing Aristotle’s contrasts makes us realize that, independently of 
ordinary discourse, we do recognize the difference between the person who does not 
help but later regrets it, and the person to whom it does not even occur to offer 
help, and we also realize that this lines up with the difference between the person 
who helps but has to overcome reluctance in order to do so, and the person to 
whom it does not even occur not to help. We recognize, that is, a state that 
corresponds to virtue in being unconflicted, but contrasts with virtue in being 
unconflicted about doing the wrong thing rather than the right thing. We are 
implicitly recognizing a concept of vice which so far corresponds to Aristotle’s: it is 
internally unconflicted by contrast with the states of the people who act in ways 
that express motivational conflict. This gives us something important to begin 
from: virtue and vice are more stable than the motivationally conflicted states.5 
One obvious implication of the discussion so far is that vice will be a character 
trait. Will it be the same kind of character trait as virtue? The vicious equally with 
the virtuous act in accordance with their settled and motivationally internalized 
convictions as to what they should do. Virtue, however, is a state which is the 
result of a certain kind of history; it can’t be acquired by reading books or by sheer 
will-power, but requires a specific kind of education, namely habituation through 
experience acquired in an intelligent way by learning from the virtuous. This is 
what is illuminated by the model of practical skill; virtue involves more than skill 
(especially its orientation to the good), but we cannot do better than Aristotle’s 
famously mundane view that, since things that we learn to do have to be learned 
by doing them, learning to be just is like learning to be a builder: you learn to do 
what the experts do, and in so doing you learn to do it in the right way, the 
virtuous or expert building way. You acquire not a routine but the right training 
and grasp of the skill or virtue. If vice is a character trait like virtue, then, we 
                                           
5 I am using ‘state’ here in a generalizing way to cover all four of the conditions I am 
concentrating on; this does not imply being static as opposed to being dynamic. 
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would expect it to result from a history of learning along the lines of a practical 
skill. However, this does not go smoothly. 
Two aspects can be picked out of the skill analogy for virtue: I have called 
these the need to learn and the drive to aspire.6 The need to learn is the more 
obvious; I don’t learn to build by foolishly starting from scratch, but by learning 
from people who already know how to do it.  With virtue I cannot choose to learn 
from scratch, since I begin learning when very young, before I am in a position to 
learn critically. I learn from various sources in the culture: role models, books, in 
large part my parents and local peers. Some people, whether in real life or other 
parts of the culture, are role models from whom I learn, in various ways, to try to 
be and to act like them. 
Here at the start there is a disanalogy with vice. We don’t look up to cowards 
and dishonest people and try to be like them. We don’t make movies honouring 
famous cowards, with film stars competing for the role; cowards feature as butts in 
comic movies in which they are they are the objects of derision. We don’t use well-
known cowards as sources of understanding to be conveyed to eager learners; 
people aim not to become well known as cowards.  
The drive to aspire also does not seem to fit vice. The learner in virtue (ideally) 
comes to understand the point of what she learns to do, to come to acquire the skill 
in a way which is hers and not just mere imitating, and to keep improving at doing 
what she has learned.7 In all these ways she moves beyond merely doing what a 
teacher or role model does, and comes to grasp what the point of it is, so that she 
will respond to a new situation in a way which will probably be different from what 
she has learnt in being a different type of action, but also the same as what she has 
learnt in being an exercise of the same virtue that she learnt in the previous type of 
situation. All of these points lead to absurdity when we think of vice. We do not 
ask ourselves whether an action really responded to the situation in an 
appropriately cowardly way. We don’t ask if we were as cowardly as the situation 
demanded (indeed it sounds absurd to think of the demands of cowardice). We 
don’t ask, after the action is done, whether we were cowardly enough.  We aren’t 
praised for the cowardice of our behaviour and encouraged to improve on this by 
making the next action an even better example of cowardice.  
These point suggest that vice is not the same kind of character trait as virtue. 
Obviously people do learn to be dishonest, greedy and cowardly, but it can’t be in 
the kind of way that they learn to be honest, temperate and courageous. This is 
significant for the structure of virtue and of vice, since the issue of how we learn to 
be virtuous is not separable from the issue of what virtue is. A virtue is a 
disposition which has come about as a result of a certain kind of history, and its 
                                           
6 I develop these in chapter 3 of my book Intelligent Virtue, Oxford – New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2011. 
7 These three aspects of the drive to aspire are explored further in Intelligent Virtue (n.6). 
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nature can’t be understood independently of that history. We expect the same to 
be true of vice; but it can’t be the same kind of history. 
Yet vice is a character trait, a disposition, which, as we acquire it, ends up 
with our being motivationally unconflicted in a way comparable to that of the 
virtuous. Perhaps it is a mistake to apply the skill analogy to vice? Perhaps the 
history that leads to the character trait of vice is different from the history that 
leads to the character trait of virtue and does not involve anything to which the 
skill analogy is appropriate. 
One answer which I will not explore here is that vice is a positive aspiration to 
evil in a way that mirrors virtue’s aspiration to good. This can be articulated in 
ways other than the one just rejected (aspiration to be cowardly, stingy and so on). 
I am leaving this aside in this paper because I am thinking of vice in terms of an 
account of virtue which is broadly Aristotelian in structure, in which, as we have 
seen, positive aspiration to evil does not fit. A full account of vice would explore 
this option.  
A common and widely appealing way of thinking of vice is that is falling for 
temptation. The coward knows that she should not run away, but is unable to stand 
by that conviction because the thought of reaching her own safety tempts her to 
run, and she gives in the temptation. This account recommends itself for greed; the 
person is fully convinced that he should not have more to eat, but ‘gives in’ or 
‘falls for’ the temptation to have that extra piece, and so acts greedily. Dishonesty 
is also readily seen on this pattern. The person knows that she should not swindle 
an easily fooled client, but ‘can’t help herself’ going for so easy a profit, and so 
falsifies the papers. This account, however, does not fit all vices equally well, such 
as cruelty or envy. In any case, independently of that it has a problem right at the 
start: it makes vice a matter of failing to stick to what you are convinced is the 
right thing to do, and this fails to distinguish adequately between vice and akrasia. 
There are cowards who just run away, gluttonous people who just take another 
piece of pie and dishonest people who just go ahead with the swindle, with no 
motivational discomfort, no idea of being tempted to go against what they think 
they should do. These look like people whose vice is not akratic; they seem to have 
a settled and unconflicted character trait of some kind. 
In ancient ethical thinking there is a running temptation to think of the 
vicious person as the person who simply goes for what she most wants, neglecting 
overall priorities. This can be seen as a version of the ‘giving in to temptation’ 
interpretation of vice. The ancient model of reasoning is often the reasoning which 
takes in a life overall, as opposed to wants and desires which are focussed only on 
their own gratification, and this sometimes suggests the model of the vicious 
person as someone who goes only for what gives them pleasure at the time, without 
taking account of the priorities of their life as a whole.  This picture, however, is 
inadequate for an account of vice as a whole, as opposed to the particular vice of 
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intemperance.8 Firstly, the objectives of the vicious need not be short-term 
gratifications: they might be as lengthy as Inspector Javert’s years-long vindictive 
pursuit of Jean Valjean. They need not have anything to do with indulgence; 
Javert is hardly a model of self-indulgence in his gruelling pursuit. The problem is 
not that the vicious are aiming at getting self-indulgent gratifications, but that 
they are going for the wrong things, whether these are what they most want at the 
time or not. Secondly, it is exaggerated to think that the greedy or dishonest 
person will have no, or weak, overall values and priorities. Being greedy for money 
is compatible with running your life overall in a perfectly competent manner, one 
focussed on getting money, rather than giving money its appropriate place in your 
life.  
As we can see from the above examples, it is not giving in to temptation that is 
at the heart of vice, but going for the wrong things. Is getting what to pursue 
wrong what most characterizes vice? In one way this has to be correct, because the 
virtuous person is the person whose disposition is to get things right – to make the 
right practical decisions in all their aspects, evaluative and mundane. There is an 
initial appeal, then, to this idea of vice as failure to do what the virtuous succeed in 
doing. The coward fails to grasp which kinds of things are really to be feared and 
which are not; similarly the gluttonous failed to grasp limits to indulgence in food, 
and the dishonest fails to grasp which things are to be thought of as others’ and 
not your own. They are failures at being courageous, temperate and honest.  
This idea also does not fit all vices equally well, but again there are deeper 
issues. Firstly, the general idea of failure will not do enough work here. Vicious 
people may turn out to have failed to learn something crucial, but vicious and bad 
people are not reasonably thought of as being blunderers, or dull and stupid.  
Becoming virtuous is not a course in which they get a failing grade. Some bad 
people are highly intelligent, and some vicious activities require intelligence, 
application and imagination. Vice is then not well characterized in terms simply of 
failure; it is a character trait, and a character trait can’t be made up just of 
failures. 
The vicious are getting something important wrong which the virtuous get 
right. Vices, however, may display, and some may require, intelligence and 
foresight, in this being like the virtues. (The importance of this may differ among 
different vices. Dishonesty will not develop very far without considerable 
intelligence; laziness is clearly different.)9 The obvious way in which the vicious 
differ from the virtuous is that they get things wrong about value. The dishonest 
businesswoman thinks immediate gain is more important than running her 
                                           
8 Aristotle’s remarks on vice are coloured by the fact that he focuses on intemperance as a 
paradigm vice. For this and other illuminating points see Terence Irwin’s interpretation of 
Aristotle on vice: ‘Vice and Reason,’ Journal of Ethics 5 (2001) 73-97. 
9 Matthias Haase has suggested that he the same vices may come in an intelligent version and an 
unintelligent or stupid version, an idea worth further exploration. 
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business honestly. The coward thinks that immediate safety is more important 
than doing what will warn others. And so on. The vicious show, in a traditional 
formulation, ignorance of the good. They are mistaken in their priorities; they get 
wrong what matters in life, in ways that distinguish them from the virtuous.  
An account of vice has to hold together, and do justice to, the following points 
about vice. It is a character trait, the state of the person who does the wrong thing 
and is characteristically (as a matter of character) unconflicted about it. It 
involves getting wrong matters of goodness and value which the virtuous get right. 
And (to varying degrees) it involves practical intelligence, something which also 
characterizes the virtuous. As a character trait, vice should be learnable in the way 
that virtue is learnable. But, as we have seen, the vicious do not have the same 
values as the virtuous, and so do not have the ethical aims that the virtuous aspire 
to as they learn to be virtuous. How then can the vicious learn to exercise the kind 
of practical intelligence that they often display? A cruel person may have as 
sensitive and practically intelligent a view of others’ psychology as a tactful 
person, but may use this to hurt rather than to support. 
Since we do seem to learn to be cruel as well as learning to be tactful, let us 
return to the skill analogy for virtue despite the problems aired above. There has 
often been a temptation to think of vice in terms of skill in a different way. 
Perhaps, it is suggested, virtue and vice both have the structure of a skill, and 
differ merely in the ends that they have. The cruel and the tactful learn the same 
practical skill, but apply it to different ends, the cruel to hurting and the tactful to 
supporting. The cruel, after all, can adjust means to ends, be aware of the different 
kinds of issues salient in a situation and deliberate skillfully; these are aspects of 
skill that can be learned and exercised systematically. How does this work out in 
terms of the skill analogy? 
Here are two examples, one from productive and one from performance skills. 
A painter becomes skilled in her art, and can produce great paintings. But since 
these do not sell well, she produces kitschy paintings which sell for large sums of 
money. A cricketer becomes a skilled batsman, but makes money from spot-fixing 
during matches. (Spot-fixing is taking money from betting syndicates for 
deliberately playing badly at a certain agreed point in a game; people bet on the 
results of parts of a game as well as the result of the whole.)10 These are clearly 
examples of having a skill and putting it to a mistaken end; they come from the 
point that ordinary skills, as has often been noticed, have the feature that the 
person who can paint well can also choose to paint badly, and the person who can 
play to win can also choose to play to lose. This use of skill to illuminate virtue and 
vice runs into problems with virtue, since it presents aspiring to be virtuous as 
detachable from the intelligent building-up of the virtuous disposition. But even 
                                           
10 It is a form of cheating without necessarily affecting the result achieved by the whole team, 
and is thus hard to track. It clearly requires skill. 
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apart from that we can see that it is inadequate to explain the nature of vice, since 
nothing in it corresponds to the unconflicted nature of vice as opposed to akrasia. 
The painter and the cricketer might be perfectly happy with the use to which they 
are putting their skill, or they might be torn and internally conflicted. We have, 
then, not yet found the nature of vice. 
However, if we return to the examples, they suggest a more subtle way in 
which we might find how we learn to be vicious. Instead of thinking of the painter 
and the cricketer as having the formed skill which they then apply to a wrong end, 
think of someone learning to do what they do – apply the skill instrumentally to 
achieving some other end. A painter learns to paint, but only to produce kitschy 
pictures which will sell well; a cricketer learns to play only  in ways that focus on 
spot-fixing, and so learns to play badly as much as to play well. They haven’t 
learnt to do the same thing as the expert painter and cricketer, since their exercise 
of skill is limited, and they cannot yet (and perhaps never can) paint or play as 
well as the expert painter and player do. On the other hand, it’s clearly false that 
they haven’t learned to paint, or to play cricket; they may be making lots of 
money for painting, or playing, the way they do. What is going on?  
In their case the acquisition of the skill involves a misdirection as it is learnt. 
The pupils learn to do what painters and players do, but not in the way that 
painters and players typically do – that is, aspiring to acquire the skill. A skill has 
standards intrinsic to it, which a pupil has to respect if she wishes to acquire the 
skill. This is most obvious when a pupil comes to see that she won’t succeed in 
reaching these because of lack of strength, aptitude and so on. Someone may, 
however, have the capacity to reach them, but instead of regarding doing this as a 
goal to be pursued for its own sake – for the sake of having the skill – regards 
reaching them merely as a means to something else, for example money. The 
painter will feel no need to practice beyond what she can do to produce money-
making pictures; the cricketer will practice to lose as much as to win and so will 
not feel the need to develop the attitude of being part of a winning team. Their 
acquisition of the skill is limited, because it has been misdirected. 
Making this distinction between reaching the standards of a skill, and learning 
the skill only for other purposes, does not imply that acquiring a skill should be 
‘above’ thinking of uses to which it should be put. Of course a painter, and a 
cricketer, need to make money, and can reasonably hope that their work will be 
appreciated and famous. The important difference is between acquiring the skill, 
and then applying it to make money among other things, and misdirecting the 
acquisition of the skill towards those things as it is learnt. The standards of a skill 
both guide and constrain what the skilled person does with it. A skilled painter will 
aim to make money by exercising her skill, not by exercising her skill in a way that 
involves no respect for the standards of her art. A skilled cricketer, and other 
athletes, will aim to make money by exercising their skill to win, not by exercising 
it to lose. The pupils who have learnt the misdirected skill have in a sense not fully 
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acquired that skill, since they have no idea of what it is to exercise that skill in a 
non-instrumental way, a way in which the standards of the skill guide and 
constrain the way the skill is exercised. They have learned in a way that is 
indifferent to the standards of the skill, and to the extent that they are satisfied 
with this result they are mistaken about what it is to reach those standards. If, for 
example, the painter making her living from kitschy paintings feels thoroughly 
self-satisfied, she is mistaking what it is to be a painter, to strive to satisfy the 
standards of her skill. (This is not to say that we are in a position to blame her; 
skills have a different role in life than virtues do.) Similarly if the cricketer is 
thoroughly self-satisfied he has mistaken what it is to be a cricketer, as opposed to 
someone exploiting cricketing skills. 
Does this illuminate the difference between learning to be virtuous and 
learning to be vicious? Take a young person whose father has run a business 
honestly for many years and been successful.11 The son learns the business from 
him, but at every point his emphasis is on how much money is made. Focussing on 
this he notices not only ways in which more money could be made in the honest 
ways assumed hitherto, but also dishonest ways in which money could be made, or 
ways that never occurred to his father. Going for getting the most money he 
proceeds to cheat unsuspecting clients. The difference between him and his father 
is not that his father was uninterested in money; it’s that for the father the pursuit 
of money was guided and constrained by honesty, whereas for the son it is not. The 
son thus does not aspire to be honest as his father did; he holds a value which 
honest people see to be mistaken. However, as far as the running of the business 
goes, the son has learned from his father the kinds of actions an honest person 
would have learned (by way of business expertise, marketing skills and so on). It 
was while he was learning them, not after, that the son learned to make money in 
ways not guided or restrained by honesty. In learning to run the business in ways 
focussed only on making money he is like the cricketer who learns to play in a way 
focussed on making money by spot fixing. Both of them are missing something 
important about the whole endeavor they are occupied in, but they can exercise 
cleverness in the ways they act. 
Here as often we can learn from Aristotle, who contrasts practical intelligence 
with another ability, which he calls cleverness (deinotes).12 This is involved in 
practical wisdom, since practically wise people not only have the right aims but are 
intelligent in the ways they achieve them, but it can also achieve ends in a way 
detached from aspiring to the right ends. We would all, of course, prefer to be 
intelligent rather than to be slow or dull; there is nothing to be rejected about 
cleverness in itself. But someone who is merely clever can end up pursuing money, 
                                           
11 I add this point to remove the idea that the son might be reacting against deficiencies in what 
his father has been doing. 
12 Nicomachean Ethics, 1144a20-b1.  
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success, status or other such aims in ways that are detached from concern with 
virtue. This is most obvious with money, but it is easy to think of other examples: 
a writer who achieves success by writings which make hurtful revelations about 
other people, an academic who exploits the work of others without 
acknowledgement, and so on. There are of course people who do this sort of thing 
once, or occasionally, and feel conflicted about it. However, we are thinking of 
people who act like this because they have learnt to pursue their aims in ways that 
are detached from the ethical values which guide and constrain the way the 
virtuous pursue them. And this seems promising as an account of vice. These are 
people who are not conflicted – they act without internal struggle because they 
have learnt to act this way and have got used to feeling positively about it. They 
do not share the aims of the virtuous: they are not aiming to be honest, or 
compassionate. At the same time, they are not aiming to be dishonest or mean. 
They are not aiming to be any kind of person at all. They are just aiming at having 
money, status or whatever, and they have learned to do this in the same ways that 
the virtuous have, and may be good at it. In their case they have limited their 
lessons to ways of achieving things like money and status, ignoring the 
considerations which guide and constrain the virtuous as they achieve the same 
aims, considerations which enable the virtuous to aspire to become honest, brave 
and so on.  
This account of vice meets the desiderata mentioned above, that vice is an 
unconflicted character trait, that the vicious get wrong about value what the 
virtuous get right, and that the vicious can nevertheless display a kind of practical 
intelligence in exercising the vices. The intelligence in practical matters which the 
vicious display may overlap with that of the virtuous, as with the cruel person who 
is as good as reading people’s reactions as the tactful person. But the virtuous have 
developed this practical intelligence while, and in the course of, learning to aspire 
to be a certain kind of person – tactful, honest and so on – while the vicious have 
learned it in a way detached from these aims. There is truth in the idea that the 
intelligence of the vicious is limited, and that because of this narrowness of scope 
and vision it may end up undermining, rather than furthering, the person’s goals. 
The ‘smart’ vicious person may trip herself up because of failing to comprehend 
what is beyond her limited range. However, this idea, which has often served to 
make virtuous people feel better about worldly failure, should not be pushed too 
hard; some of the vicious do die prosperous and successful. 
The present account of vice also accounts for the point that the cowardly are 
not aspiring to be cowardly; vice turns out not to be an aspiration to be vicious, 
but to go for the same everyday things in life that the virtuous go for – money, 
success and so on – but in a way detached from what the virtuous take to be 
important. What is this ‘detachment’, and how does it relate to the traditional 
thought mentioned above, that the vicious are ignorant of the good? Here it is 
helpful to bear in mind that for vice to be a character trait which is relevantly like 
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virtue in being unconflicted, it has to have been developed in ways which involve 
not only the building up of beliefs but the formation of our emotional and affective 
side. The virtuous person learns that it is right to do the fair thing, and learns 
through experience and teaching not to feel resentful about a fair distribution 
which disadvantages him. The vicious person is the person who does feel resentful, 
and who does not come to see the point of respecting fairness. She develops in a 
way that tries to evade fairness or to exploit occasions where fairness is demanded, 
feeling resentful when she is forced to be fair and pleased when she can get away 
with being unfair to her own advantage. We may say that she is ignorant or 
mistaken about fairness; she gets it wrong about what fairness is and what its 
value is, where the virtuous gets it right. Or we may say that she is indifferent to 
these things.13 With someone who is vicious (rather than akratic) these are not 
alternatives; both are right. The virtuous person comes to feel less and less 
impeded in virtuous action by contrary feelings or inclinations, as he comes to be 
more and more confident that the virtuous aim is worth aiming for. Similarly the 
vicious person comes to feel more and more indifferent to considerations of virtue 
as he becomes more and more confident that the virtuous aim is silly, or for losers, 
and the like. Ignorance of the good, and insensitivity to it, are mutually 
reinforcing, just as are true beliefs about the good, and increasing motivation to 
pursue it. In one case we may be struck by someone’s indifference to, say, 
suffering, and in another case it is the person’s misconception of what is worth 
doing that we notice. But indifference and ignorance of value go together; both are 
involved in a developed vice, for the same reason that practical intelligence and 
positive motivation are in the case of virtue.14  
This account of vice also goes some way towards accounting for another point. 
Since virtues all involve practical intelligence, which is not compartmentalized by 
the different areas it deals with, there is a tendency for virtues to be integrated or 
unified by the exercise of practical intelligence in them. This does not go over to 
vices, however. The practical intelligence in a vice is, as we have seen, cleverness, 
focussed on getting various ordinary aims in life, such as money and status, in 
indifference to considerations of virtue, which might restrain the cleverness in 
some directions, and guide it in others. The focus of cleverness on one such aim, 
such as money, has no tendency in itself to unify its pursuit with others in the 
person’s life, such as having a family, or being famous. This myopia of cleverness 
means that a vice can develop without integration from other character traits 
(except those whose exercise is instrumentally required to achieve the end of 
making money). Insofar as the person’s life is unified by the pursuit of a single end 
                                           
13 For interesting remarks about indifference in the context of vice see Neera Badhwar in 
chapters 6 and 7 of her Well-Being , Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
14 In this paper I do not go into the details of how the vicious’ characteristic way of getting it 
wrong about value involves ignorance and mistake; I hope to extend work on the vices I this 
direction.  
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like money, this pursuit produces a unification which is generally regarded, in the 
wider culture and not merely in philosophy, as artificial and forced. Lives of the 
vicious, in fact and fiction, are often represented as compartmentalized in this kind 
of way; the all-consuming pursuit of money in particular is generally recognized as 
producing a life which is unsatisfactory in its structure.  
Further, the disunified way in which vices can develop in the person means 
that the life of the vicious can be internally conflicted in ways that have nothing to 
do with the internal conflicts of the enkratic and the akratic. Cowardice will tend 
to interfere with cruelty, arrogance with ambition, stinginess with greed. 
Moreover, vices are unlikely to develop on any scale without the assistance of two 
virtues which have been labelled ‘executive’ virtues, courage and temperance. If 
you are unable to stand up for your projects or to resist short-term gratifications, 
you are unlikely to achieve anything either virtuous or vicious on a large scale. To 
the extent that vices do develop on a large scale, then, there is likely to be an 
internal conflict with the recognition of the value of resisting danger and 
temptation.15  
 
I have argued that we can give an account of vice which shows how it is 
similar to virtue in being an unconflicted character trait, which is learned in the 
same way as a virtue is learned, but in a way which is misdirected because 
indifferent to and mistaken about the kind of person to aspire to be as we learn to 
exercise our practical intelligence. I’ve also suggested that the account fits well 
with some aspects of vice. There is more to be said about vice, both within an 
account of virtue of an Aristotelian kind and beyond it to other types. I have 
stressed the skill analogy in this paper because it is so important to an account of 
virtue which is Aristotelian in structure, and because, at least at first, it appears to 
offer problems for a corresponding account of vice. I hope to have shown that the 
development of a practical skill is as useful for giving an account of vice as it is for 
giving an account of virtue.16 
 
                                           
15 It may be objected that executive virtues are just traits that can be harnessed to any end, and 
so not in themselves virtues. However, insofar as courage and temperance import the value of 
being a brave and self-controlled person they do import the idea of a virtue trait as worth having 
in itself, not just instrumentally to achieving some end. 
16 I am grateful to the members of my Virtue Ethics seminar in Spring 2015, and in particular to 
Phoebe Chan, Vincent Colainni and Greg Robson. I am also grateful to the audience for a very 
different first version of this paper at the Workshop on Virtue and Skill at the Centre for the 
Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, June 1-2, 2015, and especially to Christel Fricke for 
organizing it with me as well as for comments, and to Matthias Haase, Matt Stichter, Peter 
Railton,Will Small, Darcia Narvaez and  Sascha Settegast. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I would like to offer a reinterpretation of care ethics both as a feminist perspective 
on moral reflection and as an interesting remapping of the moral domain in itself. 
The feminist nature of care ethics can be understood in different terms. The leading idea of this 
paper is that the effort of distinguishing these terms may have important implications for a more 
structured philosophical understanding of our account of  care ethics (and therefore of ethics). As 
I hope will become clear in what follows, this can be thought of in terms of distinguishing – at 
least metaphorically, if not technically – between considering care ethics as an ethics which puts 
at its centre (more traditional) “feminine virtues” or alternatively (some new) “feminist virtues”.  
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Introduction 
Care ethics is nowadays considered one of the most thought provoking 
contributions of feminist thought to moral reflection and an interesting moral 
paradigm in itself. In the wake of Carol Gilligan’s first attempt to envisage an 
alternative – conceived in terms of responsible care for relationships – to the 
universalist, rationalistic, impartialist and individualistic moral paradigms (which 
characterise – to say it with Anscombe – “modern moral philosophy”), a 
significant literature has emerged. In fact Gilligan’s suggestions, but also those 
made in the same period by Sarah Ruddick and Nel Noddings, are considered 
insightful by many moral philosophers and have been further elaborated along 
different lines of development. 
As is well known, a rich, ongoing debate among feminists and among 
philosophers who are, in their turn, critical of universalist and impartialist moral 
                                           
1 I would like to thank Catherine Bearfield for her help with the nuances of English language and 
her thoughtful advice. 
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conceptions, has developed, focusing on the possibilities for understanding, 
refining and using those initial insights, giving them a more definite philosophical 
structure and considering the breadth of their implications for restructuring the 
field of moral philosophy. 
Care ethics has in fact been developed as a distinctive moral paradigm (for 
instance by Joan Tronto and Virgina Held), but also many critics of universalist 
and impartialist moral conceptions have shown an interest in this proposal and in 
the consonances to be found with forms of moral sentimentalism and virtue ethics 
(see for instance Annette Baier’s and Michael Slote’s work), with moral 
particularism (as in the work of Lawrence Blum), or – more recently – with moral 
perfectionism and ordinary language ethics (as in Sandra Laugier’s writings). 
These encounters have produced fertile dialogues. 
This wide debate notwithstanding, I think there is still room for offering 
another contribution on care ethics, focusing on some of its salient aspects, but also 
its limits. In this paper, therefore, I would like to sketch the main lines of such a 
contribution, aimed at offering a reinterpretation of care ethics both as a feminist 
perspective on moral reflection and as an interesting remapping of the moral 
domain in itself. 
It should be made clear from the outset however, that the main object of this 
paper is not that of drawing a comparison between the above-mentioned different 
lines of research, or to argue in favour of one or the other of this vast array of 
philosophical positions. Rather, my attempt is to grasp more clearly, from a 
particular point of view, some elements which are relevant to a fuller 
understanding of care ethics, and therefore of this wider philosophical debate. This 
viewpoint will involve going back to Gilligan’s initial insights and considering 
them in the light of some more recent feminist considerations. Accordingly, while 
engaging in dialogue with certain well known (mostly sentimentalist) 
interpretations of care ethics and maintaining a rather superficial reference to the 
moral language of virtues, my main effort will be that of offering an illustration of 
some recent developments in feminist thought, which I find interesting both in 
themselves and as a contribution to a fuller understanding of care ethics and thus 
of ethics as such.  
The feminist nature of care ethics, though often invoked, is not 
straightforward. It can in fact be understood in different terms, and the leading 
idea of this paper is that the effort of distinguishing these terms may have 
important implications for a more structured philosophical understanding of such 
an account of ethics (also in relation to other attempts at giving shape to non 
universalist and non impartialist accounts of ethics). As I hope will become clear in 
what follows, this can be thought of in terms of distinguishing – at least 
metaphorically, if not technically – between considering care ethics as an ethics 
which puts at its centre (more traditional) “feminine virtues” or alternatively 
(some new) “feminist virtues”. 
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It should be made clear that the idea of considering whether and to what 
extent care ethics and feminist thought are intertwined does not proceed from an 
ideological standpoint: there is no assumption that one should be feminist, nor any 
request of coherence for philosophers who declare themselves feminists, as many 
protagonists of the care ethics debate do. It proceeds instead from my opinion that 
feminist thought, in its development, offers some important considerations to be 
taken into account in the kind of reflection on ethics that care ethicists undertake 
(of value also in a wider philosophical debate on ethics). As will be argued, I 
believe that the evolution of feminist thought offers some important insights, not 
only with regard to the problem of women’s oppression but also with the need for a 
reconsideration of the human condition, of subjectivity and of morality, all of 
which are relevant to mapping the moral domain. A deeper analysis of what care 
can come to mean in the light of these feminist considerations (on subjectivity, 
humanity, morality or epistemology), may therefore be of some interest. The core 
issue of this paper is, thus, to assess whether care ethics, in the specific 
understanding I will be trying to carve out, is able to accommodate some of these 
considerations. At the same time, I will be arguing in favour of the value of these 
kinds of considerations in themselves.  
Of course, the idea of focusing on this parallelism was inspired by the declared 
feminist nature of many reflections on care ethics, and by the ongoing debate that 
has developed in order to characterise this. In fact, as will be described in the 
following pages, there are at least two different ways to consider the feminist 
meaning of care ethics. One interpretation is that this approach to ethics is a way 
of doing justice to women: recognising in them a specific moral “voice”, based on 
the particularity of women’s experiences or on specific feminine endowments (in 
this sense we can consider care ethics as envisaging a specific form of “feminine 
ethics”, based on particular “feminine virtues”). The other interpretation is to 
consider care ethics as an account of ethics which is able to deal with the 
particularity, difference and concreteness of all human beings. This is one of the 
themes feminists elaborate by reflecting on women’s experience in order to give 
shape to a more adequate account of ethics for all. An account of ethics which, 
unlike universalist abstract accounts, is able to consider the importance, but also 
the difficulties, of caring for others in their differences. My contention is that 
clarification of the sense in which care ethics is feminist – and I will argue it is 
feminist in this second sense –  is a way to clarify care ethics as such.  
In what follows I would like not only to distinguish these two interpretations 
from each other but also to elaborate on the second, in an attempt to delineate 
what is required in order to consider a (feminist) care ethics not as the elaboration 
of a peculiar feminine endowment but rather as a form of discourse on ethics which 
is able to accommodate those feminist contributions in relation to all human 
beings, and, as such, as important contributions to moral reflection. 
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In the final section, I will therefore try to develop a few suggestions, but also 
to leave open certain questions which may hopefully be of interest both to those 
concerned primarily with the debate on care ethics and to others who are 
attempting to map the moral domain in ways that offer alternatives to 
universalist, rationalist, and impartialist approaches. 
 
1. Circumscribing the problem: the core contents of care ethics and the feminist context 
In order to characterize the nucleus of care ethics I will go back to Gilligan’s work, 
since I see her work as offering the raw material on which care ethics as a 
distinctive moral approach has been developed, but also as offering some specific 
clues (not always maintained in subsequent developments), as to what renders 
such an approach so interesting. I will try to show how Gilligan’s claims can be 
read as a specific kind of feminist claim, contextualising them within a (personal) 
reconstruction of the development of feminist thought. 
It was 1982 when Carol Gilligan published In a Different Voice,2 the book 
containing the results of her work which, starting from empirical psychological 
studies on the development of moral judgement in adolescents of both sexes, 
launched the idea of a different voice in ethics and started to configure it 
theoretically. 
As she says at the beginning of her book, it was in years of “listening to people 
talking about morality and about themselves”, that she came to hear a distinction 
between: “two ways of speaking about moral problems, two modes of describing 
the relationship between other and self”3, and it was in trying to account for this 
second voice, that of girls and young women, or rather, in trying to solve what she 
considered the puzzle of female morality, that she came to think of “care” or, more 
precisely, of “responsible care” as a crucial notion for a different conception of 
morality. 
As is well known, it was mainly with reference to the results of the work done 
and ideated by Lawrence Kohlberg, concerning the moral development of 
adolescents, that she started her research. This aimed at considering the difference 
caught in the female voice, and at resisting the verdict of an inferior or defective 
moral development of girls and young women which  resulted from Kohlberg’s 
studies (a verdict which – as Gilligan argues in her book – was in line with the 
widespread representation of women’s development and role in the psychological 
tradition, but which is – one can add – also in line with the commonsensical 
                                           
2 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice. Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
3 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 1. 
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representation of women in the history of Western philosophy and Western 
culture).4 
Resisting the idea of female minority, Gilligan tried, in fact – with what can be 
defined as a feminist gesture – to characterise the answers of girls and young 
woman not as a deficient version of the male ones, but as giving shape to a 
different “voice”, with specific contents, and to recognize this different “female” 
moral development as valuable in thinking the human condition and morality.  
A crucial tenet of her work was the idea that it was indeed the representation 
of morality and humanity implicit in Kohlberg’s research, and not the girls’ and 
young women’s answers to his questions (or women as such), which was limited 
(this seems rather obvious to us now, but it was revolutionary at the time). More 
specifically, what was limited was Kohlberg’s scale5 itself. This scale is 
representative of the long history of the characterisation of human subjectivity in 
terms of isolation and separation, and of morality in terms of abstract and 
impersonal rules able to put those separate and sovereign selves in relation to each 
other, and also able to give an (impartial, objective) order to their moral 
determinations: rules and norms which are obtained by detaching oneself from 
one’s own particularity and inclinations and those of others, thus adopting an 
impersonal point of view from which to fix the representation of each moral 
problem as that of a relationship between “generalised others”, gaining at the same 
time the status of full moral agent.6 Gilligan’s idea was instead that what was 
worth inquiring into was precisely what rendered it difficult for women to give an 
account of their own experience that fitted these terms. Her thesis was therefore 
                                           
4 See Gilligan, In a Different Voice, chap. 5. For a similar comment on women seen as “defective, 
deficient and dangerous beings” throughout the history of Western philosophy see Virginia 
Held, The Ethics of Care. Personal, Political, and Global. (Oxford-New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), p. 59. For wider analyses on the subject see: Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason. 
“Male” and “Female” in Western Philosophy. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1984); Francoise Collin, Evelyne Pisier, and Eleni Varikas, Les femmes de Platon à Derrida. 
(Paris: Plon, 2000). 
5 As is well known, Kohlberg’s studies proceeded by measuring the moral development of 
adolescents on a scale of six stages, each characterised by a different conceptualization of 
justification of moral judgements, ranging from an initial stage of egotism, through one of 
heteronymous adherence to conventional norms, to a final stage of post-conventional 
universalist moral thinking. 
6 In order to express these ideas Gilligan makes explicit reference to George Herbert Mead’s 
formulation as do many others after her, see for instance: Seyla Benhabib, “The Generalized and 
the Concrete Other. The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory,” in Ead. Situating 
the Self. Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Cambridge-Molden: 
Polity Press, 1992), pp.148-177. Sandra Laugier efficaciously exemplifies the alternative between 
detachment and connection in a paper on Gilligan’s care ethics, see Sandra Laugier “L’éthique 
d’Amy: le care comme changement de paradigme en éthique”, in Carol Giligan et l’étique du care. 
ed. Vanessa Nurock (Paris: Puf, 2010). On the negative and positive role of inclinations see 
Adriana Cavarero, Inclinazioni. Critica della rettitudine. (Milano: Raffaello Cortina, 2013).  
CATERINA BOTTI 
112 
that those characteristics which were considered as factors limiting the moral 
capacity of women, such as, for instance, “their care for and sensitivity to the 
needs of others” or the “emphasis on connections rather than separation”,7 
(characteristics she herself noted in her interviews), should instead be brought to 
light and considered in positive terms. And this in order to achieve, not only, or 
not primarily, a better representation of women and their experience, but rather a 
more accurate view of morality and human relationships. 
The disparity between women’s experience and the representation of human 
development noted throughout the psychological literature, has generally been 
seen to signify a problem in women’s development. Instead, the failure of 
women to fit existing models of human growth may point to a problem in the 
representation, a limitation in the conception of human condition, an omission 
of certain truths about life.8  
Here the “truths about life” worth taking into account are those concerning 
the relational nature of each life and of life itself. These truths endorse a moral 
standpoint which casts problems and their solutions in terms of responsible care 
for relationships, an attitude acquired through solicitude and sensitiveness and 
from a consideration of humans as deeply interdependent. 
The truth of relationship, however, returns in the rediscovery of connection, in 
the realization that self and other are interdependent and that life, however 
valuable in itself, can only be sustained by care in relationships.9 
In general terms, the proposed model can be described as characterising moral 
judgement and practice as emerging from connection, instead of from detachment 
(a point widely underlined by sentimentalist readers), or as  binding interconnected 
vulnerable selves instead of separate sovereign selves (an opposition between 
sovereignty and vulnerability which opens up also to various different readings, as 
for instance to some Aristotelian approaches, or to Wittegensteinian ones, or to 
those connected to radical feminist stances, as we will see). A further crucial 
element is the importance given to the particularity and difference of each life and 
each context. This is relevant if the main concern of morality is thought of in 
terms of maintaining the connection which ties us together, and of caring for our 
and the other’s wellbeing or flourishing, from within this relational framework. 
From different passages of Gilligan’s book, care ethics emerges therefore as a 
moral model which puts at its centre the agent’s capacity to be attentive, caring 
and responsive in relation to the needs of others, in their concreteness, 
particularity and relational nature, and which defines moral responsibility (or the 
                                           
7 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, pp. 18-19. 
8 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, pp. 1-2. 
9 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 127. 
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responsible character)10 in terms of the development and practice of these 
capacities. 
Before coming in the following section to a more detailed account of her 
proposal, let me say a few words on the feminist characterization of Gilligan’s 
gesture. 
Gilligan’s move can be considered as feminist insofar as she rejects and 
criticises a stereotyped verdict concerning women’s characteristics, one which is 
congruent with the specific and inferior position assigned to women in “men’s life 
cycle”11, a typical judgement of what can be defined as the patriarchal system. In 
a very broad understanding, a position is considered feminist as long as it is critical 
toward the idea that women, qua women, are different and inferior creatures (a 
critique eventually considered as leading to a more general discourse on 
difference/s).  
But of course this feminist core issue can be, and has been, developed in 
different ways, and in this light Gilligan’s move can be understood as a gesture of a 
precise and specific feminist kind. 
The aim of claiming that women are just as human as men can be achieved, in 
fact, in different ways. I will make reference to at least three different strategies. 
On the one side it can and has been sustained, that woman are substantially equal 
to men (at least concerning the relevant human capacities, as for instance reason), 
and therefore not inferior, and that if they seem different and inferior it is only 
because of unjust social conditions that have limited their opportunities. Women’s 
minority is therefore only the result of centuries of discrimination. If Gilligan’s 
feminism were of this kind she would have sustained that girls and young women 
scored low on Kohlberg’s scale only because they had been socialised in a 
discriminating environment; had they had the same opportunities and 
socialization of boys they would have achieved the same results.  
But this is not what she argues. 
Gilligan, in fact, following a more radical understanding of feminism, 
maintains that it is the scale, and the ideal of morality it enforces, that are 
misplaced, since they do not represent human experience and morality in their 
complexity: they do not, for example, take into account women’s experience or 
women’s ways of expressing themselves. She recognises a difference but non an 
inferiority in women’s development, and hence the necessity of a reconfiguration of 
morality. In these terms her gesture can be defined as of a specific feminist kind. 
Broadly speaking one can say that this second kind of feminism maintains that 
women are different from men, but not inferior, and that the difference they 
                                           
10 Although Gilligan speaks more often of a “morality of responsibility”, I think that the 
reference to a “responsible character” is not misplaced in this context. 
11 See Gilligan, In a Different Voice, chap. 1, entitled “Woman’s Place in Man’s Life Cycle”. 
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represent is worth inquiring into. Valuing women’s difference opens up to a 
reconsideration of what it means to be human, and thus to an enrichment for all.  
For the sake of my argument it is worth mentioning that although considered 
forceful, this kind of feminist strategy has been made the object of different 
criticisms.  
The main criticism raised against it is that it seems to imply the possibility of 
offering a common definition of women or of women’s experience, which is 
precisely what has hitherto been contested. It is alleged that claiming the value of 
women’s difference, although a powerful gesture in destabilising the supposed 
neutrality and the false universality of patriarchal discourse, could in its turn 
become similarly oppressive, as it seems to convey the possibility of a universal 
description of women, thereby duplicating the monological structure of patriarchy.  
The debate has been broadranging, not only on the nature of the supposed 
difference – whether it is essential or socially constructed – but also (and more 
interestingly) the definition of this difference itself has been put under pressure. Is 
“women’s difference” that which was defined by the patriarchal system, which 
should just be freed from its negative evaluation, or should it be completely 
redefined and explored? And could such a redefinition be seen as embracing all 
women? If so, what happens to the other relevant axes of difference which operate 
among women and more generally among humans (typically, race, class, sexual 
orientation, and so forth)? In the light of these problems, a third feminist strategy 
has emerged which can be thought of as taking on and attempting to offer an 
answer to these questions, thus opening up the problem of differences, and not 
only of women’s difference, for ethics. 
This is an important issue for the kind of analysis I would like to offer, namely 
an attempt to consider to what extent Gilligan’s ideas, and care ethics as such, 
could be collocated in this latter framework. That is to say, whether care ethics 
should be considered as emerging from the second kind of feminist strategy, or 
whether it can be seen as a way to tackle these broader questions.  
Let me go back to Gilligan: in assuming, characterising and valuing women’s 
difference and morality it has been said, for example, that Gilligan disregards 
differences between women and other relevant differences among human beings 
(social class, whether one is at the margin or at the centre of the social system, 
etc.). She is thereby accused of ascribing a common nature or common features to 
women, features which besides mirror those ascribed to them traditionally (e.g. the 
traditional feminine virtues), albeit in a positive light. This is a typical issue put 
forward by the so called power-centred feminists, but also by recent (and in my 
view more interesting) developments of feminist thought. I will argue, in what 
follows, that these critiques are disputable, with regard to Gilligan’s work or to 
possible interpretations of it, at least to a certain extent. But I will also argue that 
to situate care ethics within a different feminist framework implies (and suggests) a 
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very articulated set of considerations, which have not always been taken into 
account in the ensuing debate. 
In this respect, although on the nature of the “different voice” put forward in 
her work Gilligan shows a sort of ambiguity, it must be said that in the end she 
tries to take a definite position. In the end she is explicit in claiming that while it is 
important to recognise that women have a voice, as a way of doing justice to them, 
what she is mainly interested in is that in acknowledging this different voice we are 
recognising the existence of differences among human voices, or – as she has 
recently argued – the existence of a more humane voice, which is only contingently 
more easy to individuate in (young) women.12  
In fact, already in A Different Voice she claims to be interested more in the 
“theme” than in the “gender” of the different voice she was hearing, and she 
acknowledges that the association between women and the particular vision of 
moral development she traced there was empirical and not absolute.13 She claims 
not to be interested in defining women’s difference as such, but in the more general 
aim of giving an account of human differences that is not couched in terms of 
“better or worse”.14 This is intended to be the main result of her work: a criticism 
of the supposed neutrality of the scales commonly used to measure human (moral) 
development, as part of a more general critical stance on the assumed neutrality of 
the categories of human thought, knowledge and language (and in this respect she 
talks of the “relativity” of the “categories of knowledge as human constructions”, 
while, as I will clarify, I prefer to talk of the “instability of categories”).15 This 
opens up the possibility of a positive use of this criticism. Thus she claims: 
My interest lies in the interaction of experience and thought in different voices 
and the dialogue they give rise to, in the way we listen to ourselves and to 
others, in the stories we tell about our lives.16  
With this kind of claim, in my opinion, she clearly commits herself to a 
particular radical stance in relation to the abovementioned debate within 
feminism, a position which is compatible with more recent forms of feminist 
thought, those offering an understanding of feminism not as limited to the problem 
of mending women’s oppression or affirming women’s difference, but as critical of 
patriarchy as a more generalised form of oppressive structure, as a system of power 
which disciplines hierarchically not only women, but both men and women, 
human beings in general, on the basis of supposed differences in status, whilst at 
the same time obscuring the value of differences that matter, that is of different 
                                           
12 See Carol Gilligan, Joining the Resistance (Cambridge-Molden: Polity Press, 2011). 
13 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 2. 
14 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 14 
15 See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 6 and Sandra Harding, “The Instability of the 
Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory”, Signs, 11 (1986), pp. 645-664. 
16 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 2. 
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voices. Gilligan seems therefore to regard care ethics as an ethics which deals with 
humankind in this differentiated sense.  
This is clearer in her later writings (including the letter to readers of the second 
edition of In a Different Voice), for instance where she claims that “difference [is] a 
marker of human condition and not a problem to be solved”17 and that it is in this 
light that we should recast our discourses on separation and connection with 
regard to individuals and relationships, rules and responsibilities. 
We may take it then that Gilligan is not so much interested in claiming that 
women have a different essence or nature as in claiming that what she finds in 
their development is important in order to recognise women’s possibility to express 
themselves and at the same time in order to reconsider a morality for both men 
and women, a morality which in turn is more open to differences. If this is the case, 
we can consider her argument as being made in three steps.  
In my view, Gilligan’s contention that the scales employed to measure human 
morality are not neutral, and that humanity is more complex and differentiated 
than has been assumed in uncritical representations, is a specific feminist move 
which can be described in the following way: as the idea that (1) recognising 
women’s difference will open up to (2) a recognition of human differences which 
will both allow women to gain a voice and allow for a more interesting 
representation of human experience, through (3) a wider reconfiguration of 
morality and humanity. This reconfiguration will mainly be concerned with the 
recognition of the frailty and difference of human experiences and of the ways in 
which we express them. As we will see, in fact, care ethics entails care for 
humankind in its difference and frailty and is in itself a frail voice. 
Yet this complexity of levels is not easy to express and many ambiguities 
remain to be clarified, but it is important – and this is my point – to vindicate the 
complexity of the feminist move described above, in its different aspects. Often, 
however –  particularly in the wider debate on care ethics –  this has not happened.  
It should be noted, as a final point in this regard, that even in Gilligan’s 
writings the treatment of this complexity is not always clearly articulated. In fact, 
while Gilligan seems to consider the difference she recognises in previously unheard 
women’s voices as a new voice, only empirically womanly, at times she appears to 
describe it precisely as the difference that has been traditionally ascribed to 
women, as if it were sufficient to rehabilitate terms attributed to women, such as 
those of their “goodness and virtue”, to describe the most humane voice.  
Gilligan notes in different places that the very same traits of “sensitivity” and 
“solicitude”, which she places at the centre of a different moral paradigm for 
humans, are the same traits which were traditionally considered as, on the one 
hand, characterising the “goodness of women” or as “feminine virtues” and, on the 
                                           
17 Carol Gilligan, Letter to Readers, in Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice. Psychological Theory 
and Women’s Development. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. xvii 
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other, as preventing women from achieving full moral maturity.18 As she says, this 
is a paradox that she wants to disentangle, bringing those traits fully into the light 
and putting them at the centre of a new vision of moral concern, in order to free 
women from their marginal position and, at the same time, to gain a different 
understanding of morality. 
In this case, Gilligan’s proposal seems to involve two moves. First she 
recognises a moral worth to the concerns which emerged from the girls and young 
women she interviewed in her studies, those which coincide with the traditionally 
undervalued “feminine virtues”. Then, as she claims in the same book and more 
clearly in the following works, she recognises these “virtues” as human rather than 
specifically feminine, thus recognising their role in a more comprehensive account 
of morality. What is lacking from this description is an analysis of what we can 
learn from this transposition, in terms of a broader reconfiguration of morality, 
that is to say, in terms of the instability of categories and of the frailty of human 
descriptions or voices. This is what is made explicit, instead, in the three-steps 
framework suggested above where a more general reconfiguration of the field of 
morality together with a more complex representation of human condition is 
implied. 
My point here is to ask whether the retrospective description that Gilligan 
gives of her own work is accurate, or whether in fact what she is proposing can be 
considered as something rather more complex than just moving certain questions 
from the margin to centre. In this movement, in fact, something is gained (or 
better lost): the very idea of a universal and neutral truth is lost, but the idea of a 
more unstable centre of morality is gained. The implication is therefore that the 
entire moral landscape should be reconfigured or, more radically, the notion 
emerges that it could never be configured once and for all, and that only in 
recognition of this can we try to account for human lives in all their differences.  
Is there any connection between this kind of epistemological standpoint and a 
morality of relational sensitivity? I would try to suggest something similar.  
In other words, going back to Gilligan’s claims concerning the “goodness of 
women” or the “feminine virtues”, one might wonder whether recognising their 
full value is a sufficient move from a feminist point of view, or whether something 
must be added in order to gain the refined understanding of care ethics as a post-
patriarchal morality for both men and women along the lines we have just 
described, i.e. as an ethics for humans in all their particularities and differences. 
To argue that this is the case, it is necessary first to consider more in details 
how Gilligan describes the different moral voice she has listened and envisaged. 
 
                                           
18 See for instance Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 18 but there are similar claims on many pages 
of this book as well as in many passages from her, Joining the Resistance. 
CATERINA BOTTI 
118 
2. Interdependence and responsible care 
What Gilligan finds in analysing girls’ and young women’s reactions to moral 
dilemmas can be described as follows: girls and (young) women are generally more 
aware of the role that relationships play in human life; they trust the human 
capacity to maintain and restore the web of interdependence which sustains 
human life, so that everybody and – she says – “life itself” may flourish. She 
claims that attention to interconnection leads girls and women to be more 
attentive and sensitive to the particular needs of others and to feel responsible for 
them, rather to abstract rules or principles of fairness or rights, as well as to the 
relational dimension which characterises the practice of this responsibility and not 
only its genesis. Women, or at least the women she has interviewed, once they are 
free to express themselves and to find their own voice, see moral problems in a 
different way, and find different solutions, which call for different concepts or 
different abilities. Gilligan therefore claims that if we do listen to women’s voice we 
will be able to envisage a different morality.  
It is worth mentioning that as Gilligan notes, envisaging such a different 
moral voice is not an easy task, because what makes the women’s voice relevant 
for morality results also in its weakness: that is, its recognition of the frailty of the 
human condition and of the web of relationships which nourishes it, and also of the 
relevance of the particularity of contexts, thus it is always a tentative sound that 
is produced. “It depends” is the common female answer in the case of moral 
dilemma,19 and this can be considered either as a confused answer or as a 
meaningful one, depending on what lies behind it. Gilligan attempts, out of her 
own attentive and caring listening, to envisage a framework which makes the 
power of such an answer visible, namely the attention and care it shows. 
Thus, in the famous example of the two children, Jake and Amy, who are 
asked to deliberate on the dilemma of a man, Heinz, who has to decide whether or 
not to steal a drug he cannot afford in order to save his wife’s life, while the boy 
reduces the dilemma to a conflict of rights (to life and to property) and solves it 
easily by adopting a detached and impersonal point of view according to which life 
has a logical priority over property (therefore not only should Heinz steal the drug, 
but if arrested the judge should reason according to the same logic and not 
condemn him as a thief), Amy seems at a loss and confused. She asks a lot of 
questions considered unnecessary according to the standard procedure adopted in 
such tests. It is only out of an attentive listening to her words, and by conducting 
the interview differently, that her voice emerges positively, and that Gilligan can 
claim that the girl sees the problem in a different way. 
For Amy, in fact, the dilemma arises – Gilligan notes – not from the conflict 
between the druggist’s rights and the rights of Heinz wife, but from the druggist’s 
                                           
19 Gilligan, Letter to Readers, p. xxi; In a Different Voice, p. 38. 
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failure to respond to Heinz and to his wife’s needs. Furthermore, it appears that 
this is not so much a problem that has to do with the druggist himself, as with the 
relationships between him and Heinz. The problem lies in a lack of 
communication, a communication which could render the druggist able to see the 
consequences of his refusal.  
In Amy’s vision, therefore, the problem and the solution lay in the relationship 
between particular persons in a particular context. In this sense, Gilligan claims 
that here we are faced with a different moral language and a different moral logic: 
the language of responsibility and the psychological logic of relationships. 
Yet the world she [Amy] knows is a different world from that refracted in 
Kohlberg’s construction of Heinz’s dilemma. Her world is a world of 
relationships and psychological truths where an awareness of the connection 
among people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another, a 
perception of the need of response. Seen in this light, her understanding of 
morality as arising from the recognition of relationship, her belief in 
communication as the mode of conflict resolutions, and her conviction that the 
solution to the dilemma will follow from its compelling representation seem far 
from naive or cognitively immature. Instead Amy’s judgments contains the 
insights central to an ethic of care, just as Jake’s judgments reflects the logic 
of the justice approach.20 
I think that this example is crucial in order to gain an insightful account of 
Gilligan’s care ethics. For this reason I will need to go into it more deeply.  
Gilligan continues offering the following comments: 
Her [Amy’s] incipient awareness of the “method of truth”, the central tenet of 
non violent conflict resolution, and her belief in the restorative activity of care, 
lead her to see the actors of the dilemma arrayed not as opponents in a context 
of rights but as members of a network of relationships on whose continuation 
they all depend. Consequently her solution to the dilemma lies in activating 
the network by communication, securing the inclusion of the wife by 
strengthening rather then severing connections.21 
It is worth noticing that for Amy not only should Heinz’s wife be included, but 
that in this process the druggist is not left aside either, as he would be in the 
alternative case in which his rights should give way to those of the sick woman, 
considered in an impersonal way as having greater force (as, for instance, in 
Dworkin’s understanding of rights as trumps). 
In fact, in the end Amy’s answer is that stealing is not the best choice Heinz 
could opt for, while communicating would allow the druggist to have a wider and 
                                           
20 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 30 
21 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, pp. 30-31. 
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more compelling representation of the situation. The problem thus cannot be 
solved by a single person, it requires instead the maintenance of a space for a 
relationship in which the vulnerabilities of all the actors are considered, starting 
from that of the sick woman, but without obliterating the others. The moral 
responsibility of everybody is therefore in maintaining this space of 
communication, engaging in relationship and committing oneself to care for the 
vulnerable.  
The ideal of care is thus an activity of relationship, of seeing and responding to 
need, taking care of the world by sustaining the web of connection so that no 
one is left alone.22  
This is in the end the idea of moral maturity – with its different language and 
logic – that Gilligan proposes, not only as a feminine one, but as an important 
ideal which should be recognized and valued, as indicating the way to develop an 
alternative and valuable pattern of moral development. 
Gilligan therefore puts forward a vision of moral maturity in contrast with 
those based on detachment, impersonality, impartiality and universality, those 
which rely on norms that are abstract and acquired through reason and which 
purport to breach the gap between ourselves and others. Girls, not seeing the gap, 
are rather concerned with the responsibility emerging from relationships, and with 
the need to respond from within the same relational tissue, working on those same 
relationships from within, in their concrete particularity, in order to improve 
them, to render them adequate for the survival and flourishing of their 
participants. On this view, moral maturity does not consist, therefore, in the 
capacity to abstract or detach oneself from the particular context of a moral 
dilemma, from one’s own role in it, or in reducing it to the issue of balancing 
conflicting interests on the basis of impersonal, abstract and formal procedures, 
considered as universally valid (abstract procedures or principles once gained are 
superimposed on the circumstances of everyday existence). Rather it consists in 
the development of sensitivity and solicitude, of attentiveness and interest in the 
needs of the other in their concrete particularity, in the awareness that it is 
possible to answer to these needs only by entering the same dimension of 
concreteness, communication and relationality. 
Finally, it could be said that, in order to grasp the core content of an ethics of 
care, Gilligan’s attitude is in itself an appropriate starting point: her gesture of 
entering into a direct relationship with the girls, in order to listen to them, 
abandoning pre-established interview procedures, is in fact a clear example of the 
                                           
22 Gilligan, In a Different Voice p. 62. As we will see this reference to taking care of the world is 
present also in Joan Tronto’s definition of care, although she seems to be less interested in the 
relational aspects of it. See Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries. A Political Argument for an Ethic of 
Care. (New York: Routledge, 1993) and see infra in this paper for a discussion of her position. 
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putting into practice of precisely what she went on to theorise as a result of her 
deep listening to those girls. Hers is a caring attitude, the ethical attitude in the 
new horizon she tries to depict. 
Let us now turn to certain other aspects of Gilligan’s work in order to better 
characterise ethics of care as a moral paradigm. 
Firstly, it should be made clear that while the “ideal of care” proceeds from 
the recognition of the interconnection and vulnerability of human lives, Gilligan 
seems to acknowledge the space for individual responsibility: the responsibility for 
participating in the web of relationships which sustain life, i.e. being responsive to 
the needs of others in their particularity. This sense of responsibility proceeds from 
a compelling and intimate representation of one’s own position in relation to others 
and to their needs.   
Secondly, with regard to acquiring this intimate representation, although she 
generally speaks of “sensitivity” and “solicitude”, Gilligan also indicates more 
specific kinds of capacities as crucial, such as: verbal communication, narration 
and listening; sentimental communication, empathy and sympathy; attention and 
imagination (differentiating these from identification and generalization).23 She 
doesn’t establish a hierarchy among them, nor does she offer specific 
characterizations, but calls for all these capacities together; while of course they 
have been conceptualised differently and are attributed varying values in different 
philosophical developments of care ethics. It may be important to note that at 
least in her last book, Gilligan seems to give more weight to empathy (also 
referring to neurobiological and anthropological studies), thereby opening the way 
mainly to sentimentalist reconstructions of care ethics.24 
Finally it is worth considering that, in her understanding, relationships can be 
sustained only in their particularity and should not be encapsulated within 
abstract rules, and therefore attention to differences and details is fundamental. 
Moreover, this attention to particularity is taken to be important for each (that is 
to say, for any kind of) relationship in which we might find ourselves, and is not 
limited to characterising some particular or specific kinds of relationships (such as 
for instance personal affective relationships). This is a significant development: at 
least in my understanding, the point Gilligan is making is that the needs of each 
participant in a relationships (that is to say those of each human being) should be 
met in his/her particularity, and not according to idealizations, generalisations, 
                                           
23 Regarding “empathy” see Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 8 and 11, where she characterises 
girls as having a greater store of it; she speaks of sympathy only when quoting George Eliot, at 
p. 148. General reference to sentimental communication as well as to verbal communication, 
narratives and listening are ubiquitous in her work, as well as to attention. On imagination and 
generalization see p. 59. 
24 See Gilligan, Joining the Resistance, where she refers to the works of Antonio Damasio and 
Sarah Blaffer Hardy. 
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etc.25 Conversely, however, care ethics is more often thought of as a model that 
advocates the importance of meeting the needs of (some) particular others, namely 
those with whom we have particular affective ties (see for instance the 
considerations concerning the opposition between partiality vs. impartiality in our 
obligations, developed following the above interpretation). While of course there is 
a problem, and not a trivial one, in understanding how we can represent and feel 
the particular needs of persons we do not know directly, it is clear that this forms 
part of what Gilligan is aiming at. It is not a casual fact that the core of Heinz’s 
dilemma does not turn around a particular affective relationship (or around the 
conflict between an impartial responsibility and one emerging from a particular 
tie), but lies in the encounter between two strangers (Heinz and the druggist), 
which, as Gilligan explains, can be explored in its moral aspects in two ways: out of 
an abstract logic of rights or out of care for the particular needs of all involved. 
This is a critical point in my understanding and one of the core issue of this paper.  
Thus in Heinz’s dilemma these two children see two very different moral 
problems – Jake a conflict between life and property that can be resolved by 
logical deduction, Amy a fracture of human relationships that must be mended 
with its own threads.26 
Similarly, it is important to make clear that, while appealing to the capacities 
and qualities of each to care for others, or to sustain the web of relationship in 
which one is enmeshed, in Gilligan’s account care ethics is not a form altruistic 
ethics, calling for benevolence or love and risking self-sacrifice. Gilligan clearly 
states that the different morality she has identified, in listening to girls and young 
women, is a morality that results from a development, just as much as that 
identified by Kohlberg, whose final stage results precisely from the overcoming of 
self-sacrifice or “maternal care”. In fact she is not merely making reference to the 
sort of greater openness to relationships, or willingness to communicate, or 
empathy, which she traces in the psychological development of girls (supposedly 
due to the connection with the maternal origin, a position which differs from that 
                                           
25 See for instance where she claims: “only when substance is given to the skeletal lives of 
hypothetical people is it possible to consider the social injustices that their moral problems may 
reflect and to imagine the individual suffering their occurrence may signify or their resolution 
engender”, Gilligan, In a Different voice, p. 100. On this issue, Gilligan quotes George Eliot, from 
The Mill on the Floss, where Eliot lets her main character, Maggie Tulliver, claim that “the truth 
of moral judgments must remain false and hollow unless they are checked and enlightened by 
perpetual reference to the special circumstances that mark the individual lot” (Gilligan, In a 
Different Voice, p. 148). This is an interesting reference, for instance in the light of a 
sentimentalist reading of care ethics, since, as is well known, Eliot appreciated David Hume’s 
philosophy. Of course there are also other possible readings of the importance of particularity in 
different traditions, see for instance Blum’s and Laugier’s interpretations of care ethics. 
26 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 31. 
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of separation of boys),27 and calling for a morality of (natural) compassion, 
benevolence or altruism. She is rather making reference to a progress which 
involves different stages, the latter of which, the one corresponding to moral 
maturity, is defined in terms of the ability to care for the other as well as for 
oneself through realising that “responsibility now includes both self and other, 
viewed as different but connected rather than as separate and opposed”.28 Here lies 
the ideal of the responsible care, which differs from a preceding stage of altruistic 
“maternal” care (which is in turn comparable to Kohlberg’s conventional stage).29 
It is worth mentioning – expanding this latter thesis – that stating that one 
cannot care for others at the expense of oneself is not a claim derived from the 
value of one’s own rights or sovereignty, but emerges again in the form of a 
“relational truth”: the idea is in fact that relationships will not hold if one member 
is only giving, and in so doing looses all her energies. In the same way, interest in 
the others’ suffering or flourishing is not derived from an external injunction to 
care for them or to be benevolent, but from the connection between our own 
flourishing and that of the others, between our feelings and those of the others.30 
Finally it should be noted that idea of the need to overcome care of a maternal 
kind is a sign of what I was arguing above, namely that Gilligan is not only 
acknowledging the (moral or general) value of traditional feminine attitudes (or 
virtues), but envisaging a complex new paradigm emerging from, and able to deal 
with, the recognition of the human condition of interconnection. 
In the same light, maintaining the web of relationships does not automatically 
mean that no one will be left out, as if it were a zero sum game. Of course there can 
be costs and hurts and harms, and even separations and failures, in the effort to 
maintain interconnection. Coping with the vulnerability and contextuality of 
(human) life and experience means coping with the evaluation of these costs, but 
also with the acknowledgement of their inevitability. These costs and hurts can be 
thought of as in some way individual but, in the light of the conception of porous 
subjectivities underlying this vision, they cannot be easily ascribed to one or the 
                                           
27 In later writings she has revised this claim, disentangling the development of empathy and 
communication from the gender divide, and considering these capacities as “natural” for both 
girls and boys, but obliterated by the patriarchal superstructure which girls for a number of 
reasons resist a bit more than boys. These qualities could lead instead to a different human 
moral approach. See Gilligan, Joining the Resistance. Chap. 2 and 4. 
28 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 147. 
29 And it is worth noticing this point, since other care ethicists instead have heavily relied on 
mothering as the relevant metaphor to exemplify caring attitude and to specific relationships its 
domain (see for instance Ruddick, Noddings and Held). 
30 Again Gilligan’s quotes Eliot: “Since ‘the mysterious complexity of our life’ cannot be ‘laced 
up in formulas’, moral judgement cannot be bound by ‘general rules’ but must instead be 
informed ‘by a life vivid and intense enough to have created a wide, fellow-feeling with all that is 
human’.”(Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 130). Again Humean echoes are more than present.  
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other.31 One could say that, in Gilligan’s view, the core (individual) responsibility 
is not that of facing and answering the other’s needs as given, or as the other 
represents them, but that of maintaining the possibility of an exchange 
(sentimental and dialogical) in which the needs emerge, are represented and cared 
for, as far as this is possible, and that this will not necessarily lead either to an easy 
solution or to the expected one.32 Survival, flourishing and the reduction of 
suffering are intrinsically relational; they should not be represented as the 
individual claims or needs of certain separated selves that can be answered or met 
by certain other benevolent selves, but as issues emerging and finding answers in 
the context of relationships, personal and social, which keep together 
individualities and life. Notwithstanding this accent on interrelationship I think 
that, as has been said, there is space in this account to conceive of one’s personal 
responsibility in the shape of taking part in the interpersonal exchanges which 
emerge from the interconnection, and returns to it. 
In Gilligan’s words: 
The changes described in women’s thinking about responsibility and 
relationships suggest that the capacity for responsibility and care evolves 
through a coherent sequence of feelings and thoughts. As the events of 
women’s life and history intersect with their feelings and thought, a concern 
with individual survival comes to be branded as “selfish” and to be 
counterposed to the “responsibility” of a life lived in relationships. And in 
turn, responsibility becomes, in its conventional interpretation, confused with 
a responsiveness to others that impedes a recognition of the self. The truth of 
relationship, however, returns in the rediscovery of connection, in the 
realization that self and other are interdependent and that life, however 
valuable in itself, can only be sustained by care in relationships.33 
The central tenet of responsible care as moral maturity – that is to say of an 
ethic of care – is therefore that of caring for the relationships among oneself and 
the other/s, caring for oneself and for the other/s in the relationships, and caring 
for life as a web of relationships, woven from the capacities which emerge from a 
“coherent sequence of feeling and thoughts”. And of course a deeper analysis of 
this “sequence of feeling and thoughts”, at least at the personal level, is necessary 
from a more structured philosophical point of view.  
                                           
31 This point emerges clearly from the study on abortion, see Gilligan, In a Different Voice chap. 
4. See also Baier on responsibilities which cannot be easily divided into what is mine and what is 
yours. See Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices. Essays on Ethics, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), p. 266. 
32 See where she claims, commenting on the words of some interviews: “then the notion of care 
expands from the paralysing injunction not to hurts others to an injunction to act responsively 
toward self and others and thus to sustain connection.”(Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 149). 
33 Gilligan, In a Different Voice, p. 127. 
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In this light, a final point concerning the object of our care or responsibility 
requires a mention here, because this is again the point at which different readings 
of care ethics are possible. While Gilligan places a strong emphasis on the 
importance of personal involvement in relationships, in meeting the needs of the 
others or sustaining relationships in their particularity, I wish to stress that, at 
least in her later writings, the needs or support she refers to are not only those 
involved in the physical survival of each, or in relation to a physical or 
psychological (inter)dependence, but also – at a deeper symbolic level – those 
relating to the recognition of one’s own personhood and voice. In this light, taking 
into account the other’s and our own “suffering” can be viewed in many ways. 
These can include taking into account the pain caused by physical harm, the pain 
of being left alone or not having significant relationships, or that of not being 
recognised as having a voice or as being a person. The notion of care thereby shifts 
from the sphere of simple (naturalist, psychological) kinds of attitudes and 
activities, as for instance those exemplified by nurturing and the like, to that of a 
more complex symbolic play of interrelations that are clearly linked to the social 
and cultural level. 
What is interesting, in my opinion, is the link between these different levels, 
and the idea that there is personal responsibility involved in considering all these 
different levels, while caring for the others, or for our relationships with the others. 
In other words, for example, we should cultivate a sensitivity towards different 
levels of violence and disapprove of them. So our being attentive to others can be 
configured as being attentive both to the others’ and to our own vulnerability at 
different levels, an attention that finds its roots in our own vulnerability, and one 
that can take the shape of a personal responsibility to answer to the others’ needs 
in order to maintain a rich texture of relationships which is in turn respectful of 
people’s differences and contributes to their flourishing (as we will see later a 
consonance can be found here with most recent feminist awareness, but also with 
certain refined sentimentalist considerations, such as that found in Baier’s work on 
cruelty in morals).34 Here again is where, in my opinion, a difference between just 
revaluing traditional feminine attitudes (as for instance nurturing) and the value 
of a wider (and multilayered) meaning of the proposed caring attitudes becomes 
important. 
 
To sum up, in my interpretation, Gilligan’s ethics of care can be understood as 
stemming from a conception of humans as interconnected, fragile and vulnerable 
subjects who constitute and maintain themselves, at different levels (from their 
own physical existence, to their own identity, to their sense of separation and 
                                           
34 Baier, Moral Prejudices. Chap. 13 entitled “Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and 
Kant”. 
CATERINA BOTTI 
126 
independence, their flourishing and to the satisfaction of needs of different kinds), 
through relationships. Porous to one another and – also through personal 
relationships – to society, to culture and to various forms of discourses, they are 
for that same reason in need of and capable of morality. A morality which can be 
thought of, in the end, as the practice of attention to others in their particularity 
and difference, woven from solicitude and care toward the relationships in which 
we are all enmeshed.  
The point now is how to configure this solicitude and care, so as to 
accommodate the complexity just mentioned. 
Here is where an account of the subsequent – and more philosophically 
structured – debate on care ethics becomes relevant, along with the reference to 
recent developments in feminist thought. 
The general point I would like to make is that, in giving an adequate 
philosophical account of the insights proposed by Gilligan, one should pay 
attention to two important issues among those I have mentioned: that concerning 
the existing ambiguity between caring for others in their particularity and caring 
for particular others; and that regarding the different levels at which we can think 
of the needs (as a way to express in brief what we should care for) of others and our 
own. While the first question seems to me rather straightforward, I will offer a few 
further considerations on the latter. I have tried to argue that, on the one hand, 
the needs at stake in care ethics can be conceived as the pleasures and pains which 
we might represent or feel or imagine in various ways. Either, for example, on the 
basis of a common grammar of pain and pleasure upon which given human 
faculties operate, or on the basis of a certain “knowledge” of human nature (as in 
quasi-Aristotelian accounts),35 or finally on the basis of certain forms of easily 
shared narration and communication. On the other hand, the needs at stake can be 
considered more broadly as ranging across different levels of experience, thus 
presenting the problem of the visibility or accountability of particular ways, or 
forms, of living, of being human, of being a person, of having a voice or of feeling 
pleasure and pain. To conceive of needs in this latter sense implies taking into 
account the problem of the representation of different grammars of pleasure and 
pain and that of the recognition of different voices, in a word, the radical problem 
of difference and, as we will see, also that of the instability of the categories in 
which we express all this. 
It is my conviction that the existing debate on care ethics might be pushed 
forward with regard to these two issues, and that useful contributions could be 
drawn from feminist authors who are not engaged directly in the debate on care 
ethics. In what follows I will be rather sketchy on the debate on care, and more 
detailed on the feminist contributions.  
 
                                           
35 Tronto in Moral Boundaries offers this kind of reference. 
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3. The debate on care ethics 
As has been said, there have been many attempts to develop more encompassing or 
more philosophically structured elaborations of an ethics of care. 
Among the many it is worthwhile to recall Virginia Held and Joan Tronto’s 
attempts to offer a comprehensive account of an ethics of care, considered as a 
distinctive moral paradigm,36 as well as the important work of Michael Slote 
(developed mostly with reference to Nel Nodding’s writings on care), in which he 
inquires into the consonance between an ethics of care and a sentimentalist 
approach to ethics, also in relation with a reflection on virtue ethics.37 His proposal 
of an ethics of care and empathy, his work on the breadth such an ethics could 
encompass, reaching out also to more traditional moral dimensions (such as 
deontology) and, more recently, his work on its limits (in the form of the dialectic 
between partial and impartial or personal and impersonal values or virtues), 
constitute one of the most comprehensive attempts to give shape to an ethics of 
care.38 
Another crucial reference, of course, is to Annette Baier’s work.39 Although 
Baier didn’t offer a comprehensive account of an ethics of care, dedicating her 
research – as is well known – mostly to the development of Humean themes (and 
being – as is also well known – rather diffident with regard to ethical theories), in 
my opinion she offers many of the most interesting clues to the possible 
consonance between care ethics and a distinctive and particularly refined reading 
of David Hume’s sentimentalism.40 
Finally, among the interesting philosophical researches made on care ethics, 
one should not forget the work on moral particularism, in part with reference to 
themes deriving from Iris Murdoch’s thought, as put forward by Lawrence Blum, 
and the recent work of Sandra Laugier in France, who offers an interesting reading 
                                           
36 See Held, The Ethics of Care; Tronto, Moral Boundaries. 
37 See Michael Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy. (London-New York: Routledge, 2007); 
Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism, (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) and 
also Michael Slote “Virtue Ethics”, in  Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate, ed. Marcia W. Baron, 
Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 176-237. 
38 For the dialectic between partial and impartial values and care see Michael Slote, The 
Impossibility of Perfection. Aristotle, Feminism and the Complexities of Ethics. (Oxford-New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
39 Baier, Moral Prejudices. 
40 This is not the place to go into the debate around Hume’s ethics, though many other 
contributions to this volume testify to its richness. It is however clear that in attempting to give 
a more philosophically accurate account of care ethics in sentimentalist terms, different 
interpretations of Hume do become relevant. I will hint at particular points in what follows.  
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of care in terms of ordinary language ethics and moral perfectionism, in Stanley 
Cavell’s sense.41 
In what follows, I will concentrate mostly on the works of Held, Tronto and 
Slote (leaving aside for the moment the other works mentioned, despite their 
relevance), as these are more widely known, and can be said to have contributed to 
the mainstream understanding of care ethics that is under investigation here. As 
already said, I will not enter into the details of these various analyses; I will 
instead limit my inquiry to considering whether or not, and if so in what ways, the 
richness and the complexities of the implications of Gilligan’s work that I have 
tried to show have been accounted for in these elaborations, sketching in a very 
schematic and external comparative analysis. 
The most relevant point I would like to make here concerns the fact that – at 
least in some contexts (for instance in Held’s and Tronto’s development of a moral 
model based on care) – the nature of care itself seems to go rather unquestioned as 
it is defined in terms of an experience or attitude we all already share (as for 
instance in the case of the care exchanged in the private sphere of personal and 
affective relationships). In these accounts, the existence and characterisations of 
the human attitude and activity42 of care is rather unscrutinized, or considered 
simply in terms of a shared experience, while the analysis is centred on the issues of 
developing a moral paradigm based on recognition of its moral worth, that is to 
say, on the value of the well know human ability to care, and of considering the 
breadth of its domain of application (and this holds true also for Slote’s analysis, 
although it is different in other respects). 
Held for instance in her book, The Ethics of Care. Personal, Political and 
Global,43 makes clear that an ethics of care as a normative perspective is based “on 
                                           
41 See Sandra Laugier, Le sujet du care: vulnérabilité et expression ordinaire, in Qu’est-ce que le 
care?, Pascale  Moliner, Sandra Laugier, and Patricia Paperman. (Paris: Petit Biblioteque Payot, 
2009), pp. 159-200 and the recent: Sandra Laugier, Etica e politica dell’ordinario (Roma: LED, 
2015). 
42 It is worth mentioning, as an aside, that both Held and Tronto insist on considering both the 
dispositional aspects and the practical ones of caring, they see caring in a moral sense as 
involving not only being solicitous but also acting, engaging in practices of solicitude. For them 
this characterization poses a difficulty to the possibility of reading care ethics in terms of virtue 
theories. Although interesting this is not an issue I will discuss, partly because I do not think it 
impossible, from within some virtue ethics approaches, for instance those derived from 
sentimentalist approaches, such as Humean ones, to take into account actions and their 
consequences when considering virtuous traits of character of individuals; and partly also 
because I am more interested in the question I am trying to define here, which seems to me 
rather more fundamental, that of the possibility of to meeting the others’ needs.  
43 Held, The Ethics of Care. Other relevant publications are Virginia Held, Feminist Morality. 
Transforming culture, Society and Politics. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993); 
Virginia Held, ed. Justice and Care. Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics. (Boulder, Co.: 
Westview Press, 1995). 
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the truly universal experience of care”.44 An experience common to everybody, at 
least, as she says, in that every human being: “has been cared for as a child or 
would not be alive”.45 The ordinary and daily nature of the practice of exchanging 
care is evident, and this is witnessed for instance – she claims – by the North 
American  expression “take care” as a common way to take leave of people.46 
While for Tronto care should be understood in terms of a group of activities 
which characterise our human functioning, at least at an experiential and ordinary 
level.47 Her definition of care is often quoted: 
A species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue 
and repair our ‘world’, so that we can live in it as well as possible. The world 
includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to 
interweave in a complex life-sustaining web.48 
For both these authors, care is thus an activity and a competence which is 
already present and functioning in our lives, although it is often invisible or 
wrongly considered as confined to certain spheres of  experience (that of particular 
relationships characteristic of family context, education or health care etc.), or else 
as delegated to certain individuals (women or minorities). They present it as an 
activity and competence whose practice and value should instead be recognised 
and placed at the centre of a more encompassing moral vision (and social 
transformation), suggesting that the qualities and competences characterising 
caring persons should become more widespread, and that the value of care should 
be recognised and translated from the personal to the social level, informing social 
institutions. 
In both their analyses the value and the possibility of this type of expansion of 
an already given capacity and activity of care seems to be the main issue upon 
which to exercise a philosophical effort, while the characterisation of the qualities, 
or virtues,49 constituting the practice of care, as well as the inquiry into the human 
                                           
44 Held, The Ethics of Care, p. 3. 
45 Held, The Ethics of Care, p. 3 
46 Held, The Ethics of Care, p. 29. 
47 The ordinariness of care is defined also by Tronto in terms of the common presence in our 
language of the formula “I care” in opposition to “I don’t care”, as denoting “some kind of 
engagement”. See Tronto, Moral Boundaries, p. 102. For an interesting analysis of a possible 
ontological level of Tronto’s analysis, with an Aristotelian resonance, see Stephen K. White, 
“Care and Justice. Ontological, Ethical and Political Dimensions”, (paper presented at the 
International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI) Confernce, Utrecht, 1996). 
48 Tronto, Moral Boundaries, p. 103. 
49 Although both authors do use the term virtue in this context and also make use of typical 
expressions of virtue theories (such as for instance flourishing, excellences and so forth), it could 
be worth mentioning, for those interested in the possibility of giving an account of care ethics in 
the shape of a virtue ethics, that both Held and Tronto are sceptical concerning this possibility. 
In their opinion, it is a mistake to reduce care ethics to the form of a virtue theory because such 
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capacities and faculties involved, is rather hastily undertaken. In their books this 
effort amounts to a small part of the whole. In Held it is devoted to underlining 
the role of attentiveness, sensitivity, and the ability to respond to needs, basing 
this on a sentimental dynamics to be corrected in relationships by dialogue and 
communication, or to be refined, on the model of exemplar practices, for example, 
that of “mothering”.50 In Tronto this effort amounts to the identification of four 
“moral qualities”, namely attentiveness, responsibility, efficacy and 
responsiveness, which should be integrated into our moral practice.51 
It is moreover in this context that, while recognising a continuity between the 
qualities characterising the caring person, such as attentiveness, sensitivity, 
responsibility, relational competence, and responsiveness, and the qualities 
traditionally ascribed to women (and devalued), both authors strongly deny that 
there is anything essential about this connection. An ethics of care is such precisely 
in as far as it puts pressure on such an essentialist connection between care and 
women, and recognises the human value of those qualities, which are seen as only 
ascribed to women.52 
Both Tronto and Held seem mainly interested in this latter claim. In their 
understanding, it is necessary to free care from an essentialist feminine 
connotation, which is characteristic of the old patriarchal framework (and 
according to Tronto also of the modern moral point of view).53 Achieving some 
______________________________ 
an account would consider care only for its dispositional and intentional traits, undermining the 
value of the actual engagement in the practices of care. Such an account would  be unable to 
cope with the relational and social nature of care and is pervasively patriarchal (see Held, The 
Ethics of Care, chap. 2-3; Tronto, Moral Boundaries, chap. 4-5). Of course in my opinion these are 
generic and disputable claims, but to argue in this direction would be the object of a different 
paper.  
50 See Held, The Ethics of Care, p. 20, where she claims that an ethics of care, with “its 
alternative moral epistemology”, “stresses the sensitivity to the multiple relevant considerations 
in particular contexts, cultivating the traits of character and of relationship that sustain caring, 
and promoting the dialogue which corrects and enriches the perspective of any one individual”. 
For what concerns care moral epistemology held makes a rather syncretic reference to Annette 
Baier’s and Margareth Urban Walker’s works. The reference to mothering as the moral 
experience involving “feeling and thought experienced together” is instead in Held, Feminist 
Morality, p. 30. 
51 Tronto, Moral Boundaries, pp. 126-137. For a possible Aristotelian reading see White, “Care 
and Justice”. 
52 The socially constructed nature of the gender ascription of these qualities is shown, for 
instance by Tronto, when considering the fact, that in recent times, at least in North American 
society it is not even true anymore that women are those in charge of care work, which now 
weighs upon other minorities. On this basis Tronto criticises Gilligan’s work, especially with 
reference to the gender divide she retraces in the answers to the moral dilemmas. See Tronto, 
Moral Boundaries, chap. 3. 
53 Tronto argues in the second chapter of her book, that the stabilization of the modern 
impartialist paradigm – during the 18th century - has rendered necessary the invention of 
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distance from the “old frameworks” is therefore linked to the possibility of 
recognising (an ethics of) care not as distinctively feminine but as distinctively 
human, and also to the possibility of enforcing the transformation of social 
institutions that is necessary for this recognition, interlacing in some way 
considerations on care with those on justice. In a word, the main point in their 
understanding is the need for the multiplication of the practices of care and the 
recognition of their value. But, in all this, the functioning of care as such, or the 
functioning of the human qualities it requires, remain somewhat unexplored.  
I’d like now to take up the two points made at the end of the previous section. 
On the one hand it could be said that in these readings the issue of delineating care 
not only in terms of recognising the special value of “particular relationships”, but 
also in terms of the attention paid to the “particular needs of all” has been resolved 
through the transposition of the value of care from the personal to the societal 
level; while on the other hand, the difficult issue of the visibility and the 
invisibility of needs has not been adequately examined. The epistemological 
complexity revealed in the re-elaboration of the concept of care hinted at before, 
and present in Gilligan’s work, seems to have been left aside. 
Similar, but not identical, considerations can be put forward in relation to 
other developments of care ethics. 
In Slote’s interpretation, for instance, care ethics is developed as a specific 
form of sentimentalism where what is crucial is the psychological mechanism of 
empathy, whose functioning and central role in moral development he retraces 
both in recent psychological literature, and in eighteenth century moral 
sentimentalism. His analytical effort is therefore more far-reaching in this sense.54 
Yet, although Slote offers a more structured philosophical reconstruction the core 
functioning of an ethics of care, his main interest seems nevertheless to be in the 
problem of how, and to what extent, one can give account of more traditional 
normative and political distinctions, such as obligations to distant others, 
deontological distinctions and the like, from within such a paradigm. He illustrates 
the way in which care ethics can offer an account of these distinctions and where 
instead it diverges and conflicts with impartialist accounts, since, in his 
understanding, care ethics privileges (and this is a point of difference with the 
readings previously discussed) mainly particular relationships.55  
Still, it seems to me that, while the issue of particularity and partiality is 
tackled, although not in the same way as Held and Tronto, there is again less 
attention to the problem of the different levels in which the reflection on personal 
______________________________ 
“feminine morality”, and the definition of “feminine virtues” in order both not to abandon an 
important dimension of human life, that of care, and to control women. 
54 See Slote, Ethics of Care and Empathy and Slote, Moral Sentimentalism. 
55 See Slote, Ethics of Care and Empathy. See for instance his reference to Williams’ problem 
about the integrity of agents, p. 33 and chap. 5. 
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responsibility in caring for the well being of others, and for the flourishing of the 
web of relationships sustaining life, should be articulated.  
In one of Slote’s most recent publications however he develops this point in a 
particular way. In his recent book The Impossibility of Perfection he argues that it 
would be opportune to adopt a balance between different philosophical methods 
and ideals, accounting for “‘masculine’ concepts like autonomy and justice”, and 
“‘feminine’ ideals such as caring about and personal connection”. This can be 
thought of as one way, although not the one I would suggest, to deal with this 
problem, i.e. that of recognising a limit to the paradigm of care, that is to say the 
partial value of both care and justice.56 
Of course Slote is not assuming that “feminine ideals” means, in this context, 
that what is socially constructed as feminine pertains only to women, and in fact 
he adheres to the feminist idea of considering these ideals not only as morally 
relevant, but also as characterising the moral thought and practice both of men 
and women. Interestingly, moreover, in this most recent book, relying more on the 
work of Gilligan than in the previous ones (where he relied more on the work of 
Noddings), Slote defends as particularly feminist the idea he is proposing, that we 
should think of ethics as seeing “partial values that are equally relevant to men 
and women”,57 and argues in this sense for imperfection. 
This epistemological assumption, for which ethics in general consists of partial 
and different values and methods, although interesting in the light of the 
considerations I have put forward, nonetheless seems to me, in its application to 
care ethics, still to limit the understanding of this latter to a rather direct 
possibility of knowing how to care for particular others (a possibility which, in my 
opinion, should be subjected to theoretical scrutiny). 
While I agree that some feminist thought does suggest the idea of the partial 
and incomplete nature of our values and of our moral theorising, or alternatively 
the idea of thinking of moral life as tragic and imperfect (although Slote rightly 
indicates Berlin as the champion of this latter point), I think that on the basis of a 
certain feminist awareness we might push forward this idea of instability. From 
this perspective, we might challenge the idea of care as a “partial value” with 
relation to justice, but as a complete value in relation to certain interpersonal 
settings, e.g. when we are caring for our beloved. This latter is, in my opinion, an 
option which does not account for all of the implications which can be derived 
from Gilligan’s insights, on the basis of which a more encompassing vision of an 
ethics of care could be developed, both regarding its interaction with justice (i.e. 
the problem of distant others), and in relation to a less romanticised vision of the 
limited domain of personal relationships: in other words, a vision requiring a more 
complex reconfiguration of the moral domain. 
                                           
56 See Slote, The Impossibility of Perfection, p. 4  and the entire volume. 
57 Slote, The Impossibility of Perfection, p. 34 but see the whole first chapter. 
Feminine Virtues or Feminist Virtues? 
133 
What can usefully be derived from Gilligan’s work, at least in my opinion, is 
that the emphasis on interconnection or interdependency goes together with that 
on vulnerability, which in turn can be also expressed in the form of the difficulty 
of meeting the multilayered needs of others or even one’s own. In this sense, as I 
have tried to show, caring does not mean only meeting the needs of our nearest and 
dearest, construed as a relatively easy task, or caring for them and also being able 
(through processes of refinement or artificial processes, conventions or institutions) 
to care for the needs of distant others with the same or sufficient attention (or in 
the most tragic version being split by the two partial values of care and justice). 
Given the different levels of human vulnerability and needs we have considered 
before, it is in fact impossible to consider the needs of our beloved as more easily 
identifiable and as severed from those of the others. Caring means therefore 
engaging in enough care to keep the fragile fabric of connections together and in 
the difficult task of recognising the difference of the other in its many aspects, the 
particularity of each life and the specific voice of each individual. This brings into 
question in both cases (near vs. distant others) the limits of our sensitivity and 
imagination, and of our listening, although these are fundamental and necessary 
resources. If – as I believe – the solution does not lie in calling for a 
(complementary or conflicting) impartialist methodology to confront these 
problems, since this is blind to particularity and differences due to its very 
structure, it is from within the same resources of sensitivity and imagination that 
we shall find a way to represent this kind of multilayered caring. 
I think that some works on Hume’s reflective sentimentalism could be of 
interest in dealing with these issues,58 as well as considerations derived from 
Murdoch’s ideas on perception, imagination and the relevance of frameworks, as 
developed for instance in Blum’s moral particularism, or in Laugier’s most recent 
works on moral perfectionism and ordinary ethics.59 But I think that the clearest 
illustration of the problems I am trying to represent, together with some indication 
of the way forward, come from recent developments in feminist thought. So, even 
though some of these feminist reflections have been developed in dialogue with 
philosophical traditions that are a long way from those considered in the debate on 
care ethics, in the following section I will offer a brief excursus on recent feminist 
thought, and in the final section, return to the philosophical arena of the debate on  
care ethics.  
                                           
58 See for instance: Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, Reflections on Hume’s Treatise. 
(Cambridge., Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); Eugenio Lecaldano, La prima lezione di 
filosofia morale. (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2010); Jaqueline Taylor, Reflecting Subjects. Passion, 
Sympathy, and Society in Hume’s Philosophy. (Oxford-New York; Oxford University Press, 2015); 
Alessio Vaccari, Le etiche della virtù. La riflessione contemporanea a partire da Hume. (Firenze: Le 
Lettere, 2012). 
59 See Lawrence Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity. (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge 
University Press1994); Laugier, Le sujet du care and Laugier, Etica e politica dell’ordinario. 
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I believe that offering even such a brief analysis will serve to clarify the 
different senses in which care ethics can be said to be feminist, and to render visible 
the ambiguity often present between feminine and feminist, as in the case of the 
recurrent considerations regarding “feminine virtues” already hinted at. And 
finally, I hope to draw from this analysis, some indication – to say it with the 
language of virtues – as to which traits of character might be characterised as 
“virtuous” from within a recent feminist viewpoint, traits which, and this is the 
suggestion I will put forward in the final section, might be appreciated also from 
within a more refined version of care ethics. 
 
4. The parabola of feminist thought 
If feminist thought has anything important to offer to moral reflection in our 
times, it has not, in my opinion, or not only, to do with the rehabilitation of 
certain human experiences linked to the traditional activities of caring, considered 
rightly or wrongly as feminine (as in Held’s claim concerning the “truly universal 
experience of having been cared for as a child”), but something more subtle that 
we can learn from the history of feminist thought. 
What I find interesting in this history (but I do not claim that this is exclusive 
to this line of thought) comes from the considerable range, or parabola, of different 
positions and competing claims within the tradition, and in particular from the 
oscillation over time regarding the categories of equality and of difference in the 
vindication of women’s subjectivity and freedom and from recent elaborations 
which take into account the complications that results from this alternating trend.  
 
As is well known (and as mentioned in the first section), in order to vindicate 
women’s full subjectivity and freedom, feminists have put forward a series of 
different strategies. These can – in very broad terms – be said to characterise 
different phases of the history of feminism, intended both as the political 
movement and as the theoretical reflection which has developed around it. As we 
will see, one way of giving an account of these different strategies is by referring to 
their different treatments of the question of  “feminine virtues” – as to whether or 
not they exist, whether or not this is important. 
The beginning of the feminist movement and thought is commonly thought of 
as coinciding with the suffragist movement of the second half of the 19th century 
(although one might go back also to Wollstonecraft and De Gouges), and for the 
sake of this argument we will consider this as a valid claim.60 
                                           
60 On the history of feminism and the possibility of mapping the differences between 
Wollstonecraft and De Gouges I have written elsewhere. See Caterina Botti, Prospettive 
femministe. Morale, bioetica e vita quotidiana. (Milano: Mimesis, 2014). 
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Following the line of argument of this paper, it can be said that the suffragist 
movement was asking for a fuller recognition of women as human beings and as 
citizens, while at the same time claiming recognition of the worth of the “feminine 
virtues”. The suffragists argued that the inclusion of women would enrich 
humanity and citizenships precisely because of their specific virtues. So the 
suffragist claims, whilst being a plea for equality in status, resulted also in a sort of 
acknowledgment of an important and not negligible difference among men and 
women.  
Coming back to care ethics, it is noteworthy that many authors, for instance 
Tronto, hold that some theorizations of care ethics can be reduced to this same 
schema, and can in this sense be criticized. 
Why criticised? Because it has been suggested that, since the requested 
acknowledgment of feminine virtues is in line with patriarchal framework, such a 
vindication, in the end, would not lead to the acknowledgment of the full human, 
moral and political status of women. As Tronto – among others – argues, the 
feminine virtues have here been defined by men and imposed on women, obtaining 
the double result of having a part of humankind dedicated to the necessary work of 
care, and at the same time not recognising this work as being of any moral worth 
or even as being characteristically human.61 In this light, if women are asking to be 
included as moral subjects, or as citizens, on this basis, they will not substantially 
change their situation: they will continue to be the ones in charge of care and will 
continue to be somehow devalued as subjects (although they may be able, say, to 
vote) since care and all its inherent problems will still be considered as their lot. 
(Moreover, according to Tronto, this essentialist claim also results in the 
invisibility of the fact that there are other marginalised groups besides women, and 
that there are substantial differences in power amongst women themselves). A 
change in this situation will come about only when the shape of social life and of 
political institutions is changed, such that care will be recognised not only as a 
fully human practice (culturally and morally laden), but also as a fundamental 
social and political value, that is to say when the public/private divide is radically 
rearranged. Until then, the caring attitude, even if it is re-established as worthy, 
will continue to be marginalised and marginalising.62 
The suffragist strategy has in fact been abandoned, but not in the direction 
suggested by Tronto and others. 
In the 20th century, after the two wars and the social changes that occurred, 
what can be defined as the true feminist movement distinguished itself from the 
previous suffragist movement. Exploding in the sixties, the feminist movement – 
which finds one of its early theorizations in Simone de Beauvoir’s Le deuxième 
                                           
61 See Tronto, Moral Boundaries, chap. 2. But see also Held’s interesting analysis, in Feminist 
Morality, chap. 6, on how death has been considered as a “distinctively human” experience, and 
giving birth has not. 
62 See Tronto, Moral Boundaries, chap. 2. 
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sexe63, – claims equality between men and women in much more radical terms. 
What is vindicated is no longer inclusion in difference, but the recognition of a 
more substantial equality, in terms of the same open-endedness in the unfolding of 
life. These (first) feminist vindications are based, in fact, on the leading idea of the 
equal nature of men and women and demand the possibility for women to decide 
upon their own lives as men do. From a more theoretical point of view, the crucial 
tenet of this feminist strategy is that of disconnecting the possibility of 
subjectivity from bodily differences, which are considered to be irrelevant, and on 
which a discriminatory destiny has been socially constructed (according to the 
sex/gender distinction).64  
In this light, “feminine virtues” are feminine only in the sense that they have 
been imposed on women, not because there is any direct connection between 
having those virtues and being born anatomically of the female sex (and therefore, 
for instance, able to give birth to children). What is more, as attributes they 
should be rejected in so far as they prevent women from gaining full subjectivity, 
which is broadly considered as the ability to transcend one’s own corporeal 
determinations. The ideal of subjectivity characterising this kind of feminist 
thought is in fact the incorporeal, reason-centred, transcendent idea of the subject 
of the modern tradition.  
According to this kind of feminism the crucial aim for women, in order to gain 
freedom, is to deconstruct the discriminatory scaffolding of patriarchal society, 
which prevents them from flourishing in the same way as men can. In other words, 
it is the aim of eliminating prejudices together with all the social structures which 
enforce those prejudices, considered as unjust discriminations.  
To clarify the point, it could be said that care activities are not only not 
considered as feminine traits in this perspective, but they are also devalued in 
general as human traits, to be substituted by social institutions or technologies 
which could liberate humanity from the most animal traits (or from bourgeois 
institutions such as the family). Think for instance of the enthusiastic reception of 
                                           
63 Simone De Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe.(Paris: Gallimard,1949), although it precedes the actual 
feminist movement by two decades. On the complex relationships among de Beauvoir and the 
feminist movement and vice versa see for instance Michèle Le Doeuff, L’étude et le rouet (Paris: 
Seuil, 1989); Liliana Rampello, Postfazione to Il secondo sesso by S. de Beauvoir (Milano, Il 
Saggiatore, 2008), pp. 701-715. 
64 Of course many references should be offered for this very general claim and for the whole 
overall and sketchy presentation (and personal interpretation) of the history and characteristics 
of the different feminist strategies I am offering. For general references see for instance: Linda 
Nicholson, ed., The Second wave. A Reader in Feminist Theory- (London-New York: Routledge, 
1997); Sarah Gamble, ed., The Routledge Companion to Feminism and Post-feminism. (London-
New York: Routledge, 2001). For the personal interpretation I am offering and its references, 
see: Botti, Prospettive femministe, chap. 1-2. 
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new reproduction technologies which characterised the work of certain American 
feminist thinkers in the 1970s.65 
As I have already said, if this had been, which it was not, the kind of feminism 
guiding Gilligan’s research, she would have claimed that a discriminatory 
socialisation prevented girls and young women from proceeding to what Kohlberg 
had defined as moral maturity, and that women’s minority, though correctly 
measured, found its roots not in a different and inferior feminine nature (which 
was mistakenly sustained), but in the unjust and discriminatory treatment of 
women. 
But this is not the point made by Gilligan. Gilligan’s feminism distinguishes 
itself from that vindicating equality, and is instead indebted to, as well as 
contributing to, a different kind of awareness. 
In fact, starting from the mid seventies of the last century, a sharp change 
occurred in feminist thought, or at least in part of it. For the sake of this 
argument, I am offering here a very simplified and generalised account of a more 
complex process involving geographical, political and theoretical differences. 
What at least some feminists came to realise and to theorize was that in 
vindicating equality in the form of women’s equality to men, the earlier feminist 
strategy had adhered to a model of humanity that – while supposedly neutral – 
was in reality partial and therefore inadequate: inadequate, for example, in terms 
of representing women’s experiences and subjectivity, or their freedom, and 
therefore, or more in general, also in terms of representing humankind as such. On 
this view therefore, the conflict should be brought to this new level.66 This is a 
move which is, as we will see, substantially different from that of  going back to 
the suffragist idea of the rehabilitation of traditional (i.e. patriarchal) feminine 
virtues. 
Women’s experience of pleasure, the conflicts of the sexes in the private 
sphere, the experience of pregnancy and of making decisions about it, for instance, 
were seen to be misrepresented, or as impossible to represent, within the bounds of 
the categories to which women had adhered in, for example, the general and 
abstract notions characterising liberal or Marxist conceptions of justice. Feminists 
of this persuasion therefore recognised the partiality and non neutrality of the 
categories and concepts used in scientific and political discourses, or in philosophy, 
and felt the need to develop new ones in order to describe a more comprehensive 
ideal of humanity, able to acknowledge that humankind is made of men and 
women, or to focus on the partiality of women’s experience and subjectivity. In a 
                                           
65 See for instance Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex. (New York: William Morrow, 1970). 
66 Again, it is impossible to offer here even a small bibliography, I will mention a couple of 
authors that in my opinion witness this turn in a peculiar way: Carla Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, 
la donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale e altri scritti. (Milano: Scritti di rivolta femminile, 1974); 
Luce Irigaray, Speculum. De l’autre femme. (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1974); Luce Irigaray,  
“Eguales à qui?”, Critique, 480 (1987), pp. 420-437. 
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nutshell: what was put forward in this feminist strategy was not a claim for the 
recognition of women as having the same nature as men, but the need to question 
the whole idea of considering men as the measure of humanity or subjectivity, and 
question at the same time the different nature ascribed to women by men. In other 
words, the way in which that founding notion of human nature was represented, 
namely its being accorded universal status, was challenged.67 This meant finding 
new words and new categories to account for women’s existence and experience, 
and to account for human existence and experience. It is in this framework, that 
Gilligan’s elaboration of a different moral point of view can be understood, as both 
representing the moral development of women and at the same time, as envisaging 
a moral viewpoint that is able to cope with differentiated subjectivities. 
So again the problem of women’s difference had been posed, but in a different 
way from that of  the suffragists. What is at stake in this more radical strategy, is 
the idea of looking for new words, new concepts and categories, or for general 
symbolic frameworks, in which to represent women’s and human experience, as 
well new forms of political practices and relationships in which to develop them. If 
for de Beauvoir the feminist objective was not to become a woman in order not to 
be the “second sex”, the target considered here is to become at last Woman, the 
once obscured one, now a strong one, who is different from the “women-Other” 
considered as the second sex, but also different from the “man-Subject”.68  
While claiming once more that humankind is made up of men and women, 
these radical feminists demanded and took for themselves time and space (to be 
spent mainly among women, in consciousness raising groups, at least this was so at 
the beginning), in order to find the words to signify women’s and human 
subjectivity in a new way, putting aside the old patriarchal considerations on 
women and men and their difference. And this meant, of course, not only offering 
new meanings for women’s existence but also for human existence, and new 
descriptions of the world.69 
Although there are many differences between the French and Italian versions 
of “sexual difference theory”, and developments of this kind in the USA, relating 
also to their different philosophical backgrounds, it can be said that, in general 
terms, in this kind of feminism the central question is not to recuperate and sustain 
the value of what has been considered feminine and devalued in previous 
                                           
67 An interesting account  of this passage is offered in Rosi Braidotti, Pattern of Dissonance 
(Cambridge-Molden: Polity Press, 1991), chap. 6-7. 
68 See: Irigaray, Speculum and De Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, where she claims: “Il est le Sujet, il 
est l’Absolu: elle est l’Autre”, vol. I , p.15. 
69 This is clearly explained in Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects, Embodiment and Sexual 
Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 
mostly chap. 3, 4, 5. See also: Gisela Bock and Susan James, ed., Beyond Equality and Difference, 
(London-New York: Routledge, 1992); Eleonora Missana, Introduction to Donne si diventa. 
(Milano: Feltrinelli, 2014);  Botti, Prospettive femminste, chap. 2. 
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situations, but instead to vindicate a completely new consideration of women, one 
which will allow them to name and to think their own experience. Such a 
rethinking will result in a different description of human experience or of the 
world. This entails a reconsideration not only of social structures (or social powers) 
but also of symbolic ones, and therefore a reconsideration of the way in which the 
human condition, subjectivity, knowledge and morality should be thought of and 
enacted. 
Care ethics has been read at times as this kind of effort, and in the previous 
pages I have tried to show how Gilligan’s works might be read in this way. But, it 
has also at times been criticised precisely for not being an effort of this kind: being 
read only as a way of reasserting the patriarchal definition of women. This 
criticism remains valid even when care is assumed as a human value or virtue and 
yet not substantially requalified,  when no major reconfiguration of the moral 
point of view is offered. This holds true for authors who, like Noddings, insist on 
asserting the feminine nature of an ethics of care; but also for those who, like Held, 
while identifying care as the basis for a human morality, see in practices such as 
mothering, construed as typically feminine, exemplar practices to be expanded to 
other contexts. The problem here being where the definition of what mothering is, 
is not distinguished from its patriarchal configuration.70 
Care ethics can in fact be read in terms of this ambiguity: either as a new 
paradigm offering new contents to moral reflection, or as an old content (that of 
the traditional feminine virtues) brought to light and revalorised. And of course, 
when conceived as a new paradigm, also the extent of its domain has been 
configured in different ways, as we have seen in discussing Held, Tronto and Slote, 
as has its feminine or human characterisation. In fact many ambiguities do persist. 
While many feminists have suggested abandoning this paradigm for these 
reasons,71 I personally do not consider these ambiguities to be sufficient grounds 
for abandoning it. In my opinion, the claim that humanity in its entirety is 
interdependent and vulnerable, and that this fact should mark morality, which 
ought therefore to be thought of more in terms of responsibility, care and 
relationships, than in terms of sovereignty and respect, or fair or contracted rules, 
is indeed an important new content and new starting point for moral reflection. It 
is clear however that these claims should be clearly framed in order to avoid such 
                                           
70 On the patriarchal configuration of motherhood see for instance Adirenne Rich, Of Woman 
Born. Motherhood as Experience and Institution. (New York: Bantham, 1977). 
71 See for instance: Catherine Mackinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Sandra Harding, “The Curious Coincidence 
of Feminine and African Moralities: Challenges for Feminist Theory” in Women and Moral 
Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers. (Totowa, N.J.: Roman and Littlefield, 
1987); Barbara Houston, “Rescuing Womenly Virtues: Some Dangers of Moral Reclamation”, in 
Science, Morality and Feminist Theory, ed. Martha Hanen and Kai Nielsen, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 13 supplementary volume (1987), pp. 237-262. 
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ambiguities. Their novelty depends on their articulation, which for this reason 
should be very accurate and thorough (which is not the case, in my opinion, in 
many existing accounts of care ethics). 
One way to articulate and to disambiguate care ethics might be – this is my 
suggestion – to set up a dialogue in which its own insights are confronted with 
those of the feminist parabola. In other words, it would be interesting to take into 
account the most recent considerations put forward by those feminists who have 
inherited the tension existing between the awareness of the instability of our 
categories and the need to argue for a transformation of society, of our self-
understanding as humans, and of morality.  
I will (briefly) describe this third strategy as that which has radicalised the 
notions of interdependence and vulnerability in such a way as to involve not only 
our physical or relational existence but also our abilities to think, to feel and to 
care. I am referring here to what has became known as the third feminist wave.72  
This form of reflection (here again I am simplifying and reducing to an ideal 
type a wide range of opinions and theories, that are indebted moreover with 
different axes of reflection according to which 20th Century philosophy has 
challenged the modern conception of the subject, of knowledge and morality) can 
be said to have arisen in reaction to the move described above of assuming and 
claiming the value of a different feminine subjectivity, particularly when the latter 
has been defined in new terms with respect to patriarchal definition of women.  
Although the idea of recognising a different female subjectivity has been 
acknowledged as a powerful one, and although it has been modulated in different 
ways, (for instance as a mimetic-strategic move necessary to contrast the binary 
and hierarchical patriarchal order, or as able to open up to the recognition of many 
differences, and not necessarily to the definition of a real difference in essence), it 
nevertheless implies – and this is what has been contested – a common definition of 
all women (as subjects). On this view, forms of feminism based on sexual difference 
theories run the risk (common to any identitary position) of obscuring relevant 
differences among women, and of conveying a stereotyped and partial description 
of the feminine, yet again taken as a norm which renders invisible other forms of 
subjectivity, even of feminine subjectivity, replicating the same problem of the 
false universalism of the monological patriarchal order. 
Examples of criticism of this kind can be found in the critiques and 
elaborations of lesbian feminists, black feminists and post-colonial thinkers, in the 
rich literature produced from the 1980s onwards. And incidentally, these critiques 
have faced in turn the same problem concerning the “different” identities.73 
                                           
72 The first reference to the idea of a “third wave” occurs in Rebecca Walker, ed. To Be Real: 
Telling the Truth and Changing the face of Feminism (New York: Anchor Books, 1995). 
73 See for instance the works of Adrienne Rich, Monique Wittig, Gayle Rubin, Teresa de Lauretis 
and Judith Butler, for the criticism developed in terms of lesbian and queer positioning, and 
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The result of this turmoil is a new evolution in feminist thinking. Aware of 
these risks, both the project of claiming equality, and that of asserting women’s 
difference as something essential or definable in terms of its contents, have been 
abandoned. Different authors have come to consider feminism as an 
(epistemologically aware) undertaking which moves from and tries to account for 
the many differences between subjects, opening up the space for each individual to 
live and flourish, and considering difference not only as a principle through which 
to describe human (and non human?) existences, but also as a space and a mode of 
thought.74  
From this perspective, the relevance of different axes of differentiation – as 
characterising each individual – has been recognised, together with the 
fragmentation this implies in the representation or self-representation of each 
individual, generating fragments which may have differential attribution of value 
in relation to power. This complicates the pattern of one’s own position in terms of 
dominant or subaltern status (for instance my being a white, Western, 
woman…).75 
At the same time, the same binary structure which characterises these axes, 
has come under pressure from the deconstruction of binary oppositions such as 
woman/man, white/black, western/non western, etc. A binary structure suggests 
erroneously the idea that it is possible to account for human variability in a 
number of fixed positions through these binary options, not recognising instead 
the existence of a continuum of differences which eludes any such rigid definition.76  
In these terms, the possibility of representing human beings once and for all, in 
their particularity, even in the first person (my own particularity), is radically 
challenged, not only because there is this multiplication of elements, but also 
because it is difficult to grasp, to maintain and to order these elements in a 
meaningful and definitive way. Since the possibility of accounting for this 
multiplicity and these fragmented selves varies according to time, to experience, to 
relationships and to social and cultural structures, it is difficult to individuate 
those elements which are meaningful for one’s own account, and at the same time 
______________________________ 
those of Barbara Smith, Angela Davies, bell hooks, Audre Lord, Chandra Mohanty and Gayatry 
C. Spivak for black and post-colonial feminist stances. 
74 See Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects, chap. 5. For difference as “a mode of thought” see Maria 
Luisa Boccia, La differenza politica. Donne e cittadinanza. (Milano, Il Saggiatore, 2002), chap. 2, 
where she interprets Lonzi’s reflections on difference in this way, as an existential principle. See 
Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel, p. 20. 
75 See for instance the elaboration of the category of intersectionality developed among others by 
Kimberly Crenshaw; Patricia High Collins, and Nira Yuval Davies.  
76 See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London.-New 
York: Routledge, 1990); Judith Butler, Undoing gender. (London.-New York: Routledge, 2004); 
Judith Butler, Precarious Life: Power of Violence and Mourning. (London-New York: Verso, 
2004). 
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there is no possibility of evading this multiplicity, or reducing humanity to a few 
constitutive elements. 
Who we are, what we need, and even our sex, gender, sexuality, is only a 
fragmented and contradictory experience, composed of internal drives and external 
constraints, of which we can offer only partial and temporary descriptions. 
Descriptions which maintain a degree of opacity as compared with a possible 
access to an authentic nucleus of identity.  
Opacity is, in fact, the notion I am coming to: that opacity which places a 
limit on the possibility of giving an authentic, complete or even accurate account 
of oneself and one’s own needs, and therefore on the possibility of representing the 
identities and needs of others. A notion which of course is crucial in my 
understanding of the possibilities and of the difficulties of care ethics.  
Of course, I am not claiming that this notion is a unique result of feminist 
thought. I am only interested in the way in which it has occurred in the feminist 
parabola. One could, in fact, analyse the deep consonances between these feminist 
claims and many philosophical and not only philosophical – think of 
psychoanalysis – developments in the thought of the 20th century, to which 
feminism is indebted, but this is not of relevance for the aim of the present paper. 
What is interesting in this most recent feminist line of thought, for the 
purposes of this paper, besides its usefulness in underlining the importance of 
acknowledging the plurality and variability of human experience (which is what is 
defended by all care ethicists), is that it also suggests the need to acknowledge the 
laborious process of representing human experience in its particularity, even in the 
first person; that is to say, the laborious process of representing one’s own 
experience. To give an account of oneself, or of each life in its particularity, Judith 
Butler would say, is to engage in a continuous process of “doing and undoing” the 
human, in order to open a space for the recognition of the particular unfolding of 
each life; a never ending process in which it is impossible to give a final word, or to 
grasp a source of authenticity, once and for all. A process which is collective and 
individual, since dominant or innovative representations of human experience, of 
what is important to maintain and let flourish each human life, are determined by 
each single repetition of those shared or alternative representations.77 A process 
which is, finally, according to many feminist thinkers intrinsically relational, as we 
define ourselves only in relations with  others, as Gilligan had also recognised. 
Each singular identity, its needs and characteristics, will emerge in the 
interplay between the permeability and resistance of the inner material and 
relational drives to language and constraints. In other words, one’s own 
subjectivity is defined only temporarily and partially in this play of resistance to – 
or adoption of – given descriptions, a play in which the different levels of corporeal 
                                           
77 Similar considerations, though in a different philosophical context, can be found, I would like 
to suggest, in Laugier’s works on ordinary and care ethics. 
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materiality, psychic dynamics, interpersonal relationships and socio-cultural 
dimensions, all have a role that can be in turn positive and negative for one’s own 
well being. 
What is interesting here, and this is the core issue of this paper, is the question 
– already reiterated  a few times – of whether the consideration of this radically 
multilayered, vulnerable and fragile subjectivity can be accommodated in an 
understanding of care ethics, or – better – how it can be accommodated, since I 
think that this is possible, and that care ethics is one of the chances we have  to 
envisage an ethics for such subjects. 
My suggestion is that care ethics should be more clearly articulated in the light 
of this complex framework. It is clear, for instance, that viewed in this way talking 
of “feminine virtues” no longer makes sense, while it is still possible to think of 
care and solicitude or attention, even in the form of virtues, although their 
meaning should be developed on the basis of the abovementioned elaboration. 
From this perspective, in a nutshell, the core ideal of care ethics of meeting the 
others’ needs, or sustaining the web of relationships in which we are all enmeshed, 
should be seen in a more complex way than as just an appeal to the kind of 
attention everyone has been made the object of as a child. This is, by the way, 
what I have suggested above in giving my account of Gilligan’s work.  
If then relatedness, interdependence and vulnerability are considered as the 
fundamental dimensions of humanity, dimensions in which care ethics finds it 
roots and to which it offers guidance, (as for instance Held claims when she writes: 
“It is the relatedness of human beings, built and rebuilt, that the ethics of care is 
being developed to try to understand, evaluate and guide”),78 then they should be 
articulated along the lines of the same radically complex understanding considered 
above. 
Yet, this is not a simple question.  
Given the intrinsic limits of our capacity to apprehend our own needs and 
those of the other, as we have seen, not only may universalist approaches 
encounter difficulties, but also some alternative accounts, and some versions of 
care ethics.  
Actually, considerations such as those developed in recent feminism do not 
constitute a difficulty only for universalistic or impartialist ethics, which are blind 
to human particularity and interdependence, as many care ethicists and many 
other critics of universalist accounts of ethics have claimed; they are also difficult 
to deal with from within any moral model which, while putting at its centre the 
agent’s responsibility to be solicitous toward others’ needs, assumes in a rather 
unproblematic way the agent’s (psychological, sentimental or dialogical) capacity 
to recognise and meet those needs. In this sense, the idea of considering care ethics 
as an ethics based on the possibility of meeting others needs, letting them and us, 
                                           
78 Held, The Ethics of Care, p. 30. 
CATERINA BOTTI 
144 
together with our shared world, flourish in relationships, might be weakened – 
even when this effort is limited to particular others who are closer and more 
connected to the agent.  
If even one’s own identity and needs, one’s own feelings of pleasure and pain, 
are accountable only against the background of a series of linguistic, historical, 
socio-cultural, psychic and relational ties, it might seem impossible to meet the 
needs of others in their particularity, at least in a simple way: for example, by 
assuming the existence of a common grammar of pleasures and pain, or a common 
structure of functionings and needs, or an easy and direct way to communicate on 
a sentimental or verbal or corporeal basis. In other words, it might be thought to 
be impossible to overcome the intrinsic limits of our own and the others’ ability to 
speak, think, know, or even feel and imagine. 
Yet I think that care ethics can evade this problem, but this is true only if it is 
accurately designed in its forms, or – to use the vocabulary of virtue ethics – in its 
identification of traits of character considered as virtuous, or else in its definition 
of the architecture of the virtuous character. 
In the next paragraph I will try to offer a few suggestions, and some open 
questions, on the way in which it might be possible to read care ethics in this light 
(still relying upon some feminist suggestions, but also going back to the debate on 
care ethics). The basic idea I will focus upon is that of transforming the limits of 
one’s own accountability and that of the other, recursively, in a positive effort to 
meet the others’ needs, or better, to keep and maintain the web of relationships 
which nourishes life. 
 
4.  Feminist virtues? Open questions and tentative conclusions 
Resisting the temptations of a nihilistic or a relativistic conclusion based on the 
implications of the just described feminist parabola, different feminist authors – in 
different contexts – have tried to envisage an ethics that is able to take into 
account these implications and yet to offer some normative indications. In many 
cases the ethical dimension is even seen as a necessary supplement to politics, as it 
allows – notwithstanding all the difficulties – to recognise the singularity of each 
life and to open the possibility of interconnection and encounters, as permitted 
only by the concrete and embodied personal involvement experienced in 
relationships. 
In fact, even when converging with post-modern or critical theories, and even 
appreciating the difficulties of defending shared aims, many third wave feminists 
have claimed that, although epistemologically weakened in its theorisation of the 
subject of politics and morality, feminism is characterised by, and should not 
abandon, the aim of transforming society, cultures and ways of living. And this in 
such a way as to cope with, ease and take care of the vulnerability and frailty of 
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humans, of forms of coexistence and of the planetary life. In this sense it should be 
able to give shape to an ethics and a politics. 
In this view, one of the shared convictions is that this aim can be maintained 
and fostered, not by finding a way to overcome the instability, partiality and 
variety of (feminist) categories, but, on the contrary, by considering (the 
awareness of) the instability, partiality and variety of categories as a resource for 
politics and ethics. 
Interesting attempts to overcome such an impasse, are for instance those put 
forward by Rosi Braidotti or Judith Butler, despite the difference in their 
elaborations, or by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in the context of her post-colonial 
feminism. 
Broadly speaking, in their reflections, they distance themselves from 
conceptions of ethics which are mainly defined in terms of the activity of giving 
judgements on others’ behaviour or proposing norms and rules for the behaviour of 
all, and also from attempts to find a shared vision of the good according to which 
we should live, or upon which we should base our benevolent attitude toward the 
other. They are even more critical of ethical models taking the shape of the defence 
of one’s own or universal rights. Conversely, in their own reflections, ethics is 
conceived mainly as an exercise operated upon one’s own mind in order to 
recognise the other/s, that is, the other/s to whom we are continuously exposed and 
connected in the context of concrete relationships, whilst at the same time not 
forgetting that one’s own mind is porous to relational, social and symbolic 
environments. 
From this perspective, even if the arguments put forward by these authors are 
different, what is crucial is the capacity to criticise and to abandon one’s own 
prejudices, and, to pay attention to and to deconstruct what one takes for granted 
when trying to meet others and their needs, or when defending one’s own rights. 
And it is important to note that this critical attitude, that is to say, the possibility 
of overcoming prejudices and the possibility of meeting the others, should not be 
seen as a search for convergence on the basis of shared or general comprehensions 
of humanity, or on fundamental values; on the contrary, the aim of this exercise is 
precisely that of the representation and maintenance of differences, which alone 
can render it possible, in an encounter, to communicate and to collaborate. What is 
required, then, is not the exercise of detachment from one’s own partiality to gain 
some fixed and stable standpoint from which to look at one’s own and the other’s 
suffering or flourishing; what is required is rather an exercise of humility and of 
awareness of one’s own limits and partiality, which can be thought of either as 
emerging from the interplay of the differences which inhabit our own multilayered 
or fractured subjectivity, or from the experience of difficulty itself, from the feeling 
of puzzlement experienced in encountering others we are not able to understand, or 
even from our resistance to imagining ourselves as that other, or as bound up with 
that other, to whom we are nevertheless linked. It is in this feeling of the 
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impossibility of a meeting, Spivak would say, that, paradoxically, the possibility 
of opening up our minds so as to meet the other lies.79  
Crucial for an adequate conception of morality, according to these thinkers, is 
therefore an awareness of the limits and of the partiality of one’s own feelings, 
categories and norms. Feelings, categories and norms which are nevertheless 
necessary to the having of a morality, but which at the same time cannot be 
considered immune from limits. The suggestion is then, neither that of 
surrendering to the partial nature of these feelings, or categories, and ending up in 
a relativist position, nor that of insisting on searching for a way to overcome their 
partiality completely through convergence on presumed shared understandings, 
but that of being able to transform these limits themselves into a positive moment 
for morality, using the awareness of the limits as a way to transform ourselves and 
open up to the possibility of meeting the other, of communicating, to achieve at 
least the temporary possibility of understanding each other. Morality, it has been 
said, resides more in this process of self-transformation and reciprocal 
transformation than in the possible results; in this sense it is an open ended 
process.  
According to all these authors, the moving force of such a process is not to be 
found in (abstract) knowledge or in forms of reasoning: but rather in the concrete 
experience of encounters with others and in the concrete experience of our own 
resistance to given definitions. It stems from the practice of “positioning” oneself 
(namely, the practice of recognising – as far as this is possible – the specificity of 
one’s own position),80 as well as from the feeling of one’s own vulnerability and of 
interconnection (that is, need and desire of the others)] in the end, from emotions, 
feelings and imagination. These are very intriguing suggestions, I think, and worth 
taking into consideration in a reconfiguration of care ethics. 
It is clear that the philosophical frameworks in which many of these 
suggestions are developed are often derived from philosophical paradigms rather 
distant (to say the least) from those characterising the debate on care ethics. 
Accounting for them in this context would therefore require detailed analysis, not 
possible here, but I think, nonetheless, that it might be possible to find points of 
contact and to translate the main indications which are suggested – mostly that of 
                                           
79 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Terror: A Speech After 9-11”, Boundary 2, 31 (2004),  
pp. 81-111; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,  “Thinking Cultural Questions in ‘Pure’ Literary 
Terms”, in Without Guarantees: In Honour of Stuart Hall, ed. Paul Gilroy et al. (London: Verso, 
2000),  pp. 335-357. See also: Jamila Mascat, “Etiche post-coloniali”, in Le etiche della diversità 
culturale, ed. Caterina Botti, (Firenze, Le Lettere, 2012), pp. 149-179; Laura Boella, Il coraggio 
dell’etica (Milano: Raffaello Cortina, 2012), Chap. 7. 
80 See Adrienne Rich, , “Notes Toward a Politics of Location”, in Blood, Bread and Poetry: 
Selected Prose 1979-1985. (London: Virago, 1986). 
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a recursive use of partiality and instability – into the language of philosophical 
accounts more traditionally associated with care ethics.81  
Of course it is not the aim of this paper to provide a detailed account of such a 
reframing, its main aim was in fact more that of indicating a problem, than of 
solving it. Nevertheless, I will try to offer some suggestions, and open up a few 
further questions.  
In fact, in so far as one wants to consider care ethics as a feminist approach to 
ethics, or to invoke feminism to justify certain claims concerning the importance of 
care in an account of morality  (and possibly in order to consider care ethics, in 
more general terms, as an adequate account of morality), there is only one point 
that – in my opinion – might be proposed as a result of the analysis developed in 
the previous pages, and this is that one should take into consideration the 
abovementioned implications of the feminist parabola; that is to say, one should 
consider the different levels involved in our attentiveness to others and to the web 
of relationships in which we are (all) enmeshed. In other words, the different levels 
– bodily, psychological, social and symbolic – in which our own and others’ 
vulnerability unfolds should be taken into account. Furthermore, in this light, it 
might be interesting to consider the feminist suggestion of a positive role for the 
awareness of one’s own limits, that is, the awareness of the instability of each 
viewpoint and of personal landscapes - however enlarged and rendered 
accommodating through imagination, attention to details or through listening and 
dialogue - since biases, misunderstandings and opacities are always present. 
Going back to title of this paper and playing with it, it might be said that if we 
consider recent feminist insights concerning the value of the awareness of one’s 
own point of view and the partiality of one’s own standpoint in morality as giving 
shape to a form of “feminist virtue”, as a kind of epistemological virtue that has to 
do with instability, critique and humility, then such a “feminist virtue”, more than 
the old “feminine virtues” (of nurturing, caring for the household, etc.), should be 
put at the centre of a sound care ethics. This is the main point here. It is in this 
sense, this is my opinion, that care ethics should be considered as a form of 
feminist ethics. 
With regard to the possibility of a major articulation of such a reframing of 
care ethics, I will offer only some tentative final considerations and a few 
suggestions. 
As I have already argued, we can retrace as far back as Gilligan’s work the 
idea of care ethics as an ethics mainly centred on the cultivation – as a form of 
personal moral responsibility – of a form of sensitivity or attentiveness to the 
vulnerability of others and to our own, at different levels. Even in Gilligan’s 
writings, in fact, caring means something more than simply being porous and 
responsive to the suffering of others at what is seen as an easily apprehensible 
                                           
81 I have argued in more detail for a similar reconfiguration in Botti, Prospettive femministe. 
CATERINA BOTTI 
148 
physical or psychological level; that is to say, a suffering that – using a figure 
already hinted at – might be reduced to a common or universal grammar of pains 
and pleasures. Gilligan herself has underlined that caring – as an ethical ideal or 
practice – also involves caring and being attentive to the violence which derives 
from one’s not having been recognised as a person, from not having a voice or not 
being considered fully human, or from lack of recognition of the plurality and the 
opacity of the grammars of pains and pleasures. And it is in this sense that I have 
suggested that her rather complex gesture of recognising a moral voice to girls and 
young women shows the caring attitude. 
Viewed from this angle therefore, there is a possible convergence between the 
tenets emerging from recent feminist stances and the development of an ethics of 
care. 
Of course, if the major tenets of care ethics are those of considering, as the 
most appreciable attitudes or traits of character, awareness of the relational fabric 
which binds together humans and personal sensitivity and solicitude toward the 
others’ flourishing (or to the flourishing of given relational contexts and of the web 
of relationships sustaining life), then something should be added to define this 
sensitivity and solicitude. Here are some few suggestions. 
In order to offer a more philosophically structured account of an ethics of care, 
care ethicists should not only – this is a first point to be made – make reference to 
sympathetic or empathic psychological mechanisms, but also – as many refined 
sentimentalists do suggest – to the fundamental human capacity of imagination. 
Imagination, that is meant as a faculty able to transform and widen our sensitivity 
to the suffering and needs of others, or of the poverty or richness of a relational 
context, and to open up our mental landscape and overcome the limits of those 
same psychological mechanisms, so as to render us able to recognise even the small 
details relevant for (or in contrast with) the flourishing of given relationships and 
single lives. 
In this connection, and this is a second point worth mentioning, if we are 
trying to reconfigure ethics in the light of the considerations put forward here, 
such an account of ethics must be reframed to deal with the texture of our lives in 
their concrete and particular aspects. From this perspective, it is important to 
stress that even minimal actions or interactions, and not only major dilemmas 
such as those concerning, for example, which lives to save (often considered in the 
analytical tradition of impartialist morality), should be considered as of moral 
relevance. Even small gestures, or the words we use in our everyday life, become 
important if contrasting dominant oppressive representations of humanity – i.e. of 
single human beings – is to be part of the framework of our ethical attitude. 
Reflecting on the kind of images of humanity that are hidden in our judgments, in 
our behaviours, in our language, even in apparently innocuous contexts, is in fact 
important, in that – as has been argued – oppressive or less oppressive accounts of 
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humanity are made or changed through each single repetition of these 
representations. 
Finally, in reflecting on the connection between collective and individual 
dimensions of these processes, it is also possible to consider whether part of our 
moral responsibility is  to contribute to a collective effort to produce 
representations and images that convey a larger sense of the possibility and variety 
of human forms of life. In this way we may nourish our imagination; of course not 
regarding those representations and images as definitive, but simply as enlarging, 
and not exhausting “the realm of the possible”, to say it with Pindar. In this sense 
even establishing an alternative lifestyle might be considered as invested with 
moral responsibility. 
Of course, neither the general claim concerning the role of imagination, nor the 
few considerations above may seem particularly innovative in the contemporary 
arena of philosophical reflections on morality, although they are not so present in 
the mainstream debate concerning care ethics. In effect, there have been many 
attempts to envisage, for instance from refined sentimentalist points of view (e.g. 
those which, in the wake of Hume’s ethics, focus on the possibility of returning 
reflectively on one’s own first level sentiments), similar accounts of the role of 
imagination, attention to details, collective responsibilities, and narratives and 
dialogues, all viewed as means able to enlarge the possibility of a mutual 
understanding and of solicitude toward the others, notwithstanding the 
contingency of our categories. I think there is room here for interesting 
consonances. But interesting consonances can also be retraced with the other  
philosophically more structured developments referred to above as potentially 
interesting for reframing care ethics. These issues can be dealt with, for example, 
from within perfectionist accounts centring on the importance of the effort of 
transforming oneself and one’s own images of humanity and of paying attention to 
“what is important” for oneself and for others. There are also numerous 
possibilities of exploring the role and the importance of communication, dialogue 
and narratives, as these too are fundamental resources to which one could appeal 
to in order to develop an interesting reframing of an ethics of care. I will not 
comment further on these consonances here; instead I will concentrate upon a 
single final aspect, characteristically feminist, which – in my opinion – is worth to 
be taken into account in order to provide a better account of care ethics (and 
eventually in order to develop it in tune with sentimentalist or with perfectionist 
approaches).  
As we have already seen, feminist thought offers, in my reading, a final and 
different suggestion. This is the above-mentioned idea of considering as an ethical 
attitude, or a resource for ethical attitudes, the importance of developing an 
awareness of our own limits in being able to feel, to sympathise and to imagine, 
and also to listen and being attentive. This is something which is distinctive in 
recent feminist thought, and is less represented, at least in my opinion, in 
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sentimentalist and perfectionist developments, and even less present in the 
mainstream debate on care ethics. Both approaches focus more on the positive 
possibility of expanding one’s own point of view or capacity of attention, while 
here the emphasis is, on the contrary, on being aware of the limits of this 
possibility, as a recursive form of attention. 
All these instances – sentiments, feelings and sympathy, imagination and 
attentiveness, communication and dialogue – are in general seen as important 
resources that may serve to widen our comprehension or experience, and therefore 
enable us to participate in the suffering of others and to correct our egoism and 
biases; in a word, to allow us to be in contact with the other in a positive sense. As 
such, they are considered as a means to add something to our mental landscape 
that will allow us – without recourse to reason or to a metaphysical understanding 
of human nature and values – to acquire a more stable and wider point of view 
from which to decide how to act and live morally, or from which to approve or 
disapprove our own behaviour or that of others, to make our ethical judgements. 
Conversely, feminist attention in the reading I have tried to outline here is more 
dedicated to the partial nature of our achievements in this sense. In fact, as we 
have seen, feminists have cast doubts on the possibility of achieving fully positive 
results through these resources, although these resources are the only ones we 
have. So one can wonder if, together with the idea of using all these resources to 
enlarge our sensitivity, one might also envisage a different use of them, so as to 
render continually present to us the limits of that same sensitivity, also - 
recursively and paradoxically - as a way to foster it.  
What I am suggesting is the idea that the caring individual should cultivate 
not only his/her sensitivity, understood in the more traditional terms seen above 
(i.e. developed through psychological mechanisms, sentiments, imagination or 
communication), but also cultivate an awareness of the instability of his/her 
mental contents or feelings; that is, one should keep open the aching sense of one’s 
own limits, while seeking out all the possible ways to overcome them.  
Such an awareness of our limited capacities might be thought of as a resource 
moving us toward the recognition of the tentative nature of our doings. This is not 
to deny the urgency we may feel to act, but to question the certainty of the results, 
thus rendering us more careful, in the continuous search for new ways to maintain 
the relationships we are in, and allow them to flourish. We can think of it also in 
the shape of a feeling of puzzlement. Such an awareness may play several 
important roles in the genesis of moral attitudes: as the engine of imagination; as a 
resource which pushes us to suspend our judgemental attitudes without suspending 
our care for others, and to engage ourselves in the effort of searching for more 
adequate judgments; as a drive for caring about the way we care, but also as the 
resource which pushes us, all things considered, to continue to care, to be 
interested in the wellbeing of others, as it is linked to a shared sense of 
vulnerability.  
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Coming to a characterization of this awareness, two very tentative suggestions 
can be offered. The first is that, as already underlined by many feminist theorists, 
it should not be viewed as resulting from knowledge or abstract reason, but from 
experience and feelings. It can thus be thought of as a form of sentiment, or as a 
sentimental progress or reflection upon more basic sentiments. 
A second and more interesting idea, I think, is that concerning the possibility 
of linking this awareness to the passion or sentiment of humility, thinking of this 
passion as an architectural bastion of the moral character (in opposition to the 
often quoted passion of pride). A possibility which might be of interest, for 
instance, for anyone wishing to articulate a sentimental reading of care ethics. 
In conclusion, in drawing together the threads of this discourse, I would say 
that to bring care ethics back to its original feminist matrix, but at a higher level, 
an attempt must be made to read care ethics as a reflection on morality centred 
both on care for others in their particularity, and on the recognition that such care 
implies the questioning of pre-established views of both self and the other. Care for 
others, attempting to meet their needs, has its roots in a sentimental and relational 
characterization of subjectivity, but there may be obstacles in the way of such 
care, in the form of distances, or of opacity of vision. Though it may never be 
possible to fully overcome one’s self and one’s limits in this sense, the attempt to 
do so, to discover and engage with one’s limits, and become more clear-sighted, 
should be explored as a dimension of the ethics of care. 
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The idea of this monographic issue originated in a workshop that took place at the 
University of Pisa on October 3, 2014 on the legacy of Bernard Williams’s Shame 
and Necessity.1 The goal is to reflect from different perspectives on one particular 
problem on which Williams’s book gave a decisive contribution, namely, on the 
nature, history, and moral relevance of shame in contrast with other emotions 
such as guilt and fear. 
Shame and Necessity was published in 1993 as a result of the Sather Lectures 
that Bernard Williams gave in 1989 at the University of California, Berkeley. 
When the book came out it attracted the attention of both philologists and 
philosophers.2 With a polemical stance towards what he called the “progressivist 
view,” Williams proposed a philosophical critique of some fundamental moral 
concepts in light of what he found illuminating in the Greek ethical world. 
By “progressivism” Williams meant to refer to the view, accepted by several 
scholars, that in ancient Greek literature, and especially in epic and tragedy, one 
would find an essentially primitive conception of psychological motivation, of 
action and of responsibility. According to such interpretation, the Homeric world 
lacked the distinction between body and soul, without which one could not 
attribute responsibility to an agent for his or her intentional actions, and conceive 
of moral action as based on the will. In turn, the tragedies were populated by 
heroes at the mercy of divine forces, and subject to forms of necessity that were 
clearly incompatible with free will and autonomy.   
The simplest way to express the contrast between the Greeks’ ethical world 
and the modern moral conception is to claim that the advent of Christianity 
                                                          
1 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity, Sather Classical Lectures, Volume 57, University of 
California Press, Berkeley 1993. From now on Shame and Necessity will be abbreviated as SN. 
2 See for example M. Miller, “Review of Shame and Necessity,” Modern Philology, Vol. 93, No. 2, 1995, 
217-225; T. Irwin, “Critical Notice of B. Williams, Shame and Necessity,” Apeiron, 27 1994, 45–76; P. 
Woodruff, “Review of Shame and Necessity,” Ancient Philosophy, 16 1996, 177–80. A. A. Long, 
“Williams on Greek Literature and Philosophy”, in Bernard Williams (edited by A. Thomas), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2007, 155-180.  
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allowed for progress from a culture of shame (based on appearance and 
fundamentally heteronomous) to a culture of guilt (based on interiority and the 
autonomy of the will).    
In itself Williams’s polemical stance towards progressivism qua historical 
interpretation would not have been very interesting if it had not been part of a 
very complex project. Indeed, in Shame and Necessity one can see several 
interrelated issues being addressed: 
a)  Accuracy in the history of thought. The question is how to develop a view 
of the past free from a prejudice in favour of modern concepts and at the same 
time also immune to the temptation of believing in the possibility of an absolute 
point of view.  
b) The Greek conception of ethical and psychological phenomena. This 
includes the question of whether Homeric characters are capable of deliberation, 
how they ascribe responsibility, if and how they act on the basis of their 
deliberations, how Homeric and tragic characters see themselves in relation to 
their actions and intentions.  
c) Necessity and shame. When the Homeric and tragic characters affirm 
certain actions as necessary, they are neither thinking in terms of hypothetical 
imperatives, nor autonomously choosing on the basis of categorical imperatives. 
What kind of necessity are they invoking when, like Ajax, they affirm that there 
is only one path that remains open to them and they claim that they must take it? 
How does shame work as a motivation for action? On the one hand the Greek 
characters who appeal to shame seem to express concerns which involve their 
sense of personal identity (performing certain actions appears to them as a 
betrayal of who they really are), while on the other hand shame is also a response 
to concrete social expectations. How are we to understand the relationship 
between activity and passivity, autonomy and heteronomy in the specific case of 
shame?  
d)  Moral concepts belonging to the contemporary philosophical discourse 
(such as will, autonomy, spontaneity, moral responsibility, guilt, regret). Are they 
as clear as the progressivist view claims they are? Can they withstand criticism 
when contrasted with alternative explanations of actions and emotions as they 
emerge from an analysis of Greek literature that does not take those very concepts 
for granted?  
Because the answers to these questions are dependent on each other, Shame 
and Necessity can function as a critical reflection on contemporary ethics because 
it is at the same time a reflection on paths that ethics never took or left behind.  
Williams found such paths hidden behind the ideological reconstructions 
provided by the progressivist view. In order for his project to work he had first to 
show that there was a peculiar combination of theoretical, historical and 
philological problems in the premises governing the distinction between the Greek 
culture of shame and the post Christian culture of guilt. He concentrated on the 
Guest Editor’s Preface 
 
155 
 
shortcomings of progressivism and argued that it led to misunderstanding some 
major ethical aspects of Greek life. Nietzsche’s influence is evident in his critical 
reflection on the relationship between history, philosophy and literature, which 
sets the premises for a philosophically interesting and philologically informed 
reading of the texts.3  
The ultimate goal was to show that the most common explanatory concepts 
employed in contemporary moral philosophy were not adequate. Ascribing 
responsibility is not just a matter of recognizing intentions. It involves different 
ways in which an agent can be identified with or dissociated from his or her 
actions, the interaction between what someone does and what just happens to him 
or her, and the complex web of personal and social expectations that make one 
emotionally respond in certain ways to certain actions. 
The cultural gap between the Greeks and us is significant if we consider 
contemporary and ancient theories of action, while it becomes considerably smaller 
if we lay bare the structures that actually govern our behavior. To accomplish this 
Williams moved beyond theory to literature and legal texts. There is a difference, 
he argued, between “what we think and what we merely think that we think” 
(SN, 7), and he thought that his reflections on Greek literature helped uncovering 
it. This is why he explored the ways of attributing responsibility in the Anglo-
American legal system, rather than concentrating only on contemporary 
philosophical moral theories, while with respect to the ancients his attention was 
devoted mainly to Homer and the tragic poets (with a preference for Sophocles) 
rather than to philosophers like Plato and Aristotle.4  
By focusing on how the epic and tragic characters deliberate, blame 
themselves or are proud of what they do, Williams challenged the most common 
views concerning the similarities and differences between the Greeks and us. This 
in turn helped him show the gap between our theories and the attitudes we 
ordinarily have towards our actions:  
 
If our modern ethical understanding does involve illusions, it keeps going at all 
only because it is supported by models of human behavior that are more 
realistic than it acknowledges. It is these models that were expressed 
                                                          
3 On Williams and Nietzsche, see R. Geuss, “Thucydides, Nietzsche and Williams,” Outside Ethics, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2005, 219-233. 
4 Cfr. SN, 14: “Most of the texts that I consider in this book do not even look like philosophy, and my 
aim is not to make them do so. Tragedy, in particular, is important to many of the questions I want to 
ask, but its importance is not going to be discovered by treating it as philosophy, or even, rather more 
subtly, as a medium for discussion that was replaced by philosophy. By the same token, to point out the 
obvious fact that these plays are not works of philosophy tells us nothing at all about what their interest 
for philosophy might be.” 
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differently, and in certain respects more directly, in the ancient world. In these 
relations there is […] a two-way street between past and present; if we can 
liberate the Greeks from patronizing misunderstandings of them, then that 
same process may help to free us of misunderstandings of ourselves (SN, 11). 
 
Since his turning to the history of thought was motivated by theoretical 
questions, one interesting consequence of the project Williams undertook with 
Shame and Necessity was that the book spoke to analytic and continental 
philosophers alike. Williams was impatient both with analytic jargon not 
informed by historical sensitivity, and with a philological practice not conscious of 
its philosophical premises. With respect to philologists and historians his critical 
attitude is obvious in Shame and Necessity, but if we turn to “Philosophy as a 
Humanistic Discipline” we can see very clearly the kind of criticism he leveled 
against some argumentative habits common among analytic philosophers:  
 
Paul Grice used to say that we ‘should treat great and dead philosophers as we 
treat great and living philosophers, as having something to say to us.’ That is 
fine, so long as it is not assumed that what the dead have to say to us is much 
the same as what the living have to say to us. Unfortunately, this is probably 
what was being assumed by those who, in the heyday of confidence in what has 
been called the ‘analytic history of philosophy’, encouraged us to read 
something written by Plato ‘as though it had come out in Mind last month’—
an idea which, if it means anything at all, means something that destroys the 
main philosophical point of reading Plato at all. The point is not confined to the 
‘analytic’ style. There is an enjoyable passage by Collingwood in which he 
describes how ‘the old gang of Oxford realists’, as he called them, notably 
Prichard and Joseph, would insist on translating some ancient Greek expression 
as ‘moral obligation’ and then point out that Aristotle, or whoever it was, had 
an inadequate theory of moral obligation. It was like a nightmare, Collingwood 
said, in which one met a man who insisted on translating the Greek word for a 
trireme as ‘steamship’ and then complained that the Greeks had a defective 
conception of a steamship.  
 
Of course, Shame and Necessity had such ambitious aspirations that it was 
exposed to criticisms from each specialized field it touched upon, and twenty-two 
years after its publication it is not easy to ascertain whether it had the impact it 
deserved on ancient philosophy scholarship.  
Bernard Williams has often been accused of being primarily a destroyer of 
theories rather than someone willing and capable to offer alternatives. The 
scathing irony with which he sometimes addressed theories he found inadequate 
gave the impression (to some) that he was fundamentally a skeptic who enjoyed 
dismantling anything that looked like a system (and most famously what he used 
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to call the morality system).  
The characterization of Williams as a skeptic is mostly correct.  Nonetheless, 
he had seen something crucial. There was indeed a problem that he approached 
from different points of view, a source of confusion which he tried to warn us 
against in quite a few of his writings. What I take to be his fundamental insight 
can be expressed negatively, though it was meant to have positive consequences: 
philosophy ought not to aim at total awareness. He took this point to be important 
both with respect to historical accuracy and with respect to ethics. What had to 
be avoided by the historian was the mistake of thinking that by giving up the 
belief in an absolute standpoint one was going to surrender historical accuracy 
altogether. He argued for this idea several times. One clear example was his reply 
to Putnam in “Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline”: 
 
But the second assumption I have ascribed to Putnam, that if there were an 
absolute conception, it would somehow be better than more perspectival 
representations—that is simply false. Even if it were possible to give an account 
of the world that was minimally perspectival, it would not be particularly 
serviceable to us for many of our purposes, such as making sense of our 
intellectual or other activities, or indeed getting on with most of those 
activities. For those purposes—in particular, in seeking to understand 
ourselves—we need concepts and explanations which are rooted in our more 
local practices, our culture, and our history, and these cannot be replaced by 
concepts which we might share with very different investigators of the world. 
The slippery word ‘we’ here means not the inclusive ‘we’ which brings together 
as a purely abstract gathering any beings with whom human beings might 
conceivably communicate about the nature of the world. It means a contrastive 
‘we’, that is to say, humans as contrasted with other possible beings; and, in the 
case of many human practices, it may of course mean groupings smaller than 
humanity as a whole.5 
 
In ethics the impossibility of total awareness is due to the fact that we always 
think from dispositions. What we see, the way we see it, our best insights come 
from our dispositions to see things in certain specific ways, to illuminate our 
actions according to priorities that we receive from the world and cannot undo 
(clearly an Aristotelian thought). This is how Williams states this point in the 
“Postscript” to Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy:  
 
I hope I have made it clear that the ideal of transparency and the desire that 
our ethical practice should be able to stand up to reflection do not demand total 
                                                          
5 B. Williams, “Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline (2000),” in B. Williams, Philosophy as a 
Humanistic Discipline, A.W. Moore, (ed.), Princeton University Press, Princeton 2006, 180-199 (186-7). 
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explicitness, or a reflection that aims to lay everything bare at once. Those 
demands are based on a misunderstanding of rationality, both personal and 
political. We must reject any model of personal practical thought according to 
which all my projects, purposes, and needs should be made, discursively and at 
once, considerations for me. I must deliberate from what I am. Truthfulness 
requires trust in that as well, and not the obsessional and doomed drive to 
eliminate it.6  
 
In Shame and Necessity the warning against the temptation of absolute 
transparency takes the form of a defense of shame, both as a moral emotion and as 
a distinctive trait of Greek culture. Shame is contrasted with guilt, which is 
normally associated, especially by the progressivists, with a more developed moral 
sense, based on psychological depth, autonomy and self-sufficiency. 
In the Greek conception of shame Williams sees preserved some fundamental 
aspects of guilt, but without the virtues that progressivism attributed to guilt. 
Shame looks at who I am, and for this reason it encourages attention to what I did 
or omitted to do, like guilt. But, in contrast with guilt, shame keeps me more 
strongly connected with others: when I feel ashamed I am not just concerned with 
what I did to someone, but also with what the action reveals about me, and, as 
Williams argues, this question cannot be properly addressed without taking into 
account how others I respect would react to it. (The other of shame can be 
concrete or internalized. Fussi and Montes Sánchez address this point in the 
articles they wrote for this issue).  
From the point of view of shame I can be critical of the social expectations to 
which I am responding, but I cannot sever all ties with them: I cannot go so far as 
to consider my reflections as stemming from a pure form of rationality, or to 
consider myself free from my received dispositions of character. Williams’s 
warning to those who take this route is that they run the risk of motivational 
solipsism (SN, 99-100). His retort to those who accuse the Greeks’ reliance on 
shame of leading to selfishness on the one end and to heteronomy on the other 
hand, is to point out that this kind of critique ultimately leads to contradictory 
requests concerning the role others should play:  
 
When it is complained that the Greek ethical outlook, or at least that of the 
archaic Greeks, is both egoistic and at the same time heteronomous, because 
it rests conventionally on the opinion of others, there is a constant and 
powerful tendency for these two complaints to turn against each other. 
Which is supposed to be the trouble, that these people thought too much 
about others' reactions, or too little? (SN, 100). 
                                                          
6 B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (with a commentary on the text by A. W. Moore), 
Routledge, London and New York, 2006 (“Postscript,” 199-200).  
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If I understand him correctly, Williams thought that shame forces us to 
acknowledge that there is always a place and a time from which we think. The fact 
that shame is bound to local practices and expectations makes it ultimately 
opaque to reason, but this limitation has the important consequence that it keeps 
philosophical thinking away from embracing illusory hopes. It drives us to 
realism.  
Williams admired Plato enormously, but he thought that precisely because 
Plato had not given shame the place it deserved in his psychological theory, he 
believed that philosophy could or should be a liberation from humanity. As others 
before me have noted, this accusation was misguided. Actually, shame played a 
central role in Plato’s ethical and psychological reflection, and this is true both 
from the point of view of the arguments explicitly defended by Socrates, and from 
the point of view of the behavior exemplified by him in the dialogues.  
On the argumentative side one should consider the importance of the political 
and ethical role attributed to spiritedness in the Republic, since that part of the 
soul plays a key role in education, involves social recognition and is responsible for 
emotions like shame, pride, anger and indignation. On the dramatic side one 
should mention that Thrasymachus’s blushing is clearly a turning point in the 
first book of the Republic. Furthermore, as Laura Candiotto shows in the paper 
she presents in this volume, the shame felt by the different characters in the 
Gorgias contributes not just to the efficacy of their refutation, but involves the 
audience as well. That Williams’s criticism of Plato was not correct of course does 
not make his connecting the recognition of the importance of shame with 
philosophical realism less worthy of reflection.  
The essays collected in this volume take their bearings from Williams’s 
discussion of shame, both from the theoretical and the historical point of view. 
The discussion concentrates on the nature and phenomenology of shame, and on 
its relationship with emotions like fear or anger, and virtues like courage. The 
papers follow two main lines of inquiry: two of them (written respectively by 
Alessandra Fussi and by Alba Montez Sánches) focus on Bernard Williams’s 
account, while for the last two papers (by David Roochnik and by Laura 
Candiotto) Shame and Necessity is the background for further inquiries on the role 
of shame in ancient thought.  
Alessandra Fussi concentrates on Williams’s defense of the Greek conception 
of shame against some commonly held critical views: 1) that shame expresses 
selfish concerns and it ignores the needs of others; 2) that it belongs to the so 
called objective attitudes and inhibits second-person responses; 3) that it is 
dependent on social conventions and is therefore both superficial (since it mostly 
relies on appearance) and heteronomous (since it depends on external values). In 
the last part of her paper she concentrates on the role of others in shame. She 
examines the problem of the other’s attitude (do we feel shame only when others 
are critical of us?), and finally turns to Williams’s distinction between the concrete 
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other and the internalized other, and discusses some difficulties connected with 
the identity of the other whose views are internalized. 
Precisely the notion of the internalized other is the main focus of Alba Montes 
Sánchez’s contribution. She examines in detail Williams’s position in Shame and 
Necessity, contrasts it with recent accounts of shame and finally presents and 
endorses a Sartrean view. In order to clarify the role others play in the feeling of 
shame Montes Sánchez initially differentiates shame from embarrassment and 
disgrace. In the second part of her paper she discusses Calhoun’s objection to 
Williams: if respect for the other’s judgment is necessary for shame, then 
ultimately I am my own judge, since I cannot respect judgments that I would not 
myself share. Calhoun thinks this is wrong: sometimes we are shamed by people 
we don’t respect and by judgments we don’t endorse. In her view, this is not a sign 
that others have contaminated our value system. It simply shows that shame is 
not about evaluations; it is about their practical impact on the life we share with 
others. Montes Sánchez observes critically that Williams and Calhoun are both 
too restrictive in giving others the power to shame us. It is not true, she affirms, 
that others cannot shame us unless we allow them to do so by respecting them or 
entering into shared practices with them. Rather, “everybody has, to a higher or 
lesser degree, the power to shame us unless we withdraw it from them through 
contempt or disengagement, for example.” It is on the basis of this view that 
Montes Sánchez proceeds to retrieve the Sartrean account of shame. The role the 
other plays in shame is not that of evaluating me, but, more fundamentally, that 
of allowing me to focus on myself as the object of someone else’s perception. The 
other is fundamental not qua internalized other but, rather, as constitutive of the 
possibility of inter-subjectivity, and hence of transforming me into a subject 
capable of feeling shame. 
The fact that shame is aroused when we feel judged by people we respect (and 
not just by anybody who happens to be our witness) is a point that Williams 
shares with Aristotle, who first formalized it. It is to Aristotle’s account of the 
relationship between courage and shame in the Nicomachean Ethics that David 
Roochnik devotes his paper. The problem he addresses is the relationship between 
courage (which for Aristotle is a virtue) and shame (which is a quasi-virtue: shame 
is an emotion, not a disposition like virtue, but it is instrumental to virtue because 
it is appropriately felt by young people in the process of becoming good men). 
Aristotle affirms that there is a difference between those who exhibit authentic 
courage and those who exhibit only “political courage” (1116a17). While 
courageous men “act on account of (dia) the kalon” (1116b30-31), those who act 
out of political courage (and are not motivated merely by fear of their superiors) 
face death in battle because they would be ashamed if they did not. The difference 
between such men and the truly courageous appears very thin, since both are 
motivated by what is beautiful and noble. Citizen-soldiers, Aristotle affirms, act 
“on account of virtue (di’ aretên). For they do so on account of shame (aidô) and a 
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desire (orexin) for the kalon, since they have a desire for honor, and in order to 
avoid blame, which is aischron” (1116a27-29). Roochnik distances himself from 
Irwin’s interpretation, for whom the difference rests on the fact that only the 
truly courageous are altruistic. In facing death they consider the good of others 
and nothing else, while the citizen-soldiers aim at their selfish interest: they seek 
honor and the glory of a noble death. According to Roochnik, in Irwin’s 
interpretation the kalon is unduly moralized, and it loses the connotation of 
visibility that is essential to it: something kalon is not just noble, but beautiful 
and fine. Roochnik proposes an interpretation that takes into account two points 
made by Williams: 1) The internalized other is essential to shame. 2) Shame makes 
us relate not just to others but to ourselves.  
If we remember that shame is an appropriate emotion for young people, we 
can imagine young soldiers motivated by a desire to be appreciated by their fellow 
soldiers, by their superiors and by the citizens at large. They act nobly on account 
of virtue because they desire their deeds to shine in glory. When they get older 
they will have internalized the sense of the kalon for which it is worth fighting. At 
that point their actions will not just be altruistic (virtue for Aristotle is never 
disjoined from a concern for one’s own happiness), but motivated by a sense of 
such actions as are appropriate to the kind of people they deem to be. Acting for 
the sake of the noble will mean, at that point, to act in such a way that one can 
see himself as kalon and hence maintain a sense of his own identity as the kind of 
person who does certain things and would blame himself for doing something 
aischron. Ultimately, in Roochnik’s paper we can see an Aristotelian 
developmental account from the capacity to feel appropriately ashamed of oneself 
to that of feeling appropriately proud of oneself.   
The volume ends with Laura Candiotto’s paper on the role of shame in 
Socrates’s refutation of his interlocutors in Plato’s dialogues. More specifically, 
Candiotto observes that in the dialogues that portray conversations with 
important public figures (for example politicians, sophists, generals or 
rhetoricians), Socrates’ interlocutors react to their refutation with two alternative 
attitudes. They either accept the shame of a defeat in argument as an emotional 
recognition of ignorance (as is the case of Charmides in the dialogue that takes his 
name), or they try to hide their feelings (as does Critias in the same dialogue, or 
Callicles in the Gorgias) for fear of losing face. In this second instance, the audience 
plays the role of an extended mind. Those who are present at the refutation 
become aware that Socrates’s interlocutors are unable to acknowledge their 
failings, and this is for the audience an occasion to see through the social masks 
exhibited by these public figures and realize what kind of people they really are. 
That the refutation reaches out to the audience has two consequences: 1) The 
audience is allowed a critical stance with respect to public figures who tend to use 
rhetorical defenses in order to hide their shortcomings. 2) Those shortcomings, 
once perceived by the audience, bounce back to the refuted interlocutors, who are 
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therefore forced to revise their self-image.  
Candiotto’s conclusion is that the extended elenchus involves cognitive and 
emotional means. Its visible aspect is aporia, which is the result of a process 
whereby Socrates, interlocutor and audience through the mediation of shame 
realize a form of catharsis. The audience is purified from the superficial opinions it 
initially entertained about the interlocutors and led to consider the subjects under 
discussion under a different light. The interlocutors, in turn, receive from the 
audience the possibility of experiencing the shame they initially refused to accept, 
and this initiates a process of transformation in their attitude towards truth.  
The authors whose contributions appear in this volume approach Shame and 
Necessity from different perspectives. To some the book reveals important aspects 
about Williams’s attempt to understand ethics from a genealogical perspective; 
others find inspiration from the way historiographical categories are questioned. 
Some are bent on finding connections between Williams’s theory of shame and 
those of authors who preceded or followed him, while others find in this book the 
invitation to a dialogue with contemporary theories. Williams used to say that 
philosophical arguments do not need to form a system: it would be good enough if 
they hung together, “like conspirators perhaps.”7 This is an interesting key to 
Williams’s work. One might hope it can also characterize the essays presented 
here.  
 
                                                          
7 ) B. Williams, “Replies,” in J. E. J. Altham & R. Harrison (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on 
the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, 185–224 (186).   
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ABSTRACT 
Section 1 examines four reasons most commonly adduced to support the claim that guilt is 
superior to shame, both psychologically and morally: a) While guilt expresses a concern for 
others shame is a self-centered and selfish emotion. b) While guilt appeals to autonomy shame is 
linked to heteronomy. c) Shame is not a reactive attitude, like guilt, indignation, blame, 
resentment, but an objective attitude, like disdain or disgust. d) While guilt invites us to 
second-person responses, shame inhibits them. The second part of the paper (sections 2 and 3) 
addresses Williams’s analysis of the role of shame in ancient Greek literature and philosophy. 
Section 2 is dedicated to Williams’s response to the objections concerning selfishness and 
shallowness and to discussing his reply to the charge that since shame belongs to the objective 
attitudes it tends to inhibit second-person responses. Section 3 concentrates on Williams’s 
reflections on heteronomy by focusing on the attitude of others in shame and on the role played 
by the internalized other.  
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Introduction 
 
It is still a widespread belief in moral philosophy that shame is a more primitive 
and less reliable emotion than guilt. As Stephen Darwall puts it in a recent essay,2 
shame and guilt belong to two different spheres of recognition: shame is the 
typical emotion of honor societies, while guilt is at home in societies in which 
respect for one another is mediated by a mutually accountable public space. 
Honor is bestowed and can be taken away by those in a given society who have 
the power to do so, while dignity is not something that can be taken away or, like 
honor, diminished by the behavior of others. 
                                                 
1 J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Washington Square Press, New York 1993, 222. 
2 S. Darwall, “Due tipi di rispetto come riconoscimento per le persone”, in Eguale Rispetto, 
edited by I. Carter, A. E. Galeotti, V. Ottonelli, Bruno Mondadori, Milano 2008, 1-19. A revised 
version appeared in English as “Respect as Honor and as Accountability,” in Reason, Value, 
and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., eds. Robert Johnson 
and Mark Timmons, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015, 70-88.  
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Those who consider emotions like shame and guilt from a theoretical point of 
view often do not distance themselves from the familiar story according to which 
the ancient Greeks failed to put the concept of the will at the center of their moral 
theories, and had a conception of human life shaped by a “culture of shame.” This 
story is supported by the so-called progressive view of historical development, 
presented in a classic way by Dodds in his book The Greeks and the Irrational and 
by Adkins in Merit and Responsibility.3 Dodds and Adkins detected in ancient 
Greek culture a progressive if slow detachment from a culture of shame towards a 
culture of guilt, which was thought to have reached its best articulation with the 
advent of Christianity. In such historical reconstruction Plato and Aristotle play 
the role of intermediary figures in the progressive development from shame to 
guilt: they anticipate some fundamental discoveries concerning human agency 
and autonomy, while at the same time still expressing in several ways the culture 
of shame to which they originally belonged.  
Contrary to this line of thought, Williams is skeptical of a psychology based on 
the separation between body and soul (SN, 25-26), the notion of the will as a 
mental action in-between a decision and the ensuing action (SN, 41-46), the idea 
that we can be responsible only for actions that derive from our intentions,4 and 
the thesis that guilt is more morally relevant than shame (SN, 75-102). He 
maintains, rather, that psychological and ethical theories can benefit from an 
understanding of agency that includes agent-regret, moral luck, necessity, and 
takes into account the role of shame. In his view, if we are open to such concepts 
we will no longer look down on the ancient Greeks as if they were the 
representatives of a primitive moral outlook. 
Williams is not inclined to historical nostalgia: his point is not that the Greeks 
were right in their approach to the most fundamental ethical questions. Rather, 
he refuses to assume with progressivism that modernity, whether in the shape of 
Kantianism or Utilitarianism, made substantial progress in tackling problems 
that had supposedly not been properly addressed by classical Greek philosophy 
and literature. He asks us to distance ourselves from such a theory. He thinks that 
                                                 
3 E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1951; 
A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1960. 
4 See, Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity, Sather Classical Lectures, Volume 57, University 
of California Press, Berkeley 1993, 64: “Progressivist writers refer to a concept of moral 
responsibility that we supposedly enjoy and the Greeks lacked, but it is unclear what they have 
in mind. Their thought seems most typically to be that the Greeks, or at least archaic Greeks, 
blamed and sanctioned people for things that they did unintentionally, or again—though this 
distinction is often neglected—for things that, like Agamemnon, they did intentionally but in a 
strange state of mind. We are thought not to do this, or at least to regard it as unjust. But if 
this means that the Greeks paid no attention to intentions, while we make everything turn on 
the issue of intentions, or at least think that we should, this is doubly false.” From now on 
Shame and Necessity will be abbreviated as SN. 
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by accepting the possibility that we can learn something from the Greeks we will 
also be ready to assume a skeptical attitude towards moral concepts that we tend 
to take for granted.5  
Williams’s strategy in Shame and Necessity takes two directions: 1) He tries to 
bring back to life a view of the Greeks’ ethical life as free as possible from the 
prejudices of progressive history. 2) He argues that by examining our ethical 
concepts in the light of the psychological and ethical patterns articulated by the 
Greeks we can draw different maps of our emotional life.  
If we understand well what aidos or aischyne were for the Greeks, our own 
understanding of the demarcations between shame and guilt will be significantly 
affected, and this in turn will shake our assurance that we really know what we 
mean when we characterize ancient Greek culture as a culture of shame.  
In section 1 I will consider four reasons most commonly adduced to support 
the claim that guilt is superior to shame, both psychologically and morally. I will 
focus on the arguments mentioned by Williams, and, in two cases, on Darwall’s 
own version of them.  
In sections 2 and 3 I will address Williams’s analysis of the role of shame in 
ancient Greek literature. In section 2 the focus will be on Williams’s response to 
the objections concerning selfishness and shallowness, and on his position 
regarding the charge that shame belongs to the objective attitudes and inhibits 
second-person responses. In section 3 I will concentrate on Williams’s response to 
the charge that shame, as opposed to guilt, is heteronomous and on his account of 
the role of others in shame. Here I will discuss three points: a) the distinction 
Williams finds necessary between the concrete other and the internalized other; b) 
the attitude of the audience before whom we feel shame; c) the internalized other 
as the focus of real social expectations.  
 
1. Four Objections to Shame 
  
In Shame and Necessity Williams argues that the opposition between guilt and 
shame is often rests on ideological preconceptions, but he also concedes that the 
progressivist position is based on arguments. In order to understand Williams’s 
                                                 
5 SN, 5-6: “These stories are deeply misleading, both historically and ethically. Many of the 
questions they generate, of when this, that, or the other element of a developed moral 
consciousness is supposed to have arisen, are unanswerable, because the notion of a developed 
moral consciousness that gives rise to these questions is basically a myth. These theories 
measure the ideas and the experience of the ancient Greeks against modern conceptions of 
freedom, autonomy, inner responsibility, moral obligation, and so forth, and it is assumed that 
we have an entirely adequate control of these conceptions themselves. But if we ask ourselves 
honestly, I believe that we shall find that we have no clear idea of the substance of these 
conceptions, and hence no clear idea of what it is that, according to the progressivist accounts, 
the Greeks did not have.” 
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own defense of shame, it may be useful to identify first the criticisms that are 
most commonly addressed to this emotion. Here are some of the reasons why 
many maintain that guilt is morally superior to shame: 
1) Shame is charged with being a self-centered and selfish emotion. Adkins 
maintains that in Homer shame serves the competitive virtues of the warrior 
society. Courage in war, the ability to do heroic deeds, personal success and 
victory are the qualities with which the best man (the kalos kai agathos) is 
identified. Failure and defeat make someone feel ashamed of himself. Success and 
victory are of course public values, and this is why being good means, ultimately, 
to be spoken well of, while being bad is to be despised or ignored. Seeking fame is 
therefore the main goal, and fear of a bad reputation the central preoccupation. I 
care for my reputation: as Bernard Williams points out, when he gives voice to the 
critics of shame, “it is simply my face to save or lose, so its values are egoistic” 
(SN, 78). Guilt, on the other hand, expresses my preoccupation with the 
sufferance of others, and is therefore considered an other-regarding emotion. 
2) Guilt invites us to look into ourselves, to discover our deepest intentions and 
responsibilities: it is an emotional expression of our being autonomous agents. We 
feel guilty when others ask us to give an account of our actions or omissions, and if 
we believe that their indignation or resentment is justified. By contrast, shame is 
felt when we feel exposed to the wrong people in the wrong situation (SN, 78). 
Since it is a response to how others see us, shame is connected with the idea of 
losing face, and for this reason it is often charged with being a superficial emotion. 
Shame gives central stage to appearance and the opinions of others: hence it is the 
emotion of conformism. So, while guilt is deep, shame is shallow. While guilt 
presupposes autonomy, shame points to heteronomy.  
3) Differently from shame, guilt implies equal footing with others, i.e., our 
mutual accountability. We do not lose but rather affirm our dignity when we feel 
guilty: by recognizing that others have a right to consider us accountable, we 
acknowledge our right to speak in our defense, or to acknowledge our faults.  
This is not the case with shame. As Darwall maintains,6 shame does not belong 
to a second-person standpoint: it is third-personal. When we feel shame we are not 
interlocutors of those who call us to respond of our actions, but objects of their 
gaze. Shame is not a reactive attitude, like guilt, indignation, blame, resentment, 
but an objective attitude, like disdain or disgust.7 To the real or imaginary 
spectators before whom we feel ashamed we appear as objects. Our real or 
                                                 
6 S. Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press, 2006, 70-72. 
7 For the distinction between reactive and objective attitudes, see P. Strawson, “Freedom and 
Resentment”, in Freedom and Resentment and other Essays, Methuen, London 1974, 1-28; for a 
critical assessment of Darwall’s interpretation of Strawson’s essay, see J. Deigh, “Reactive 
Attitudes Revisited”, in C. Bagnoli, Morality and the Emotions, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2011, 197-216.  
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imaginary spectators have an authority over us, not, as in the case of guilt, an 
authority shared with us. While with guilt we are on an equal footing with the 
other, with shame we are seen qua inferior. Darwall here follows Sartre:  
 
By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing 
judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the 
Other. Yet this object which has appeared to the Other is not an empty image 
in the mind of another. Such an image in fact, would be imputable wholly to 
the Other and so could not “touch” me. I could feel irritation, or anger before 
it as before a bad portrait of myself which gives to my expression an ugliness 
or baseness which I do not have, but I could not be touched to the quick. 
Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me.8  
 
The moment I become ashamed my freedom escapes me, because I become an 
object for another and at the same time I recognize that I am that object. 
4) Typical expressions of guilt are in the second person: confession, apology, 
reparation are ways to keep the relationships with others alive. Shame, on the 
other hand, makes us desire to hide: we do not want to meet the other’s gaze, we 
do not want to reciprocate, we do not feel called to respond, we are not addressed 
but merely looked at. We feel ugly and despised; we would want to disappear from 
view. Hence, while guilt invites us to second-person responses, shame inhibits 
them. 
 
2. Shame revisited 
 
Williams responds to the criticisms leveled against the so-called culture of shame, 
with which the Greeks are identified, by following a rather complex strategy. 
First of all, he questions the stark opposition between shame and guilt and 
shows that aidos, the Greek term commonly translated as shame, can be properly 
understood only if one realizes that it contains some fundamental aspects of guilt. 
Secondarily, he addresses the objections to shame as a shallow, heteronomous and 
selfish emotion, and argues that they are misunderstandings due to a superficial 
reading of ancient texts. Thirdly, he explains that shame responds to concerns 
that are wider than the concerns of guilt and, to a certain extent, include them (in 
some instances, when shame fails to include the concerns of guilt Williams argues 
that it is for the best). 
His response is conducted by analyzing literary passages: from Homer (who 
was the main target of Adkins’ theory concerning the culture of shame) to the 
tragic writers. Only occasionally does Williams comment upon classical 
philosophical texts, and never in great detail. This is one of the main limits of 
                                                 
8 J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 222. See also 261. 
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Shame and Necessity, and it is especially relevant with respect to Plato and 
Aristotle, who, as I mentioned earlier, were mostly viewed by progressivist 
historians as improving upon the original Greek culture of shame by 
distinguishing between autonomy and heteronomy, interiority and exteriority, 
conventional or political values on the one hand, and moral values on the other 
hand.  
Perhaps it is because of the priority given to the polemical stance against the 
progressivist view that in Shame and Necessity one does not find the sensitivity 
one might have expected from Williams to the significance of the literary aspects 
in Plato’s dialogues. Williams is clearly aware that the characters and the 
dramatic setting in Plato’s dialogues deserve keen philosophic attention: 
 
In contrasting philosophy and literature, we should remember that some 
philosophy is itself literature. Philosophers often suppose that the kinds of 
difficulties raised for them by a literary text are not presented by texts that 
they classify as philosophical, but this idea is produced largely by the selective 
way in which they use them. We should bear in mind how drastically some of 
these texts are being treated when they are read in this way. […] One 
philosopher with whom the cost of these processes is especially high is one who 
will be relevant to this inquiry, Plato (SN, 13). 
 
Unfortunately, Williams subsequently sets aside the problem of the proper 
interpretation of the literary aspects in Plato’s dialogues, and in chapter 4 
proceeds to raise his criticisms to Plato’s conception of autonomy as if he were 
addressing a proto-Kantian theory (and one should add that Kant himself is given 
a far too schematic approach in this book). Williams’s criticism of Plato’s stance 
towards shame in the example of Gyges’ ring is directed to the theory presented 
by a character, Glaucon, whom Williams arbitrarily identifies with Plato himself. 
Yet, Glaucon is only one of several characters in Plato’s Republic. Williams does 
not seem to appreciate the difference between theories held by characters in a 
Platonic dialogue and the interpretation of the dialogue as a whole.9  
                                                 
9 Williams’s attitude towards Plato shifts from sympathetic in “The Legacy of Greek 
Philosophy” (in The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal, ed. M. I. Finley, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1981, 202–255) to negative in Shame and Necessity. It becomes appreciative again 
in Plato: the Invention of Philosophy (Phoenix, London 1998). Williams’s essays on the history of 
philosophy (including “The Legacy of Greek Philosophy,” “Plato: the Invention of 
Philosophy,” and six more essays on Socrates and Plato) were collected by M. Burnyeat in B. 
Williams, The Sense of the Past. Essays in the History of Philosophy, ed. M. Burnyeat, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2006. For a reconstruction of the motivations 
underlying Williams’s fluctuating positions towards Plato, cfr. A. A. Long, “Williams on Greek 
literature and philosophy,” in A. Thomas, ed., Bernard Williams, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2007, 155-80. For a critical assessment of Williams’s objections to Plato in Shame 
and Necessity, cfr. T. Irwin, “Critical Notice of B. Williams, Shame and Necessity,” Apeiron 27, 
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With respect to Aristotle, the problem is somewhat different. It would have 
been helpful to find in Shame and Necessity a treatment of Aristotle’s conception 
of shame, with which Williams’s theory shares some fundamental aspects. 
Aristotle’s discussion of this emotion (the terms he employs are aidos and aischyne) 
can be found in the Nicomachean Ethics and in the Rhetoric. It is debatable to 
what extent the meanings of aidos and aischyne overlap, but, as David Konstan 
helpfully pointed out, in Aristotle’s ethical works aidos never refers to past 
events.10 Aischyne, on the other hand, can refer to past, present and future events, 
as is evident in Aristotle’s definition of shame in the Rhetoric.11 The reference to 
the three temporal dimensions allows aischyne to play a role similar to guilt with 
respect to actions that one blames oneself for having done, and to function as a 
prospective and inhibitory emotion with respect to actions that one finds debasing 
but attractive.  
Williams’s analysis of aidos in the Greek world is very close to the Aristotelian 
view both for what concerns the intersection between the ancient conception of 
shame and the modern conception of guilt, and for those aspects of shame which 
embrace ethical phenomena wider than those relevant for guilt. For example, as 
Aristotle makes clear, shame (aischyne) can be felt not just concerning actions and 
behaviors for which one feels responsible, but also in situations of disadvantage 
with respect to one’s peers, or when someone is subjected to violence and 
humiliation. This is a point that from Williams’s perspective can be understood 
and appreciated in all its importance and it is a pity that it is not explicitly 
discussed in Shame and Necessity, where Aristotle’s conception of shame is only 
left in the background.12 
Let us now turn to Williams’s response to the charges leveled against shame. 
Points 1) and 2) can be summarized by saying that shame is accused of being a 
selfish, shallow and heteronomous emotion, especially in contrast with guilt. We 
can of course imagine the kind of shame felt by someone who is solely driven by a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1994, 45-76.  
10 D. Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature, 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2006, 95. See also the following observation: “The 
emotion, as Aristotle understands it, is uniform; what varies is simply the timing of the 
perceived ills. The lexicographers are thus wrong to split aischyne into sub-definitions, for there 
is nothing to disambiguate” (99). On the debate concerning the relationship between aidos and 
aischyne in EN, IV, 1128b15-23, see W.M.A Grimaldi, Aristotle, Rhetoric II. A Commentary, 
Fordham University Press, New York 1988, 105-107. 
11 Rhet., ii 6.1383b13-16: “Let shame [aischyne] be [defined as] a sort of pain and agitation 
concerning the class of evils, whether present or past or future, that seem to bring a person into 
disrespect, and [let] shamelessness [be defined as] a belittling about these same things” (G.A. 
Kennedy, trans., Aristotle: On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1991). 
12 For a discussion of Aristotle’s conception of shame and humiliation in light of Williams, see A. 
Fussi, “Aristotle on Shame,” Ancient Philosophy 35, 2015, 113-135. 
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preoccupation with appearance and the opinion of others. For such a person a 
critical stance with respect to conventional values will be out of the question, and 
his feeling ashamed at his failures to adapt to the expectations of others will 
indeed express his conformism. However, this is not the way shame works most of 
the time for most people, and it is certainly not how it was meant to work in 
ancient Greek literature. 
Let us begin with the charge of egoism. As we have seen, Adkins claimed that 
shame in Homer served competitive values, and was therefore a selfish emotion. If 
this had really been the case, Williams responds, we would find only instances of 
shame in the face of defeat or failure to overcome others. Yet, in the Homeric 
works characters are shown to be blamed for actions and situations that exemplify 
breaches both in competitive and in collaborative virtues. Williams invites us to 
remember that the terms aidos (shame) and nemesis (indignation) form a system: I 
will be ashamed of actions that would make me indignant or angry if they were 
performed by others. If we pay close attention to the kinds of actions and 
situations that are the object of shame and indignation in the Iliad and the 
Odyssey, we will realize that selfish concerns, such as personal success and victory 
in battle, are not the only objects of such emotions. One can feel indignant at 
someone running away in battle, but indignation can be an adequate response also 
to such actions as giving poison for arrows, sending one’s mother away, or 
behaving like Penelope’s suitors in the Odyssey (SN, 80). Shameful actions include 
failures to behave in a generous way, to respect one’s parents, to have a sense of 
what I can do to others and others can do to me in such a way that we both 
preserve our self-respect.  
Adkins’ distinction between competitive and collaborative virtues does not 
help us to isolate those actions that in the Iliad and the Odyssey would be 
stigmatized as shameful. Failures in generosity are as blameworthy and shameful 
as failures in courage. The opposition between shame and guilt from the point of 
view of selfishness versus altruism is therefore due to a prejudice in favor of guilt 
rather than to the actual analysis of Greek texts.  
We should note here that if nemesis and aidos form a system of reciprocal 
expectations and responses, then the charges raised in points 3) and 4) fall: 
 
The reaction in Homer to someone who has done something that shame should 
have prevented is nemesis, a reaction that can be understood, according to the 
context, as ranging from shock, contempt, and malice to righteous rage and 
indignation. It should not be thought that nemesis and its related words are 
ambiguous. It is defined as a reaction, and what it psychologically consists of 
properly depends on what particular violation of aidos it is a reaction to. As 
Redfield has put it, aides and nemesis are “a reflexive pair” (SN, 80). 
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In the interpretation that Williams draws from Redfield, nemesis is clearly a 
reactive response: the indignation felt at failures of aidos calls the other to answer 
for his actions and omissions rather than treat him as an object to be judged from 
a third-personal point of view. And if aidos and nemesis form a “reflective pair”, 
then aidos itself is a reactive attitude. The shame felt by Telemachus, when he 
realizes that he forgot to close the door to the storeroom from which the suitors 
are now taking out armors and spears, entails, among other things, a recognition 
of responsibility and a desire to make amends (SN, 50-52). Telemachus’ reaction is 
not a desire to hide from view: rather, it is a response that recognizes the 
authority of others to blame him for what he (albeit unintentionally) did. 
Williams analyzes the concept of responsibility in the Homeric poems and 
shows that it entails regret and the need for reparation. The opposition between 
objective and reactive attitudes, with shame belonging to the former and guilt to 
the latter, does therefore not apply to aidos, which seems rather to entail traits 
that the opposition in question attributes to the sphere of guilt (SN, 90-91). The 
stark contrast between shame and guilt from which the progressivist view took its 
bearing in distinguishing us from the Greeks ought to be reconsidered.13  
 
3. The Other in Shame 
 
Let us now turn to discuss how Williams addresses the charge that shame, as 
opposed to guilt, is heteronomous, i.e., that the person feeling shame is dependent 
on the opinions and values of others. In this context Williams asks us to 
concentrate on three points:  
a) We should distinguish between a concrete other and an internalized other. 
b) We should consider the attitude of the other. Do we need a critical audience 
in order to feel ashamed?  
c) We should ask ourselves if the other who elicits our shame can be anybody 
or needs some further characterization. 
 Williams argues that it is a trivial mistake to think that shame is only 
triggered in the presence of others who witness our actions and find them wanting. 
                                                 
13 In his review of Shame and Necessity (Mind, New Series, Vol. 104, No. 413, Jan., 1995, 214-
219) Colin Allen asks whom Williams is referring to when he speaks of “we” and “the Greeks.” 
Williams anticipates the objection to the usage of the first person plural by explaining that it is 
an invitational “we”: “More than one friend, reading this book in an earlier version, has asked 
who this ubiquitous ‘we’ represents. It refers to people in a certain cultural situation, but who is 
in that situation? Obviously it cannot mean everybody in the world, or everybody in the West. 
I hope it does not mean only people who already think as I do. The best I can say is that ‘we’ 
operates not through a previously fixed designation, but through invitation. (The same is true, I 
believe, of ‘we’ in much philosophy, and particularly in ethics.) It is not a matter of ‘I’ telling 
‘you’ what I and others think, but of my asking you to consider to what extent you and I think 
some things and perhaps need to think others.” (SN, note 7, 171).  
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If we understand the Homeric culture as indeed a “culture”, and not just as a 
heap of facts from the past or a collection of actions and speeches lacking any 
internal structure, we have to acknowledge that the characters we encounter in 
the Iliad and Odyssey exhibit the culture of shame in their distinctive manners: 
they typically do certain things, and would never do other things. Now, the idea 
that shame is fear of being seen by others while doing blameworthy actions fails to 
account for the fact that someone like Achilles would find certain actions simply 
below himself, regardless of whether someone or no one saw him. Can we conceive 
of Achilles stealing by night the gifts that he had arrogantly refused to accept 
from the embassy in the clear light of day? Would such an action satisfy his sense 
of honor? Petty stealing, doing in secret what he could not do openly, is simply 
not part of Achilles’ character.  
Achilles is not Gyges, who, having found a ring of invisibility, commits all 
sorts of crimes. Before finding the ring, Gyges looked like a good person. So tells us 
Glaucon in Plato’s Republic, who uses the example of Gyges to prove that people 
follow the law not because of justice, but in fear of punishment. Williams takes 
issue with Glaucon’s thesis precisely because the example assumes that norms 
cannot be internalized. 14  
If shame were operative only in the presence of concrete witnesses Achilles, 
one of the most important representatives of a culture of shame, would not be 
inhibited from stealing when nobody could see him. If such a picture is 
unthinkable, it is because, as Williams points out, understanding Achilles means 
understanding his manners, and this implies that his sense of shame is not 
reducible to paying lip service to the expectations of those who happen to be 
present in the scene of his life at the time (SN, 81).  
If shame entails reference to another, the other must be capable of playing a 
role independently of his concrete presence: the other of shame is an internalized 
other. Shame plays an inhibitory role even when one is alone and certain that 
nobody will find out what he is tempted to do. If this is the case, then the 
opposition with guilt is even in this case less stark than one was initially led to 
believe. Shame is far from a shallow emotion: like guilt, its roots are in our 
interiority. The concrete other can trigger my shame, but is not what shame can 
be reduced to.  
                                                 
14 SN, 98-101. The problem with Williams’s objection is that he attributes Glaucon’s thesis to 
Plato. In my view, Socrates responds to the example of Gyges when, in book IV of the Republic 
he introduces thumos, the part of the soul responsible for the internalization of norms. Thumos 
makes us respond with anger and indignation to the injustices committed by others, and with 
shame when we are to blame. I have discussed Williams’s objection to Glaucon’s example, as 
well as what I take to be Socrates’ response, in A. Fussi, “La critica di Williams alla Repubblica 
di Platone,” Méthexis, Volume 22, 2009, 39-59; see also A. Fussi, “Inconsistencies in Glaucon’s 
Account of Justice,” Polis, The Journal of the Society for Greek Political Thought (UK), vol. 24.1, 
Spring 2007, 43-69.   
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Let us now focus on the other’s attitude. Do we need a critical audience in 
order to feel shame?  
In shame one feels exposed. In Being and Nothingness Sartre discusses two 
examples: in the first example, a person making a vulgar gesture suddenly realizes 
that he is being seen. Now the gesture, which had previously clung unreflectively 
to the subject, abruptly becomes a matter of judgment, a vulgar gesture, 
something that makes him shudder in shame. In the second example (which 
Williams takes up in his discussion) someone is induced by jealousy to peep 
though a keyhole. He is entirely absorbed in the action when he is abruptly 
brought to self-reflection by the sound of some steps in the hall. In both cases 
shame comes as the painful realization that the person is doing something vulgar 
at the same time as he realizes that he is being observed.15 Shame is seeing 
ourselves through the eyes of another whose gaze is critical of us.  
From Sartre onwards, scholars assumed that most cases of shame would 
involve an audience taking a negative attitude towards a subject, who, in turn, 
shares the audience’s critical view. Yet, as Gabriele Taylor has pointed out in her 
pivotal study on the emotions of self-assessment, one can feel ashamed of being 
admired by the wrong audience or for the wrong reasons.16 If I feel contempt for 
someone, his admiration can trigger my shame. If the other has reasons to feel 
that I should be flattered by his admiration, I may, in turn, have reasons to feel 
ashamed of it. 
Williams, like Taylor, refers to Max Scheler’s example of a model who, having 
been sitting naked for a painter, at some point realizes that the painter is no 
longer absorbed in his work but looks at her body with desire. All of a sudden the 
model is no longer protected by an impersonal relation with the painter: she feels 
exposed and ashamed of her nudity.  
Of course shame might not be her only reaction: she could feel anger at the 
painter’s unprofessional attitude, or fear if she thought that he might assault her. 
Two paintings come to mind, one by Rembrandt and one by Artemisia 
Gentileschi, in which we see a woman realizing all of a sudden that her nudity is 
exposed to the gaze of two lecherous men.17 The scene portrayed is the famous 
biblical episode of Susanna and the Elders. Two corrupt judges blackmail Susanna, 
the virtuous wife of a wealthy man, having introduced themselves into her garden 
while she was bathing, and demanding sexual favors.  
 
                                                 
15 See J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 221 for the first example and 259 for the second 
example.  
16 G. Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt. Emotions of Self-Assessment, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1985, 59ff.. 
17 I owe to Peter Hacker, who let me read part of his book manuscript on the emotions (The 
Passions – a Study of Human Nature), the reference to Rembrandt’s Susanna and the Elders as 
an “an archetypal representation of the primal feeling of shame.” 
ALESSANDRA FUSSI 
 
174 
 
 
 
Rembrandt van Rijn, Susanna and the Elders, 1647. Oil-on-panel painting, 76.6 by 92.8 cm  
Gemäldegalerie, Berlin, Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
Artemisia Gentileschi, Susanna and The Elders, 1610. Oil on canvas, 170 by 121cm. Graf von 
Schonborn Kunstsammlungen. Schloss Weissenstein, Pommersfelden, Germany. 
 
 
In Artemisia’s painting, the two well-dressed men are very close to Susanna’s 
naked body, so that the stress is not as much on their gaze as on their threatening 
proximity. They are whispering to each other, while Susanna averts her face in 
revulsion.  
Rembrandt portrays Susanna while she is looking away in front of her. We can 
imagine she is meeting the gaze of the painting’s viewers, who are thus involved in 
the voyeuristic scene. One man is grabbing the cloth which barely covers part of 
her body; more than excited by her nakedness he looks reflective and malicious, as 
if he were pondering how he could profit from the situation. The other man, more 
at a distance, is leering at her with a sort of amused lust.  
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Artemisia portrays a woman who feels in danger — the scene is one of terror 
— while Rembrandt focuses our attention on Susanna’s shame at being exposed 
to the two men’s intrusive and lascivious gaze. In both paintings the men show no 
sign of uneasiness about what they are doing. They are shameless.  
Even though the two painters represent differently Susanna’s emotional 
reaction to the men’s voyeurism, she certainly does not face a critical audience. 
Susanna (or, rather, her body) is represented without any doubt as an object of 
desire in the men’s eyes. If what we recognize in Rembrandt’s painting is shame, 
then we have to wonder if a critical gaze is relevant at all in generating this 
emotional reaction.  
A similar point can be made with respect to the model in Scheler’s example. 
The painter is certainly not critical of her. Actually, she might even feel that from 
his perspective she should consider herself flattered by his sexual attention. The 
shame she feels cannot derive, then, from her identification with the attitude of 
the audience. Taylor suggests that what is involved here is a more complex 
reflective structure: 
 
The model need not see herself as the artist sees her. But as the result of 
realizing her relation to him she sees herself in a new light. The point can be 
expressed by introducing a second, higher order point of view from which she 
is seen not as an object of sexual interest, but is seen as being seen as such an 
object. With this point of view she does identify, and this point of view is a 
critical one. The adverse judgment, however, comes not from the artist, but 
comes from herself. It is critical in that it pronounces it wrong for her to be so 
seen, at least at this time and by this audience.18 
 
Williams, in turn, does not think that we necessarily need to imagine two 
kinds of judgments — the positive judgment belonging to the concrete other (the 
painter’s desire for the model), and the negative judgment, belonging to the model 
(that she should not be seen as a sexual object by such a man). What is relevant in 
the scene is that the model feels suddenly exposed. Previously her nakedness did 
not make her feel vulnerable: as Williams puts it, “she had previously been 
clothed in her role as a model; that has been taken from her, and she is left truly 
exposed, to a desiring eye.” (SN, 222). In other words, the feeling of shame is a 
reaction to the consciousness of her loss of power.  
The idea that shame may be connected to a loss of power is interesting, though 
in this particular case, as we have seen in the two different pictorial 
interpretations of Susanna and the Elders, the sense of being exposed could cause 
fear rather than shame. What is it that makes Susanna’s awareness of her loss of 
                                                 
18 G. Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1985, 61. 
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power turn into shame rather than fear? 
 In the case of shame the loss of power is not linked, as in the case of fear, to a 
concern with the consequences for one’s safety, but, rather, to a concern with 
one’s worth. The model feels ashamed at the thought that the painter might think 
it appropriate to look at her like that. If this is the case, though, one can see why 
Taylor thought it necessary to introduce a second, higher order point of view. 
Williams, on the other hand, introduces the higher order point of view as a second 
step in the process by which a certain figure is internalized. In his view, what 
initially appears as a loss of power in the eyes of a concrete observer, can become a 
loss of power or a failing in the eyes of an internalized other: 
 
The root of shame lies in exposure in a more general sense, in being at a 
disadvantage: in what I shall call, in a very general phrase, a loss of power. 
The sense of shame is a reaction of the subject to the consciousness of this loss: 
in Gabriele Taylor’s phrase, quoted in the text, it is “the emotion of self-
protection.” […] More generally, the loss of power is not actually constituted 
by the presence of a watcher, even though it is still a loss of power “in the eyes 
of another.” A process of internalization is now possible, and “bootstrapping” 
can proceed in terms of an increasing ethical content given to the occasions of 
shame (SN, 220-221). 
 
In other words: what in the experience of nakedness is a loss of power caused 
by a concrete observer, becomes, with internalization, a loss of power or failing in 
the eyes of an internalized figure, and being actually seen by someone while doing 
something that one would consider a failing is no longer necessary. Suppose I am a 
writer. Realizing that my novel appeals to people whose tastes I despise makes me 
feel like a cheap writer. Someone I despise, however, can be right about my 
failings. In this case my shame is compounded: I agree with the negative 
assessment, and I find it even more painful because it comes from a person whose 
views I normally do not take into account. 
Williams takes up Taylor’s point concerning the attitude of the audience, and 
applies it thus to his theory of shame: 
 
Shame need not be just a matter of being seen, but of being seen by an 
observer with a certain view. Indeed, the view taken by the observer need not 
itself be critical: people can be ashamed of being admired by the wrong 
audience in the wrong way. Equally, they need not be ashamed of being 
poorly viewed, if the view is that of an observer for whom they feel contempt. 
Hector was indeed afraid that someone inferior to him would be able to 
criticize him, but that was because he thought the criticism would be true, and 
the fact that such a person could make it would only make things worse. The 
mere fact that such a person had something hostile to say would not in itself 
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necessarily concern him. Similarly on the Greek side of the war, the opinions of 
Nestor carried weight, and those of Thersites did not (SN, 82).  
 
Shame is not just in the face of someone, but about something, and, as we have 
now seen at some lenghth, some actions do inspire shame even if those whose gaze 
is upon us applaud what we are doing or believe that we should be pleased by 
what they are doing.  
This implies that we should distinguish the perspective of the agent from the 
perspective of the audience by focusing on the content of the judgment that plays 
a role in shame. The concrete other whose gaze triggers our shame may or may not 
judge things the way we do. If we despise someone’s judgment we will not be 
ashamed in front of him, unless we realize that what we are doing is indeed 
shameful, and we come to realize it not because our witness is reliable, but because 
having a witness makes us take a distance from what we are doing.  
In sum: there is a difference between the internalized other and the concrete 
other. The internalized other is someone whose judgment we share; the concrete 
other is someone who may be critical, admiring, indifferent, and whose judgment 
we need not share.19  
If being admired by someone we despise makes us feel ashamed, then the 
internalized other, the other whose judgment we share, does not coincide with the 
concrete other who happens to approve what we are doing. It is not true, then, 
that shame is fear of losing face before any kind of audience, or that it is a 
superficial emotion which relies only on external appearance.  
To some extent it is true that shame exposes our being dependent on the 
opinions of others, but we should also add that the others in question must be 
                                                 
19 See SN, 82: “Even if shame and its motivations always involve in some way or other an idea 
of the gaze of another, it is important that for many of its operations the imagined gaze of an 
imagined other will do. It is not so, of course, with the most elementary case, the shame of 
exposure when naked; someone who was afraid in that case of being exposed to a merely 
imaginary observer would be afraid of his own nakedness, and his fear would be pathological. 
But the imaginary observer can enter very early in the progression towards more generalized 
social shame. Sartre describes a man who is looking through a keyhole and suddenly realizes 
that he is being watched. He might think that it was shameful to do it, not just to be seen doing 
it, and in that case, an imagined watcher could be enough to trigger the reactions of shame.” 
Sartre is claiming that what forces the man to move from being completely immersed in the 
activity of looking through the keyhole to becoming conscious of himself is the presence of 
another. Williams may be moving too quickly here from exposure to the gaze of another to the 
imagined gaze of the imagined other. For a critical view of the role of the internalized other in 
the explanation of shame, see J. A. Deonna, R. Rodogno, and F. Teroni, In Defense of Shame: 
The Faces of an Emotion, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012. 
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people whose opinions we respect. This was a central point in Aristotle’s 
treatment of aischyne.20 Williams finds it expressed in Homer: 
 
Nausikaa is afraid of what people will say if they see her with the handsome 
stranger, and that there will be a scandal; but she adds: 
 ‘And I myself would think badly of a girl who acted so’. 
[…] An agent will be motivated by prospective shame in the face of people 
who would be angered by conduct that, in turn, they would avoid for those 
same reasons. Nausikaa is conscious of how she shares with others the 
reactions that they might have to her. […] There has to be something for 
these interrelated attitudes to be about. It is not merely a structure by which I 
know that you will be annoyed with me because you know that I will be 
annoyed with you. These reciprocal attitudes have a content: some kinds of 
behavior are admired, others accepted, others despised, and it is those 
attitudes that are internalized, not simply the prospect of hostile reactions 
(SN, 83-84). 
 
Let us now turn to the third point highlighted by Williams. By distinguishing 
the views and the attitude of the concrete other from those of the internalized 
other we come to realize that the problem of heteronomy is more complex than 
the usual charges raised against shame may lead us to believe. However, even if 
we grant that the other of shame is not just anybody who happens to be our 
witness, we could still object that the values on the basis of which we respond 
with shame are heteronomous in the sense that the internalized other is a 
representative of the society, of the neighbors, of others with whose moral criteria 
we uncritically identify. 
Here Williams warns us about the risks of a Manichean attitude. It would be 
tempting to defend shame from the charge of heteronomy by assuming that the 
internalized other is free of any influences derived from the contingent factors of 
our social, historical and political life. In this perspective the other, in so far as he 
or she plays a role in shame, would simply be someone whose judgment we share. 
The important point is not who the other is, but what he or she thinks. If he thinks 
what we think, we preserve our autonomy of judgment: the charge of heteronomy 
vanishes, or is in any way considerably weakened. The internalized other, if we 
follow this line of thinking, is just an echo of our conscience.  
If we assume this purified sense of the internalized other, however, we face a 
problem: in what sense can we still talk of an “other,” if all that remains after 
                                                 
20 “Since shame is imagination (phantasia) about a loss of reputation and for its own sake, not 
for its results, and since no one cares about reputation [in the abstract] but on account of those 
who hold an opinion of him, necessarily a person feels shame toward those whose opinion he 
takes account of” (Rhet., ii 6.1384a24-27). 
Williams’s Defense of Shame as a Moral Emotion 
 
179 
 
having purified the other of its accretions is the content itself (that this or that 
action is vulgar), and not the gaze that makes us aware of our vulgar gesture, and 
the perspective from which it appears vulgar? 
We cannot have it both ways. We cannot hope to save shame from the charge 
of heteronomy by grounding its content in our own judgment, while at the same 
time holding on to the phenomenological insight that in shame we feel exposed, 
i.e., that we feel shame in the face of another. If we think that the real or 
imaginary other does indeed play a significant role in the emotion we cannot allow 
it to turn into a ghost empty of all determinations.  
Williams’s solution is not to defend shame from the charge of heteronomy at 
all costs, but to make us aware that an attack on shame in the name of autonomy 
may be misguided: 
 
It is a mistake to take that reductive step and to suppose that there are only 
two options: that the other in ethical thought must be an identifiable 
individual or a representative of the neighbors, on the one hand, or else be 
nothing at all except an echo chamber for my solitary moral voice. Those 
alternatives leave out much of the substance of actual ethical life. The 
internalized other is indeed abstracted and generalized and idealized, but he is 
potentially somebody rather than nobody, and somebody other than me. He 
can provide the focus of real social expectations, of how I shall live if I act in 
one way rather than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my 
relations to the world about me (SN, 84).  
 
Once again it is by reference to Greek literature that Williams invites us to see 
why it is important to hold on to the idea that the internalized other is 
“potentially somebody rather than nobody.” Someone who, like Ajax, is led by 
shame to consider suicide a necessity, may appear at first sight irrational. 
Williams’s subtle analysis makes us listen to the other whose disappointment Ajax 
cannot face. He cannot continue to live in a world in which those he respects can 
no longer respect him.  
One can try to fill the concept of respect with purely abstract content, or claim 
that the voice of autonomy is pure and our dignity unshakable. Williams leads us 
down the opposite path: by paying heed to shame we become sensitive to the 
reciprocal expectations that bind us with each other, and willing to question the 
idea that concepts like dignity or autonomy are really helpful in establishing 
clear-cut historical boundaries. 
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Introduction 
 
In Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams engages in a forceful vindication of the 
ethical significance of shame. In his view, shame is an extremely productive moral 
emotion because of the distinctive connection that it establishes between self, 
others and world, through a self-evaluation that is mediated by an internalized 
other. In this paper, I examine Williams’ conception of the internalized other and 
contrast it with other ways of conceiving the role of others in shame. I argue that, 
although Williams’ views contain many important insights, much is to be gained 
by conceiving the role of others in Sartrean terms instead. It allows us to better 
understand the experience of shame and its moral significance. In Sartre’s account 
of shame, the other’s perspective is not merely internalized; it is constitutive of 
the kind of selfhood that has a capacity for shame. According to this view, the role 
of others in shame is at the same time thinner and more fundamental than the one 
advocated by Williams. It is thinner, because it does not presuppose the learning 
or endorsement of any substantial set of values and norms in order to feel shame. 
But it is also more fundamental, because it makes the relation with others, or 
rather, the capacity for it (relationality), constitutive of the self that can feel 
shame. This means that the structure of relationality is prior to any 
internalization of norms, and it establishes the ground for shame to become an 
emotion informed by norms and standards. 
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This paper starts by sketching a fairly typical definition of shame according to 
the relevant literature, a description that is in line with Williams’ own account of 
this emotion. In order to clarify why he postulates the notion of an internalized 
other to explain shame, I take a step back and analyze the role of others in shame 
by contrasting it to other emotions in the same family, which shows that 
audiences are not necessary for shame. The question then arises: what is the role 
of others in shame? The following section returns to Williams’ views on this 
matter, and specifically to his hypothesis of the internalized other. In the final 
section, I discuss my own Sartrean view and argue in its favor. 
Shame 
 
Among emotion researchers from various disciplines, the word ‘shame’ is often 
used in at least two senses. Some use ‘shame’ to refer to an “affect,” i.e. a hard-
wired, innate response,1 that underlies a whole family of hedonically negative self-
conscious emotions, including embarrassment, humiliation and some types of 
guilt. Many others use it to refer to a specific emotion belonging to this family. I 
will be using it in this latter sense, and comparing it to other related emotions in 
the following section, while retaining the idea that all these emotions form an 
inter-related family.  
Shame as an individual emotion is characterized by a feeling of exposure, 
inferiority and vulnerability. Typical bodily manifestations include blushing, 
averting the gaze, adopting a collapsed bodily position and so on: in shame, one 
feels smaller or wishes to become smaller and hide from view. In the relevant 
literature, shame has been described through several labels: a self-conscious 
emotion, an emotion of self-assessment, a social emotion or a moral emotion. It 
has been labeled as a “self-conscious emotion” because it is directed back at 
myself: the intentional object of the emotion is the individual that feels it, not the 
situation or action which gives rise to the shame episode. In shame, I focus on 
myself and see myself as small, faulty or inadequate. As such, it has also been 
called an “emotion of self-assessment” because it involves a negative self-
evaluation.2 This negative self-assessment can be due both to active and passive 
aspects of selfhood: to actions and omissions of all kinds (lying to a friend, acting 
or speaking against one’s values in order to maintain status in a particular social 
group), to things that befall us (victims of abuse typically feel it), to character 
traits, physical features, social background and so on.  
The label “social emotion” refers to another key aspect of shame: exposure. 
Many authors claim that shame is a response to being exposed to the censoring 
gaze of a real, an imagined or an internalized audience.3 The unpleasantness of 
                                                          
1 Cf. e.g. Elison, ‘Shame and Guilt.’ 
2 Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt. 
3 Cf. e.g. Williams, Shame and Necessity; Maibom, ‘The Descent of Shame.’ 
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exposure of a negative trait would explain why in shame we often experience a 
wish to hide and disappear from the view of others. However, the connection of 
shame to exposure to an actual external gaze or judgment is a rather controversial 
point, and this is what this paper focuses on. Finally, the label “moral emotion” 
mostly refers to its role in mechanisms of self-censorship and regulation of 
behavior according to norms or standards. This paper deals mainly with the social 
aspects of shame, but the other dimensions will come to the fore, especially the 
moral one, which was of special interest to Williams. 
 
Shame and audiences 
 
According to Williams, shame is an unequivocally social emotion. Now, to say 
that shame is social amounts to much more than saying that we learn the codes 
and standards of what is shameful from other people, that those standards are 
encoded in culture, or that shame serves social functions. As social psychologists 
Hareli and Parkinson4 and philosophers Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni5 explain, 
these claims are obviously true, but they do not tell us anything especially 
interesting about shame in particular, or even social emotions in general. They are 
far too broad to distinguish shame and the like from other, non-social, emotions, 
because all human emotions are partially governed and shaped by cultural codes 
and most of them serve social functions.6 Characterizing shame as social implies 
attributing to others a specific crucial role that is not exhaustively covered by the 
above general assertions. So what role do others play in shame? 
In order to pin this role down, it is helpful to divide the possible answers into a 
taxonomy devised by Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni.7 They identify three different 
strands of the claim that shame is social: (i) shame as heteronomous, i.e., informed 
by values that do not belong to the ashamed subject, but to other people; (ii) 
shame as involving “an evaluation in terms of one’s appearance vis-à-vis an 
audience”; (iii) shame as the result of adopting an external perspective on 
ourselves.8 In short, others can provide the values, the gaze or the perspective. 
Williams, for his part, falls within the second strand: for him (and many others) 
the negative self-assessment of shame is triggered by the disapproving evaluation 
of an audience. But would he not fall within the first strand too? After all, what 
exactly causes my shame? The gaze of the other or her evaluation of me? Williams 
maintains that both are important, by arguing that this audience is an internalized 
                                                          
4 Hareli and Parkinson, ‘What’s Social About Social Emotions?’ 
5 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame. 
6 Cf. Hareli and Parkinson, ‘What’s Social About Social Emotions?’, 132–37; Deonna, Rodogno, 
and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, chap. 1. 
7 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, 32–37. 
8 They disagree with all three strands and offer a thought-provoking non-social account of 
shame, which I cannot engage with here. 
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other with very specific characteristics: it is, as we will see, a respected other. This 
dampens the heteronomy of shame to a very large extent. But how does Williams 
come to this conclusion? Let me spell out some of the considerations at play. 
The first consideration is that, if shame requires an audience, it cannot 
possibly be an actual audience that is present in all instances of shame. After all, it 
is not difficult to think about examples of shame felt in solitude, when we think 
about our failures (even those that nobody else knows about), or when we 
remember certain past situations. This can be seen more clearly by comparing 
shame with embarrassment.  
One might think that embarrassment is merely a mild form of shame, and 
indeed the two emotions are related, but there is an important experiential 
difference between them. Shame clearly concerns our sense of self; it burdens us 
with an “unwanted identity”9 and impacts our self-esteem and self-respect.10 As 
Williams brilliantly put it, shame helps us “understand how a certain action or 
thought stands to ourselves, to what we are and to what realistically we can want 
ourselves to be.”11  
Embarrassment does not seem to have this impact, and empirical studies have 
confirmed this.12 Nussbaum points out the differential features of embarrassment, 
as opposed to shame: although both typically take the subject by surprise, 
embarrassment is “momentary, temporary and inconsequential,” while shame 
lasts longer and is more serious.13 This is the case, according to Nussbaum, because 
embarrassment does not involve, like shame, a sense of being flawed and 
defective, but merely a sense that something is socially out of place (marked social 
attention, often in the form of praise, can cause embarrassment). As such, it is 
social and contextual; it always requires an actual audience in front of which we 
are performing awkwardly. Solitary shame is possible, since one can feel faulty or 
inadequate when thinking about one’s flaws ore remembering one’s failures, but 
solitary embarrassment (a solitary feeling of social awkwardness) makes no sense. 
The audience may turn out not to be there - perhaps you simply mistakenly 
thought that someone had seen or heard you - but it must be part of the story. 
And as soon as we are on our own, or we have ascertained that there was nobody 
looking or listening, embarrassment disappears without leaving a feeling of 
degradation. We typically feel embarrassed in front of others of things that do not 
embarrass us when we are alone, such as bodily functions, or of failures that are 
conceivable as such only because others are present, such as telling a joke that 
nobody else finds funny. This need not be the case in shame, which often concerns 
                                                          
9 Ferguson, Eyre, and Ashbaker, ‘Unwanted Identities.’ 
10 Cf. e.g. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, para. 67; Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt; Deigh, ‘Shame 
and Self-Esteem.’ 
11 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 93. 
12 Cf. Miller, Embarrassment, 22–28. 
13 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity, 204–5. 
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flaws that are perceived as more permanent and much less dependent on the social 
context. 
A good example of solitary shame can be found in the passages of Anna 
Karenina that describe her return to St. Petersburg from Moscow, where she has 
just met the dashing Vronsky.14 She sits alone in the train, with no audience, 
trying to fight her intense and anguishing shame by telling herself that her 
behavior to Vronsky was proper, that she did not betray her husband and nobody 
can blame her for anything. It is clear, however, that she does not dare to admit, 
even to herself, that a respectable and decent married woman like herself could 
have fallen in love with a dashing young officer like Vronsky. But who is the 
audience that is assessing her here in light of her unacknowledged feelings? And 
how to explain that she felt no shame at the party, while flirting and dancing with 
Vronsky in front of the high society of Moscow, and she only comes to feel it while 
she sits alone in the train?  
This contrast between the two moments might lead one to think that 
audiences are irrelevant to eliciting shame: all Anna Karenina had to do was 
adopt a different perspective on herself and the situation. This might seem even 
clearer in an example proposed by Goldie in a different context:15 a man gets 
drunk at an office party, he climbs on top of a table and starts singing “Love is 
like a butterfly” at the top of his voice. At the time, in his drunkenness, he may 
have only been enjoying the music and the general merriment, but when he 
remembers the episode the next morning, he will see the situation in a different 
light, he will realize that his colleagues were laughing at him and not with him, 
and only then feel ashamed of himself. This would seem to indicate that the gazes 
of others, even when coupled with their mockery, are insufficient to cause shame: 
something is needed on the part of the subject as well, a change of perspective on 
himself. But does this completely rule out the need for an audience? Both Anna 
Karenina and the man in Goldie’s example exposed themselves publicly before an 
audience, and felt ashamed of themselves in solitude when they re-examined the 
situation, so the audience was a part of their memories. These examples might 
therefore suggest that both the audience and the change of perspective are 
necessary. 
Furthermore, one might want to argue that the essential element is the 
negative evaluation of others: the man at the office party only becomes ashamed 
in the morning, because only then does he realize that his colleagues found him 
ridiculous. Similarly, Anna Karenina was engrossed with Vronsky and caught up 
in the excitement of falling in love with him at the party; while only in the train 
did she have enough distance from the excitement to realize what others must 
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have been thinking about them. This might suggest, then, that the actual 
presence of others is unnecessary, but their evaluations are not.  
Even so, it would be a mistake to argue that the awareness that others 
evaluate me negatively constitutes shame. This would amount to conflating the 
emotion of shame with what I would call “objective” shame, i.e., the verdict of 
society on what is shameful, or disgrace. Disgrace is not an emotion, but a 
condition. In the Online Oxford English Dictionary, it is defined as follows: “loss 
of reputation or respect as the result of a dishonourable action … [In singular] a 
person or thing regarded as shameful and unacceptable.”16 A similar definition can 
be found in the Merriam Webster’s Dictionary: “1a: the condition of one fallen 
from grace or honor; b: loss of grace, favor, or honor. 2: a source of shame.”17 
Disgrace is, therefore, not an affective phenomenon, but a “social attribute,” i.e., 
an objective state, or a thing that can cause such a state. But the objective state 
of disgrace does not always necessarily cause shame: social attributes, codes and 
verdicts do not shape our experience of shame in a necessary and inescapable 
way.18 Shamelessness is possible and comes in many forms, including immorality 
and moral reformism.19 One may feel ashamed of things that are not disgraceful, 
and conversely, one may be in a state of disgrace in one’s society and not feel 
ashamed. One may argue that this is at some point the case of all moral reformers 
who actively criticize with the ways of life and the codes of shame and honor in 
their societies: think about Diogenes the Cynic, Jesus Christ and the sexual 
revolution, for example.20 The possibility to resist the external verdict and 
respond to disgrace with defiance and even pride indicates that the external 
evaluation is also insufficient to cause shame.  
What is then required for shame to arise? Sartre writes that “my shame is a 
confession”: in the moment of shame, I am endorsing the evaluation of 
unworthiness or inadequacy.21 Through shame I confess my “sin”, I confess that I 
am thus and so. Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni argue that this is the central 
element.22 They view shame as a negative self-evaluation in terms of my own self-
relevant values, where no reference to the other is necessary. According to them, if 
I assess that I’m not capable of exemplifying my own self-relevant values, I will 
feel shame regardless of what others think or see in me. Their work yields a crucial 
insight: that my own values and perspective also play an important role in 
                                                          
16 Oxford Dictionaries Online. April 2010. Oxford University Press (accessed February 21, 
2012). My emphasis. 
17 "disgrace." Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, 2013. Web. 12 December 2013. 
18 Yovel, ‘The Birth of the Picaro from the Death of Shame’, 1299. 
19 Hutchinson, ‘Facing Atrocity.’ 
20 Cf. ibid. for an interesting discussion of cases of shamelessness and their meaning; also 
Calhoun, ‘An Apology for Moral Shame.’ 
21 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 261. 
22 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame. 
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eliciting shame, but in my view they go too far. Evidence from empirical 
psychology seems to suggest that the role of audiences is crucial for intensifying 
and eliciting shame experiences.23 Furthermore, looking at developmental 
psychology, it seems clear that all experiences of self-conscious emotion first 
appear in infants in the presence of audiences, which indicates that shame felt 
before others is much more primary than solitary shame.24 Solitary shame 
depends on self-reflectivity and a well-developed self-concept, but not all shame is 
like this. Therefore, an account of shame that only accords a peripheral role to 
others seems to be missing something important.25 
 
The internalized other 
 
Let me now turn to Williams’ account of the role of others in shame. He is very 
well aware of the complexities of the issue that I addressed above, and in order to 
do justice to them, he (along with many other authors) defends the idea that 
shame is caused by the internalization of an audience, which doesn’t necessarily 
involve explicitly imagining or remembering the audience every time.26 Williams 
agrees to a large extent with Wollheim’s Freudian account, which explains shame 
as caused by the introjection of an external authority figure, which becomes an 
internal “criticizing agency,” or superego, that judges and censors the ego.27 Freud 
believed that the superego starts to emerge around the fifth year of life, as a result 
of the child’s internalization of the parents’ moral standards through education.28 
For Freud, small children cannot feel shame, but during the developmental stage 
that he calls “sexual latency,” a transition stage that goes approximately from 3 
to 7 years of age (but may be longer or shorter depending on various 
circumstances), several “dams” are built that restrict and block the flow of sexual 
drive. These obstacles are shame, disgust and morality.29 They arise as a form of 
self-protection, against a feared parental figure. According to Freud’s theory of 
the Oedipus complex, the little boy phantasizes his father as threatening him with 
castration due to the boy’s sexual desire for his mother. Then, in Wollheim’s 
words, “in terror, the boy introjects the father, thereby exchanging a frightening 
external danger for enduring internal torment. The superego now harangues, 
upbraids, chastises the boy according to standards that make no allowances for, 
                                                          
23 Smith et al., ‘The Role of Public Exposure in Moral and Nonmoral Shame and Guilt.’ 
24 Cf. Rochat, Others in Mind; Reddy, How Infants Know Minds. 
25 Cf. Zahavi, ‘Self, Consciousness, and Shame.’ 
26 Cf. e.g. Williams, Shame and Necessity; Maibom, ‘The Descent of Shame.’ 
27 Wollheim, On the Emotions. 
28 ‘Superego | Psychology.’ 
29 Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 43, 58; see also Metcalf, ‘The Truth of Shame-
Consciousness in Freud and Phenomenology.’ 
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indeed often expressly run counter to, the boy’s own wishes.”30 Due to this 
developmental history, this introjected figure possesses both authority and 
heteronomous force:  
 
[I]t is because internal figures originate, through an incorporative phantasy, 
from external figures, that, once they have been internalized, they may well 
continue to address the person who now harbors them as an alien force. They 
may set themselves to make the person feel shame or guilt on occasions when 
the person finds no reason to do so.31 
 
Now, Williams does not make any claims about the developmental history of 
the internalized other, but he agrees that it possesses an authority that is related 
to its otherness, just like the superego does. But he makes a small observation 
here. On Wollheim’s account, shame would share the same psychoanalytic origin 
as guilt: they would both be the result of different kinds of indictments by the 
superego. According to Williams, however, the figures that are internalized in 
these emotions are different, at least in terms of their perspectives and roles: in 
shame the internalized other would play the role of an observer or a witness, and 
in guilt, the role of a victim or a judge.32 The shaming audience, in any case, 
would be an element of our psyche, something we acquire and internalize as 
children, and that accompanies us throughout our lives, monitoring our emotions 
and behavior. Shame in these kinds of accounts is essentially in all cases a 
consciousness of exposure to the censoring gaze of another. 
Now, this other cannot just be a literal copy of one’s actual father and his 
values and norms, since people can come to be ashamed of their fathers (or their 
mothers, or their educators) for holding and cherishing values that they later 
repudiate. But on the other hand, it is also problematic to assume that the 
internalized other can simply be a placeholder for any observer, since not every 
observer, witness or judge can make us feel ashamed. Williams argues, for 
example, that we typically are not ashamed to be evaluated negatively by people 
we despise. In his view, therefore, the internalized audience is someone we respect.  
To illustrate this, Williams employs the tragedy of Ajax by Sophocles. He 
quotes Ajax’ suicide speech, where the Greek hero wonders how he can face his 
father after covering himself in shame.33 This is not a purely rhetorical device: it 
points to something deep. Indeed, in the tragedy, Ajax is surrounded by people 
who express support and love for him, and do not condemn him: his servants and 
his wife. But he is a warrior, it is his honor as a warrior that is at stake, and those 
                                                          
30 Wollheim, On the Emotions, 195–96. 
31 Ibid., 178–79. 
32 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 219–223, Appendix I. 
33 Ibid., 85; Sophocles, Sophocles II, Ajax, 462 seq. 
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views have no value for him in that context, no relevant impact on his sense of 
who he is. They have no power to counter the fact that he would feel deep shame 
in front of his (absent) father Telamon, who as a young man had been a brave and 
celebrated warrior. For Williams, however, in contrast to Wollheim, the crucial 
point is not that Telamon happens to be Ajax’s father. What is essential is that 
Telamon functions, according to Williams, as the anchoring point that symbolizes 
the world where Ajax wants to live and the identity he wants to preserve (in this 
sense, his brother Teucer or his admired Achilles would have done just as well). 
Ajax is aware that the things that we do and do not do impact on who we are; 
that the world has certain expectations that must be fulfilled in order for us to 
possess and retain certain identities; that our identities, in short, are not under our 
exclusive control. In Ajax’ case, his final monologue expresses that if he cannot 
command the respect of his father and men of similar position, worth and 
accomplishments, he cannot keep his identity as an honorable warrior, or his self-
respect. In Williams’ account, the internalized other always points towards the 
world I (want to) live in and its expectations of me: 
 
The internalised other is indeed abstracted and generalised and idealised, but 
he is potentially somebody rather than nobody, and somebody other than me. 
He can provide the focus of real social expectations, of how I shall live if I act 
in one way rather than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my 
relations to the world about me.34 
 
As such, what is crucial about the internalized other is that it commands our 
respect and functions as the reference point and limit to our possibilities in the 
world.35 The fact that, according to Williams, respect is required implies that 
there is a degree of autonomy in the choice of the audience that can shame me, 
since respect seems to entail the recognition and admiration of certain values in 
the other. This means that my own values and standards are relevant to my 
shame and play a role in eliciting it. But at the same time, the other is genuinely 
other because it points towards my possibilities in the world, and those are not 
determined exclusively by me. Williams believes that giving respected others the 
power to shame us, even in the cases in which we do not share their opinions, is a 
sign of good moral discernment, because it entails a recognition of the limits of our 
own reason and the need for the help of others. Since, according to Williams, 
reason has its limits and moral truth is indeterminate, giving weight to the 
opinions of others is not incompatible with critical thinking and discernment: it is 
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often a result and an enhancement of them.36 Shame is an acknowledgement that 
we give others that weight. 
Now, Calhoun agrees with Williams in this last point, but she criticizes him for 
not going far enough.37 According to her, his claim that, through respect, we have 
some power to choose the audience that can shame us is not so different from 
saying that in shame I am my own judge, that ultimately the only evaluation at 
play is my own evaluation of myself. This is so, in her view, because respect relies 
on shared values, and if the person I happen to respect betrays them, I would 
typically withdraw my respect.38 In her view, therefore, Williams’ solution means 
that eventually it all comes down to our individual values and norms. It wouldn’t 
be so far away from an account of shame as autonomous, like the one proposed by 
Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni, who claim that the often referred-to 
phenomenology of the gaze of another is a metaphor through which we sometimes 
seek to make sense of shame.39 It is part of some, but not all, instances of the 
emotion, and therefore cannot be a necessary factor for shame to arise. If this is so 
- their reasoning goes - would it not be more natural, and more faithful to the 
phenomenology of shame, to say that I am always the main judge, that the 
standards at play in this self-assessment are my standards? 
Calhoun objects that accounts of this kind, which present shame as 
autonomous, have very undesirable implications when it comes to the shame that 
members of oppressed groups feel before the shaming of their oppressors.40 In her 
view, these accounts cannot explain such instances of shame without implying 
that the oppressed are complicit in their own oppression at some level, or that 
they are morally immature or self-alienated, since they let themselves be 
influenced by external opinions they don’t share or deem respectable. The dubious 
assumption that, in her view, this kind of accounts make is that “no rational, 
mature person who firmly rejects her subordinate social status would feel shame in 
the face of sexist, racist, homophobic or classist expressions of contempt,”41 and 
therefore, those people who do feel it are morally immature. Calhoun thinks this is 
unacceptable, because it shifts from the aggressor to the victim a substantial part 
of the responsibility for the suffering caused. Williams’ account, in her view, has 
the same flaw, for it implies that in this sort of cases the ashamed subject respects 
someone who, in her own view, is not worthy of respect, and thus the suspicion of 
collusion stands. This cannot be right, she claims. Her strategy to avoid this 
problem, while honoring Williams’ insight about the importance of others in our 
moral lives, consists in separating the realm of moral autonomy, reason and 
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37 Calhoun, ‘An Apology for Moral Shame.’ 
38 Ibid., 134–35. 
39 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, pt. one. 
40 Calhoun, ‘An Apology for Moral Shame.’ 
41 Ibid., 136. 
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knowledge from the realm of morality as a practice shared with others. Thus, I 
might recognize that the opinions of others have social weight and have an impact 
on me, because we’re all participants in a shared practice of morality, while 
believing that these opinions are false, that they carry no epistemic weight.42 
Calhoun’s strategy to save the autonomy of oppressed minorities is therefore 
to keep it separate from shame and give shame a different ethical role. When one 
is shamed for belonging to an oppressed group, one might deny the truth of the 
insulting remark, one might deny that the minority one belongs to actually has 
that negative trait, or deny that being a part of that group is a shameful thing, 
and still recognize the negative impact that such evaluations by others have in 
one’s public identities, the power they have in shaping the world one will have to 
live in. That impact is real, and acknowledging it amounts to acknowledging a 
fact about the world and about our public identities, but it does not thereby imply 
that our capacity for autonomous judgment is compromised. 
Now, there are at least two problems with Calhoun’s criticism, one of them 
having to do with emotions of self-assessment, the other with respect. Beginning 
with the latter, one might argue that respecting another person does not have to 
entail agreeing with everything she says, thinks or values. This is clear in debates 
about tolerance. Indeed, the classic liberal way of thinking about tolerance, which 
is an essential attitude to cultivate in a pluralistic democracy, precisely requires 
distinguishing between respecting persons and agreeing with their actions, 
opinions or judgments. Tolerance is supposed to be justified precisely because one 
respects the person, since she is a free autonomous agent, and as such worthy of 
respect, even though one disagrees with her opinions - disagrees to the point where 
those opinions are deeply unpleasant, perhaps even in some sense painful to 
oneself, and yet one maintains one’s respect for the person who holds them. 
Indeed, one tolerates those opinions out of respect.43 With this I do not mean to 
take a position in the debate on tolerance, I simply mean to highlight that there 
are important and widespread views on respect that do not imply agreeing or even 
sharing values with the respected person. They merely imply conceiving persons 
as intrinsically valuable in themselves.  
Judging by Calhoun’s choice of examples, and from the ease with which she 
concedes that one might withdraw respect, it seems to me that she construes 
respect not in the above way, but as something quite close to admiration. 
Admittedly, Williams also choses “role models” as examples of respected persons, 
and so he seems to lean in that direction as well. But if tolerance is thought of as a 
sign or a consequence of respect, I think both Calhoun and Williams go too far in 
approaching respect to admiration: respect is a more neutral attitude than they 
lead us to understand. At this point, one might think that such a notion of respect 
                                                          
42 Ibid., 139. 
43 Cf. Tonder, Tolerance. 
Shame and the Internalized Other 
 
191 
 
is too wide to allow us to distinguish audiences that have the power to shame us 
from those that lack it, but I don’t think so. Indeed, the problem with both 
Williams’ and Calhoun’s formulations is that they are too restrictive about who 
can shame us. In a sense, they get things the wrong way around. They seem to 
imply that nobody has the power to shame us unless we give it to them. In my view, 
the reverse is true: everybody has, to a higher or lesser degree, the power to shame 
us unless we withdraw it from them through contempt or disengagement, for 
example.44 The power to shame is not a privilege we accord to certain esteemed 
others, it is a default power we all have over each other to varying degrees in 
social relations, and completely withdrawing it from particular individuals or 
groups is typically an effortful endeavor (with the exception perhaps of some 
pathological cases, like those of psychopathy or other social impairments). 
The second of my criticisms to Calhoun has to do with her way of presenting 
the relation between shame and oppression. The main problem is that she only 
takes into account one of the varieties of shame and other shame-related emotions 
that come into play in resisting oppression and caving in to it. But as Deonna, 
Rodogno and Teroni remark, at least two other notions that Calhoun overlooks 
need to be considered in these cases: humiliation and stigma.45 Distinguishing 
shame from the feeling of humiliation can do part of the work of saving the 
autonomy of oppressed minorities. The feeling of humiliation is different from 
shame in several crucial aspects. First and foremost, it necessarily involves 
another agent, who is trying to downgrade your status vis-à-vis hers. Her actions 
can be extremely violent (torture typically involves systematic acts of 
humiliation), but they need not be: something like refusing to greet you or 
acknowledge your presence can be humiliating. As such, the other’s negative 
evaluation and downgrading of you is typically perceived as unjust and 
outrageous, and the focus of the experience is as much on the humiliated self as on 
the offending other.46 Taking this into account, one can argue that acknowledging 
the practical impact of someone else’s negative evaluation but refusing to ascribe 
any normative weight to it is precisely what we do when we feel humiliated, when 
we feel unjustifiably attacked, accused, offended or put down in the eyes of others. 
Humiliation is a common response to shaming; and some of Calhoun’s examples 
could be described as humiliation.47 But the moment one transitions into shame, 
one seems to be appropriating the negative evaluation on some level, this is why 
shame is considered an emotion of self-assessment.  
                                                          
44 Cf. Hutchinson, ‘Facing Atrocity’ on Diogenes the Cynic. 
45 Cf. Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, 226–43. 
46 Gilbert, ‘What Is Shame? Some Core Issues and Controversies.’ 
47 Cf. Calhoun, ‘An Apology for Moral Shame’, 137. The example she takes from Adrian Piper, 
in which Piper herself seeks to describe her feelings as ‘groundless shame’, is in my view a good 
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Indeed, in this type of situations, when we feel ashamed of something we do 
not deem shameful because of pressure from others, it is not rare later to come to 
feel ashamed of one’s own shame, as FitzGerald argues.48 As an example, she uses 
a personal anecdote, where she reports that out of shame anxiety, she lied to a 
group of colleagues about shopping in a discount supermarket, and told them that 
she shopped in a more expensive one. Afterwards, however, when telling the 
anecdote to her partner, she felt ashamed of having allowed her shame anxiety to 
overrule her other values. In other words, she reports being ashamed of her shame. 
This meta-shame can often arise because one interprets the initial shame episode 
as a betrayal of one’s own deeply held values, as a moment of weakness in which 
one momentarily upheld someone else’s wrong values and self-evaluated in terms 
of them. One feels ashamed of having felt unjustified shame, of having caved in to 
external pressure. One feels that one’s own value system has been fleetingly 
contaminated. This is exactly what FitzGerald reports.49 This meta-emotion 
evidences the difference between shame and the feeling of humiliation, and it is 
proof that one felt a contaminating shame in the first place. Imagine a situation 
where, instead of acting like she did, she had told the truth, and someone in the 
group had ridiculed her for her choice of supermarket. She might have felt 
humiliated while enduring the mockery, but she probably would not feel ashamed 
of herself afterwards. This meta-shame suggests that her initial shame, as opposed 
to what would have been the case in humiliation, did evidence a fleeting value 
contamination. 
Since social groups can and do exert high levels of pressure, feelings of 
humiliation often transition into shame, when the other’s negative evaluation 
infiltrates our own. This infiltration can be very fleeting, like in FitzGerald’s 
example above, or more permanent and insidious, as in the case of stigmatized 
groups that are constantly bombarded by stigmatizing messages.50 It is therefore 
important to also look at stigmatization processes and be aware of their capacity 
to infiltrate our values and contaminate our autonomy.51  
It should be noted, however, that the transition need not always be from 
humiliation to shame. As Morgan argues, shame can prompt us to examine our 
                                                          
48 Cf. FitzGerald, ‘“Review Article: Defending Shame”. Extended Critical Review Essay on J. 
Deonna, R. Rodogno & F. Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012’. 
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relations to others, and thus motivate a transition from shame to humiliation.52 In 
the case of a stigmatized group, this transition towards feelings of humiliation 
might be an affirmation of autonomy, but this is not necessarily the case for all 
individuals and groups. In some other cases, responding to shaming with shame 
(rather than humiliation) might be an expression of autonomy too, such as when 
somebody publicly accused of a reprehensible action she indeed performed accepts 
her responsibility and shame. 
In any case, I believe that the right approach to these issues requires 
abandoning the idea that, at least when it comes to emotions, autonomy and 
heteronomy are dichotomous, that this is an all-or-nothing issue, that shame must 
be either autonomous or heteronomous. FitzGerald argues convincingly that it is 
not possible to clearly determine whether the self-assessment of shame is 
autonomous or heteronomous in all cases.53 In her view, autonomy and 
heteronomy come in degrees, and shame is a phenomenon where this becomes 
particularly clear, since it shows that the values of others can infiltrate one’s own 
to varying degrees. 
Thus, so far it seems clear that the role of others in shame is not equivalent to 
heteronomy, because shame can be autonomous, or it can fall somewhere in 
between autonomy and heteronomy. But it seems also quite clear that this is an 
emotion through which others can and do exert some influence on our values. This 
is, arguably, one of the reasons why shame has often been regarded as especially 
conducive to moral learning, as in Aristotle,54 and it is frequently used for 
education purposes, as a tool to instill social and moral norms.55 In this sense, 
shame has even been called the “midwife” and the “condition of possibility” of 
any human education.56 This is also why humiliation and stigmatization can 
become insidious. The question now is whether we need to postulate an 
internalized other to make sense of the influence others can have in our shame. 
 
The other in shame: internalized or constitutive? 
 
Let me now address head-on the issue of the internalized audience. Why postulate 
it? As shown above, Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni are right in pointing out that in 
many cases, one cannot pin down the audience in front of which one is allegedly 
                                                          
52 Morgan, On Shame. 
53 FitzGerald, ‘Review Article: Defending Shame’. Extended Critical Review Essay on J. 
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55 See e.g., Heller, ‘Five Approaches to the Phenomenon of Shame’, 1024; Ferlosio, El alma y la 
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56 Ferlosio, El alma y la vergüenza, 29. This is not to say that shame should be used as an 
educational tool. I merely mean to register the fact that it can and has been used in this way.  
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ashamed.57 Furthermore, the issue of internalization raises the questions of how 
and when do we internalize this audience, and which audience do we internalize. 
According to the psychoanalytic story, the audience would be our parents and 
main educators, which might be in line with many of the above examples. But 
what about someone who came to severely question and even be ashamed of her 
parents’ values? What if, for example, the racist one is your father and you 
become ashamed of him having such views?58 This gets complicated even further 
by Williams’ requirement that one must respect the audience that gives rise to our 
shame. Does this mean that we internalize all the others we respect? Or a 
representative of all spheres of our lives that significantly shape our identities? 
How many internalized others do we typically have? When do we internalize 
them? Perhaps looking at development can give us some clues to clarify these 
questions. 
According to Freud, shame emerges during the “latency stage” of 
development, between the 3rd and the 7th year of life.59 Modern developmental 
psychologists have pushed this age further back, although there is no consensus 
on a specific age, or on approaches and interpretations of results. According to the 
cognitive-developmental approach to developmental psychology, self-conscious 
emotions such as shame or pride emerge in normally developing infants around 
the second year of life.60 This is so because in the cognitive-developmental view, 
self-conscious emotions are thought to depend on the possession of a concept of 
self. Empirical proof that this concept is in place is linked to the mirror self-
recognition test. Typically infants start to pass this test consistently from the 18th 
month of age onwards, and from then on, supporters of the cognitive-
developmental view start to talk about the onset of self-conscious emotions, such 
as embarrassment, pride, jealousy and shame.61 There is much to discuss here that 
falls out of the scope of this paper, but for my current purposes, it is enough to 
underline that, according to the cognitive-developmental view, the condition for 
self-conscious emotions to arise is a concept of self that allows the child to re-
identify herself from the perspective of any external observer (the image that the 
mirror shows is what others can see of us). 
There is a growing number of developmental psychologists that criticize these 
views, and favor an interactive, second-personal approach instead. With this 
approach, Reddy, for instance, argues that starting from a self-concept gets things 
                                                          
57 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, 30–32. 
58 Zahavi, ‘Self, Consciousness, and Shame’, 313, fn. 8. 
59 Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 43, 58; cf. also Metcalf, ‘The Truth of Shame-
Consciousness in Freud and Phenomenology.’ 
60 Cf. Lewis, Shame for a prominent example; Rochat, Others in Mind, 96–98 endorses this view. 
61 Cf. Rochat, Others in Mind, 96–98. 
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backwards.62 In her view, what self-conscious emotions require is self-experience 
and interpersonal awareness (which the infant is capable of from the start), not 
any conceptual abilities.63 In Reddy’s view, interpersonal engagement elicits in 
the infant a very basic sense of self and other (the other person as qualitatively 
distinct from an object), that is tied to the interaction. This basic interpersonal 
awareness is what prepares the ground for a concept of self, not the other way 
around.64 This is also what allows infants to experience self-conscious emotional 
reactions of coyness and showing off, which she documents already during their 
first year of life, sometimes as early as in the second month.65 She doesn’t call 
these reactions full-blown shame or pride (although some others, like Trevarthen, 
have no qualms about attributing shame to 3-month-olds66), but they are its 
precursors and form its experiential ground. The point is that the sense of self that 
is required for shame, the kind of self-consciousness it exemplifies, arises 
immediately in and from the interaction and emotional engagement with others: it 
does not require a stable self-concept independent of the interaction, nor an 
internalized other. Indeed, these things rely to some extent on the sense of self 
that arises out of intersubjective emotional engagement.67 This is why Reddy 
suggests that we call it “self-other-consciousness”, instead of just “self-
consciousness”.68 
All this suggests that the most basic structures that enable shame are social in 
a fundamental way, but they do not rely in any form of internalization. This is in 
line with the Sartrean insight that shame exemplifies a form of self-consciousness 
that is fundamentally different from the minimal pre-reflective form given in the 
first-personal character of experience. As Zahavi explains, there is a minimal form 
of selfhood implied by the fact that experiences are perspectival, they imply an 
experiencer for whom these phenomena are given.69 Sartre’s example is 
illuminating: if I’m crouching at a keyhole to spy on someone, at that point I’m 
completely focused on what I see and hear, and my experience of self is minimal, 
it is implicit in those perceptions as their mode: those experiences are given for me, 
but this for-me-ness is not their focus, it is not part of their content, it is rather 
the mode in which they are given. Now, suppose I hear a noise in the corridor, 
indicating perhaps that another person is approaching, and I’m overcome by 
shame. Now my experience has changed fundamentally: I focus on myself and 
                                                          
62 Reddy, How Infants Know Minds; Draghi-Lorenz, Reddy, and Costall, ‘Rethinking the 
Development of “Nonbasic” Emotions’. 
63 Reddy, How Infants Know Minds. 
64 Ibid., 144. 
65 Ibid., 129–40. 
66 At talks given at the University of Copenhagen and the University of Portsmouth in 2014. 
67 Reddy, How Infants Know Minds, 144. 
68 Ibid., 148–49. 
69 Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, Investigating the First-Person Perspective. 
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experience myself as an object, the object of someone else’s perception. This is 
what Sartre calls my “being-for-Others”: a fundamentally different form of self-
consciousness that arises from recognizing that there are other subjects in the 
world who can perceive me.  
Sartre’s subsequent development of these ideas is very complex and 
problematic in many ways, but this is no place to engage in such long 
controversies. All I want to highlight is his central idea that engagement with 
others gives rise to a fundamentally different form of self-consciousness, that 
Zahavi and I have previously called social self-consciousness.70 This is the form of 
self-consciousness that is at stake in shame. And according to Reddy, it is present 
in a very basic form from the first weeks of life, when infants are aware and 
respond to others’ attention to them. This does not necessarily entail that shame 
(or pride, for that matter) can only be elicited when other people are present, it 
simply means that in those phenomena, the dimension of selfhood I am focusing 
on is the same that arises out of and is at stake in my engagements with others. A 
solipsistic being would be incapable of shame or pride. In emotions of social self-
consciousness there is a crucial change in my self-experience: I relate to myself 
from the perspective of engagement with others. This does not mean that I need 
to take on any specific person’s attitudes towards or judgments of me, it doesn’t 
mean that I need to imagine a specific audience. It simply means that I focus on 
the dimension of myself that can be perceived from the outside and engaged with. 
Very young infants might only be able to experience it in direct interaction, but 
adults, who do possess a self-concept, can experience it in solitude. This is both 
thinner and more robust that internalization of an audience: it is a background 
constitutive condition, a feature of any self that can experience shame. But it isn’t 
an other with a particular face or an idiosyncratic set of values. It is a condition of 
possibility for “self-other-conscious” emotions to arise. 
Now, this is obviously not all that shame requires. Shame is an unpleasant 
form of social self-consciousness, a form that foregrounds the vulnerability of self 
and the dangerousness of others. Sartre believes that it is more fundamental than 
the pleasant forms, like pride, but it is quite unclear why that should be so, and 
developmental psychology does not support that view. Be this as it may, my aim 
here is not to establish the primacy of shame over pride, or the other way around, 
it is rather to highlight that the social self-consciousness they evidence does not 
require internalization of an audience: it requires the ability to relate to others as 
subjects, which is there from the outset in a very basic form. All emotions of social 
self-consciousness get enriched and complexified through sustained engagement 
with others, to the point where the notion of internalizing an audience might seem 
plausible. The underlying structure, however, is not a product of internalization; 
it is a feature of engagement. What we internalize, or learn, are norms and 
                                                          
70 Zahavi, Self and Other; Montes Sánchez, ‘Self-Consciousness, Caring, Relationality.’ 
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standards, and facts about the social world and one’s position in it. This makes it 
possible for shame (and guilt, for that matter) to disengage from the direct 
disapproval of others and become a personal self-evaluation, but this does not 
require internalizing the other. The other remains outside, as that which 
constitutes the dimension of self that gets evaluated: the intersubjective self. 
To conclude, I want to return to Williams and his claim that shame includes a 
reference to real concrete others, to the world I want to live in and my possibilities 
in it. I think he is essentially right, but this does not require an internalized other. 
It requires an intersubjective self, i.e., a self that can become aware of a dimension 
of her being that depends on others. In other words, it requires the capacity to 
understand others and relate to them as subjects who can perceive oneself, and to 
understand oneself as an object of their experience, an object who is thereby 
affected and changed. It requires the capacity to experience that my identity, who 
I am, is not fully in my control, but depends on others. As one’s world widens and 
enriches through learning, and one acquires the capacity to project oneself 
backwards and forwards in time, among other things, this enables the kind of 
complex, thick experiences that Williams describes, where Ajax understands he 
can no longer live as the hero he had been and wanted to keep being. The 
experience is concrete and can involve a reference to individual others, but it does 
not require internalization of audiences, just the awareness that who I am does 
not solely depend on me. The heightened shaming power of specific others depends 
on how my world is built, how much I care about them, and how much influence 
they have on the possibilities that matter to me, among other factors. All in all, I 
believe that shame is social in a thin but fundamental sense: in the sense that it is 
only possible for a social being, who is aware that her identity is partially 
dependent on others. But this does not require internalizing others: it requires 
living with and being affected by them. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper analyzes the intricate relationship between courage and shame as presented in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics III.6-9. To cite the most pressing example: citizen-soldiers 
endure in the face of deadly risk in the hope of gaining honor and avoiding what is “shameful” 
(1116a29). They act “on account of virtue” and “a desire for what is noble” (1116a27-29). 
Nevertheless, Aristotle insists that such citizen-soldiers, however admirable, are not truly 
courageous men. In order to understand both the distinction between, as well as the proximity 
of, shame and courage, this paper draws on Bernard Williams’s account of shame offered in his 
Shame and Necessity. 
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Describing the courageous man in NE III.7, Aristotle says that he will “fear such 
things as he should, as reason (logos) maintains and for the sake of the kalon” 
(1115b12-14).1 By contrast, in NE II.4 he says that in order for agents to qualify 
as genuinely virtuous they must “act by choosing and choosing [the virtuous 
actions] for their own sake (di’ auta)” (1105a33).  Terence Irwin thinks that 
“Aristotle takes these two descriptions of the virtuous person’s motive to be 
inseparable.”2 Although I believe his statement to be true, his reconstruction of 
Aristotle’s argument on its behalf is unsatisfying. For Irwin, the kalon, at least as 
used in the NE, is “necessarily connected to the good of others,”3 and a virtuous 
action is kalon. Hence, acting for the sake of the kalon is inseparable from acting 
for the sake of the virtuous action itself.  Part VI will argue against this view on 
the grounds that it excessively “moralizes” Aristotle’s conception of virtue.   
                                                 
1 Kalon will be left untranslated. It is typically rendered as “beautiful,” “fine” or “noble” and is 
regularly used to described that “for the sake of which” a virtuous person acts.  So, for example,  
The “liberal” person (eleutherios) “will give [money] for the sake of the kalon” (1120a24).  
Translations from the NE are my own.   
2 Terence Irwin, “Beauty and Morality in Aristotle,” in J. Miller (ed.)  Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics:  A Criticial Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 241.  
3 Ibid., 251.   
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In order to narrow down the vast (and treacherous) terrain of the NE, this 
paper will focus only on courage as explicated in NE III.6-9.  Parts I-IV will 
analyze these chapters.  Part V will investigate another pair of closely related 
descriptions. In NE III.7 Aristotle says that the courageous man acts for the sake 
of the kalon. In NE III.8 he states that the citizen-soldier who, while similar to is 
not a genuinely courageous man, acts from a desire for the kalon.  Once again, I 
will argue that Irwin’s moralizing interpretation of the kalon will not suffice to 
explain the proximity of these phrases.  
 
 
1. NE III.6 
 
Aristotle announces that in taking up each of the “moral” (êthikê: 1103a15) 
virtues, “we should state what they are, concerning (peri) what sort of things they 
are, and how (pôs) they are” (1115a4-5). He begins with courage (andreia: 1115a6), 
defined as the “mean concerning (peri) fear and confidence” (1115a7).  Strikingly, 
however, he quickly shifts focus away from courage and toward the person who 
possesses it:  “the courageous man” (ho andreios: 1115a11).4  For reasons unstated, 
understanding the “who” seems to precede understanding the “what.”  
NE III.6 then asks, with what is the courageous man concerned? This move 
reveals an important feature of Aristotle’s treatment of the moral virtues (with, 
arguably, the exception of justice).  Understanding what a virtue is first requires 
concretization or personalization - the virtuous person must be studied - which in 
turn requires identifying the area of concern, the field or region of human life, in 
which that person activates his virtue.5  This procedure can be likened to 
cartography. Throughout his discussion of the moral virtues, Aristotle demarcates 
various regions of concern on a conceptual map of the ethical life. In these 
bounded areas the virtues, manifested in the people possessing them, will appear.6  
In this sense, his procedure can also be likened to a phenomenology of the ethical 
life.  
The region of concern in which courage appears is constituted by the two 
emotions or passions (pathê) of “fear and confidence” (phobous kai tharrê: 1115a7).  
As he explains in III.9, the former is decisive, and so Aristotle begins here by 
discussing fear and its objects. He seems to approve of the definition of fear as 
“the expectation of a bad thing” (kakou: 1115a9). This is, at least, compatible 
with his more detailed discussion in Rhetoric Book II, where he says that “fear is a 
                                                 
4 For reasons that soon should be obvious, the masculine will be used throughout this paper. It 
is meant to reflect Aristotle’s thinking, not my own.   
5 Compare NE VI.5:  “concerning practical wisdom, we could grasp it by studying (theôrêsantes) 
those whom we say have practical wisdom” (1140a24-25).  
6 The mapping of the moral virtues in NE III.6-IV.11 thus develops or fleshes out the “outline,” 
“sketch” or “diagram” (diagraphê: 1107a34) presented in NE II.7.   
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pain or disturbance that comes from the image of an imminent bad thing that 
causes destruction or pain” (1382b14) and is accompanied by “an expectation of 
experiencing a suffering that will be destructive” (1382b22). 
Human beings fear many things, including “disrepute, poverty, illness, 
friendlessness, and death” (1115a10-11), but not all of them belong in the region in 
which the appears. Aristotle must thus narrow the sprawl. Although, for example, 
a reasonable person should fear disrepute - in fact, it is,“kalon to do so, and 
aischron not to do so” (1115a12-13) - doing so does not manifest courage.   
To make the region in which courage is manifested more precise (and thus 
visible), Aristotle restricts the proper objects of the courageous man’s fear to the 
“greatest” (megista:  1115a25) of the fearful things; that is, to the worst of the bad 
things. This is death. Again, however, since most human beings fear death, and 
many comport themselves admirably in the face of it, this determination is 
inadequate. Facing death “on the sea or from disease” (1115a29), for example, 
does not qualify as a proper occasion for courage. Aristotle does not elaborate, but 
he does give a clue. He asks whether courage is only manifested in the face of “the 
most kalon” (kallistois: 1115a30) of circumstances, and then states that “such 
circumstances would be found in war, for here there is the greatest and most kalon 
of dangers” (1115a30-31). It follows, then, that “the one who is fearless (adeês) in 
the face of a kalon death could authoritatively said to be courageous” (1115a33-
34). At this stage of the analysis, Leighton thus seems quite right in saying that 
“the paradigm of courage…courage in its most perfect and noble form…is to be 
found upon the battlefield.”7 As we shall see in Part III below, however, this will 
not be Aristotle’s final say on the matter.   
Several difficulties in Aristotle’s ethical mapping of courage emerge from these 
brief remarks. Most basically, many people who are not courageous will look like 
they are.  As just mentioned, since it is kalon to fear disrepute, it is tempting to 
include the person doing so (properly) among the courageous. This, however, 
would be a mistake.  Another example, to expand (considerably) the sparse 
language Aristotle himself employs (in 1115b1-6), can be generated by imagining 
two people on a ship during a storm.  One is an experienced sailor. When the 
waves get bigger, he remains unperturbed since he knows they do not actually 
threaten the safety of the ship.  Another, however, is a passenger who has never 
sailed before.  Seeing the waves grow he “despairs of his survival and the prospect 
of such a death upsets him” (1115b2-3).  Nonetheless, he does not capitulate to his 
fear and so, like the sailor, appears “fearless” (adeês: 1115b1). To a third person 
who knows neither of the two men and can only observe their behavior, they 
appear indistinguishable even though they are, in fact, quite different. 
                                                 
7 Stephen Leighton, “Aristotle’s Courageous Passions,” Phronesis 33(1988), 76.  Alessandra 
Fussi alerted me to this excellent article.  
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NE II.4 prefigured this difficulty. There Aristotle asserted that it is impossible 
to  determine whether people are virtuous simply by witnessing their actions. 
Even if an action “holds in a certain way (pôs echêi)” - that is, “is in accord with 
the virtues” (kata tas aretas) - it must be performed by an agent who “holds in a 
certain way (pôs echôn) as well” (1105a28-31).  In short, the agent must be 
virtuous if the action is to be counted as genuinely virtuous. Specifically, he must 
meet three conditions: (1) he acts “knowingly (eidôs);” (2) he “acts by choosing 
and choosing [the actions that accord with the virtues] on account of themselves 
(di’ auta);”  (3) he “holds (echôn) in a stable and unwavering manner” (1105a31-
34); that is, he reliably and consistently possesses a virtuous character trait. 
Obviously, a deep knowledge of the agent, rather than a mere observation of his 
behavior, is required in order to determine whether he meets these criteria.  
A second and related difficulty raised by Aristotle’s exploration of the 
courageous man in NE III.6 is that it seems to identify courage with fearlessness. 
Consider this passage, parts of which have already been mentioned.    
 
One should fear some things, like disrepute, and it is kalon to do so and 
aischron not to do so.  For the person fearing [disrepute] is decent and modest 
(aidêmôn), while the one not doing so is shameless (anaischuntos).  He is said 
by some to be courageous metaphorically, since he does bear some similarity 
to the courageous man.  For the courageous man is someone fearless (aphobos) 
(1115a12-16). 
   
 Aristotle’s thinking here is expressed in typically sparse language. Perhaps it 
is this:  disrepute is bad, and as such is a reasonable object to fear in a kalon 
manner.  So, for example, a decent person may assist people who are trapped in a 
fire because of his fear of what others would say about him if he failed to act, and 
it will be kalon for him to feel such fear. Entering the burning house, then, he 
appears fearless.  He is not, however, genuinely courageous. After all, he is 
motivated by fear of disrepute.  At best, he is similar to the courageous man.  
The big problem here is located in the last sentence of the passage:  the 
courageous man is said to be someone fearless, a point Aristotle reiterates later 
when he says that “the one who is fearless (adeês) in the face of a kalon death 
could authoritatively said to be courageous” (1115a33-34).8  But on Aristotelian 
terms this cannot be. After all, courage is the “mean concerning fear and 
confidence.” By definition, then, it requires some measure of fear.  
On the one hand, this problem can be eliminated by noting that NE III.6 is a 
preliminary stage of Aristotle’s analysis, and that in it he is exploring widely held 
opinions that he may not share.  Note, for instance, the optative at 1115a33:  
someone “could say” (legoit’) that the fearless man is the courageous man. 
                                                 
8 There does not appear to be a difference in the meanings of aphobos and adeês.   
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Presumably, though, he would be wrong.  For the reasons mentioned above, 
however, this is an easy mistake to make. Recall the earlier example: to an 
external observer the experienced sailor and the passenger - both of whom look 
calm and composed and behave accordingly - seem indistinguishable, even though 
one understands that the waves are not dangerous, while the other believes the 
ship will be swamped and that he will suffer an unbecoming death.  It is 
impossible to detect courage through a glance.  
NE III.6 provokes another challenge. Aristotle says courage is 
“authoritatively” instantiated only in facing a “kalon death.” Furthermore, it 
must occur in the face of “whatever may bring sudden death, and this occurs 
especially in war” (1115a33-34).  Recall Leighton’s comment that “courage in its 
most perfect and noble form…is to be found upon the battlefield.” But does it 
matter on which side the good soldier is fighting?  Can one who is fighting in a war 
that is not kalon be courageous? What about the Persian soldier who in every 
observable way appeared indistinguishable from his Athenian counterpart when 
Xerxes invaded Greece? Did he not have the opportunity to be courageous 
because his cause was unjust?  Could he not have met the three conditions 
Aristotle lists for genuine virtue in NE II.4?   
Aristotle’s mapping of this virtue in NE III.6 is not yet perspicuous. Its 
various difficulties can be encapsulated under the heading of “the recognition 
problem.” How is it possible to distinguish the courageous man from those who 
merely appear courageous?  
 
 
2. NE III.7 
 
In NE III.7 Aristotle advances beyond the preliminary reflections of NE III.6 
and seems to speak in his own voice. First and foremost, he maintains that 
courage does require the agent to feel fear.  Indeed, there are some fears that 
would require a “super-human” (huper anthropon: 1115b8) capacity not to feel and 
courage, a human virtue, cannot possibly require that. It is thus in facing normal 
fears that “the courageous man is, as a human being, imperturbable” (anekplêktos: 
1115b11).  He will “fear such things as he should, as reason (logos) maintains, and 
for the sake of the kalon” (1115b12-14). To reiterate, the underlined phrase differs 
from that required of the virtuous agent in NE II.4, where he must choose 
virtuous actions for their own sake. Before confronting this apparent discrepancy, 
another issue, also related to the recognition problem, must be addressed.   
Aristotle states that the courageous man “endures” (hupomenei: 1115b23). He 
“experiences” (paschei: 1115b20) fear, presumably in facing a kalon death, but 
does not get shaken by it. As such, he is not fearless.  But if that is so, then how 
can he be distinguished from someone who has “self-restraint?” (engkrateia: 
1145a18); someone who knows what he should do, feels a desire or passion to do 
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otherwise, but then resists that temptation? The ethical typology of NE VII.1 
makes it clear that even though the self-restrained person (the engkratês) is 
praiseworthy, he is inferior to the genuinely virtuous person.  (Analogously, the 
akratês, the person characterized by “lack of self-restraint” [akrasia], is 
blameworthy, but superior to the genuinely vicious person.) The principal 
difference between the virtuous and the self-restrained is that the former suffers 
no conflict between reason and desire or passion. As Aristotle says, for example, 
about the moderate person (ho sôphrôn), “the desiring part” (to epithumêtikon) 
“ought thus to be in harmony with (sumphônein) reason (logos)” (1119b15-16). 
This person wants to do what he should do, and in fact enjoys doing it. As a 
result, he experiences no internal struggle.  By contrast, the engkratês fights a 
battle against himself, against his pathê, and wins. He does what he thinks he 
should even though his desires sorely tempt him. 
If the courageous man is required to feel fear, and endure in the face of it, then 
how does he differ from the engkratês? Leighton is helpful in tackling this 
question. He argues that, yes, the courageous man does indeed feel fear, but he 
does so in a uniquely virtuous manner.  Most important, he does not experience it, 
or any other emotion, as a force that needs to be “whipped into line.”9 In other 
words, instead of being enemies that must be subjugated, the pathê of the virtuous 
man are potentially useful friends or allies. Describing the fear experienced by the 
courageous man, Leighton explains:  
 
What Aristotle claims for fear, then, is a mechanism sensitive to and focusing 
upon certain sorts of information, leaving persons moved to fear with very 
specific conceptions of how their surroundings relate to them. To use a 
contemporary way of speaking about this, fear identifies certain features of 
our world as salient ones. 
 
Viewed in these ways, fear is not something to be struggled with or overcome, 
but something to be sensitive to and exploited. The prospect of imminent, 
destructive or painful evils that fear embodies is particularly important to a 
creature whose ultimate aim is to live and do well. Fear on a battlefield then 
involves an awareness of the situation with which one has to deal, and does so 
in a way that allows one to prepare to deal with the situation. Feeling fear 
enables one to act courageously. 
 
On this understanding of fear, not only is there little wonder that Aristotle 
should think that the courageous fear, but also little surprise that this passion 
should help define the state as an excellence rather than a form of self-control 
                                                 
9  Leighton, “Aristotle’s Courageous Passions,” 88. 
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[engkrateia]. Fear, so conceived, is not like [the engkratês’] bodily appetites 
with which one must struggle and overcome, but rather something that is of 
great assistance to the courageous, something to be sensitive to and exploited 
[…]. So understood, fear is a sign of virtue, not [engkrateia].”10   
 
To illustrate by means of an innocuous example:  when riding a bicycle on a 
busy city street, especially one that does not have dedicated bike lanes, it is useful 
to feel some measure of fear.  It is vital for the cyclist to be alert to the possibility 
of a parked car veering suddenly to the left or a car on the left abruptly turning to 
the right.  The appropriate measure of fear, just as Leighton describes, heightens 
the cyclist’s sensitivity to his surroundings and helps him identify those features 
of it that might get him killed. Strikingly, this sense of keen alertness, this bit of 
excitement, is attractive, which is why the cyclist returns to it day after day.  His 
doing so illustrates (only by analogy, since cycling is not a virtue) an Aristotelian 
principle: “what accords with virtue is pleasant, or not painful, or minimally 
painful” (1120a27). The virtuous person enjoys, or at least is not pained by, being 
virtuous. Aristotle makes the same point in stronger terms in NE I.8:  “the person 
who does not enjoy kala actions is not good (agathos).  For no one would say that 
the person who does not enjoy acting justly is just….if this is so, then actions 
according to virtue are pleasant in themselves” (kath’ hautas) (1099a17-21).  
Consider the moderate person:  he is “not pained by the absence of pleasure 
and for holding himself away (apechesthai) from it” (1118b32-33). At first blush, 
this seems odd. If, for example, the beautiful body of his neighbor’s wife becomes 
available to him, and he is attracted to her but knows adultery is wrong, how 
could “holding himself away” from his passion not be a kind of pain?  On 
Leighton’s model, it is because the passion has been integrated into the agent’s 
whole being.  Yes, the woman is attractive and so, yes, he is drawn to her.  But 
acting on this desire is inconceivable to him and so the passion he feels is, once 
again, not a wild beast that needs to be tamed, but a source of energy that can be 
successfully sublimated. While it may not be pleasurable for him to hold himself 
away from the woman’s body, it is not a struggle nor does it hurt to do so.  This 
notion will prove to be pivotal in Part VI below. 
To sum up so far: Leighton successfully differentiates, at least conceptually, 
the courageous man from the one who exhibits self-restraint.  The latter must 
struggle hard to contain the fear that is exploding in his chest.  The former feels 
fear, but instead of having to fight it, he welcomes it as an energy source. For an 
external observer, however, it remains difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish 
the two. Like the experienced sailor and the passenger on the ship, they may 
appear to be identical in the face of danger.  Internally or psychologically, 
however, they are not.  In fact, we can easily imagine (today) a device that 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 91.  
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measures the physiological fluctuations that accompany fear and pleasure in a 
human body. By using it we could detect differences in the courageous man and 
the engkratês.  Even as the two appear identical on a casual glance, the latter 
would measure low on the pleasure scale, and high in fear, while the former would 
be the reverse.    
(Aristotle would support this thought experiment, since he identifies courage 
as a virtue of the “non-rational parts” (1117b22). As such, either its presence or 
absence could be accompanied by physical symptoms. So for example, someone 
fearing death “turns pale” (1128b14).)   
Unfortunately, even if Leighton provides us with significant resources to 
differentiate the courageous man and the engkratês, the recognition problem is, as 
we shall next see, far from resolved.  
 
 
3. NE III.8 
 
“Courage is this sort of thing,” Aristotle says at the outset of III.8, “but others 
(heterai) are said in five ways” (1116a15-16). He does not specify to what “others” 
he refers and so, not surprisingly, translations vary.  Bartlett and Collins attempt 
to assist the reader by supplementing the Greek: “but there are also other kinds of 
courage, spoken of in five ways.”11 This is not impossible, but it is misleading. 
Because heterai is feminine plural it could refer to “courages” (andreiai), which in 
turn could be taken as shorthand for “kinds of courage.”12 However, as will soon 
become clear, this chapter describes five kinds of people who only “seem” 
(dokousi: 1116a20) to be, or are “similar to” (hômoiôtai: 1116a27), or “appear” 
(phainontai: 1116b8) courageous, but in fact are not. This chapter, then, is not 
articulating five kinds of courage. Crisp, who also supplements the heterai, 
captures this by translating thus: “Courage, then, is something like this. But the 
name is applied to five other states of character as well.”13   
 The order in which the five “others” will be examined below differs from that 
presented by Aristotle himself. It begins with the cases that are more easily 
distinguished from courage, and concludes with the most difficult. 
1. “Those who are ignorant also appear to be courageous” (1117a22). Such 
people are oblivious to the dangerous reality that faces them and so, even if they 
                                                 
11 Robert Bartlett and Susan Collins, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:  A New Translation 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).  
12 Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:  Translation, 
Introduction, and Commentary  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), follow this reasoning 
strictly when they render the phrase, “but there are also other ‘courages,’ so called.”  
13 Roger Crisp, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
Terence Irwin, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis, Hackett,1985) translates the line 
as follows: “but other states, five of them, are also called bravery.”  
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seem as unperturbed as a courageous man would be, they do not feel the fear that 
is requisite in order to possess the virtue.  As Leighton puts it, such virtuous fear 
has cognitive value since it “identifies certain features of our world” - namely, 
those that immediately threaten us - “as salient,” and ignorant people fail to 
detect these.  
 2.  “Nor are men of good hope (euelpides) courageous, since they are confident 
in the face of risks because they have often been victorious over many. They are 
much like (paromoioi) the courageous because both are confident” (1117a9-12). In 
fact, however, they are “not far” (1117a23) from the ignorant; that is, they are 
unaware of salient features of their surroundings; namely, the ones that are really 
dangerous.  For this reason, they are like those who are “drunk” (1117a14).  
3. The person of “experience” (empeiria: 1116b3), such as a professional soldier 
(or the sailor on the ship mentioned in NE III.6), will also appear courageous. 
Well-versed in things military, he knows what events are actually life-threatening, 
and what are merely “false alarms” (kena: 1116b7).14 Since the latter are common, 
most of the time he will seem unafraid or imperturbable, and so he is easily 
confused with the genuinely courageous soldier. In fact, Aristotle says, such men 
typically flee when their lives are seriously at risk. For this reason they are quite 
unlike “citizen soldiers” (politika: 1116b18), who keep their post even in the face of 
likely death (and who will be discussed in 5. below.) 
4.  Men energized by “spirit” (thumos: 1116b31) are ready, even eager, to face 
real danger. Driven by anger, or the desire for revenge, or brute love of the fight, 
they enter the battle and face death with fierce joy. As such, they too will appear 
courageous. But they are not because “courageous men act on account of (dia) the 
kalon” (1116b30-31), while spirited men, driven by their “passion” (pathos: 
1117a9), act impulsively.  Nonetheless, the character described here (1116b24-
1117a9) is easy to mistake for the genuinely courageous because “the courageous 
are spirited” (thumoeideis: 1116b26). As Aristotle puts it, in them spirit “works 
together” (suergei: 1116b31) with other psychological components. This seems to 
mean that, similar to fear, this potentially lethal passion will be integrated into 
the totality of their being, specifically their “reason” (logos:1117a9). To apply 
Leighton’s terminology again, spirit will be “something to be sensitive to and 
exploited” rather than struggled against. In fact, Aristotle says that if thumos is 
supplemented by “choice and the for the sake of which” it will actually become 
“courage” (1117a4-5). Presumably the “for the sake of which” is the kalon.   
To sum up again: it now seems that the courageous man must face a kalon 
death in battle, must energetically try to kill his enemies while feeling either 
pleasure or at least no pain in doing so, and yet not be driven by rage or an 
exuberant lust for blood, but instead be guided by a deliberate choice and for the 
                                                 
14 “False alarms” is from Bartlett and Collins, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:  A New 
Translation.  
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sake of the kalon. As the final (albeit Aristotle’s first) example makes clear, such a 
person is terribly difficult to recognize.  
5. “Political” (politikê) courage - or rather the political inflection of apparent 
courage - “seems most like” (1116a17) real courage.  Citizen-soldiers “seem to 
endure” (1116a18) in the face of deadly risk on account of both the punishment 
they would suffer were they to desert their post and “the honors” (1116a19) they 
will receive should they prove heroic. The first motivation is not impressive, since 
such soldiers are “compelled” (1116a30) to fight.  The second, however, is.  As 
Aristotle puts it, those who face death in battle in the hope of gaining honor and 
avoiding what is aischron (1116a29) do so “on account of virtue (di’ aretên). For 
they do so on account of shame (aidô) and a desire (orexin) for the kalon, since 
they have a desire for honor, and in order to avoid blame, which is aischron” 
(1116a27-29).   
These lines bring the recognition problem to a head. First, both the courageous 
man and the citizen-soldier act “on account of virtue.”  Second, both their actions 
are propelled, in some fashion, by the kalon.  The courageous man acts “for the 
sake of the kalon” (1115b13) or “on account of the kalon” (1117a8), while the 
citizen-soldier has a desire for honor, which translates into a “desire for the 
kalon.” Both will appear fearless and either enjoy or at least not be pained in 
facing death.  How can they possibly be differentiated? 
 
 
4.  NE III.9 
 
This chapter begins by asserting that courage is far more concerned with fear than 
with confidence. As such, “courage is in fact painful” (1117a33).  This is odd, since 
the exercise of virtue should be pleasurable, or at least not painful, so Aristotle 
elaborates.  “The end (telos) that relates to courage would seem to be pleasant” 
(1117a35).  He illustrates with a comparison to a boxer who endures painful blows 
“for the sake of” (hou heneka: 1117b3) sweet victory.  Similarly, a courageous man 
endures death and wounds “because (hoti) it is kalon to do so and aischron not to” 
(1117b9). This phrase is similar to the description in NE III.6 (1115a12-13) of the 
“modest” (aidêmôn) person. It is kalon for him to fear disrepute and would be 
aischron for him not to.  The difference seems to be that, as stated in NE II.4, the 
courageous man “knowingly” (eidôs: 1117b13) “chooses (hairetai) what is kalon in 
war” (1117b14-15), while the person animated by aidôs, principally the citizen-
soldier, desires honor, which is kalon, and seeks to avoid disrepute.  The difference 
in these formulations is subtle, to be sure, and needs to be elaborated.    
 
 
 
 
DAVID ROOCHNIK 
 
210 
 
5. For the Sake of the Kalon v. Desire for the Kalon 
 
In NE IV.9 Aristotle presents two reasons why the agent driven by aidôs is not 
genuinely virtuous. First, aidôs “seems to be more of a pathos than a 
characteristic” (hexis: 1128b9). As stipulated in NE II.4, for an action to be 
virtuous it must be performed by an agent who “holds (echôn) in a stable and 
unwavering manner” (1105a31). Because the person energized by shame is driven 
by a pathos, and so acts impulsively, he does not qualify. This is reinforced by the 
fact that aidôs, like fear, manifests itself in physiological symptoms such as 
“blushing” (1128b13).  Second, while it is appropriate for the “young” (1128a16) 
to be moved by aidôs, it would not be suitable in an older, genuinely virtuous 
person.15  Such a person “will never voluntarily do base things” (1128b30) nor 
(unlike the engkratês) even be tempted by doing so.  Therefore, aidôs is simply not 
part of his psychological repertoire. By contrast, the young person, impelled by 
orexis for the kalon, strives to be, but has not yet actually become, a good man.  
At his age, then, the best he can do is take his bearings from what others think of 
him.  As such, shame is his appropriate motivator. When he fights as a citizen-
soldier he holds his ground even when facing the threat of imminent death because 
he fears looking bad, and hopes to look good, in the eyes of his comrades and 
elders, through which he sees himself.16  
By contrast, a mature and genuinely virtuous person no longer needs such 
external motivation. As Aristotle says in NE I.6, because honor “seems to reside 
more with those who bestow it” (1095b25) than with the agent himself it does not 
qualify as the highest good, which of course turns out to be “an activity of the 
soul in accord with virtue” (1098a17).  Furthermore, he continues, “people seem 
to pursue honor so that they may be convinced that they themselves are good” 
(1095b28). In other words, the desire for honor manifests an internal insecurity, 
which younger people are naturally prone to feel, and consequent need for 
validation.  Because the highest good must be “complete” (teleion: 1097a29) and 
“self-sufficient” (1097b7), being motivated by either the desire for honor or the 
fear of disrepute eliminates someone from the ranks of the genuinely virtuous.    
It must be remembered, however, that the mature man was once young. In his 
youth he too was guided by what others thought of him. Through experience and 
reflection he somehow outgrew this need.  He became able to see himself for what 
he is rather than needing the eyes of others.  Alternatively formulated, he 
internalized those others. This notion will be elaborated in Part VI below.  
                                                 
15 Note that shame plays an important role in the educational scheme Aristotle sketches in X.9.  
A young person is habituated so that he regularly “feels pleased by (stergon) the kalon and 
displeased by the aischron” (1179b30).  
16 My colleague, the ancient historian Loren J. Samons, tells me that although Athenians were 
liable for service into their 50s, and the average age of the Athenian soldier is unknown, it is 
likely that most were rather young; that is, between twenty and thirty-five.  
Courage and Shame: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics III.6-9 
 
211 
 
Aristotle now seems to have mustered the conceptual resources needed to 
distinguish between the apparently courageous citizen-soldier and the genuinely 
courageous man, and not simply on the basis of age differences. The former, 
driven by aidôs, acts from a desire for the kalon, understood as some sort of public 
visibility and affirmation, and the latter for the sake of the kalon 
understood…understood as what?  
This is a problem since, as many commentators have noted, “Aristotle never 
explains in the NE what to kalon is.”17 Furthermore, as Irwin notes, throughout 
the corpus in different contexts it clearly refers to different properties. He cites as 
examples things that are “pleasant through sight and hearing,” those that exhibit 
“teleological order” or “symmetry, definiteness and greatness,” and those that are 
“appropriate and admirable.”18 But he also argues that there is “one recurrent 
point” when the word is used in the context of ethics:  something kalon is 
“admirable insofar as it extends to the common good.”19 He reformulates: there is 
“good reason to believe that the property [Aristotle] picks out in moral contexts 
through his use of ‘kalon’ is moral rightness,”20 understood as acting for the good 
of others.  
On Irwin’s view, then, the genuinely courageous soldier who endures in war 
would be driven by a non-selfish imperative, which could be formulated roughly 
as follows: ‘I must stay at my post and risk my life because doing so will benefit 
others and as such is morally right.’ Another clause can be added in order to 
distinguish it from the imperative that would guide the citizen-soldier: ‘Even 
though honor is kalon, whether I am recognized for my actions or not is irrelevant 
to me.’  
There is textual support for Irwin’s thesis. In the Rhetoric, for example, 
Aristotle states “those actions are kala that a man does not for the sake of himself. 
Actions that are simply good (agatha) are ones that someone does for the sake of 
his city, while neglecting his own interest” (to hautou)” (1366b35-67a5). 
Nonetheless, Irwin’s account is unsatisfying for at least two reasons. Crisp 
marshals one. Simply stated, “the virtuous person’s only object of concern is his 
own happiness,” not the well being of others.  This is true even if the agent does 
care about the well being of others, and acts (virtuously) on their behalf. As Crisp 
puts it, the Aristotelian agent “may be moved by a genuine non-instrumental 
concern for the good of a friend. But he knows that action on such concern is part 
of what constitutes the best life for him.”21 If Crisp is right - and whether he is or 
not is obviously a complicated question - then Irwin is wrong in his interpretation 
                                                 
17 Gabriel Richardson Lear, “Aristotle on Moral Virtue and the Fine,” in Richard Kraut (ed.) 
Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Ethics  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 118.  
18 Irwin, “Beauty and Morality in Aristotle,” 241.  
19 Ibid., 243. 
20 Ibid., 241. 
21 Roger Crisp, “Nobility in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Phronesis 59(2014), 241.  
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of what it means to act “for the sake of the kalon.” The phrase would not signal 
moral rightness understood as acting essentially for the benefit of others.    
Irwin’s account is problematic for other reasons, which come to light in 
returning to the genuinely courageous man (or soldier) of NE III.6-9, the one who 
acts for the sake of the kalon.  On Irwin’s view this person is willing to risk death 
on the battlefield for a moral reason; that is, the good of others. Since Aristotle 
explicitly contrasts him with the citizen-soldier who is prompted by desire for 
honor or fear of disrepute, he is unconcerned with what those others will think of 
him. He wants to benefit them but does not need to be noticed by them.  He is 
willing to act even if his agency becomes invisible. This, however, violates a 
primary feature of  “kalon.” As Lear puts it, “visibility or ‘showiness’ is essential 
to” Aristotle’s conception of the kalon, which is why she translates it as “fine.”22 If 
she is right, then by moralizing “for the sake of the kalon” Irwin strips it of its 
connection to visibility. In other words, he too sharply distinguishes “kalon” from 
“beautiful.”  
To elaborate: Aristotle says that “political courage” as embodied in the 
citizen-soldier “seems most like” real courage. But if Irwin were right, then the 
two would in fact be fundamentally different. The genuinely courageous man, on 
his view, is guided by a moral imperative and is animated by concern for others, 
while the citizen soldier is animated by aidôs and therefore a kind of self-concern. 
He desires the kalon for himself, and so seeks honor and avoids disrepute. 
Nonetheless, Aristotle states that even the young soldier acts “on account of 
virtue.” Now, with this phrase he may be referring to an immature version of 
virtue, but his use of the word suggests that far from being fundamentally 
different as Irwin’s account would imply, there is continuity between the young 
self-regarding soldier and the mature virtuous man.  
Furthermore, recall that the mature man was animated by, even educated by, 
aidôs when he was young. But if Irwin were correct that acting “for the sake of 
the kalon” means acting for what is morally right and the betterment of others, 
then a youth spent driven by aidôs would not prepare someone for a morally 
virtuous life. Instead, a youth spent in the army, surrounded by (mostly young) 
fellow soldiers who aspire to glory, who take their bearings from what others think 
of them, would prepare him to become supremely self-concerned. A genuinely 
“moral” education would somehow inculcate selflessness in the agent, not a desire 
for honor. On Irwin’s moralizing interpretation of the phrase “for the sake of the 
kalon” a mature (virtuous) person should repudiate his own youth, for he would 
see himself then as having been far too oriented to others. By contrast, Aristotle 
states that it is “fitting” (harmozei: 1128b16) for a young person to feel, and for an 
older person to have felt, aidôs.  The mature man should thus appreciate, even 
admire, who he was. After all, even back then he acted “on account of virtue” and 
                                                 
22 Lear, “On Moral Virtue and the Fine,” 122. 
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on a desire for what is kalon.  
A quick rebuttal is available to Irwin here.  He could follow Korsgaard in 
arguing that a young soldier’s desire to look good in the eyes of his comrades and 
superiors - that is, his desire for the kalon in the form of honor - prepares him for 
true virtue insofar as it makes him “receptive to the more mature state of 
autonomy.”23 This is just one element in her argument that Aristotle and Kant, 
the moralist par excellence, are actually closer than is usually thought.  As she puts 
it, both “think that what gives an action more value is the fact that it is chosen 
for its intrinsic rightness.”24 Furthermore, she quotes Kant in saying that “the 
love of honor is ‘the constant companion of virtue’” and thereby helps teach a 
young person to act morally; that is, unselfishly. She does not explain how this 
educational process would work.  In any case, by her lights, “Kant and Aristotle 
need have no disagreement about this kind of case [aiming for honor] at all.”25  
While this line of thought is plausible, it does not adequately address the 
startling proximity into which Aristotle brings the citizen solider and the 
genuinely virtuous man. The former acts from a desire for the kalon while the 
latter for the sake of the kalon. If, as Irwin has it, the property to which Aristotle 
refers in using “kalon” in the ethical works is “moral rightness,” then both would 
be acting for the sake of others. But this is manifestly untrue of the (young) 
citizen soldier who is driven by aidôs and the self-regarding desire for honor.  
Another account of how the kalon enters the life of the virtuous is needed. 
 
 
6. For the Sake of the Kalon and For the Sake of the Virtuous Actions Themselves  
 
Recall that Irwin claims that acting “for the sake of the kalon” (NE III.7) and 
“choosing [the actions that accord with the virtues] on account of themselves (di’ 
auta)” (NE II.4) are “inseparable.” As he puts it, “to say that it is kalon” - which 
for him means morally right and for the benefit of others - “is simply to say that it 
is to be chosen for its own sake.”26 The two formulations are inseparable indeed, 
but not because both share a similarly moralized conception of the kalon.  To 
explain, consider the following hypothesis.   
The genuinely courageous man, the one who acts both for the sake of the kalon 
and on account of the virtuous actions themselves, is guided by the following sort 
of imperative: ‘I must stay at my post because that is what I do; that is who I am. 
Not to do so would be to fracture or betray myself, and as such would be 
                                                 
23 Christine Korsgaard, “From Duty and For the Sake of the Noble:  Kant and Aristotle on 
Morally Good Action,” in Engstrom S. and Whiting, J. (ed.) Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics: 
Rethinking Happiness and Duty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 220.  
24 Ibid., 205. 
25 Ibid., 220. 
26 Irwin, “Beauty and Morality in Aristotle,” 248. 
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aischron.’ In this formulation, aischron will come closer to “ugly,” and kalon to 
“beautiful” than Irwin would allow.  For the genuinely courageous soldier acts for 
the sake of maintaining himself, of presenting himself to himself as a coherent, 
well ordered being; one who is kalon.  Hence, he acts for the sake of the kalon.  He 
acts on account of the virtuous actions themselves insofar as he does not look 
beyond them to consequences or for any reason other than their worthiness; that 
is, they are kala.  
This hypothesis helps account for the proximity between the citizen-soldier 
who is driven by aidôs and so is self-regarding (and who is the younger self of the 
mature man), and the genuinely courageous man.  The kalon figures prominently 
in the souls of both. In order to clarify how it does so, a deeper understanding of 
aidôs is needed. For this I turn briefly to Bernard Williams’s well-known 
discussion of shame.  
Williams argues against the “progressivist” view that the Greeks, specifically 
Homer and the tragedians, whose characters are indeed often driven by aidôs, 
lacked a sophisticated concept of ethical responsibility.27 Thinking this results 
from the pernicious identification of the ethical with the “moral.” For the 
moralist, “I am provided by reason, or perhaps by religions illumination… with a 
knowledge of the moral law, and I need only the will to obey it.”28 While a shame-
based system is not that, neither is it shallow or crudely heteronomous. 
Consider what Williams has to say about Sophocles’ Ajax.  Having been 
tricked by Athena into thinking that the animals in the pen are actually the 
leaders of the Greek forces who have humiliated him, he slaughters them.  When 
his madness subsides and he realizes he is surrounded by the bloody entrails of 
dead sheep, he feels an overwhelming sense of shame. He can no longer live with 
himself and so resolves to commit suicide.  He expresses his conviction in the form 
of an imperative: “now I am going where my way must go.” This is not a moral 
imperative but nonetheless, according to Williams, it is categorical.  As he puts it, 
Ajax’s words mean “that he must go: period.”29  
From a Kantian or moral perspective, Ajax’s imperative does not deserve to 
be counted as categorical. On this view, it is merely hypothetical in that it 
represents an action chosen “relative merely to what the agent wants to do….or 
to avoid what he fears.” Even worse, it takes it bearings from what others will say 
of the action, and as such is ethically shallow and bound by convention.  Williams 
disagrees. While it is true that shame is fundamentally related to being seen, it is 
not true that this makes an aidôs-driven action superficial or crudely 
heteronomous. As he puts it, even if shame does require an other, that “other may 
be identified in ethical terms.  He…is conceived as one whose reactions I would 
                                                 
27 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity.  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 64. 
28 Ibid., 95. 
29 Ibid., 76. 
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respect.”30 In this, its most developed form, where it no longer is dependent on an 
actual audience (and therefore on mere convention), shame incorporates an 
internalised other capable of holding an “inner personal conviction.”31 And this 
makes possible the sort of categorical imperative, or necessity, that drives Ajax.  
As Williams puts it, 
 
This sense of necessity lies in the thought that one could not live and look 
others in the eyes if one did certain things:  a thought which may be to 
varying degrees figurative but can also be in a deadly sense literal, as it was 
with Ajax. These necessities are internal, grounded in the êthos, the projects, 
the individual nature of the agent, and in the way he conceives the relation of 
his life to other people’s.32   
 
For Williams, as for Aristotle, the person animated by shame can grow.  
 
Shame looks to what I am.  It can be occasioned by many things - actions…or 
thoughts or desires or the reactions of others.  Even where it is certainly 
concerned with an action, it may be a matter of discovery to the agent, and a 
difficult discovery, what the source of the shame is, whether it is to be found in 
the intention, the action, or an outcome. Someone might feel shame at the 
letter he has mailed because it is …a petty and stupid response to a trivial 
slight; and the shame is lightened, but only to some degree, when it turns out 
that the letter was never delivered. Just because shame can be obscure in this 
kind of way, we can fruitfully work to make it more perspicuous, and to 
understand how a certain action or thought stands to ourselves, to what we 
are and to what realistically we can want ourselves to be.33  
 
Williams’s aidôs-driven agent advances beyond shame understood as seeing 
himself through the eyes of others and toward shame as seeing himself through an 
internalized other who holds ethical convictions he himself embraces.  His agency 
deepens and he becomes more self-sufficient. The agent must act the way he does 
because that is who he is. As Williams so sharply puts it, “shame looks to what I 
am.” 
Following Williams on shame helps explain why, according to Aristotle, aidôs 
is preparatory for a life of genuine virtue. To return to my hypothesis:  as a youth, 
the genuinely courageous man was driven by aidôs and the desire for recognition 
by his comrades and elders.  As he developed, he internalized these others. He 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 84. 
31 Ibid., 95. 
32 Ibid., 103 
33 Ibid., 93. 
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came to think for himself.  But he never lost his desire for the visibility of the 
kalon. In acting on account of virtuous actions themselves, he seeks this visibility 
in the form of a self-image or representation. In short, the virtuous person is 
prompted to act by the desire to see himself as kalon.  
To clarify this interpretation of Aristotle, which I am not attributing to 
Williams, consider Lear’s argument concerning the relationship between moral 
virtue and “the fine.”  Pace Irwin, who is adamant that Aristotle’s “use of [kalon] 
does not express a conviction about morality and beauty,”34 Lear thinks Aristotle 
has “good reason to make beauty central to his account of virtue.”35 For her, the 
key ingredients of the kalon are  “effective teleological order, visibility and 
pleasantness.”36 The latter two items are particularly important here. As she says, 
“the experience of one’s actions as beautiful is, we might say, the mode of the 
virtuous person’s apprehension of their goodness.”37 In turn, this apprehension is 
the source of the pleasure that Aristotle stipulates that the virtuous person must 
feel.  As Lear puts it, “acting well is a proper source of self-regarding pleasure.”38 
It is a pleasure that comes from apprehending oneself, not simply as someone who 
acts to benefit others (although of course one may do so), but as kalon…as 
beautiful to behold.      
To suggest reasons why Lear may be right here, consider the following three 
passages from the NE.   
1. In NE III.4, Aristotle asks whether the object of “wish” (boulêsis) is the 
good or “what appears to be good.”  If it is the former, then the wish of someone 
who “chooses incorrectly” - that is, pursues a bad end - in fact does not have an 
object and so is no real wish at all.  If it is the latter, then a pernicious relativism 
sets in: whatever “seems so to individual” would have to be counted as good. 
Aristotle resolves this dilemma by stating that “to the ethically serious person 
(spoudaios) the object of wish is what is truly [good], while to the base person it is 
whatever happens [to appear good]…for the ethically serious person judges each 
situation correctly, and in each of them what is true appears to him.”   
On the one hand, Aristotle’s reasoning here may seem uninformative or even 
circular.  The true good is what appears to be good to the virtuous person, who in 
turn is identified by having the capacity to discern the true good.  But this offers 
no independent specification of what the true good is, and so provides no 
guidance. On the other hand, Aristotle’s reasoning here is illuminating, at least 
given his own standards of philosophical adequacy in the NE, whose project (as 
argued in Part I) is a kind of phenomenological mapping of the ethical life.  While 
it does not disclose criteria of the true good, it does tell much about the character 
                                                 
34 Irwin, “Beauty and Morality in Aristotle,” 253. 
35 Lear, “On Moral Virtue and the Fine,” 117. 
36 Ibid., 117. 
37 Ibid., 117. 
38 Ibid., 128. 
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of virtuous agency.  Simply put, the virtuous person can trust himself.  He can 
rely on himself to determine what is good. He is supremely confident and needs 
only look to himself in order to determine in what direction he should go.  
The above is compatible with the hypothesis offered earlier:  the courageous 
man acting for the sake of the kalon is driven by his sense of himself as a kalon 
being who strives to be, first and foremost, himself.  He acts on account of 
virtuous actions themselves because he issues to himself the categorical 
imperatives governing them:  “this I must do: period. For this is who I am.  Not 
to do so would be aischron; ugly, ill-becoming, ill-fitting. It would be a betrayal of 
myself.”  
2.  My hypothesis is supported by the results of Part II above. There the 
virtuous agent was distinguished from the engkratês.  The latter struggles against 
his passions or desires, and is finally victorious.  The former experiences no 
internal conflict and is instead a harmonious being.  As Aristotle says, the 
knowledge of what good actions are “has grown into him” (sumphuênai: 1147a22) 
such that he is a fully integrated and harmonious being.  
In this context, Williams’s characterization of the Kantian-moral view 
provides a useful contrast: “what I am, so far as it affects the moral, is already 
given, and there is only the matter of discerning among temptations and 
distractions what I ought to do.”39 In other words, on the Kantian view engkrateia 
is the highest moral achievement.  Fighting temptation simply is the moral life. 
By contrast, for Aristotle, while fighting temptation (and winning) is admirable, it 
pales in comparison to true virtue.  For this is a kind of wholeness. The virtuous 
agent acts for the sake of the kalon. He acts for the sake of maintaining and 
presenting to himself his wholeness, which is kalon.   
3. In NE II.4 Aristotle states the virtuous agent “acts by choosing and 
choosing [the actions] on account of themselves (di’ auta).”  But it is important to 
note that this is only the second of the three requirements for virtuous agency. 
The first is that the agent acts “knowingly (eidôs),” the third is that he acts from a 
“stable and unwavering manner” character trait.  All three relate to the kind of 
person he is. He is a unified being who trusts in his own judgment and as such 
confidently engages in certain actions simply because he thinks they must be 
done. Hence, the self-generated imperative of the genuinely courageous soldier is, 
‘I must stay at my post: period. That is what I do. That is who I am. Not to do so 
would be aischron, which I am not.’ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 95. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The complications of the NE are legion. Indeed, sometimes the book feels like a 
vast and churning sea, in which a reader, at least one attempting to make sense of 
it as a whole, will surely drown. A sterling example of this is the problem, raised 
by Crisp and Irwin (and many others), of how to reconcile Aristotle’s conviction 
that happiness is the ultimate human good, which implies that self-concern drives 
the ethical life, with his discussion of the virtues, at least some of which are other-
oriented. This paper makes no pretense at a comprehensive reading of the NE or a 
solution of this problem. It does, however, suggest, that trying to determine and 
distinguish the meaning of three of Aristotle’s descriptions will be useful in the 
attempt to do so.  
1.  The courageous man acts for the sake of the kalon. 
2. The virtuous person acts on account of the virtuous actions themselves. 
3.  The person driven by aidôs and a desire for the kalon in the form of honor is 
most similar to the courageous man.  
As Irwin says, the first two are inseparable.  They are not identical. An agent 
acts for the sake of the kalon insofar as he insists on maintaining his identity and 
sense of self as kalon.  He acts on account of the virtuous actions themselves 
insofar as he is driven by categorical imperatives.  He must remain at his post 
even if his life is at risk: period.  Not to do would destroy himself.  When he was a 
younger soldier he also remained at his post, but he did so because he would have 
been ashamed to do otherwise.  As a mature man he no longer feels this way.  But 
he is still driven by the kalon, with its essential feature of visibility, even if he 
fundamentally concerned with how he appears to himself.  
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ABSTRACT 
The Socratic elenchus is a procedure which tests out the consistency of  the interlocutors’ beliefs. 
To this end, it is necessary to carry out, alongside the renowned Socratic strategies (questioning, 
examples, definitions, etc.), also an emotional process acting inside reasoning and where shame 
has a leading role. The aporetic state is a good example of  the collaboration of  emotions and 
reasoning, growing from the shameful recognition of  contradictions. It is a cognitive and 
emotional acknowledgement of  errors that pushes the subject to transform his/her behaviour. 
The use of  emotions is not merely a rhetorical strategy for argumentation; emotions are the 
elements that embody knowledge into a practice capable of  transforming life into a good life 
thereby determining the rational way of  living for flourishing.  
The recognition of  mistakes does not happen just “in the head” but is “extended” in the public 
environment that permits the generation of  shame. This is the case, not only because shame is a 
“collective emotion” but because the audience is a necessary component of  the catharsis. 
My main thesis concerns what I call the “extended elenchus”, a process based on the extended 
nature of  the aporetic state. The first section highlights the “necessity thesis”, or the role of  
emotions in reasoning; the second focuses on shame as an epistemic emotion and on the 
cognitive role played by the audience in the implementation of  the “system of  shame”; the 
third addresses the role of  cathartic and zetetic aporia. 
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Introduction 
 
The Socratic elenchus is a procedure which tests out the consistency of  the 
interlocutors’ beliefs. To this end, it is necessary to carry out, alongside the 
                                                 
1 This paper arises from the project “Emotions First”, which I am carrying out at the 
University of  Edinburgh as a Marie Curie Research Fellow, thanks to a grant from the EU 
Commission. A previous version of  the paper was presented at the 2nd Annual Conference of  
The European Philosophical Society for the Study of  Emotions, University of  Edinburgh, 15-
17 July 2015. I would like to thank the organizers and those with whom I had the opportunity 
to discuss my approach, in particular Alessandra Fussi, John Dillon, Edwart Harcourt, Niels 
Hermannsson, Paolo Maccagno, Dory Scaltsas, Clerk Shaw, Jan Slaby and Luigi Vero Tarca. 
Their contribution enabled me to rethink and improve the first version of  the paper.  
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renowned Socratic strategies (questioning, examples, definitions, etc.), also an 
emotional process acting inside reasoning and where shame has a leading role. The 
dialogue takes the form of  a refutation, which is different from Eristic due to its 
moral purpose: thanks to the critique that it engenders, the dialogue enables the 
interlocutor to realize his own inferiority, to the extent that he must recognize 
that he does not really know what he thinks he knows. This feeling of  inferiority 
aims at inducing in him the desire to respond by changing his lifestyle, recognizing 
in himself  the truth he sought. Therefore, the Socratic refutation plays on the 
feeling of  shame that enables the interlocutor to admit his own ignorance.  
This aspect is crucial as shame played a fundamental role in Greek civilization. 
The Athenian citizen had to avoid all situations in which he could appear weak, or 
he was lost. But Socrates, arguing in the public square, does precisely that: he 
shows his interlocutors that they do not know what they think they know; he 
ridicules them and, above all, strips them of  their claims.  
My thesis is that the audience listening to the refutation was not a mere 
spectator but had an active role within an extended cognitive process that 
included Socrates, his interlocutors and the audience. This hypothesis, which I 
will explain in its main epistemological facets, is based on the recognition of  the 
particular historical period and of  the specific functioning of  the dialogues.  
Socratic dialogues were written not only by Plato but also by other writers.2 
They represent a particular form of  writing emerging in a period in which the oral 
performance was the most important. Based on the analysis of  this historical 
context, I think it is possible to claim not only that Socrates’ dialogues took place 
in the public square, but also that the dialogues written by Plato and by other 
disciples of  Socrates were performed and read in public.3 In writing the Socratic 
dialogues, Plato had in mind a specific and well defined external audience: an 
audience on which he wanted to impress a conceptual change, therefore a change 
in values and political approach. 
My main thesis concerns the existence of  what I call the “extended elenchus”, 
a process based on the extended nature of  the aporetic state as catharsis in the 
drama, and is grounded on various premises that I am going to explain in specific 
sections, providing also items of  textual evidence. The first section highlights the 
“necessity thesis” or the role of  emotions in reasoning; the second focuses on 
shame as an epistemic emotion and on the cognitive role played by the audience in 
the implementation of  the “system of  shame”; the third addresses the role of  
cathartic and zetetic aporia. 
 
 
                                                 
2 According to Livio Rossetti, we lost approximately 200 Socratic dialogues. Cf. Rossetti, L. 
2011.  Le dialogue socratique. Paris: Encre Marine, Editions Les Belles Lettres. 
3 Ryle, G.. 1966. Plato’s progress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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1. The Socratic method: emotions in reasoning 
 
My main and general thesis is that the awareness of  the role of  emotions in 
reasoning represents a cornerstone of  the Socratic method. I argue that the view 
that Socrates propounded is the reverse of  the so-called Socratic intellectualism:4 
emotion is the more primitive guide to the discovery of  the good, since it shows 
the way to reach knowledge, and has the power to transfer it into our lives.5 In this 
perspective, knowledge concerns every aspect of  life and reality.  Accordingly, not 
only do we reach knowledge through emotions, but emotions are also the powers 
through which knowledge can impact our lives.  
The elenchus aims at improving the interlocutor through a process of  
purification that is capable of  changing his whole existence: the goal of  the 
Socratic method is to give birth to a correct mode of  life, and, as we shall see, it is 
precisely the literary aspect of  Plato’s dialogues that makes this possible.6 The 
literary form allows us to understand the performance of  the dialogues: Plato was 
well aware7 that the diegetic-mimetic form of  the dialogues allowed the public to 
participate actively in the process. This participation does not mean, in my 
opinion, just that the audience could identify with the interlocutor, mirroring his 
emotional state, but also that the audience played a fundamental role in the entire 
cognitive process engendered by the dialogue. For this reason, the hypothesis of  
the extended mind and, more specifically, of  the extended emotions, as we shall 
see in detail in section 4, seems central for understanding this dynamic. 
Plato argued that emotions are necessary to reach the truth: emotions are not 
sufficient by themselves8 but – and in this perspective we can maintain a 
moderately rationalist approach – they act within reasoning to enhance the 
epistemic process. 
Plato was the first to explore and gain significant insights into the relation 
between emotions and reasoning: for instance, Plato’s Sophist 230b4-230e5 (the 
“noble sophistry” passage)9 clearly shows the bond between the logical and the 
                                                 
4 For a critique of  the paradigm of  Socratic intellectualism, cf. Brickhouse, T., and Smith N. 
2010. Socratic Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
5 For a defence of  this thesis, cf. Candiotto, L. 2012. Le vie della confutazione. I dialoghi socratici 
di Platone. Mimesis. 
6 For a literary analysis of  Platonic dialogues leading to a maieutic interpretation, cf. Gill, C. 
2006. “Le dialogue platonicien”. In: Brisson, L., Fronterotta, F. (eds.), Lire Platon. Paris: PUF, 
53-75. 
7 Cf. Plato, Resp. III, 395b sgg. 
8 On the problem concerning whether emotions be necessary or only sufficient to produce a 
moral judgement, see Sauer, H. 2012. “Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral 
Judgment?”. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15:95–115. 
9 For a detailed comment on this passage, cf. Candiotto, L., “Purification through emotions. The 
role of  shame in Plato’s Sophist 230b4-e5”. In: in  Dillon, J., Zovko, M. L. (eds.),  Proceedings of  
the International Conference Bildung and paideia: Philosophical Models of  Education, special 
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emotional levels that can be found in the Socratic elenchus. 
In this passage it is possible to isolate a quotation which proves the extension 
of  the cognitive process: Plato argues that the release is sweet for those who 
attend as listeners and is firmly established for those who undergo the process (the 
refutation). Besides indicating the presence of  an audience, this passage 
demonstrates how the action of  the elenchus affects also the listeners of  the 
dialogue. 
Refutation brings the interlocutor to the aporetic state, understandable as an 
embodied and embedded experience of  mistakes, the first step for grasping the 
truth. The aporetic state is a good example of  the collaboration of  emotions and 
reasoning, growing from the shameful recognition of  contradictions. It is a 
cognitive and emotional acknowledgement of  errors that pushes the subject to 
transform his behaviour. The use of  emotions is not merely a rhetorical strategy 
for argumentation; emotions are the elements that embody knowledge into a 
practice capable of  transforming life into a good life, thereby determining the 
rational way of  living for flourishing.  
In order to be complete, the elenctic purification needs also a psychological 
cleansing: in this perspective, it can be obtained only through the collaboration 
between rationality and emotions,  mainly shame. Socrates uses shame as a tool 
for healing the illness of  one’s soul and style of  life. That is the effect that 
Socrates aims to achieve through the elenchus, namely the state of  aporia of  the 
interlocutor. The aporia is a mental state of  perplexity and being at a loss, that 
involves feelings, which in turn play a role in the cognitive development of  the 
interlocutor. The aporetic state is not a purely cognitive state; it is a cognitively-
motivational state involving emotive elements.  
The turning point between the refutation and the maieutical production of  
the thesis consists in the acknowledgement of  one’s own inadequacy, a sense of  
inferiority – a situation that is captured by the Greek terms aidos and aischyne 
and which unfolds as an aporetic condition, in other words as awareness of  
contradiction The recognition of  mistakes does not happen just “in the head” but 
is “extended” in the public environment that permits the generation of  shame. 
Frustration and the feeling of  shame as a result of  the dialogic challenge is thus 
experienced by Socrates, by the interlocutor and by the audience. 
 
 
 
_________________________________________ 
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2. The central role of  the audience for the dynamics of  shame 
 
Arguably, the kind of  shame pursued by Socrates as a factor of  elenctic 
transformation represents a productive social use of  the “system of  shame”, 
adopting the distinction proposed by Bernard Williams between a positive and a 
negative shame.10  
Shame is often defined as a primitive emotion: it plays a fundamental role in 
the way our personal identity is constructed through relationships with others 
(both with peers and hierarchically). In Greek times, dialogues were not for the 
most part private, but more often public conversations. Acceptance of  the 
refutation therefore had a social value, given the way in which social status was 
constitutive of  individual identity. In this perspective, accepting a public 
refutation could imply accepting a change of  identity. 
However, Plato’s dialogues only rarely give testimony of  a successful 
transformation occurring in the interlocutor. This is due to the interlocutor’s 
attitude towards shame: the feeling of  shame can be accepted as a means for self-
transformation or hidden to protect a social status. Shame is frequently concealed 
(through the psychological mechanism of  the “shame of  shame”) due to social 
reasons. 
In Euthyphro (12b4-c1), Socrates argues that where there is shame there is also 
fear of  losing face, and we blush for this reason. What makes us blush is the fear 
of  losing our reputation or, conversely, as Socrates says literally, of  acquiring the 
“reputation of  an evil man” (12c1). Shame is in fact experienced in front of  other 
men (15d4-e2). 
The interlocutor’s identity depends on social recognition, namely the social 
attribution of  a role; therefore, the interlocutor can hardly accept to forego this 
safe foothold by openly admitting his errors.  Arguably, by outlining the 
distinction between these two types of  shame, it is possible to notice how the 
purification of  the interlocutor implies a turning – or “break” – point within the 
dialogue, which influences the epistemic outcome of  the aporia. Shame as a tool 
of  transformation conduces to the generative phase of  the maieutic process and 
shame as an obstacle to transformation that functions as a resonator for the 
audience.  
In Charmides we find, embodied by Charmides and Critias, the expression of  
these two different ways of  experiencing shame. Modesty is connected with shame 
when Charmides blushes as he does not know whether or not he is wise: thanks to 
shame, Charmides recognizes his own inadequacy, accepting – at least at the age 
when he is represented in the dialogue – that he should be accompanied by 
                                                 
10 Williams, B. 1993. Shame and Necessity. Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of  California Press. 
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Socrates in the research. Critias’ shame,11 however, hinders the research, as it 
triggers a defence mechanism that causes Critias not to admit his shortcomings. 
In passage 164 d Critias says he is not ashamed to admit his mistakes; however, 
subsequently he fails to realize what he had set out to do. As a result of  the 
inconsistency between words and deeds, and of  the inability to admit the 
condition of  being in aporia, Critias does not admit that he does not know. 
Therefore, he is unable to make the first step towards a sincere research: he does 
not recognize his own ignorance. As we can see, shame, depending on the 
character and the social role of  the interlocutor, can either engender or hinder the 
process of  research.  
The concealment of  shame, however, is not an evidence of  the failure of  the 
Socratic method, which uses shame as a tool for transformation. On the contrary, 
Plato uses the defence of  the interlocutor (the way he conceals shame) as an 
element that, thanks to the involvement of  the audience, backfires on the 
interlocutor himself. 
Emotions collaborate with reason not only to purify the soul, but to deliver a 
message to the audience: the necessity to be aware of  the inadequacy of  
contemporary politicians and teachers.  When interlocutors try to protect their 
social image, their standing is unavoidably compromised. By trying to save face, 
they lose face. More specifically, interlocutors cannot protect their socially ratified 
identities insofar as, by attempting to do so, they demonstrate their unwillingness 
to admit their errors. The audience, realizing that the interlocutor does not 
acknowledge the shortcomings which, thanks to the refutation, emerged clearly in 
the dialogue, understands that he is not the person he believes himself  to be. This 
mechanism, which I call “outreach elenchus”, occurs mainly when the 
interlocutors are politicians, sophists, and rhetors. In the outreach elenchus 
Socrates carries out directly the refutation of  the interlocutor, but the elenchus 
affects indirectly also the audience.  
In other words, this elenchus increases in size and incorporates the dialogic 
context, like a stone thrown in a pond that produces a series of  increasingly larger 
circles. This mechanism, however, as we will be explaining in detail in section 4 by 
emphasizing its extension, demonstrates not only the effect of  the Socratic 
intervention on the audience, but also the role the public plays in the refutation, 
functioning as a resonator and leading back the refutation to Socrates’ 
interlocutor. 
In this perspective, the movement of  the refutation is not just similar to that 
of  a stone thrown into a pond, but also to that of  a boomerang, which comes back 
to those who have launched it and which, when used for hunting, allows the 
                                                 
11 Platone, Charm. 169 c-d.  
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hunter to hit an object whilst apparently being thrown towards a different 
direction. In this sense we could say that when Socrates points indirectly to the 
public, he does so in order to hit his direct interlocutor: he just needs the active 
participation of  the public, which allows the boomerang to bounce back. The 
movements exemplified here represent the cognitive and emotional dynamics that 
develop between Socrates, the interlocutor and the audience, and that find their 
realization in a specific moment of  Socratic dialogue, the aporetic state. 
A clear example of  this mechanism is present in the Gorgias and, in particular, 
in the figure of  Callicles.12 In 461 c Polus says that Gorgias was ashamed to 
maintain certain statements, e.g. that he did not know what justice was and that, 
as he did not know, he could not teach it. The shame that is ascribed to Gorgias is 
therefore caused by the recognition of  ignorance; Polus himself, later, will become 
a victim of  the mechanism of  shame by recognizing that, had he expressed his 
thoughts, he would have fallen into contradiction. Callicles, however, manages to 
avoid these consequences – the recognition of  ignorance and contradiction – 
exposing accurately the Socratic strategies and individuating in which point of  
the dialogue Polus gave in and “found himself  entrapped in your discourses and 
could no longer open his mouth, ashamed to say what he was thinking”.   
Callicles is not ashamed as he does not identify with the values13 that are at 
the basis of  the critique – this is why Socrates had to use another strategy with 
him, which is based on the extension of  the elenchus. In my perspective, the 
tenacity of  Socrates in continuing his dialogue with Callicles is not moved by the 
hope of  changing his lifestyle – this interpretation would ascribe to Socrates a 
certain naivety – but by the attempt to express explicitly the consequences of  
such a vision and lifestyle, in order for the listeners and the audience to realize 
Callicles’ shortcomings and to rebound onto Callicles a critique that compromises 
his image. 
These tools are not specific to every Socratic elenchus, but Socrates uses the 
public as a vehicle for the extension of  the elenchus when he is dealing with those 
who represent the values of  the society he wants to criticize. Accordingly, my 
claim is not that all the elenchi are extended, but that it is necessary to recognize 
the existence of  this particular form of  elenchus. The Socratic elenchus is 
contextual and is configured into different ways according to Socrates’ strategic 
purposes.14 
                                                 
12 For a detailed analysis of  the dialogue according to this paradigm cf. Candiotto, L. 2014. 
“Elenchos public et honte dans la troisième partie du Gorgias de Platon”, CHORA. Revue 
d’études anciennes et médiévales, 12: 191-212. 
13 According to Adkins, this is a fundamental aspect for realizing the experience of  shame. Cf. 
Adkins, A. W. H., 1970. From the Many to the One. A Study of  Personality and Views of  Human 
Nature in the Context of  Ancient Greek Society, Values and Beliefs. London: Constable. 
14 For our study, it is important to highlight how these changes impact also on the emotional 
aspect of  the dialogue. Cf. Brisson, L. 2001. “Vers un dialogue apaisé. Les transformations 
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This interpretation could be criticized by referring to another passage in the 
Gorgias15 where Socrates tells Polus that there are two types of  elenchus, the 
rhetorical elenchus, which is usually used in courts, and the dialectic elenchus, the 
type used by Socrates. The sharp distinction between these two types of  elenchus 
lies in the fact that, to have value, the first needs a large number of  witnesses, 
whilst for the second to succeed it is sufficient that a single witness recognizes the 
truth. This difference is linked to the specificity of  the Socratic maieutics, which 
addresses each time a single interlocutor, and to Socrates’ refusal to seek consensus 
and approval from large audiences, as did the orators and politicians of  the time. 
The objection would thus emphasize the fact that Socrates’ intervention is usually 
directed to a single party.  
I would reply to this objection by highlighting how the difference between 
rhetoric and dialectic elenchus is not only methodological, but also related to the 
Platonic construction of  Socrates’ public role, which should be understood in 
opposition to the masters and politicians of  his time.16 
Plato is aware that the elenchus has an effect on the listeners, he even uses the 
audience to induce the elenchus to bounce back on the interlocutor.  However, he 
does not unmask this mechanism for two reasons: firstly, because he is drawing 
Socrates’ image in contrast with that of  the masters of  the time, and secondly 
because he wants the strategy to be successful (if  the rules of  the game were 
revealed they would lose their effectiveness). Moreover, it is also true that Socrates 
seeks the consent of  only one individual: to do this, however, he needs the active 
participation of  the public in the aporetic state. In so doing, he obtains also the 
political and rhetorical effect that Plato could not ascribe to Socrates, given the 
apologetic construction of  his figure.  
 
 
3. Aporetic state 
 
According to Anne-Marie Bowery shame, which is linked to the physical reaction 
of  blushing, indicates exactly the aporetic state and the difficulty of  recognizing 
what has been discovered. The interlocutors blush when they have to admit what 
they would rather not admit, or when they do not know how to respond. 
According to Bowery, the phenomenon of  blushing indicates a turning point of  
_________________________________________ 
affectant la pratique du dialogue dans le corpus platonicien”. In Cossutta, F., Narcy, M., eds., La 
forme dialogue chez Platon: Évolution et réceptions,  209-226. Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme Millon. 
15 Plato, Gorg. 471e-472c. 
16 On Plato’s construction of  Socrates’ character, cf. my article: Candiotto, L. 2013. “Socrate e 
l’educazione dei giovani aristocratici. Il caso di Crizia come esempio di mascheramento operato 
dai difensori socratici”. In F. de Luise, A. Stavru, eds., Socratica III. Studies on Socrates, the 
Socratics, and the Ancient Socratic Literature, 190-198. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. 
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the dialogue, the emergence of  real possibilities for a dialogic development.17 
In relation to the aporetic state, it is also important to remember that the 
Socratic method does not reach a stable definition but, in a Daedalic fashion,18 it 
puts in motion all the notions proposed by the interlocutor in order to lead him to 
recognize his own ignorance. In my view such an outcome, often considered as a 
skeptic one, should not be understood as an epistemic failure: the object of  the 
method was not to attain a stable definition – as in the case of  Prodicus’ method – 
but to carry over  the purification from error, which can be achieved only through 
conceptual contradiction and becoming ashamed of  oneself. The Socratic method, 
despite having a strong sophistic connotation in the use of  linguistic and 
rhetorical strategies, could therefore be turned against the sophists themselves, 
who could be accused of  selling a knowledge that was not as stable as they 
claimed. The aporetic outcome of  the Socratic method can thus be understood as 
a place in which rationality comes to a standstill, where the paradox replaces firm 
knowledge and contradiction serves as the best medication against the assumption 
of  wisdom. Exactly in its negativity aporia provides the consciousness of  errors as 
the necessary starting point to wisdom. In this way, aporia is not only cathartic, 
as pointed out by the traditional approach, but also zetetic. The zetetic aporia 
underlines how solving particular aporiai is part of  the search for knowledge. This 
conception of  aporiai as puzzles to be solved is not only central for Aristotle (i.e. 
Met. B1. 995a34–b1) but also meaningful for the Socratic elenchus.19 The 
roadblock is also “a breakthrough (euporia), pointing to the right direction in 
which to pursue an answer to the question posed by the dialogue”.20 
Studies on the so-called epistemic emotions are central to the cognitive 
phenomenon we are describing: they highlight how emotions – being conceptually 
vital, and emerging in the course of  a practically motivated enquiry – are 
necessary for thinking. One aim of  this paper is to demonstrate how, in the 
Socratic method, the feeling of  shame, connected to the above-mentioned aporetic 
status, represents also an epistemic emotion.21 Socrates was persuaded that deep 
                                                 
17 A. M. Bowery, “Know Thyself: Socrates as Storyteller”, in G. A. Scott (ed.), Philosophy in 
dialogue. Plato’s Many Devices, University Park 2007, pp. 82-110. 
18 On the Socratic method as a Daedalic method cf. Platone, Euthphr. 11 b 6-8, Alc. I, 121 a3, 
Men. 97 d 6. See Candiotto, L. 2011, «Il metodo adatto per Eutifrone: una calma distanza», 
Peitho. Examina antiqua 1(2), 39-55,  in particular  48. 
19 According to Vasilis Politis it is necessary to distinguish these two types of  aporia, 
highlighting the point that only the second one refers to puzzlement in itself  and, therefore, to 
the significance of  the question as the main drive for  the research (see p. 107-109).  Politis, V. 
2006.  “Aporia and Searching in the Early Plato”. In J. Lindsay, V. Karasmanis, eds., 
Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays, 88-109. Oxford-New York: Clarendon Press. 
20 Gerson, L. P. 2009. Ancient Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 44. 
21 Cf. analysis of  epistemic guilt in relation to accountability in Morton, A. 2010. «Epistemic 
Emotions», in P. Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of  Philosophy of  Emotions, 385-399. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 395-396. 
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beliefs revealed by shame were true beliefs about what was right or not right to 
do22: shame played therefore a central role in the practice of  wisdom.  
The Platonic paradigm of  knowledge as a vision (originating from the 
attribution of  ideas as object of  noein) cannot be found in the Socratic method, 
except as its negation: as a matter of  fact, the  Socratic discourse leads to a  non-
vision, to the incapability to see a way out (cf. the etymology of  aporia) for 
thought. However, the value of  the Socratic elenchus should be grasped 
intrinsically and in its radicalism: its possible positive value should not be sought 
in the generation of  further knowledge (although this process does take place with 
the transition from elenchus to maieutics), but in the way it engenders an ethic of  
care that is able to transform the recognition of  powerlessness in the constant 
search for good deeds. It is necessary to emphasize this aspect in order to grasp 
the intrinsic epistemic valence of  the elenchus, which should not be considered 
only as a pre-condition to reach a subsequent state of knowledge. The aporetic 
outcome of  the elenchus, therefore, should not be understood in a passive sense: 
the strength of  the aporetic event requires a transformative process that allows us 
to find, within negativity itself, the key to imagine an otherness. 
 
 
4. The extended elenchus 
 
The study of  the primary role of  emotions in the Socratic elenchus, as well as the 
research on the epistemic nature of  shame and on the zetetic character of  
purification through aporia, allow me to propose the thesis that the Socratic 
elenchus is extended.  
This means that not only the purpose of  the Socratic elenchus is external (e.g. in 
relation to  lifestyle), but also its genesis.  
I argue that the aporetic state is achieved in the elenchus, not only in the 
interlocutor’s mental state; the state is the conclusion of  the elenchus that is a 
shared cognitively-motivational state of  both interlocutors, Socrates and the 
dialogue-partner. My position is that the elenctic aporia is the external shared 
dialogical embodiment of  the cognitively-motivational state of  the two 
interlocutors in a Socratic elenchus. 
The theory I employ for explaining the shared state achieved through the 
elenchus is the theory of  the extended mind23 and of  the extended emotions. 
The theory of  the extended mind – a form of  active externalism, for which the 
environment constantly drives one’s intellect in an ongoing way – refers mainly to 
the way in which the human mind extends itself  in external technologies: 
                                                 
22 Moss, J. 2005. “Shame, Pleasure and the Divided Soul”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 
XXIX: 137-170. 
23 Clark, A., and Chalmers  D. 1998. “The extended mind”. Analysis 58: 10-23. 
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although this would seem to be very far from the classical age, I believe that 
Socrates “was using” the audience in the same way as today’s mind “uses” 
technologies, for a well-defined cognitive purpose: not only the purification from 
false beliefs, but also (and here we see the need for externalization of  the cognitive 
phenomenon) to bounce back to the interlocutor a conceptual shift concerning his 
role. According to this model we regulate ourselves through other people: they are 
there “for me”, they are resources which I use instrumentally, for my own self. 
Socrates uses the audience to achieve his objectives: an extended conceptual 
change, able to impact the ethical and political behaviour of  the audience. The 
cognitive extension takes place especially via the affective channel: in this 
perspective, I think the configuration of  the extended mind as extended emotions 
is even better recognized as a conceptual paradigm for understanding the 
phenomenon of  the aporetic state. Extended emotions are therefore part of  the 
Socratic method: Socrates uses them as a strategy and a tool to achieve the 
aporetic status and, through it, a cognitive transformation. 
The theory of  extended emotions proposed by Jan Slaby24 goes in the direction 
of  “collective emotions”, to be intended both as emotions “common” among the 
members of  a group, and as emotions constituted by all the members of  a group 
at the same time. For this aspect it is fundamental to refer to Printz’s work,25 even 
though Slaby holds his distance from the perceptual framework and emphasizes 
the rich phenomenology of  affective states, drawing on Helm in regard to the 
systematic interrelatedness of  the instances of  momentary feeling,26 and attaining 
the concept of   “phenomenally extended emotions”.27 Slaby proposes examples of  
emotions which are very significant for our theme: in his opinion it is possible to 
encounter extended emotions not only in the general social-interactive domain, 
but also in the context of  art reception and in dialogical interplay. 
For Adam Carter, Emma Gordon and Orestis Palermos28 emotions extend 
beyond the agent’s body to aspects of  its dynamic environment. Their proposal is 
to understand the hypothesis of  extended emotions as a novel application of  the 
hypothesis of  extended cognition, claiming that, if  understood within this 
conceptual paradigm, their characterization is less radical. Their defence depends 
                                                 
24  Slaby, J. 2014. “Emotions and the Extended Mind”. In: Salmela, M., von Scheve, C., eds., 
2014. Collective Emotions, 32-46. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
25 Prinz, J. 2004. “Emotions Embodied”. In Solomon, R., ed. Thinking about Feeling: 
Philosophers on Emotions, 1-14. New York: Oxford University Press.  
26 In “Relational Affect” (paper delivered at the 2nd Annual Conference of  The European 
Philosophical Society for the Study of  Emotions, University of  Edinburgh, 15-17 July 2015) 
Slaby underlines however how, differently from Helm, he assumes that the relational affect is 
from the outset transindividual. 
27 Slaby, J.. 2014, 42. 
28 Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C., and Palermos, S. O. Forthcoming. “Extended emotion”, 
Philosophical Psychology. 
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therefore on the justification of  the hypothesis of  extended cognition. 
For our analysis about the cognitive process pursued by the Socratic elenchus, 
it is enough to highlight here that knowledge does not just happen “in the head” 
of  the interlocutor but is “extended” in the public environment, and this allows 
the generation of  shame. It is not only a question of  location but also of  
determining the type of  knowledge that is realized: such knowledge is not just 
“shared” with both the speaker and the audience; it is also extended in the sense 
of  enhanced or maximized.29 This also clarifies how the regulation of  the self  
always involves the other. Shame is really experienced also by the audience; it is 
not a “fictional shame”. Not only because shame is a “public emotion” but 
because the public and dialogical context is a necessary component of  the 
catharsis, through what I call “outreach elenchus”,  i.e. the public act of  
purification, which I have already described in its essential features in the section 
devoted to that topic.  
Therefore, Socrates, his interlocutors and the audience form a group: to 
understand this aspect we must remember that the audience of  the Socratic 
dialogues is not a generic set of  listeners, but a very specific audience that 
Socrates wants to influence using the instrument of  the outreach elenchus to 
trigger an extended elenchus. The audience is composed of  the Athenian 
intelligentsia, a group that has a great weight in the political constitution of  
morals and customs. As claimed by Williams, one does not depend on generic 
others, but only on a few others, those whose way of  judging is shared by the 
agent.30 The cognitive dynamic underlying the outreach elenchus is that of  an 
extended elenchus, which expresses the externalization of  mind and emotions. 
The fact that Socrates aims his method – albeit indirectly – at the audience 
enables us to grasp not only the embodiment of  knowledge, but mainly its 
external origin: by bouncing back the elenchus towards the interlocutor, the 
audience makes it more powerful. This process takes on not only a political and 
educational valence towards the audience, but also a cognitive and epistemic 
significance. It is a synergic process of  transformation of  both the subject and the 
environment. In particular, I would like to stress that this kind of  elenchus not 
only purifies the audience, but it affects also the interlocutors who are the object 
of  the confutation: it bounces back and obliges them to recognize the shame they 
had concealed. Socrates “uses” the interlocutors to ensure that the message he 
sends them - through the aporetic state experienced by Socrates himself  and by 
the interlocutor - goes back enhanced. 
Andy Clark  describes the cognitive process as “the actual local operations that 
                                                 
29 Clark, A. 2008. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
30 For an analysis of  these terms in Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium of  Plato, cf. De Luise, 
F. 2013. “Alcibiade e il morso di Socrate: un caso di coscienza”. Thaumàzein 1: 187-205. 
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realize certain forms of  human cognizing include inextricable tangles of  feedback, 
feed-forward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the 
boundaries of  brain, body and world”.31 The movement that I described 
previously, referring to the expansion of  circles on the water produced by a stone 
thrown in a pond, and to the trajectory of  a boomerang, which has the ability is 
to turn back and to hit an object without being thrown at it directly, should 
therefore be understood within this wide, circular process of  continuous entries 
and exits, intersections and links between the mind, the body and the world. 
Furthermore, the circularity of  this process is expressed by the movement of  the 
boomerang: aerodynamic forces generate a twisting moment that causes the 
‘gyroscope’ to proceed and to move on a circular path. 
Moreover, the emphasis on the cathartic connotation of  aporia within the 
paradigm of  extensive knowledge allows us to understand how such connotation 
does not imply a passive stance but defines an immediately active source of  
knowledge, reinforcing therefore the active externalism model. 
Therefore, the distinction between cathartic aporia and zetetic aporia we 
mentioned earlier,  referring to the interpretation of  Politis,  should be considered 
as an expression of  the strength of  aporia as a tool of  extended knowledge. Shame 
is generated and has effects in the “society of  dialogue”.32  
This emotional knowledge is realizable just in the shared and cathartic setting 
of  the drama. 
According to Aristotle, rhetoric favours working on logos in order to lead to 
the truth (representing a technique of  persuasion through logos) but, by doing 
this, it does not negate the possibility of  using the emotional dimension to 
influence the audience.33 
Moreover, Aristotle was the first to identify extended emotions in the practice 
of  dramatic catharsis and to point to its significance and value for society. He 
analysed the role of  tragedy in the theatre, showing that the tragic events in a 
play are acted out in the feelings of  the audience. The embodiment of  the 
emotions in the engagement of  the audience with the tragic plot becomes a 
deliberative corrective in the audience, balancing their feelings of  pity, anger and 
fear, in the light of  the conceived calamity. The Socratic elenchus is staged by 
Plato in performative settings, and is a carefully crafted counterpoise between 
arguments and feelings in social reasoning interactions. Both practices, as 
analysed by these great philosophers, give us profound understanding of  the 
interplay and mutual support of  emotions and reasoning resulting in knowledge 
and cognition. 
                                                 
31 Clark, A. 2007. “Curing Cognitive Hiccups: A Defense of  the Extended Mind”. The Journal of  
Philosophy, 104: 163-192, 164. 
32 Vidal-Naquet, P. 1990. La démocratie grecque vue d’ailleurs, Paris: Flammarion.  
33 Aristotle, Rhet., book II. 
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Conclusion 
 
At the core of  wisdom – which is the main purpose of  the Socratic practice and, 
therefore, needs to be understood as practical reasoning – there are emotions, seen 
as forces capable of  directing actions towards the good of  the individual and of  
the context in which he operates.34 Nevertheless, we should not think that only 
“positive” emotions can be a source of  improvement in personal and collective life. 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate, as an outcome which is secondary to 
the one referring to the extended elenchus, how “negative” aspects of  shame and 
the aporetic state may acquire a positive meaning insofar as they enable us to 
transform our unquestioned knowledge of  reality.  Notably, the most effective 
form of  purification for human knowledge is accessible in a dialogic context, in a 
situation which implies relations with others. In this perspective the extended 
elenchus takes shape  within a conception of  extended cognition, where a primary 
role is played by collective emotions. In fact, the elenchus is the main strategy of  
the Socratic dialogue, which – albeit often unfolding as a dialogue between two 
individuals – implies also the presence of  listeners who serve as source and 
receptacle for the process of  purification. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In the trolley case, an individual is faced with killing one man in order to save five equally 
innocent people. This philosophical conundrum pits deontology (do not murder) against 
utilitarianism (saving lives). Numerous non-libertarian commentators have weighed in on this 
challenge. The present paper offers a libertarian analysis of this case. 
 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
Murder, rights, deontology, utilitarianism. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Foot (1967, 1) discusses “the driver of a runaway tram which he can only steer 
from one narrow track on to another; five men are working on one track and one 
man on the other; anyone on the track he enters is bound to be killed.” 
Another classic statement of the trolley challenge reads as follows (Thomson, 
1976, 206):  
 
David is a great transplant surgeon.  Five of his patients need new parts – one 
needs a heart, the others need, respectively, liver, stomach, spleen, and spinal 
cord – but all are of the same, relatively rare, blood-type.  By chance, David 
learns of a healthy specimen with that very blood-type.  David can take the 
healthy specimen’s parts, killing him, and install them in his patients, saving 
them.  Or he can refrain from taking the healthy specimen’s parts, letting his 
patients die. 
 
If David may not even choose to cut up one where five will thereby be saved, 
surely what people who say “Killing is worse than letting die” mean by it must be 
right! 
On the other hand, there is a lovely, nasty difficulty which confronts us at this 
point.  Philippa Foot says2 – and seems right to say- that it is permissible for 
Edward, in the following case, to kill: 
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(5) Edward is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed.  On the 
track ahead of him are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not be 
able to get off the track in time.  The track has a spur leading off to the right, 
and Edward can turn the trolley onto it.  Unfortunately there is one person on 
the right-hand track.  Edward can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can 
refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five. 
 
If what people who say “Killing is worse than letting die” mean by it is true, 
how is it that Edward may choose to turn that trolley? 
Killing and letting die apart, in fact, it’s a lovely, nasty difficulty:  why is it 
that Edward may turn that trolley to save his five, but David may not cut up his 
healthy specimen to save his five?  I like to call this the trolley problem, in honor 
of Mrs. Foot’s example. 
The philosophers usually credited with plagueing us with this challenge are 
Foot, 1967; and Thomson, 1976, 1985. Since then there have been literally 
hundreds of discussions of this issue. But not a one of them has been written from 
a libertarian perspective. The contribution of the present paper is to offer a 
distinctively libertarian analysis of the trolley problem. 
We do well, then, to at least briefly discuss this particular political economic 
philosophy (Rothbard, 1998; Hoppe 1989, 1993; Huebert, 2010; Kinsella, 1992, 
1996). Libertarianism is not a theory of law, nor is it an analysis of rights, nor, 
yet, ethics. Rather, it is an attempt to discern what the proper law should be; an 
analysis of the just use of violence. As a first approximation, there is the non-
aggression principle (NAP). According to this axiom of libertarianism, it should be 
legal for a person to do whatever he wants to do,1 provided, only, that he refrain 
from initiating aggressive violence against anyone else and his legitimately owned 
property.  Libertarianism does not say people should adhere to the NAP; that it 
would be right for them to do so. It only maintains that if they do not so restrict 
themselvs, they are in violation of libertarian law. But that is merely a first 
approximation. At bottom, libertarianism is a theory of what constitutes just 
punishment2 for law breakers. 
                                                 
1 With his own person and justly owned property, based on homesteading (Block, 1990, 2002A, 
2002B; Block and Edelstein, 2012; Block and Yeatts, 1999-2000; Block vs Epstein, 2005; 
Bylund, 2005, 2012; Grotius, 1625; Hoppe, 1993, 2011; Kinsella, 2003, 2006; Locke, 1948; Paul, 
1987; Pufendorf, 1673; Rothbard, 1973, 32; Rozeff, 2005; Watner, 1982) and legitimate title 
transfer (Nozick, 1974) 
2 In the view of Rothbard (1998, p. 88, ft. 6): “It should be evident that our theory of 
proportional punishment—that people may be punished by losing their rights to the extent 
that they have invaded the rights of others—is frankly a retributive theory of punishment, a 
‘tooth (or two teeth) for a tooth’ theory. Retribution is in bad repute among philosophers, who 
generally dismiss the concept quickly as ‘primitive’ or ‘barbaric’ and then race on to a 
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It is only the first approximation of libertarianism to aver: do not violate 
rights. The more sophisticated version, is that libt is a theory of punishment: if 
you violate rights, we punish you in thus and such a manner. 
This is in sharp contrast to the non libertarians who have tried to wrestle with 
the trolley challenge. For example, states Thomson (1976, 204, emphasis added): 
“Alfred kills his wife out of a desire for her death. Bert lets his wife die out of a 
desire for her death. But what Bert does is surely every bit as bad as what Alfred 
does. So killing isn’t worse than letting die.” Note that this philosopher is not 
concerned with proper law, and punishment, use of violence against, criminals. 
Rather, she, like so many others (Unger, 1992, 1996; Kamm, 1989; Barcalow, 
2007; Singer, 2005; Mikhail, 2007; Norcross, 2008; Otsuka, 2008; Hauser, et al, 
2007), focuses on the good and the bad, the bad and the worse, what people should 
do and refrain from doing. It cannot be denied that of course there is a strong 
overlap between these two different concerns, but it is the divergences that 
distinguish the libertarian analysis of the trolley case from that of all others. 
One more element of libertarianism. In this view, there is no such thing as 
positive rights. There are only negative rights (Block, 1986; Gordon, 2004; Katz, 
undated; Long, 1993; Mercer, 2001; Rothbard, 1982; Selick, 2014). A right implies 
an obligation. If Smith has a (negative) right not to be murdered, raped, robbed, 
then everyone else has a negative obligation not to murder, rape or rob him. It is 
incumbent upon all others to refrain from initiating violence against him. If Smith 
has a (positive) right to food, clothing and shelter, then all other people have a 
positive obligation to give him these goods. But, if so, then their own negative 
rights to their private property will have been violated. 
We are now in a position to shed some light on the issue of killing an innocent 
person on the one hand, and letting him die on the other. Under the libertarian 
code, the former would be considered murder, and punished severely. However, 
allowing someone to die, standing idly by while another person perishes, would 
not be considered a crime. Now, it may not be nice to do so, it may not be moral 
or ethical to fail to come to the aid of a potential victim, but, qua libertarianism, 
that is not, cannot be, our concern. Rather, we focus, very narrowly, on whether 
or not an NAP violation, an uninvited (personal) border crossing has taken place, 
and, if so, what violent repercussion would be justified. 
Pinker (2011, 328) states: “Most of us agree that it is ethically permissible to 
divert a runaway trolley that threatens to kill five people onto a side track where 
it would kill only one. But suppose it were a hundred million lives one could save 
                                                                                                                                                                  
discussion of the two other major theories of punishment: deterrence and rehabilitation. But 
simply to dismiss a concept as ‘barbaric’ can hardly suffice; after all, it is possible that in this 
case, the ‘barbarians’ hit on a concept that was superior to the more modern creeds.” See also 
Block, 1999, 2002-2003, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2009A, 2009B; Block, Barnett and 
Callahan, 2005; Gregory and Block, 2007; Kinsella, 1996; Morris, 1968; Olson, 1979; Rothbard, 
1998, 88; Whitehead and Block, 2003 
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by diverting the trolley, or a billion, or ─ projecting into the indefinite future ─ 
infinitely many. How many people would it be permissible to sacrifice to attain 
that infinite good? A few million can seem like a pretty good bargain.” 
What is the libertarian analysis of someone who diverts the trolley from its 
present track where it will kill, say, a billion people, and onto a path where it will 
murder a single individual? Utilitarians would speak out as one: such an act would 
be justified, since it would save one billion minus one lives.  Most commentators 
would agree.3 
But things are different for the libertarian. The diverter of the trolley is a 
murderer. We must not lose sight of this primordial fact. As such, he must be 
punished to the full extent of the law. And what, pray tell, is the full extent of the 
law? His life is forfeit, since he took someone else’s life. However, if the heirs of 
the victim, all of them, all five billion of them, forgive this murderer his crime, 
then and only then may he go free. But if even one of these heirs wants to impose 
the death penalty of our savior of five billion lives, he has the right to insist upon 
this punishment.4 
This brings us to the libertarian concentration camp guard (Block, 2009). Here 
is the situation. All such criminals must murder 100 innocent Jews, gypsies, 
blacks, gays, other non Ayrians, per day. However, we posit that a libertarian 
guard can get away with murdering only 90 victims daily. If he goes below this 
figure, say, to a mere 89 or fewer murders, he will be found out, and himself 
summarily executed. Of course, our liberrtarian hero engages in this dangerous 
pursuit not to murder 90 people daily, but rather to save 10, who, we posit, would 
perish were it not for his admirable5 and courageous acts. A week goes by, the war 
is over, and our libertarian murderer is in the dock at the Nuremberg trial. He has 
murdered 630 people, but saved 70. Should he be put to death for his evil deeds? 
Yes, unless all of the heirs of the 630 victims agree to forgive him his tresspasses. 
Our hero may plead with these people: “I wish I could have saved your parent, 
your child, your spouse, but I could not. I could only save 10 people per day. That 
is why I embarked upon this dangerous acts of mine. If I had saved even as few as 
one more person daily, I would have been discovered, and prevented from saving 
                                                 
3 Thomson (1976, 206) states: “Edward may turn that trolley to save his five (people, at the cost 
of one life).” If so, she would certainly favor saving a billion people even though one innocent 
man must be murdered. 
4 However, some of us will hold a ticker tape parade in honor of this murderer, and pin a big 
medal on this chest before the execution. After all, he is a hero. He lives, we may suppose, in a 
libertarian society and full well knows the penalty for murder: execution. Yet, he engaged in 
this heroic murder in order to save the lives of five billion people. We cannot do this qua 
libertarian, since this very narrow philosophy admits of no such actions. But, we can do this as 
decent human beings. 
5 We say this not qua libertarian, which, we insist, is a very narrow philosophy, concerned only 
with justified punishment for criminal behavior. See Block 2001B, 2002, 2003B, 2004, 2006 
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any more victims of Nazi oppression.” Whether or not he prevails, he desserves, 
once again, a medal, a parade in his honor, and the thanks of all civilized people. 
In order to further highlight the differences on the Trolley question between a 
libertarian and members of other philosophical traditions, I offer my responses to 
a popular query on this subject 
(http://www.philosophyexperiments.com/fatman/). My responses are in italics. 
 
 
II. Should You Kill the Fat Man? Preliminary Questions 
 
This activity is a treatment of some of the issues thrown up by a thought 
experiment called ‘The Trolley Problem’, which was first outlined by the 
philosopher Philippa Foot, and then developed by Judith Jarvis Thomson and 
others. But before we start properly, we need to ask you four preliminary 
questions so we get a sense of the way that you think about morality. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Just select the option that most corresponds to your view. 
 
Question 1: Torture, as a matter of principle, is always morally wrong. 
I answered no. As a libertarian, I have no views on this. No, I go further. Qua 
libertarian, I am precluded from having an opinion on this vital issue. Because it 
asks about morality, and libertarianism, in sharp contrast, deals only with what 
the law should be. So, I can only answer as a citizen, as a moralist. I can think of 
cases where it would be justified. For example, if the criminal tortured a victim, it 
would be just, under the libertarian code, to torture him back. 
Question 2: The morality of an action is determined by whether, compared to 
the other available options, it maximises the sum total of happiness of all the 
people affected by it. 
I responded in the negative to this one, too. Not because I have strong views 
about morality; I don’t. I answered in this way because utilitarianism turns me 
off, and this sounded pretty utilitarian to me. 
 
Question 3: It is always, and everywhere, wrong to cause another person’s 
death - assuming they wish to stay alive - if this outcome is avoidable. 
This one, too, got a thumbs down from me. Again, as a libertarian, I know of 
nothing “wrong” except that which violates the NAP. But, surely, given that the 
death penalty is justified, and as a libertarian I maintain it is (Block, 2006), it 
would be justified to execute a murderer, even assuming he wished to stay alive. 
 
Question 4: If you can save the lives of innocent people without reducing the 
sum total of human happiness, and without putting your own life at risk, you are 
morally obliged to do so. 
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I responded positively to this question, since in my own vision of morality, it 
would be immoral not to save someone’s life if I could do so with trivial cost to 
myself. However, speaking as a libertarian, I would oppose laws requiring that we 
give aid to each other, as this would be a positive obligation, and libertarians 
support only negative rights. 
 
Next question: 
Should You Kill the Fat Man? - The Scenarios 
You will now be presented with four different scenarios to test your moral 
intuitions against the answers you gave to the first four questions. 
 
The Runaway Train (Scenario 1 of 4) 
The brakes of the train that Casey Jones is driving have just failed. There are 
five people on the track ahead of the train. There is no way that they can get off 
the track before the train hits them. The track has a siding leading off to the right, 
and Casey can hit a button to direct the train onto it. Unfortunately, there is one 
person stuck on the siding. Casey can turn the train, killing one person; or he can 
allow the train to continue onwards, killing five people. 
Should he turn the train (1 dead); or should he allow it to keep going (5 dead)? 
Turn the Train 
Allow the Train to Keep Going 
I do not know what Jones “should” do. I do know that if he turns the train he 
is a murderer, if he allows it to keep going he is not. Based on the analysis offered 
above, if he turns the train to save four lives, he fits the bill of “heroic murderer. I 
had to answer, otherwise I couldn’t finish the quiz, so I filled in “turn the train,” 
making him into a heroic murderer. 
I was then presented with the following: 
Interesting. you do not believe there is any general moral requirement to 
maximise the happiness of the greatest number of people, yet you think that 
Casey Jones ought to divert the train. There’s no contradiction here, but it would 
be interesting to know what thoughts motivated your decision. For now, though, 
let’s see what you make of the scenario below. 
 
The Fat Man on the Bridge (Scenario 2 of 4) 
 
Marty Bakerman is on a footbridge above the train tracks. He can see that the 
train approaching the bridge is out of control, and that it is going to hit five 
people who are stuck on the track just past the bridge. The only way to stop the 
train is to drop a heavy weight into its path. The only available heavy enough 
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weight is a (very) fat man, who is also watching the train from the footbridge. 
Marty can push the fat man onto the track into the path of the train, which will 
kill him but save the five people already on the track; or he can allow the train to 
continue on its way, which will mean that the five will die. 
Should he push the fat man onto the track (1 dead); or allow the train to 
continue (5 dead)? 
Push the fat man onto the track 
Allow the train to continue   Please make a choice! 
I voted for pushing the fat man onto the track, so as to make Bakerman, also, 
into a heroic murderer. I might as well be consistent, I thought. But, I could as 
easily have gone the other way, if I wanted to reduce the incidence of murder. 
 
Next, I was presented with the following: 
 
That’s an interesting response. Previous research has indicated that most 
people disagree with you that it would be right to push the fat man off the bridge 
into the path of the train. However, your response is certainly consistent with 
your claim that Casey Jones should divert the runaway train so that it only kills 
one person rather than five. However, as before, there is a puzzle in that you do 
not think there is any general moral requirement to maximise happiness, which 
makes the reason why you think it is justified to kill the fat man to save five 
people unclear. Perhaps your response to the scenario below will help to clarify 
your thinking here. 
 
The Saboteur (Scenario 3 of 4) 
 
Okay so this scenario is identical to the preceding scenario but with one crucial 
difference. This time Marty Bakerman knows with absolute certainty that the fat 
man on the bridge is responsible for the failure the train’s brakes: upset by train 
fare increases, he sabotaged the brakes with the intention of causing an accident. 
As before, the only way to stop the train and save the lives of the five people 
already on the track is to push the fat saboteur off the bridge into the path of the 
train. 
Should Marty push the fat saboteur onto the track (1 dead); or allow the train 
to continue (5 dead)? 
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Push the fat saboteur onto the track 
Allow the train to continue   Please make a choice! 
I elected to shove fatty onto the track; he richly deserved to die, as he was a 
murderer. And, if this could save five innocent people, that is even better.  
Whereupon, I was presented with this material: 
 
Your belief that the right thing to do is to throw the saboteur off the bridge is 
not surprising given your previous response that it would be right to throw an 
‘innocent’ (fat) man off the bridge if it had the effect of saving five people. We 
noted a tension in your earlier response in that it wasn’t clear why you thought it 
justified to kill the innocent man given that you do not think there is any general 
moral requirement to maximise happiness. However, this tension is less 
pronounced this time around, since presumably thoughts to do with culpability 
are part of the moral calculus in deciding whether it is justified to throw the 
saboteur off the bridge. It is possible that similar thoughts about culpability will 
be a part of how you think about the scenario below. 
 
The Fat Man and the Ticking Bomb (Scenario 4 of 4) 
 
The fat man, having avoided being thrown in front of the runaway train, has 
been arrested, and is now in police custody. He states that he has hidden a nuclear 
device in a major urban centre, which has been primed to explode in 24 hours 
time. The following things are true: 
1. The bomb will explode in 24 hours time. 
2. It will kill a million people if it explodes. 
3. If bomb disposal experts get to the bomb before it explodes, there’s a chance 
it could be defused. 
4. The fat man cannot be tricked into revealing the location of the bomb, nor 
is it possible to appeal to his better nature, nor is it possible to persuade him that 
he was wrong to plant the bomb in the first place. 
5. If the fat man is tortured, then it is estimated there is a 75% chance that he 
will give up the bomb’s location. 
6. If the fat man does not reveal the location, the bomb will explode, and a 
million people will die: there is no other way of finding out where the bomb is 
located. 
Should the fat man be tortured in the hope that he will reveal the location of 
the nuclear device? 
The Trolley: a Libertarian Analysis 
 
245 
 
Yes, the fat man should be tortured 
No, the fat man should not be tortured   Please make a choice! 
 
I opined that yes, the fat man should be tortured. 
The reaction to my answers to this quiz was as follows: 
Should You Kill the Fat Man? - Analysis 1 
A Matter of Consistency 
 
The first thing to note is that your consistency score is 100%. This is higher 
than the average score for this test (where higher is better), which is 78%. 
It is often thought to be a good thing if one’s moral choices are governed by a 
small number of consistently applied moral principles. If this is not the case, then 
there is the worry that moral choices are essentially arbitrary - just a matter of 
intuition or making it up as you go along. Suppose, for example, you think it is 
justified to divert the train in the first scenario simply because it is the best way 
to maximise human happiness, but you do not think this justification applies in 
the case of the fat man on the bridge. The problem here is that unless you’re able 
to identify morally relevant differences between the two scenarios, then it isn’t 
clear what role the justification plays in the first case. Put simply, it seems that 
the justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for the moral judgement that it 
is right to divert the train. 
You’ve done better than average in this test, but now is not the time to rest on 
your laurels, because let’s face it, most people don’t think very clearly about 
morality. However, before you embark on any further study(!) we suggest you 
check out the next page of analysis. 
My reaction. Whoa, I am not sure that I like this even one tiny bit. If a non 
libertarian thinks I am logically consistent, perhaps I have erred somewhere along 
the line, for, as I say, there is a gigantic chasm between the thinking of those who 
favor, and oppose, the freedom philosophy. 
 
The next response of the quizmaster is this: 
The Trolley Problem  - Analysis 2  
The scenarios featured in this activity have been constructed to elicit 
contrasting intuitions about whether it is justified to end the life of one person in 
order to save the lives of some other greater number of people. 
Part of what is interesting here is what this tell us about consequentialist 
approaches to moral thinking. For example, straightforward utilitarianism, which 
holds that an act is morally right to the extent that it maximises the sum total of 
happiness of all the people affected by it (when compared to the other available 
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options), would seem to require an affirmative response to all the questions below. 
However, we know from previous research that such a consensus is unlikely. In 
particular, very few people tend to think that the fat man should be pushed off 
the bridge in order to save the lives of the five people stuck on the track. The fact 
that this option is so counterintuitive to so many people represents a significant 
challenge to straightforward utilitarian thinking. 
I am not sure of what to make of all of this, but I report it, just to be 
thorough. 
I opted to torture this fat pig of a man. This seems like a no brainer to me. 
Such an ogre deserves the most heinous punishment imaginable, and torture 
would appear to fit the bill. I resist the notion, however, that there is any 
“tension” in my answers. Yes, this is a reasonable position for a non-libertarian to 
take of an adherent of this position, but this is a two way street. I, too, see a 
“tension” in the mainstream view, not to say an utter contradiction, with the 
NAP. 
The point of this exercise is not to cast aspersions on the quiz. It is well 
thought out, and interesting. Rather, my goal here is to establish that there is 
rather a large chasm between the thinking of non libertarian philosophers, who, I 
assume, concocted this quiz, and libertarians such as myself, who fit into this 
model as do round pegs into square holes or vice versa. 
When asked about morality, I chose to call the heroic murderer “moral.” I 
could have easily gone the other way around, since I have no strong views on 
ethics or morals. (I only have an established perspective on what the law should 
be: to punish murderers, heroic or not, unless forgiven for their crimes). If I had 
indicated this, I suspect, my opinion would not have been characterized as 100% 
consistent by the non-libertarian creator of this quiz. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
The problem of the selfhas recently regained a wide interest in the philosophical panorama. The 
need to rethink the agent has then encouraged the rediscovery of Ancient Philosophy. Focusing 
on Aristotelian practical philosophy, this paper aims to demonstrate the intrinsic circularity 
existing between the agent and his context. To give evidence of this theory, it will be necessary 
to investigate the extensive concept of ethos, the meanings of which embrace both individual 
and collective dimension. Moreover, this itinerary through the Aristotelian thought will be the 
occasion for putting the rebirth of interest towards Ancient Philosophy into question. 
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Introduction 
“b” 
In the last decades the contemporary ethical scenario, especially in analytic 
philosophy, has renewed the debate about the self and the agency. The shared 
dissatisfaction towards the ethical perspectives, as P. Donatelli observes1, has led 
to the rediscovery and examination of the overshadowed dimension of the moral 
agent. 
In this discussion, the Aristotelian voice has been raised by many scholars 
(belonging mainly to the Virtue Ethics current), who have identified the Greek 
philosopher as a relevant source for rethinking the moral agent and for putting 
the coordinates of contemporary moral philosophy into question. Given this 
premise and background, the paper will develop the research hypothesis that to 
fully understand the moral agent we have to consider him as deeply linked to his 
context. In order to throw some light on this issue, the essay will engage the 
cardinal concept of ethos2 in the Aristotelian practical philosophy. In particular, it 
                                                          
1 Donatelli P., Il senso della virtù, Carocci, Roma, 2009. 
2 In this essay I will follow some simple and coherent rules for the transliteration from Greek to 
English. I will not be taking into account the differences between the vocals, such as epsilon and 
eta or omicron and omega; the two vocals’ couple will be transliterated with “e”, in the first case, 
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will attempt to analyze the relationship between its two essential meanings: 
individual ethos and collective ethos. While the first one states the agent’s character, 
the second one indicates the context, referring to shared values, habits and 
tradition. Collective ethos will then be named directly polis or context in the 
development of the paper, due to the plurality of the connotations involved.  
However, if the general aim is to determine the relationship between the two 
meanings of ethos, then the specific themes of the paper are two crossed subsets. 
The first aims to show how for Aristotle moral agent and polis are conceivable as 
poles existing only in their relationship. Whereas, the second sought subset wants 
to prove whether this approach is effective in front of some specific contemporary 
practical challenges. The intersection between these two parts is played by a 
transitional passage that shows the reasons for the rebirth of the Aristotelian 
praxis in the contemporary scenario. Coherently with its purpose, the paper is 
organized into three main sections: (1) the reconstruction of contemporary ethical 
demands; (2) the Aristotelian answer to the relationship between the part and the 
whole and (3) the test of its legitimacy and limits regarding contemporary ethical 
experience.  
Therefore, (1) the first part of the paper will focus on the contemporary ethical 
debate, by giving an account of what kind of contemporaneity is thought and why it 
has been chosen. In fact, due to the complexity and heterogeneity of the 
philosophical panorama, as previously mentioned the boundaries of the discussion 
will be circumscribed to a specific movement in the analytic philosophy, notably 
Virtue Ethics, and to some of its actors (such as A. Anscombe, A. MacIntyre, M. 
Slote). Thus, to satisfy this preliminary passage, it will be necessary to interrogate 
the reasons of Virtue Ethics and the main steps of the rediscovery of Aristotelian 
practical philosophy in this scenario. 
Following the research project, (2) the second part will be shaped on the 
concept of ethos as it emerges in Aristotle’s practical writings. As a matter of fact, 
its characteristic plurivocity is the key lecture for showing the circularity between 
individual ethos and the collective one. This draws the attention to two cornerstone 
ideas: (a) the character preformation and (b) the practical agent’s active 
contribution. In order to elucidate them, it will be necessary to study the problem 
of the character education by looking at the concept of virtue. First, I will briefly 
introduce (a) the passive phase, by showing how the polis influences the individual 
character. Thanks to the concepts of induced virtue it will be possible to emphasize 
the process of metabolization of habits and values. Thereafter, I will demonstrate 
how Aristotle conceives (b) the way an agent may modify or influence his context. 
Indeed, although Aristotle believes in the priority of the context/polis, he does not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
and “o”, in the second one. Moreover, the Greek vocal “u” will be transliterated with “y” (e.g. 
physis). 
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suppress a certain level of freedom for the agent. In this case, it will be necessary 
to examine the two meanings of practical reason in depth: the phronetical and the 
philosophical one. This will lead to the possible conclusion that the circularity 
between the individual ethos and the collective one cannot be defined as vicious, 
despite many scholars doing so. 
To conclude, (3) the essay will focus on the pertinence of the Aristotelian 
perspective in the contemporary debate. Due to this goal, the conclusive part will 
problematize one issue: the impasse of collective ethos. The purpose will be to verify 
whether at present the concept of collective ethos has become too reductive or 
whether it is still functional. In other words, the attempt will be to understand 
whether the collective ethos still offers interpretative tools to approach the ethical 
experience and, if it does not, it will be necessary to explain why. In this case, the 
core issue will be to understand if we are bearing witness to an explosion of forms 
of life, that is to say to a pluralization of the contexts involved in our experience. 
However, as mentioned, it is necessary to begin with the reconstruction of the 
contemporary philosophical background.  
 
 
1. The necessity of  a new approach and the rebirth of  Aristotelian practical philosophy 
 
As the introductory title anticipates, this chapter aims at reconstructing a 
particular horizon incontemporary philosophy, Virtue Ethics, where Aristotelian 
practical philosophy has been the object of study and served as a model. This 
statement immediately raises difficulties, because it does not reckon with the 
many different trajectories that cross Virtue Ethics. In effect, when we talk of this 
movement, we are easily tempted to read it as if it were strictly coherent and 
rigorous. Contrarily, all the philosophers3 who took part in it have developed some 
essential peculiarities and they would deserve a specific analysis. Some of them 
have probably distanced their ideas so far from that they can no longer be 
assimilated. However, even if it is impossible (and most likely not even necessary 
for our purpose) to abridge all of them in a single scenario, it is unobjectionable 
that there are some relevant early agreements. In fact, although their thoughts 
have been described as described heterogeneous and irreducible parabolas to each 
other, they have primarily moved from some considerable affinities. My present 
goal will be to investigate them and their reasons. 
To begin with, I would like to retrace the theoretical milieu that has 
encouraged the actualization of Aristotelian thought and of its cross concepts. The 
best way in order to do that is to understand its starting point. The analysis of 
two philosophers will support me in this operation: E. G. Anscombe and M. Slote. 
                                                          
3 I am thinking mostly of  MacIntyre A., Murdoch I., Anscombe G. E., Annas J. and Slote M.  
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Thanks to them, it will be possible to fully examine the ethical demand at the 
heart of the Aristotelian rebirth. By reading the Anscombe’s text, Modern Moral 
Philosophy, and Slote’s contribution, Virtue Ethics, we realize (a) that these 
authors raised their voices because of their dissatisfaction with contemporary 
moral philosophy and (b) that in Aristotle they found their favorite interlocutor 
because his philosophy offers a reliable alternative approach. 
 Let us start by taking a look at the analysis of the dissatisfaction with the way 
moral philosophy has been done in modern times and, especially, recently4 made by 
Slote. In particular, Slote’s claim is that the contemporary panorama is connoted 
by the struggle between two main ethical theories, on the one hand Kantian ethics 
or deontology and on the other Utilitarianism or Consequentialism. Slote remarks 
that neither of these approaches can give reason of the complexity of the ethical 
experience. As a consequence, according to Slote this shared unfitness legitimizes 
the assimilation of the two and, at the same time, promotes the revival of interest 
in ancient practical philosophy. Hence, the landscape of ethical debate has 
become re-articulated from two ways of thinking to three: Consequentialism and 
Kantian ethics, joined together, and Virtue Ethics, whose roots are generally in 
ancient philosophy and, especially, in Aristotle.  
 But Slote’s work also offers us a deeper key to understanding the 
interpretative battlefield, by explaining why Consequentialism and Kantian’s 
dyad are not able to completely satisfy the necessity of thinking the praxis. The 
reason lies in the dominant property that characterizes them: they are act-
focused, in the manner that they look for moral rules that are supposed to govern 
human actions5. According to Slote, this polarization of the action swallows up a 
fundamental part of morality, the one regarding the self and the moral agent. 
Conversely, Virtue Ethics is actually qualified for being agent-focused, that is to 
say that the focus is on the virtuous individual and on those inner traits, dispositions, 
and motives that qualify him as being virtuous6. So, Virtue Ethics is born exactly 
because of the necessity of rethinking the importance of the self, of the agent and 
of his entire characteristics, in contrast with the abstraction and the focus on 
action of the normative theories7. 
 However, the distance between these two lines of thought is marked not only 
by their main-focuses (act or agent), but also by their different ways of settling in 
the reality. On the one side, the Kantian/Utilitaristic approach privileges 
impersonality and objectivity, thanks to the support of an abstract and general 
parameter (whether it is the duty or the advantage is not important). Indeed, 
with this external principle they can guarantee an efficient and reliable way of 
                                                          
4 Slote M., Virtue ethics, in Three methods of  ethics, Wiley-Blackwell, 1997, p. 175. 
5 Ivi, p. 178. 
6 Ivi, p. 177. 
7 Donatelli P., Il senso della virtù, Introduction.  
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handling the experience. On the other side, Virtue Ethics demands a contextual or 
internal point of view. In this sense, the main problem is not the search for a 
criterion, but the analysis of how the agent is basically shaped by his form of life 
in order to become good. Now, the Aristotelian reference also becomes much 
clearer. As we will soon widely analyze, in Aristotelian practical philosophy, the 
character development necessarily takes place within the polis.  
To sum up, Slote’s principal contribution came in terms of a contraposition: 
the act-focus approach is grounded on an external point of view, while the agent-
focus approach is anchored on an internal one. Before continuing the analysis of 
the revival of practical philosophy it is important to bear in mind that the above-
seen contrast answers to the necessity of clarifying and that a “pure” approach 
does not exist. For example, imagining an absolute Kantian approach is useful in 
a descriptive perspective, but it is not realistic. In other words, it does not matter 
whether the focal center is the concept of duty, one of advantage or one of virtue: 
in the moral approach there is always an amalgam of different considerations 
working together.  
 Anyway, in these terms the importance of an internal point of view emerges 
for the first time with Anscombe. In her article, Modern Moral Philosophy, she 
denounces the stalemate of contemporary philosophy and she attacks 
contemporary normative philosophies. The reason of Anscombe’s account lies in 
their detachment from their background, where they were still valid. Talking 
about the contemporary approaches, she says that they are survivals, or derivatives 
from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics, which no longer generally survive, 
and are only harmful without it8. In this sense, the necessity of rethinking morality 
is born because of the disconnection between moral concepts and the consequent 
form of life, which concretely gives sense to them. Again, the answer is the 
rehabilitation of the Aristotelian conception of ethics and, in agreement with this 
different paradigm, the focus shifts from the duty and the action to the virtue and 
the agent’s character.  
 But, Anscombe’s analysis, based on the importance of the form of life, also 
highlights another latent root of Virtue Ethics: Wittgenstein and, especially, his 
late writing, Philosophical Investigations. This clarification reveals that the 
perception of dissatisfaction, which moves Virtue Ethics, is not a unicum and it is 
also shared with other authors, who find their roots in Wittgenstein’s works and 
in his fundamental idea of form of life9. If on the one side there are Anscombe, 
                                                          
8 Anscombe G.E.M., Modern Moral Philosophy, “Philosophy” XXXIII, 1958,pp. 1- 19, quote 
from p. 1. 
9 See Donatelli P. in Reshaping Ethics after Wittgenstein, in Wittgenstein-Studien, Band 4/2013: 
“I’d like to mention here the views held by authors such as Anscombe, Murdoch, Cavell and 
Diamond. They criticize, in very different ways, a significant line in modern and contemporary 
moral philosophy, which has depicted moral thought as the operation of  a few concepts cut off  
from the life form where they have place”, p. 224. Moreover, see Donatelli P. in the introduction 
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MacIntyre and other philosophers, who belong to Virtue Ethics and look at 
Aristotle as a model, then on the other there are some, such as S. Cavell and C. 
Diamond, who present themselves as a reliable alternative to Virtue Ethics. 
Although they share the same need to rethink ethics (and, above all the category 
of the self) beyond the limits of the moral ought conception and they do it by 
moving from the same claim of the form of life, the similar aim is pursued from 
different perspectives. In fact, the shared importance of the conceptual context as 
backdrop of moral life leaves room to a considerable distance, caused by the idea 
of “constitutive nature”. According to Anscombe’s account, virtues have to be 
inferred through the discovery of “natural” characteristics, that define what is 
truly human. This renewed naturalistic hypothesis supports then the assumption 
that the moral concepts of the Virtue Ethics are still valid, since they are stably 
based on human nature, while the morality of ought is temporarily attached to a 
particular form of life. The reference to a constitutive human nature is also the 
reason why Anscombe looks for a paradigm in ancient philosophy (e.g. in 
Aristotelian Practical Philosophy10), while Diamond and Cavell refute this option. 
Indeed, they have attempted to overcome the boundaries of a morality reduced to 
the ought not by referring to some proper human functions, but by focusing on the 
historical and dynamic density of moral concepts.  
 As a result, given this general framework, the real problem is not whether 
moral philosophy should be rethought or not, but how to perform this operation, 
in what direction and with which basis. It is for this reason that testing the 
efficacy of Virtue Ethics becomes even more important as well as remembering 
that the same philosophical necessity and root have produced at least two 
alternatives.  
 To recall the cardinal points, Virtue Ethics is a moral approach that can be 
interpreted as a laboratory for rethinking the praxis and it is qualified by two 
traits, inherited from the Aristotelian perspective and integrated with some 
contemporary philosophy contributions: (1) the problem of the self and of the 
virtuous character and (2) the inalienable contextual dimension. These two 
elements are inextricably shaped together. So, what matters above all, even more 
than their single exams, is always their relationship.  
But now, after having rebuilt the contemporary philosophical scenario and 
having outlined the main features of Virtue Ethics, it is time to inquire directly 
practical philosophy and to analyze Aristotle’s account of the relationship 
between the agent and the context.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
to Diamond C., L’immaginazione e la vita morale, edited by Donatelli P., Carocci, Roma, 2006. 
However, the reconstruction of  this contemporary framework is actually far more complex, 
since it also includes also a third interpretive line, Williams B., not reducible to the here 
instituted contraposition. 
10 The issue of  what kind of  “naturalism” we can talk about in Aristotelian Practical 
Philosophy will be problematized in the following pages.  
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2. Aristotle and the different meanings of  ethos  
 
a. The character preformation: from the collective ethos to the individual one  
 
As stated above, the scope of this second section is the study of the 
interactions between the different meanings of ethos in Aristotle. The supposition 
is that through a path in practical philosophy their necessary co-implication will 
be demonstrated.  
 However, preliminarily it is essential to make some methodological remarks. 
In fact, though the main book reference is surely Nicomachean Ethics, if we 
consider Aristotelian practical philosophy as a prism whose faces show different 
perspective of the same figure, it becomes evident that we also have to include the 
analysis developed in other practical works, such as Eudemian Ethics andPolitics. 
As a matter of fact, all these works have a common theme, which is the praxis, or 
better the eu-praxia, approached from different points of view and priorities. 
Moreover, it is always because of the continuity of contents, that it is impossible 
to elude the centrality of another treatise, De Anima, whose topic is the cardinal 
concept of the soul (psyche). In fact, a proper study of the eudaimonistic goal 
needs to broaden the horizon to the Aristotelian psychology and also to the 
metaphysics, since they both provide the coordinates for the analysis11. Always 
following the figurative representation, we could imagine a Cartesian plane whose 
axes are respectively Aristotelian metaphysics and psychology and whose point of 
intersection coincides with the prism of practical philosophy with all its sides. 
Thanks to this synoptic perspective, it will become clear that when we talk about 
a single concept we are at the same time engaging all the connected concepts (e.g. 
the concept of ethos is necessarily linked with those of psyche, of physis, of polis and 
of phronesis). Every concept is completely integrated in a network, giving a 
meaning to it. This principle is essential because it will play the role of evaluative 
parameter in the last section of the paper, being aimed at testing the pertinence of 
this point of view in contemporary ethics. Indeed, the result of this coordination 
of concepts is that they only make sense when kept together, therefore they may 
                                                          
11 Irwin T. H. proceeds exactly in this direction, in The metaphysical and psychological basis of  
Aristotle’s ethics, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, edited by Rorty A. O., University of  California 
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980. Irwin wants to prove the point that sectorial and self-
sufficient interpretation of  the Aristotelian’s writings is unsatisfactory, while it is more 
productive to imagine them as intersections of  a more complex texture. Moreover, it is 
important to remind that Aristotelian psychology is far from an anthropological reduction, 
since the concept of  psyche embraces all the living things. About the metaphysical coordinates 
of  practical philosophy, the last Book is paradigmatic, the chapters from VI to VIII and the 
problem of  the “human condition”. 
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be unacceptable singularly. If there is a significant critical point of the present 
analysis, it is probably caused by this necessary co-implication of concepts.  
 But the above-outlined synoptic principle is the reason why if we want to 
engage in the issue of the reciprocal influences among the two ethos forms, we have 
to also address our interest to the virtue theory. This expression refers to the 
process of learning, training and practice of the political12 virtue. This clarification 
of the political dimension is necessary since Aristotle makes a distinction between 
the “natural” virtue (physike arete) and the virtue “in the full sense” (kyria)13. 
Following the philosopher’s remarks, we shall turn our attention to the second 
meaning, which from now on will simply be called virtue. The reason behind the 
minimization of the natural roots of the virtue is that Aristotle refuses to qualify 
his ethics as a simple form of naturalism14. That means that his ethical perspective 
does not imply a natural exercise of dynameis, capacities, but a canalization of 
them towards ton agathon (the good). Nevertheless, although the agent cannot be 
naturally moral, since ethics needs a detachment from simple naturalness, the 
interpretation of character as a “second nature” is sustainable. This is only one of 
the paradoxes of practical philosophy that will be dissolved in the next pages, like 
the one concerning the new form of automatism generated by the acquisition of 
this second nature. Barely outlined now, these themes will be widened below.  
                                                          
12 Here and in all the paper political will be used in an etymological sense; so, it is directly 
connected with the dimension of  the polis, not “simply” with the political horizon, as we are 
used to believe now.  
13 The unique definition of  character we have is in Eudemian Ethics, Inwood B. and Woolf  
Raphael (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2013 (Book II, 1220 b 1) and is imbalanced towards 
the natural virtue. However, in Nicomachean Ethics we witness an understatement of  the 
natural virtue importance and a strengthening of  habituation process. The reconstruction of  
the confutation of  the natural virtue inNicomachean Ethics and its reasons are exposed in La 
catena delle cause, determinismo e antideterminismo nel pensiero antico e contemporaneo, edited by 
Natali C. and Maso S., Hakkert, Amsterdam, 2005. Another fundamental reference is Abitudine 
e saggezza. Aristotele dall’Etica Eudemia all’Etica Nicomachea, Donini P., Edizioni dell’Orso, 
Alessandria, 2014. In this book Donini explains the differences between the Eudemian Ethics 
and the Nicomachean Ethics analyzing their chronology, and proving the anteriority of  the 
Eudemian,. In fact, while in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle emphasizes the natural foundation 
of  virtue, in the Nicomachean Ethics he focuses on the metabolization of  habits. Donini then 
retraces the cause of  this turn and of  this deeper analysis of  the habituation process on the 
influence played by Plato’s Laws on Aristotle. 
14 Nicomachean Ethics, translated with Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle, 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975, Book II, 1103 a 15 ff.: “an ethical virtue is acquired by 
habituation (ethos), as it indicated by the name ‘ethical’, which varies slightly from the name 
‘ethos’. From this fact it is also clear that none of  the ethical virtues arises in us by nature [at 
birth], for no thing which exists by nature can be changes into something else by habituation 
(…) Hence virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature; but by our nature we 
can receive them and perfect them by habituation”. 
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 However, what exactly is the thread that connects the relationship between 
individual ethos and collective ethos with virtue in practical philosophy? To 
understand it, let me turn to the first cornerstone idea: the preformation of 
character or the habit-forming process. With these two equivalent expressions I 
mean the way collective ethos shape and educate the practical agent. This is 
synthesizable by the concept of induced virtue, which is functional to this analysis 
for two reasons: (a) it creates an initial hierarchy between the forms of ethos in 
favor of the collective one and (b) it demands us to give reasons on how the virtue is 
induced.  
 First, we assumed that from Aristotle’s account the polis is responsible for 
character habituation through paideia, education. This point of view is clearly 
supported by the continuity existing between Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. As 
it emerges from Nicomachen Ethics, Book I, the goal of politics is the highest good 
and politics takes the greatest care in making the citizens of a certain quality, i.e., good 
and disposed to noble actions (praktikoi ton kalon)15. This institutes a direct 
correspondence between the polis and the possibilities for the agent of practicing16 
the human end, which is the eudaimonia17. The programmatic declaration of 
intent recurs not only at the beginning of the logoi18, in Book I and II, but also at 
the end, in Book X.In this sense, the Aristotelian logoi create circularity, where 
the end of the course confirms the beginning. What matters is that in these 
passages Aristotle explains why virtuous attitude can grow only at the political 
level and introduce the problem of how the polis generates this metabolization. Let 
us try to summarize the Aristotelian argumentation, with references to the afore-
mentioned books: 
 
(1) The objective of  practical philosophy is the highest good, the human 
flourishing, which is defined as a virtuous activity19. This definition shifts the 
problem from the highest good to the assimilation of  virtues; 
                                                          
15 Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1099 b 30 – 31. 
16 The purpose of  these logoi is as well the action: “since the end of  such discussions is not 
knowledge but action”, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1095 a 5- 6. 
17 “ Accanto dunque alla concezione della polis come territorio abitato da comunità di liberi 
cittadini, la polis assumeva nel mondo greco anche il ruolo di comunità civica, la quale offriva, 
essa sola, al cittadino la possibilità di vivere bene e di esprimere e realizzare compiutamente se 
stesso, ed è in quest’ultima accezione del termine che la polis viene considerata da Aristotele” 
Salis R. in La polis tra filosofia e storia nel primo libro della Politica di Aristotele, p. 122, in 
Aristotele e la storia, edited by Rossitto C., Coppola A. and Biasutti F., Cleup, Padova, 2013. 
18 For an analysis of  the function of  the Aristotelian logoi, see Bodéüs R., Le philosophe et la cité. 
Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans la pensée d’Aristote, Paris, Les Belles 
Lettres, 1982. 
19 “Then the good for a man turns out to be an activity of  the soul according to virtue, and if  
the virtues are many, then according to the best and most complete virtue” The Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book I, 1098 a 16 – 18. 
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(2) the virtue is a habit (hexis) and it is acquired by acting in a virtuous 
way20, so it is crucial to acquire the right habit as soon as possible21. This is the 
scope of  the polis; 
(3) the polis promotes the virtuous habits with the good forms of  
government, constitutions and the coercive force of  laws22. In order to do that, the 
politician has to study the human soul , because by ‘human virtue’ we mean not 
that of  the body but that of  the soul, for it is of  the soul , too, that happiness is 
stated by us to be an activity. If  such be the case, it is clear that a statesman 
should understand in some way the attributes of  the soul23. 
 
The importance assigned by Aristotle to the polis and to its legislative process, 
connected with the educational purpose, is exemplified by the rôle éminemment 
éducatif qui la fin de l’Ethique à Nicomaque fait jouer à la loi politique instituée par 
le nomothète24. Indeed, as R. Bodéüs demonstrated25, Nicomachean Ethics is a 
                                                          
20 Ivi, Book II, 1105 b 20 ff., paragraph IV. Here Aristotle qualifies virtue as a hexis and shows 
the difference between habits, powers and feelings.  
21 Ivi, Book II, “For it is by making citizens acquire certain habits that legislators make them 
good, and this is what every legislator wishes, but legislators who do not do this well are making 
a mistake; and good government differs from bad government in this respect. Again, it is from 
the same actions and because of  the same actions that every virtue comes into being or is 
destroyed, and similarly with every art (…) In short, it is by similar activities that habits are 
developed in men; and in view of  this, the activities in which med are engaged should be of  [the 
right] quality, for the kinds of  habits which develop follow the corresponding differences in 
those activities. So in acquiring a habit it makes no small difference whether we are acting in 
one way or in the contrary way right form our early youth; it makes a great difference, or rather 
all the difference” 1103 b 3 ff. 
22 Ivi, Book II, “For it is by making citizens acquire certain habits that legislators make them 
good, and this is what every legislator wishes, but legislators who do not do this well are making 
a mistake; and good government differs from bad government in this respect. Again, it is from 
the same actions and because of  the same actions that every virtue comes into being or is 
destroyed, and similarly with every art (…) In short, it is by similar activities that habits are 
developed in men; and in view of  this, the activities in which med are engaged should be of  [the 
right] quality, for the kinds of  habits which develop follow the corresponding differences in 
those activities. So in acquiring a habit it makes no small difference whether we are acting in 
one way or in the contrary way right form our early youth; it makes a great difference, or rather 
all the difference” 1103 b 3 ff. 
23 Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1102 a 9 ff.  
24 Rodrigo P., Aristote et les choses humaines, avec une appendice sur la politique stoïcienne, préface 
Aubenque P., Ousia, Bruxelles, 1998, p. 37. The last lines of  the Nicomachean Ethics completely 
support this interpretation and directly open to the Politics: “since our predecessors left the 
subject of  lawging without scrutiny, perhaps it is better if  we make a greater effort to examine 
it, and especially the subject concerning constitution in general, so that we may complete as 
best as we can the philosophy concerning human affairs. First, then, let us try to go over those 
parts which have been stated well by our predecessors, then form the constitutions we have 
collected let us investigate what kinds of  things tend to preserve or destroy the states or each of  
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course whose conceived audience is mainly made by scholars and politicians, 
namely the nomothetês. Thus, the emphasis Aristotle puts on these figures and on 
their particular functions allows us to distinguish two specific correlated aims of 
the Nicomachean Ethics: the political purpose, or the education of the educators26, 
and the spiritual one, or the transformation of the self.  
Now, after having summarized the Aristotelian argument, we should attempt 
to grasp more precisely how this metabolization happens. Even though we said 
that the political education is the preferential channel in order to acquire virtues, 
we did not specify how it works, while Aristotle reconstructs this passage. The 
philosopher’s account is that we acquire habits mainly thanks to an emotional 
education. This implies that above all in the earlier stages27 the good man’s 
development seems to devalue the cognitive and rational dimension and to appeal 
mainly to the emotional one. As a consequence, this draws the attention to the 
role of emotions (or passions, which both translate the Greek word pathos) in the 
habituation process and to the problem of being properly affected. Aristotle’s 
claim is that:  
 
Thus ethical virtue is concerned with pleasure and pains: for we do what is bad 
for the sake pleasure, and we abstain from doing what is noble because of the 
pain. In view of this, we should be brought up from our early youth in such a 
way as to enjoy and be pained by the things we should, as Plato says, for this 
is the right education. Again, since virtues are concerned with actions and 
passions, and since every action and every passion is accompanied by pleasure 
or pain, then for this reason, too, virtues would be concerned with pleasures 
and pains. (…) We assume, then, that such virtue is concerned with pleasures 
and pains and disposes us to do what is best, while vice disposes us to do the 
contrary.28 
 
 But what is the connection between virtues/vices, desire, passions and 
pleasure/pain? In fact, what actually characterizes and qualifies the Aristotelian 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the forms of  government and why some states are well while others are badly administered; for, 
after having investigated these matters, perhaps we would also be in a better position to 
perceive what form of  government should be ordered, and what laws and customs each should 
use. So let us start to discuss these”, 1181 b 13 ff.  
25 See Bodéüs R., Le philosophe et la cité. Recherches sur les rapports entre morale et politique dans 
la pensée d’Aristote. 
26 Expression borrowed from Bien G., La filosofia politica di Aristotele, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000. 
27 About the earlier stages of  education, it is paradigmatic the study of  Burnyeat M. F.in 
Aristotle on Learning to Be Good, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, pp. 69-92. “A wide range of  
desires and feelings are shaping patterns of  motivation and response in a person well before he 
comes to a reasoned outlook on his life as a whole, and certainly before he integrates the 
reflective consciousness with his actual behavior”, p. 70.  
28 Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, 1104 b ff.  
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account is the effort made to give reason of this dynamic rigorously and to justify 
it coherently with the other parts of his work. So, first, I will briefly demonstrate 
the connection between virtues/vices, passions and pleasure/pain, omitting for the 
moment how desire takes part in this process. From this point of view, we know 
that in the Aristotelian theory virtue is a hexis (habit or disposition). We also 
know that the philosopher describes habits as those qualities in virtue of which we 
are well or badly disposed with reference to the corresponding feelings29. Thanks to this 
definition it is possible to connect and, at the same time, maintain distinct virtues 
and feelings. Moreover, this leads us to shift the focus from virtue to feelings (or 
passions), identified as whatever is accompanied by pleasure or pain30. So, if the polis 
wants to promote an effective educational aim, it has to recognize pleasure and 
pain as the load-bearing axes in the early habituation stage.  
 However, we are still missing the conjunction among feelings and behavior, 
which I will now elucidate thanks to the concept of desire. For this reason, in 
order to completely understand this dynamic we have to also include Aristotelian 
psychology, especially the passage exposed in De Anima, Book III, chapter 7. 
Here the philosopher institutes a correspondence between feelings (or better, 
pleasure and pain) and desire (orexis)31. The sensitive faculty and the appetitive 
one entail each other, since when we feel pleasure we pursue and when we feel pain 
we avoid. So, though the sensitive function and the appetitive one are logically 
and physically different, they strictly cooperate together.  
This rapid reconstruction of the intersections between all these concepts says 
something more about the Aristotelian action theory32, especially about the role of 
desire. As Aristotle asserts,appetency (orexis) is the major cause of locomotion: 
 
Both these, then, are causes of locomotion, intelligence and appetency. By 
intelligence we mean that which calculates the mean to an end, that is, the 
practical intellect, which differs from the speculative intellect by the end at 
which it aims. Appetency, too, is directed to some end in every case: for that 
which is the end of desire is the starting point of the practical intellect, and the 
last stage in this process of thought is the starting point of action. Hence there 
is good reason for the view that these two are the causes of motion, appetency 
and practical thought. For it is the object of appetency, which causes motion; 
and the reason why, thought causes motion is that the object of appetency is 
the starting point of thought. (…) But, as a matter of fact, intellect is not 
                                                          
29 Ivi, Book II, 1105 b 27-28. 
30 Ivi, Book II, 1105 b 23. 
31 De Anima, edited by Hicks R. D., Cambridge University Press, 1990, Book III, 7, 431 a 8 ff.  
32 Because of  the lack of  space it will not be possible here to analyze the criterions of  
responsibility (or better, the voluntary actions/virtues), that is one of  the more important 
contributions of  the Aristotelian action theory. However, as is known, the text reference is Book 
III, Nicomachean Ethics. 
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found to cause motion apart from appetency. For rational wish is appetency; 
and, when anyone is moved in accordance with reason, he is also moved 
according to rational wish. But appetency may move a man in opposition to 
reason, for concupiscence is a species of appetency.33 
 
 As this quotation underlines, appetency has a greater influence than practical 
thought. Consequently if desire is the cause of actions (praxeis), it is as well the 
cause of virtues, because of the connection existing between actions and virtue. To 
cast some light on this circularity, we acquire virtues through the reiteration of 
actions, and the acquired virtue guarantees some stability to the agent’s behavior 
and some reliability to his character (that is to say, to his future actions). 
Nonetheless, we should make two considerations about the habituation 
process: (1) the rediscovery of the role of desire as a revolution, not as a tyranny 
and (2) the “natural” boundaries of the induced virtue. Focusing on these two 
considerations is also the turning point from the first part to the second part of 
the section dedicated to Aristotelian practical philosophy.  
 First, because of the extraordinary attention directed to the key role of 
appetency in action we could talk of a desire revolution. In contrast with an 
intellectualistic prejudice, Aristotle valorizes the primacy of desire over practical 
reason. A further evidence of this inversion of importance between practical 
reason and desire is the case of akrasia, known also as the Medea principle34. 
Indeed, the incontinence is described as a conflict engaging what we know we 
should do (which means the cognitive perception of a specific situation) and what 
we would like to do (which means the influence of passions in that context) 
resolved by the priority of desire35. In contrast to Plato’s account36, Aristotle 
conceives the hiatus between reason and desire as plausible and believes that the 
strength of the first is not sufficient to assert itself. The reason is that even if the 
intellect issues the order and the understanding bids us avoid or pursue something, still 
we are not thereby moved to act: on the contrary, action is determined by desire; in the 
case, for instance, of the incontinent man.37 In a hypothetical scale showing the 
weight of the action components, the emotional side would clearly turn out to be 
                                                          
33 De Anima, III, 10, 433 a 13 ff.  
34 Definition given by Davidson D. in Paradoxes of  irrationality, in Philosophical essays on Freud, 
Cambridge Editions Wollheim D. R. et Hopkins J., 1982, p. 294. 
35 This characterization of  akrasia corresponds to the strict incontinent action, described by Mele 
A. R. in Irrationality: An essay on Akrasia, self-deception and self-control, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1987. The strict incontinent action is defined as an “incontinent action 
against a consciously held better judgment about something to be done here and now”, p.7. 
According to Mele, this is the typical kind of  incontinence studied and its features are that it 
is free and intentional.  
36 The reference is to the Platonic writing, Protagoras, and, in particular, to the passages 351 a – 
358 d. 
37 De Anima, Book III, 433 a.  
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predominant. However, it may be objected that the question concerning the 
action and the hierarchy between the rational sphere and the emotional one is 
actually far more complicated than that claimed by the “desire revolution”. The 
main risk is that the deconstruction and the invalidation of a picture of human 
nature based on a rational prejudice gives room to a new tyranny, one of feelings 
and desire. The phenomenon of weakness of willing always testifies the danger 
involved in this perspective, since it shows the consequences of being guided by 
appetency in contrast with reason or, generally speaking, the danger of a conflict 
between the plural components of actions. Indeed, when the akratic man is faced 
with a choice between two chains of actions, he experiences an internal conflict 
caused by these different tensions, and because of the lack of harmony he can not 
behave virtuously. But this remark leads us to the analysis of the practical 
reasons.  
 
b. The double meaning of  practical reason: from individual ethos to the collective 
one 
   
Therefore, the importance given to the akratic phenomenon is a proof of the 
Aristotelian awareness of the risks hidden behind this revolution. Consequently, 
the hypothesis is that in practical philosophy we can talk of a morally virtuous 
action only in presence of the conjunction between intellect and desire. In absence 
of a reevaluation of the role of intellect, virtue would be an exclusive prerogative 
of desire and Aristotle could be assimilated to Hume and the emotivists38. For this 
reason, it is possible to read many passages from Nicomachean Ethics to try to 
throw light on the dangers of this new form of extremism and to mitigate it. In 
particular, Aristotle makes some interesting remarks about the necessity of 
harmonizing the distance between reason and desire when he introduces the 
crucial problem of the principle of action, decision (proairesis) in central Book VI. 
On this occasion, Aristotle affirms that: 
 
now virtue of character is a state that decides; and decision is a 
deliberative desire. If, then, the decision is excellent, the reason must be true 
and the desire correct, so that what reason asserts is that desire pursues. (…) 
But the function of what thinks about action is truth agreeing with correct 
desire.39 
 
                                                          
38 As Sorabji R. says in Aristotle and the Role of  Intellect in Virtue, in Essay’s on Aristotle’s 
Ethics, p. 209. 
39 Nicomachean Ethics, translated with Introduction, Notes and Glossary by Irwin T., Hackett 
Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997, Book VI, 1139 a 22 – 26. In this case, I have preferred 
Irwin’s edition because of  the translation of  proairesis with decision. 
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This definition ties the acquisition and the practice of virtue to the agreement 
and the proportion between reason and desire: what reason asserts is that desire 
pursues. But Aristotle goes further. Not only is decision the source of motion and 
the above-outlined dyad the source of choice, but also decision is either 
understanding combined with desire or desire combined with thought, and this is the 
sort of principle that a human being is40. As a result, the necessity of an agreement is 
directly required by the human composite soul and all the other states are above 
or below the human condition. Concerning the conditions beyond the truly human 
one, the beginning of Book VII is paradigmatic, since it offers a complete 
overview of the human possibilities41. Indeed, here Aristotle talks about six kinds 
of states. If we exclude virtues and vices, which are both a hexis requiring the 
explained agreement, four different states are left. Our attention is drawn to two 
of them, brutality and the divine or heroic virtue42, because they represent the 
negative and the positive extremes. Otherwise stated, brutality and the divine 
virtue identify the possible developmental directions beyond ta anthropina, the 
human affairs. On the other hand, the remaining two are the already-seen akrasia, 
incontinence, and its opposite, continence. Whereas the first couple synthesizes 
the extreme options, the last one embodies the condition of oi polloi, the many. In 
fact, Aristotle states that the virtuous man is one who has harmonious thoughts, 
who desires the same things with respect to every part of the soul43, while the majority 
of men are in conflict with themselves, as the incontinent case proves44. So, not 
only is Aristotle well aware of the complexity of the agreement between reason 
and desire, but he is also conscious that the virtuous condition concretely concerns 
only a minority in the polis.  
 The intrinsic difficulty of acting virtuously legitimates the controversial 
characterization of semi-utopian. On the one hand, it is a form of utopia, because it 
requires the correct education and the correct complete moral development; in 
this sense, only a few people can actually promote this kind of care of self. On the 
other hand, it is semi-utopian since Aristotle still leaves room for the perfectionism 
of the self, both in political and philosophical dimensions. In fact, the recognition 
of an unattained higher condition and the consequent work on oneself to realize it 
(or, at least, to get close) are the warranty of a continuous improvement towards 
the moral development. Thus, the self-realization is a concrete possibility, even 
though extremely difficult. Moreover, if until now the doubts affected mostly the 
                                                          
40 Ivi, 1139 b 4 – 6. 
41 Nicomachean Ethics, translated with Commentaries and Glossary by Hippocrates G. Apostle, 
Book VII, 1045 a 15 – 24. 
42 If  we want to clearly identify divine life or virtue, we should think of  Book X of  
Nicomachean Ethics, chapter VI – VIII, where Aristotle introduces the bios theoretikos and the 
human tension toward divine life. 
43 Nicomachean Ethics, Book IX, 1166 a 14 – 15. 
44 Ivi, 1166 b 7 – 8. 
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agent and the practicability of the virtuous attitude, because of the complexity of 
intertwined elements, it is important to note that the doubts also touch the 
correlated concept, the polis. As a matter of fact, Aristotle is well aware that there 
could be polis whose constitutions (politeia) do not incentivize the moral 
development, or, what is worse, they concretely do not allow it. From this point of 
view, the Aristotelian account rather than being descriptive of a concrete 
condition, it is indicative of a tension towards the realization of the intrinsically 
connected aims, as well as the political and the individual. In this sense, 
Aristotelian practical philosophy is not naively optimistic or anchored in an irenic 
imagination of reality. But the confutation of a simplified interpretation of 
practical philosophy could be clarified through a deeper analysis of the concept of 
practical intellect and of its role.  
 The renewed importance of reason clearly unveils itself if we consider the 
formalization of the chain of reasoning, the practical syllogism45. First of all, in 
order to best capitalize this tool, we should briefly recall the structure of a 
practical syllogism, that could be schematized like that: 
 
MaPX-Y 
MiP Z-X 
Con Z-Y46  
 
Moreover, an example will make this schema more intelligible: 
 
MaP: To not get wet when it rains (X) it is important to be in good health (Y); 
MiP: To carry an umbrella (Z) is a way not to get wet when it rains (X); 
Con: You should carry an umbrella when it rains (Z) to be in good health (Y). 
 
What is relevant in our analysis is the exam of the different functions played 
by each concept andtheir interactions with each other. Concerning the major term 
(Y), thanks to the analysis in Eudemian Ethics, we know that no one decides on an 
end, but rather on what contributes to the end (…) for example no one decides to be 
healthy (…) nor to be happy47. So, according to Aristotle, the goal is not the result 
                                                          
45 A careful examination of  Aristotle’s concept of  practical syllogism is offered by Natali C., La 
saggezza di Aristotele, Bibliopolis, Napoli, 1989, especially chapter IV. 
46 Where MaP identifies the major premise, MiP indicates minor premise and Con identifies the 
conclusion, the syllogism’s outcome, that is an action. Moreover, we have to distinguish: 
a) The major term (Y), which indicates the end (telos) that in the practical syllogism is ton 
agathon/eudaimonia; 
b) the minor term (Z), which is the efficient cause whose end is the major term; 
c) the middle term (X), which is a specification of  the general goal relative to a particular 
kairos and connects the other two terms.  
47 Eudemian Ethics, Book II, 1226 a 6 – 10. 
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of reasoning or choice. But the philosopher goes further and shows that the end of 
the MaP is composed by the couple of opinion (doxa) and desire (orexis)48, which 
means the recognition of a good habit linked to the above-seen dynamic of 
pleasure and pain. Thus, the end of the practical syllogism is the result of 
metabolization and ethismos49, as induced virtue explained. However, because of its 
indeterminacy the MaP is inactive (e.g. human flourishing and to be in good 
health are still abstract concepts). Due to this passiveness and inactivity, the 
middle term (not to get wet) plays a key role in concretely re-determining the end (to 
be in good health) in the particular situation (when it rains) and, by doing that, in 
connecting the MaP with the conclusion. But this passage is still not enough, since 
we are missing what the agent actually does in order to realize the specification of 
the general end. And that is where the minor term (to carry an umbrella) 
intervenes. As it emerges from the scheme, the minor term is actually the course of 
action deliberated for achieving the general goal, after having specified it. 
However, the cooperation between middle and minor term is still unclear. That is 
why we have to focus on the MiP, since it is the place where they are joint 
together. Again, it is only through the balance of reason and desire that the agent 
can make choices, since the decision is a deliberational desire for things that depend 
on us50 (in fact, e.g. the weather does not depend on us). The latter implies the 
transmission of desire, conveyed from Y to X, the specification of the general 
agathon, and the role of practical wisdom, which allows us to identify the best 
action model. Finally, we arrive at the study of the concept of practical reason, 
phronesis, the function of which has always engaged Aristotelian scholars51. They 
are mainly polarized into two perspectives: one that considers phronesis as the 
search (zetesis) for the ways to reach the goal, whereas the other one sees phronesis 
as directly involved with the definition of the goal52. However, E. Berti has 
offered a different interpretation, which goes beyond the polarization described 
above. According to Berti we should read practical wisdom as being differently 
involved in both. As a matter of fact, phronesis firstly has to recognize the goal53, 
                                                          
48 Ivi, Book II, paragraph X. 
49 In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle directly recognizes the polis as the responsible of  this 
habituation: “hence the good itself  would be this: the goal of  all that is achievable by human 
action. This is what falls under the science that has authority over all sciences; this science is 
politics and household management and wisdom”, Book I, 1218 b 13 ff. By ethismos we mean the 
process of  social transmission of  behavioral patterns, through rewards and punishments, as Natali 
defined it in La saggezza di Aristotele, p. 163. 
50 Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, 1113 a 12. 
51 In fact, Bodéüs has coined the expression l’irritante querelle des exégèts to talk about the 
debate that has gone through the XX century about the role of  phronesis in practical 
philosophy.  
52 The two interpretative lines respectively are well represented by Aubenque P. and Gauthier R. 
53 Berti E., Nuovi studi aristotelici vol. III, Filosofia pratica, Morcelliana, Brescia, 2008, chapter 
3, Phronesis et science politique, pp. 39 – 59, paragraph 2, La phronesis et son objet, pp. 47–51. 
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and only after the acknowledgement of ton agathon (which is the result of the 
habituation process) is it possible for one to decide on how to achieve it. Thus, this 
necessary recognition is what distinguishes phronesis from cleverness (deinotes)54, 
that is conceived as a form of instrumental reason that calculates the ways to 
achieve any goal (no matter if right or wrong). In this sense, even though practical 
wisdom does not deliberate about the telos55 nor does it call it into question, its 
function is not simply the choice of the best chain of actions addressed to any end. 
Its fundamental premise is ton agathon, the good end (to recall the previous 
example, the first step is the acknowledgement of health (Y) as a good to be 
pursued). 
These initial considerations about phronesis lead us to the second point, called 
the “natural” boundaries of the induced virtue. Indeed, it is important to remind 
ourselves that the induced virtue defines an “embryonic moment” that should be 
overcome. If it is true that political education is fundamental, since it represents 
the first stage in moral development, it is also true that habituation is not 
sufficient to make men virtuous, when this also implies autonomy, in the sense of 
being able to self-exercise practical reason. In other words, two elements work in 
synergy for eupraxia: intellect and character56. If character at the beginning is the 
outcome of the induced virtue and of the polis’ work, intellect, on the other hand, is 
always particular and requires the active contribution of the agent. And that is 
exactly the role of phronesis, since it is the intellectual virtue letting the agent 
deliberate about the possible course of actions.  
But, allow me to make some remarks about phronesis and its personification, 
the phronimos. We could start from the incarnation of practical reason. The 
phronimos is an agent who shares the common opinion of the highest good, thanks 
to habituation, and who knows how to achieve it in the situation, thanks to the 
exercise of phronesis. The constant combination of these two features makes the 
phronimos a behavioral model, since the measure of each thing is virtue or a good 
man as such57. But this figure is problematic. Or better, it is, as we remarked for 
the aims of Aristotelian practical philosophy, a semi-utopia. In this case, its main 
problem is the unity of virtue: as J. Annas said, if we acquired a hexis, we should 
                                                          
54 Nicomachean Ethics, Book, VI, 1144 a 24 -29.  
55 And it would not be possible, since we cannot deliberate about things that could not be 
otherwise, as Aristotle states in Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, 1141 b 8 ff. : “prudence, on the 
other hand, is concerned with things which are human and objects of  deliberation; for we 
maintain that the function of  a prudent man is especially this, to deliberate well, and no one 
deliberates about invariable things or about things not having an end which is a good attainable 
by action”. 
56 Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, 1139 a 31 – 1139 b 6. 
57 Ivi, Book X, 1176 a 16 – 17. The distance between the virtuous man, the excellent, and oi 
polloi is stated in Book III, 1113 a 25 – 1113 b 2. 
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be able to acquire all, since the link is the exercise of phronesis58. Thus, according 
to Annas’ analysis, the complete wise-man, in possession of all the virtues, is a 
normative ideal, while we could talk of the concrete phronimos as a continuous 
“approximation”, getting closer and closer to the ideal paradigm. 
The second consideration directly aims at the characteristics of practical 
intellect. We could explain it by introducing two metaphorical pictures, often used 
among Aristotelian scholars in order to better represent the moral developmental 
dynamic: the athlete and the student59.In both cases, there is a fundamental 
initial training, where the athlete and the student are taught the skills that they 
will be able to practice, and then a moment of autonomous application. For 
instance, when you learn to play the piano, first you have to learn the 
fundamentals and the technique. Only at a later date you will be able to play 
more difficult compositions or to extemporize. In this case, assimilation goes 
through the repetition and recognition of the developed skills. That is why you 
will be able to use it and you will be persuaded of their goodness. The combination 
of repetition and recognition moreover generates a form of automatism, which 
allows the definition of virtues, and more generally of character, as “second 
nature”. To understand this statement, the example of the athlete is perfect: as a 
matter of fact, the spontaneous and graceful movement made by athletes looks 
natural, and one could almost think that no effort is required. So, the result of the 
training is that the athlete or the student does not have to concentrate on what to 
do or how to do it all the time, thanks to the long repetition of the movement and 
to the acknowledgement of its reasons. As a consequence, the metabolization 
makes the thought and the resulting action immediate and natural. But the 
automatism, induced by lifelong repetition, generates the action naturally, so only 
a new metabolization can modify it. The concept of second nature should be now 
clearer: a developed character which is spontaneous and intuitive, but not 
impulsive. If we think of the practical syllogism, it means that the cardinal 
passage of the transmission of desire and of the practice of phronesis (MiP) 
becomes an automatism. 
All these remarks about the chain of practical reasoning and the role of 
phronesis provoke two related questions: 
 
1) How many chains of  actions does phronesis really consider and practice? 
                                                          
58 Annas J, The morality of  happiness, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995. 
59 See Annas J., The intelligent virtue, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. Moreover, it has to 
be recognized that one of  these figures is primarily Aristotelian, since the philosopher talks 
about the athlete in order to explain the existing connection between activities and character in 
Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, 1114 a: “for it is particular activities which produce men of  a 
certain kind. This is clear in the case of  those who train themselves for any contest or action; for 
they are constantly active”. In addition, the student, as it has been said at the beginning, is the 
ideal audience of  these logoi. 
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Does it really leave room for different chains of  actions or do we follow some 
already fixed behavioral patterns? 
2) Does Aristotle imagine any form of  criticism of  the politically accepted 
end? If  yes, what is it and how does it work, since we know that by the end 
practical wisdom, although concerned,does not deliberate upon it? 
 
The first question could be posed in two different ways: on the one hand it 
concerns the reliability of character, on the other hand it implies a form of 
character determinism. The two interpretations differ from the weight of the 
automatism seen above. While the first reads the mechanism as an assurance of 
character stability, the second one interprets it like a “prison of the 
character”60.The supporters of the first interpretation, like Annas and Burnyeat61, 
affirm that character positively conditions future actions, since ethos is a 
compound of virtues, being stable habits acquired through repetition. That is the 
previously announced circularity between hexeis and praxeis. The problem is to 
understand whether training and metabolization can enrich our possibilities or if 
they produce some standardized and predictable patterns. In other words, what is 
at stake is the chance of acting differently from how we are supposed to do 
according to our ethos. Otherwise, there is a risk one might fall into what has been 
called the “prison of character”, since the habit would become too strong and 
inevitably influence praxeis. This problem has been perfectly analyzed by P. 
Donini, who states that 
 
il possesso di un carattere formato, qualificato da abiti stabili, consente 
dunque a un agente di rispondere correttamente nel modo richiesto dalla 
situazioni che gli si presentano, anche senza calcolare e deliberare intorno ad 
ogni parola e a ogni azione: ma gli abiti e il carattere comportano una sorta di 
automatismo nelle risposte anche in un altro senso: escludono, cioè, di per sé la 
possibilità di dar corsa a un’intera serie di azioni.62  
 
This concern for character crystallization finds some coherent remarks in the 
Aristotelian text, especially when Aristotle recognizes that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to change an ethos once it has been acquired. The main reference is the 
debate about the alcoholic, who could have avoided drunkenness but did not, or 
                                                          
60 Donini P., Ethos, Aristotele e il determinismo, Edizioni dell’Orso, Torino, 1989. 
61 Annas J., The morality of  happiness, and Burnyeat M. F., Aristotle on learning to be good in 
Essays on Aristotle’s ethics, pp. 69-72. 
62 Donini P., Ethos, Aristotele e il determinismo, p.79 and Abitudine e saggezza. Aristotele dall’Etica 
Eudemia all’Etica Nicomachea, chapter IV, Unidirezionalità degli abiti e posizione del fine, pp. 
91–137.  
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the one, who became ill because of his way of life63. In both cases, their activities 
produced the stable negative state and the consequence is that a sick person will 
not become healthy by merely wishing to become healthy64. Again in Book V, Aristotle 
states that a habit does not leave room for opposite actions due to its tendency, 
such as from healthy only healthy things are done and not both contraries65. However, 
it is true that Aristotle contemplates also the reversibility of ethos when he talks of 
friendship, or better when he faces equally the corruption and the improvement of 
a virtuous character. In both cases, the shared question is if the character 
involution66 or the superiority in virtue67 justifies or not the rupture of friendship. 
As it is evident, the problem generated by character automatism cannot be 
determined easily and Aristotle offers no decisive help in answering this question. 
Anyhow, it is needless to say: in all the considered situations representing cases of 
practical wisdom, the general end is never discussed. For instance, who can bring 
the choice of playing the piano or of learning a language into question and how? 
According to Aristotle’s account, the same student cannot do that for two reasons. 
First, he is persuaded of its activity, which means that he has absorbed the right 
motivations68. Second, the practical reason, as it has been described till now, does 
not consider such a possibility. Although simplified, this example directly leads to 
the second point, namely the eventual critic of the telos, the goal. We could now 
explain this problem by going back to the formal presentation of the practical 
syllogism. In the MaP, we saw that the highest good is never actually brought 
into question and it is the outcome of orexis plus doxa. As already remarked, it is 
accepted due to the habituation process and practical reason (MiP) is active in all 
its concrete specifications, in the kairos (given by the middle term). For this 
reason, phronesis is fully immanent or, in other words, never separated from the 
shared telos. Like that, all solutions and courses of action are always within the 
possibilities offered by the collective ethos. This sort of finalistic dogmatism could 
be highly dangerous, in particular because it inhibits any form of criticism. The 
intrinsically negative potentialities of an immanent practical reason becomes clear 
if we consider some paroxysmal examples: just imagine living in a context or form 
                                                          
63 Both the examples come from Nicomachean Ethics Book III, in the discussion about 
ignorance and responsible actions. 
64 Ivi, Book III, 1114 a 15 -16. 
65 Ivi, Book V, 1129 a 15. 
66 Ivi, Book IX, 1165 a 13 – 14: “again, if  one accepts another ad a friend, taking him as a good 
man, but the latter turns out to be evil and is regarded to be such, should he still be kept as a 
friend?” 
67 Ibidem, 1165 b 23 - 25: “but if  one friend were to remain the same while the other were to 
become better and far superior in virtue, should the latter treat the former as a friend, or should 
not?” 
68 If  you talk to an athlete or to a student of  music or in general to someone who has for long 
time practiced an activity, he would certainly be able to give you many good reasons for doing 
that action, such as, for instance, it is healthy or it makes you feel good. 
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of life where wealth or physical wellness respectively are considered the highest 
good and everything (such as the educational system or the welfare state) always 
tends to it. In both cases, the simple exercise of phronesis does not provide any 
kind of instruments to discuss those ends, and the phronimos would be the agent 
able of better performing them.  
This is potentially the aporetic climax of practical philosophy. And exactly 
here politike episteme intervenes, with its task of contesting and determining the 
telos69. In fact, this form of rationality aims at discussing the shared ends and at 
testing their contradictions through the dialectical method. To better understand 
how practical philosophy works, the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics is 
paradigmatic, where Aristotle discusses the different conceptions of eudaimonia 
and he shows the incongruity of the ways of life based only on pleasure, wealth 
and honor (edone, ploutos and time)70 with respect to the human soul. In fact, the 
concepts of the human psyche and its excellence, perfection71 are the basis of the 
confutation of these common opinions. Again, another opportunity to witness 
how politike episteme works are Books VIII and X, where Aristotle talks of 
friendship (philia). Also in this case, the philosopher proceeds dialectally and 
demonstrates that the central type of philia rather than being based on pleasure 
(dia to edu) and advantage (are dia ton chresimon) is dia ten areten72 (according to 
virtue, so to character).  
Moreover, thanks to these examples it is also possible to verify how far 
Aristotelian practical philosophy differs from the common sense. Indeed, on the 
one side, the recognition of bios theoretikos73 as the highest and most preferable 
way of life does not match the sensibility of the polis, that demands the political 
involvement typical of the bios praktikos74. On the other side, although we have 
seen how uncommon moral excellence is, the perfect form of friendship is 
characterized by being the one among good men, who have developed the virtuous 
ethos. In both cases, politike episteme radically puts common sense into question 
and proposes alternative ways. These do not exclude shared opinions (such as 
                                                          
69 One of  the clearest studies about the different meanings of  the practical reason is the already 
quoted work of  Berti E. Nuovi studi aristotelici vol. III, Filosofia pratica; especially chapters II, 
Ragione pratica e normatività in Aristotele, p.25-38 and chapter III, Phronesis et science politique, 
pp. 39-59. 
70 Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, chapter 2. 
71 Which in the Aristotelian vocabulary means the skill of  accomplishing its most important 
part. In the case of  the human soul, the highest function is the rational one, or better the bios 
theoretikos. 
72 The definition of  the highest kind of  friendship is in Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII. 
73 Ivi, Book I and Book X. 
74 Which is, after all, the proper human way of  life, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X. However, the 
conciliation of  the practical and contemplative lives is one of  the biggest issue of  the 
Nicomachean Ethics, played between an inclusive or exclusive interpretation. 
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pleasure, honor and wealth, or pleasure and advantage), but reallocate their 
importance in a wider perspective. 
In the light of this, the distinction between the two co-existing plans in 
practical philosophy can be summarized by this picture: phronesis focuses on how 
to exercise skills properly, while politike episteme pays attention to the purpose on 
its whole and it is guided by the understanding ofbasic human properties. In this 
sense, the practical philosopher is a cardinal figure in Aristotelian reflection, since 
it guarantees the existence of a critical circularity between the individual ethos and 
the collective one. Whereas the phronimos and phronesis show the immanent 
practice of reason, practical philosophy demonstrates that there is a reflective and 
transcendent movement towards the polis and its constitution anyway. Again, 
while the immanence of phronesis is typically conservative, since it finds its 
categories only inside the polis, the transcendence of politike episteme assures a 
form of transformation and of dynamism. This also enlightens a new figurative 
representation of their relationship: politike episteme is the compass whose variable 
and dynamic openness delimits the space of phronesis, all statically75 contained 
within the circumference. Here all the different variations of phronesis take 
place76, while politike episteme remains external. This graphical representation also 
gives reason of another fundamental Aristotelian idea, especially if compared with 
Plato’s point of view: the distinction between the roles of the philosopher and the 
politician. The first one influences politics at the base (in terms of drawing 
boundaries by defining the goal, telos), whereas the second one practices the 
political exercise concretely. These two figures are never overlapping, as regards 
the different functions.  
The importance of politike episteme emerges also by considering the 
contemporary interpretation of the Aristotelian practical philosophy. As a matter 
of fact, one shortcoming of many scholars, especially from the analytic scenario, 
has been to underestimate the role of practical philosophy, emphasizing only one 
kind of practical reason, phronesis. As Berti has shown, this has led to a 
misunderstanding of the different plans involved in the praxis, overestimating the 
                                                          
75 In this case, statically is not negatively qualified, since it is actually the right practice of  a 
specific function. All the concepts of  dynamism, transformation and conservationism rather 
than being the expression of  values’ judgment want to be a neutral description of  functions. 
76 As a matter of  fact, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle clearly distinguishes different 
practices of  phronesis: “both politics and prudence are the same disposition, but in essence they 
are not the same. Of  prudence concerned with the stat, the one which is architectonic is 
legislative, while the other which is concerned with particulars has the common name ‘political 
prudence’; and the latter is concerned with particular actions and deliberations, for a particular 
measure voted on is like an individual thing to be acted upon. (…) Prudence is thought to be 
concerned most of  all with matters relating to the person in whom it exists and with him only; 
and this disposition has the common name ‘prudence’. Of  the other kinds, one is financial 
management, another is law-giving, and a third is political, of  which one part is deliberative and 
the other judicial”, Book VI, 1141 b 24 – 35. 
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importance of phronesis. But the consideration of only a one-dimensional practical 
wisdom, merely endogenous, has had as a consequence a flattening of the agent on 
the context and an agent’s inability to dissociate himself from the values of life 
form. This problem becomes clear if we consider two examples, coming from 
authors who are influenced by this interpretation, J. Annas and A. MacIntyre. In 
Intelligent Virtue, Annas analyzes the case of someone who grew up in a slum. 
Annas' account is that the considered context radically compromises his 
possibilities of developing and practicing virtue77. At the same time, in After 
Virtue, MacIntyre seems to connect virtues mainly to the common morality, 
moving the goal of criticizing contemporary ethics to the background. Even if it is 
true that when MacIntyre values the role of tradition he is thinking of the 
problem of individualism78, his emphasis on the community and on its values 
apparently do not consider the possibility of refusing or redirecting that tradition. 
Although in MacIntyre’s account79 the importance of the interpretative 
framework does not entail neither a relativistic conception of values and truth, 
nor an exclusive interpretation of traditions (as if they could exist closed on 
themselves), his voice is functional to emphasize one of the possible risks caused 
by the understatement of the role of politike episteme. 
This rapid account of a misunderstanding of the Aristotelian view leads us to 
the last part of this paper, whose content refers directly to contemporary 
philosophy. Here I will approach the problem of the relationship between the 
agent and the context by trying to understand if the Aristotelian answer is still 
suitable for ethical experience. 
 
 
3. The pertinence of  an inactual thought for the contemporary debate 
 
To address this final topic, I would like to start from the above-mentioned 
problem of the imbalance in the relationship between the agent and the context, 
                                                          
77 In Annas’ thought it is important to remember that she distinguishes the difference between 
not being able of  virtue and not expecting virtue here, where the first case if  an error while the 
second is reasonable. That is why “we do not expect people raised on a garbage dumps outside a 
Third World megalopolis to be kind and generous in their everyday behavior, but this, I suggest, 
for the same kind of  reason that we do not expect them to play the piano or to do the 
crossword. Their environment has obviously lacked the opportunities to learn and to do these 
things, and because this is so obvious we do not assume that they are naturally unable to do 
them”, p. 31. 
78 MacIntyre A., After Virtue, University of  Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, third 
edition, 2007: “I inherit from the past of  my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of  
debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of  my life, 
my moral starting point. (…) This thought is likely to appear alien and even surprising from the 
standpoint of  modern individualism”, p. 220. 
79 Which is surely far more complicated than this brief  reconstruction.  
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as it has come to light thanks to previous references to Annas and MacIntyre. My 
purpose is to recall this aporia and to show that, if seen through the analysis made 
in the first part, an asset has paradoxically emerged.  
As already remarked, the impasse is created by the omission of the function of 
politike episteme. Once the task of practical philosophy is properly sharpened and 
the importance of transcendence has arisen, the role played by tradition and 
community still remains fundamental, but it is attenuated and specified. In these 
terms, phronesis and politike episteme co-operate and they can guarantee a 
bidirectional circularity between individual ethos and collective one. While 
phronesis proves the efficacy of the habituation process and of the individual 
responsibility, both within the polis’ perspective, politike episteme assures the 
reflective movement upon the polis itself. At the exact point where Virtue Ethics 
seems to produce a deadlock, it is possible to rediscover the complexity of 
Aristotelian practical philosophy, the main strength of which is the ability of 
weaving together complementary tensions. As just seen, the harmony between the 
constitutive belonging to an ethical substance, or the immanence of phronesis, and 
its necessary passing, or the transcendence of politke episteme, are all perfect 
examples of this peculiarity.  
The clarification of how all the different levels in practical philosophy imply 
each other revokes the evaluative principle introduced at the beginning, that is to 
say the coordination of concepts. As explained, each concept finds its sense in the 
network built by the relationship with others. The latter, meaning that if any 
concept is abstracted from the network, it loses its sense or its efficacy. For 
instance, the misunderstanding about the role of practical reason is the result of 
the overestimation of one concept, phronesis. But, allow me to establish another 
critical example, which has already been introduced many times: the desire 
revolution. Although it represents a fascinating acquisition in comparison with 
the rational prejudice that demonizes the importance of desire in the decision-
making process, as I have tried to explain we can talk of it only by accepting the 
premises of Aristotelian ethics and psychology. Otherwise, the concept of desire is 
excluded from the context where it becomes productive and it loses its 
demonstrative strength.  
From this point of view, we cannot look for an immediately implementable 
model in Aristotelian practical philosophy. In fact, a break has occurred between 
the modern conception of praxis and the ancient one; because of it, the cardinal 
concepts and their relationship have deeply changed80. An impracticable 
actualization of the whole train of thought, which is radically different from the 
contemporary one81, would be required to try to actualize one concept (e.g. desire).  
                                                          
80 This is the strong theory exposed by Chignola S. et Duso G. in Storia dei concetti e filosofia 
politica, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2008. 
81 A paradigmatic example is also the Aristotelian category of  agent. As a matter of  fact the 
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These remarks lead to the inactuality of Aristotelian practical philosophy and 
the necessity to respect its difference. This issue occupies the final part of the 
paper, which once again calls into question the relationship between individual 
ethos and collective ethos and introduces to the last and, probably, biggest problem. 
In fact, the concluding topic refers to the existence of one context or the explosion 
of the forms of life. This issue radically challenges the structure of the essay, since 
up to now I have focused on the connection between one agent and one life form 
(namely, the polis). The pluralization of the forms of life could jeopardize the 
thesis of the dynamic circularity between the two meanings of ethos, or could have 
to modify and extend it to this new input. In fact, the eventuality of considering 
many forms of life would confirm the inactuality of Aristotelian practical 
philosophy, which is based on a one-to-one relationship (the agent and the polis), 
and the impossibility to actualize it. To pursue this itinerary, first I will briefly 
draw a picture of what I mean by the pluralization of the contexts in contrast 
with the one-to-one connection, and then I will try to sum up some conclusive 
considerations. 
First of all, at the beginning of the paper I defined the collective ethos, with all 
its meanings, as the context or the polis. In this sense, the polis has been thought 
of as a singular and coherent reality, where different parts interact with each 
other. This interpretation is suggested and confirmed also by Aristotle, when in 
Politics he talks about the relationship between the whole and the parts and the 
primacy of the whole82. As a consequence, the relationship between the individual 
ethos and the collective one is bidirectional, initially imbalanced towards the polis 
but never vicious thanks to the roles of practical reason. But what is relevant at 
this point is that Aristotle rigidly establishes both practical agent and polis. 
Indeed, Aristotle is thinking of a precise polis, Athens, in contrast with the other 
polis and the Barbarians. Moreover, the philosopher is considering a specific 
agent, the free man, in contrast with all the other excluded categories (e.g. women 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
philosopher in his logoi, and generally in his philosophy, is thinking of  specific figure: the adult 
and free man in the polis. The evident consequence is that he is leaving out from this category 
many other figures that we are used to consider in it, such as women or children. I will come 
back soon on the issue of  polis dimension. 
82 See the Politics, Second Edition, University of  Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013, Book I, 1253 a 
18 ff.: “Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the 
whole is of  necessity prior to the part; for example, if  the whole body be destroyed, there will be 
no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of  a stone hand; for 
when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their working 
and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their 
proper quality, but only that they have the same name. The proof  that the state is a creation of  
nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and 
therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who 
has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of  
a state.” 
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or slaves). As a consequence, the match between the possible combinations is all 
played inside these two specific terms and it does not consider different kinds of 
agents or forms of life.  
To schematize it, we could imagine this kind of representation Xy, where 
X stands for the context (or the whole, or the polis), y for the agent, and the 
majuscule or minuscule indicates the balance of power between them. But this 
rigid bidirectional equivalence no longer fits our ethical experience, due to one 
main reason: the expansions of the contexts, or what C. Taylor has defined as the 
“nova effect”83. With this expression the Canadian philosopher indicates the 
pluralization of perspectives and the openness of different forms of life. 
Rethinking the figurative representation seen above, it becomes clear that the two 
parts of the equivalence no longer correspond to the ethical scenario. To begin 
with the first term of the relationship (X), instead of living within one context we 
now have to face the co-existence of many different ways of life. If in Aristotelian 
Practical Philosophy was acceptable to recognize a specific collective ethos (namely, 
the polis) as the reference frame, in the contemporary ethical horizon this strict 
identification is reductive. Not only the polis is not the current political 
dimension, but it has also been "substituted" by a multiplicity of co-existing 
contexts. In this sense, the texture composed by the forms of life seems to be 
thicker and more dynamic if compared to the case of the polis. To pass from one 
graphic representation to another, the supernova effect could be drawn as a 
stratification and intersection of many contextual levels, the directions and 
intensities of which are different. 
But in this perspective, the focal point of which is the bidirectional 
relationship between the two means of ethos, the pluralization of the frames of 
reference problematizes two main questions: 
 
1. Given that the basis of virtue are political, not natural, which grid of 
intelligibilityis prevalent in the character preformation? 
2. What happens to the correlative minor term (Y) of the equivalence? That is 
to say, what changes in the way we approach the issue of the agent? 
 
Regarding the grid of intelligibility, the question could be posed in this way: in 
Aristotelian Practical Philosophy the emphasis on the context corresponds to the 
early stage of the character habituation, when virtue is induced and the agent 
educated. In this sense, if the polis was responsible for the character habituation, 
who plays this role now and how? Let us consider an example: what mainly 
                                                          
83 Taylor C., A Secular Age, Harvard University Press, 2009. In particular, the chapter The 
Nova Effect, pp. 299-419. In that case, Taylor talks of  the nova effect in the context of  the 
secularization problem. From this paper point of  view, we will use that expression to identify 
the pluralization process. 
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characterizes our self-perception and identity? The sense of belonging to our city, 
to our country, to the European Union, to a certain conception of the European 
Union or to any other structure of society? What level actually prevails on the 
others and in which case, given that each one seems to be reasonable and 
acceptable? Consequently, if the concept of the form of life is modified or 
extended, also the agent has to be put into question (not to mention that the 
concept itself of an agent enlarged from the Aristotelian free adult man). From 
this point of view, the issue of the pluralization of collective ethos (X) radically 
involves the correlative term: the agent (y). Indeed, recalling the graphic 
representation of a stratification and an intersection of different contextual levels, 
the agent seems to discover himself as a changing segment that experiences and 
crosses some of them. Moreover, the pluralization of forms of life concerns not 
only the "passive" phase (so, the character preformation), but also the "active" 
one, since all the practices of practical reason are displayed through the 
constitutive reference to these complex stratification of contexts. As a matter of 
fact, a shared and recognized pattern of virtues is the premise for phronesis, for the 
consequent recognition of the phronimos and for the critical task of politike 
episteme. 
 It is unlikely that this is the right place to analyze and discuss in greater 
detail the depth of the problem of the pluralization of forms of life, that would 
deserve an independent and much wider analysis. However, what is interesting 
here is that the current ethical scenario seems to be more complex and articulated 
than the one described by Aristotle and this density is the cause of a new impasse. 
In fact, this stalemate is produced by the change in the definitions of the terms of 
agent and context, and, as a result, of their relationship itself.  
Now let me conclude by making some remarks, that will summarize the hot-
spots of the paper and will recall the above-seen issue. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As previously stated, I would like to conclude by briefly summing up some of the 
most relevant points emerged in the paper. They are principally two: (1) the 
intimate contiguity and bidirectionality between individual ethos and collective one 
and (2) the impasse of the distance and the solution of the contingence.  
The demonstration of the first theme has occupied all the initial section and 
has been encouraged by the reconstruction of the contemporary debate. First, 
thanks to Anscombe and Slote’s analysis, a window into Virtue Ethics and its 
reasons has been given. Then, the clarified necessity of rethinking the moral agent 
has supported the examination of practical philosophy, guided by the inclusive 
concept of ethos. An itinerary through a composite complex of Aristotelian 
writings (Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, Politics and De Anima) has led to 
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the conclusion that the relationship between the two meanings of ethos is both 
circular and dynamic. These two features are guaranteed by the distinct steps of 
the moral development. From one side, we have (a) the metabolization or 
habituation process, denoted with the induced virtue. From the other side, we have 
(b) the co-existence of different levels of freedom, identified with the two practices 
of practical reason, phronesis and politike episteme. Moreover, another 
fundamental characteristic of Aristotelian practical philosophy has come to light: 
the constant balance between desire and reason. Its examination is unavoidable in 
order to fully understand the circularity just mentioned, because it gives reason of 
all the dimensions involved in the inner workings behind the above-seen 
expression.  
An intermediate remark about the inactuality of Aristotelian Practical 
Philosophy has then conducted to the last section of the essay, whose problem is 
the legitimacy of Aristotelian practical philosophy in contemporary thought. 
Thus, I tried to draw the attention to an aporetic moment, referring to the 
problem of the collective ethos and its pluralization. From this point of view, the 
distance and the inactuality of Aristotelian reflection are at the same time an 
advantage and a limit. But this is precisely this issue I would like to recall here. 
Indeed, I would like to point out that one of the main contributions of this 
analysis is having demonstrated that next to the importance of the distance there 
is always the need for the contingence and for the specificity of the situation. In 
this sense, ancient philosophy does not directly provide an abstract and fixed 
model to be put into practice, since the same practice would contradict it. After 
all, the immanence of the praxis is one of the main Aristotelian lessons, as it is 
proved by his care for endoxa (shared opinions) in the dialectical method and for 
the role of phronesis in the decision-making process. Thus, if the rediscovery of 
Aristotelian practical philosophy wants to be included in the contemporary 
ethical horizon, it must always be accompanied by an immanent point of view, 
that has to take the peculiarities of each specific context and historical situation 
into consideration.  
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